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ABSTRACT
Empty Metal Jacket: The Biopolitical Economy of War and Medicine: A Case Study
By
Sandra L. Trappen

Advisor: Patricia Clough
Empty Metal Jacket: The Biopolitical Economy of War and Medicine undertakes study of how
global conflict and violence shape the entire range of social production, from commodities and
culture to social goods and social theory. The research presented in this work draws from cuttingedge theories in body and science studies, in addition to theories of affect and biopolitics to address
how war became a problem solving paradigm in medicine. Combat casualties are shown to serve
as a material nexus for medical knowledge production. Although the focus here is on medicine
and medical innovation in particular, these developments are connected to developments in
military science and battlefield strategy and tactics, and so they illustrate how violence organize
knowledge across different realms of scientific endeavor.
This research situates important developments in medicine within a historical, economic, and
political context to show how war and military ideas not only were extended into the social spaces
of everyday life, they advanced in such a way as to help determine the conditions of possibility for
life, living, and what it means to be human. In thinking through this multi-faceted configuration, I
employ Foucauldian genealogical methods, covert ethnographic methods, and archival/historical
interpretive methods to assemble case data that allow me to look at war’s impact on the social
organization of medicine. Case findings illustrate a "non-linear history" that documents war's
influence on medical innovation. I highlight these developments, but go one step further: I question
the centrality of methodological positivism to research methods in the social sciences, which I
argue are also a product of war and global conflict. Collectively, the findings support the claim
that wounded soldiers have throughout history been used as medical test subjects to facilitate
practice innovation and progress. Analysis shows how wounded bodies are produced within a
circulating biopolitical economy of relations, where the radical undoing of the body forms the
basis of a medical governance of control.
This work makes a contribution to theorizing violence and political economy, as it calls attention
to the instrumental role played by wounded soldiers to life-saving medical advance; it suggests
there is a need to re-think the transcendence of medicine through war and capitalism: wars make
human subjects out of soldiers, who cannot ethically consent to medical procedures any more than
medicine can ethically be practiced when its advance depends on violence.
Key words: Biomedicine, Militarization, Affect, Foucault, Biopolitics, Bodies, Embodiment, Civil
War, World War One, World War Two, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Human Terrain System,
Military Anthropology, Epistemology, Trauma, War, Violence.
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Section One: Introduction & Literature
CHAPTER I
Introduction

“Nothing [after the war] remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a
field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body.” Such are
the words of Walter Benjamin, whose oft quoted passage calls attention to the problem of the
body in connection with war.1 This research begins and ends with the body; it will consider
particular bodies in addition to bodies in general that become caught up in the torrents of
violence Benjamin describes. The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. once declared “the
United States is the greatest purveyor of war and violence in the world today.”2 Though in this
case their individual histories and stories may be different, both men speak to the problem of war
and violence in their time.
The Body is the Frontline

Modern armies bear little resemblance to the armies of the past. Contemporary wars and the
soldiers that fight them have evolved, even as they continue to inspire nostalgia for a past that
still reverberates in our present. One aim this research takes is to investigate the role that
violence plays in mapping the human terrain of war. The human body remains a perennial if not

1
2

Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. New York: Shocken Books, 2007, p.84.

On April 4, 1968, exactly one year before he was assassinated outside his hotel room, the Reverend Dr.
Martin Luther King appeared at Riverside Church in New York City, where he outlined his views in
opposition to the Vietnam War. It would become known as his "Beyond Vietnam" address. Shortly
thereafter, in another speech, he would call the U.S. “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world
today.” In that speech, King made an important connection between the war and violence in Vietnam and
the struggle that he and others were waging within the Civil Rights movement in the United States.

favored target. Thus one finds the world-wide manufacture and proliferation of the weapons of
war ensures a steady stream of combat casualties. Like hominoid grist for the mill, combat
casualties continue to be produced. Correspondingly, when the bodies pile up, we turn to the
miracle that is modern medicine to recover them. Global instability as such has produced a
situation where bodies and ever life itself have become destabilized. Enemies notwithstanding
(because it doesn’t really matter who we are fighting), armies launch themselves headlong into
the task of spilling the blood of millions if only, so they tell us, that we might be kept safe in our
bodies. Such is the calculus of combat death, where it appears we have accepted the Hobbesian
bargain: we prioritize security and economics over life and living. Veritable industries grow from
the boom, bust, boom cycles that characterize the political economy of war, which cultivates
states of exception, discontinuity, volatility, and risk in order to create profit from human misery
and suffering.

Fast forward now to the present, where the United States stands alone without rival in terms of
the ability to wage war. Conflict theorists have for years debated the role conflict and violence
play in bringing about social change. The dynamics of such have been analyzed by philosophers
and other thinkers from the time of the ancient Greeks, who with Sisyphean diligence remain
committed to the task of arguing whether change is dialectical, rational, irrational, etc. Some
here, of course, have argued that social change is less revolutionary than it is evolutionary; that
change might be slowly and incrementally realized. In the case of the latter, I want to caution
how easy it may very well be to lose sight of the fact that war and violence are perhaps
instrumental and infrastructural to that change.

2

The United States, I think, furnishes a perfect example of this. Its military spending, as category
of federal spending, overshadows by far all other forms of national spending. Military
Keynesians, who do in fact claim membership in both major political parties, Republican and
Democrat alike, support U.S. military hegemony, which uses increased military spending as a
tool to spur economic growth. Politicians follow their lead and advocate for war because it is
good for industry, technology innovation, the economy, and even jobs. With that, there can be no
argument against the fact that war is driving these changes, which many people find they are
hard-pressed not to support. The social dynamics of how this economy reveals itself in some of
the more mundane aspects of daily living is a matter, however, that remains not well understood.

The real problem of war then, aside from what it does to bodies, is that it has historically been
and continues to be the favored problem solving paradigm for problems deemed to be in the
national interest. Perhaps more than others, Americans as a people and as a nation have been
conditioned since World War II to favor military solutions to solve complex problems. Problems
of national solidarity and social cohesion; that is, bonding between individuals, too often this has
been achieved through unmitigated belief in the restorative powers of violence, or what literary
historian Richard Slotkin (1973) refers to as “the myth of regeneration through violence.”3 As s
nation, we seek national integrity and wholeness through violence. This is, of course, a problem
sometimes for people that lack military experience: the failure to serve in this regard is
experienced as a non-articulated existential malaise. Feeling ill at ease, they compensate by
saying “thank you for your service” – an empty gesture that permits people to feel good about

3

Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860.
(University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
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themselves more than it does say anything about one’s service. But even this does not fill the
void. It’s like depression. You feel as if something is missing in your life, though it is difficult to
say what that might be. American war, American violence, and American identity are in this
respect deeply intertwined. This is why it may be important to understand that how we make war
then in many ways is also a story about how we are potentially making ourselves.

Thus, even as it has been demonstrated the world over through countless wars, there may be
other problems to consider when war becomes infrastructural to social organization and progress.
Lives are lost, public health is sacrificed, children are orphaned, and access to social goods like
medicine and education might be restricted. This, unfortunately, has become our normal
operating environment in the United States. Under the aegis of national defense and progress, our
most basic institutions betray evidence that they may be caught up within and are working across
purposes, such that the effect is to normalize violence, death and destruction. To the extent that
we are continuing to move down this evolutionary path, where military institutional logic is
expanded into the social spaces of everyday life, we run the risk as President Eisenhower once
warned of fostering the growth of an unchecked “military-industrial complex.” The results are
proving costly for the United States — socially, politically, and economically. They are also
costing the people who fight the wars in addition to their victims, all of whom together share
precarious access to finance capital, whose rent seeking makes a harvest of their life, labor, and
blood.

Despite these developments, the public at large is not especially given to think about war in these
terms. Rather, the tendency here is to think about war as a bedtime story. The nation itself after
4

all was formed through an act of war; it is our originary trauma. Yet too often, lacking first-hand
experience with war, the American recourse is to put soldiers on a pedestal. Having been
seduced by a preternatural landscape of mythos and legend, they prefer the “smooth patriotism”
of fables war stories. Rarely, do people think beyond realm of fantasy, to consider how war
might be (mis)shaping our most fundamental social relations.4 Nonetheless, we also know that
soldiers and our military have not always been venerated. The Vietnam War in particular
inspired fierce opposition and backlash. Returning soldiers were often maligned and left to selfmedicate their wounds.
This treatment produced a “corrective” response by both the government and the military. After
Vietnam, veterans were again venerated, the living and the dead, for reasons that had as much to
do with the “volunteer” nature of service as the need to overcome negative affect associated with
veterans and military service. Were it not for veterans being publically rehabilitated, no one
would have volunteered service at a time when their bodies were badly needed to stoke the fires
of the Cold War. The propaganda continued through the post-Vietnam era to the years of the Iran
hostage crisis and later the 9/11 attacks. The process in hindsight seems seamless, such that
soldier worship, or what is perhaps more appropriately termed non-reflective patriotism, now
appear to be the default setting in American culture.
We have arrived at a cultural moment such that now the American narrative is one that sees war
as a viable means to help individuals fulfill their higher purpose and calling; war and violence

Dr. Martin Luther King used the words “strange liberators” and “smooth patriotism” in his Riverside
speech given in New York City, April 1968. A transcript as well as a recording can be downloaded as
follows: http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_beyond_vietnam/
Last accessed May 3, 2016.
4
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validate our sense of self-worth; they make us feel moral and enable us to demonstrate to the
world that we are “good” people. War, in other words, permits one, if only vicariously, to
become the hero of their own life story. Tragically, however, those who risk military service and
the physical perils of war are too often making one last ditch effort to achieve the “American
Dream.” But to achieve that dream they must suspend disbelief; they must forego acknowledging
that United States and its military are fabricators of an “American Nightmare” for anyone that
dares stand in its way. These are among the affects of war that too often escape verbal
articulation. It is therefore not surprising that it is difficult to get people to think critically about
war as a social problem. Considering how one’s job, livelihood, life, and perhaps even selfconcept depend on them not recognizing the personal is political, there are built-in incentives to
remain blind to the fact of their own role that they play perpetuating the problem of war in
society.
In light of this, we are to use Dr. King’s words again “strange liberators.” We promise peace
through war even though violence “brings only temporary victories; violence, by creating many
more social problems than it solves, never brings permanent peace.” Having failed as a nation to
process his warning, we have arrived in the twenty-first century, only to find that war now is
being waged across an increasingly wider social spectrum. The battlefield is everywhere— and
this includes, as I will argue here, our bodies and ourselves. The contradictions that characterize
the terms of modern life are too numerous to cite here. Among them, it will be discussed how
civilians might be classified as soldiers; people who don’t represent an imminent threat or danger
might be classified as enemy combatants. Toddlers, for example, in the United States have killed
more Americans than any other social group. Unremitting surveillance of internal populations
6

deemed to be “public enemies” have ensured that anyone on the margins, who dares to defy
official classification, will be forcibly classified through whatever feats of linguistic subversion
and violence may be necessary to bring about their conformity with military strategy and policy
objectives.

What all of this suggests is that when we look at war as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary
social process, we find the boundaries between the warfare state and the welfare state become
eroded. The same holds true for the boundaries of the body which I will show here have also
been rendered less stable. Thus, in the same manner as the epistemic boundary that delineates a
“hero” from a “terrorist” has been undermined, so too have the boundaries of the body itself been
rendered malleable. The soldier’s body, the social body, and the human body have all become
manipulable to such an extent they comprise a new “political anatomy,” made up of endlessly
permuting body pieces and parts. Benjamin’s fragile body is everyone’s body, which in terms of
substance and affect has been made to function “as a part of a multi-segmentary machine.”5

By calling attention to the relationship between medicine, combat injury, and the role that
violence plays in reproducing the political economy of war, it is my hope that we might acquire a
better understanding of how war operates in ways that are non-linear through “operations other
than war.” For there are arguably non-war identified day-to day institutional practices and social
forces that are operating outside of public visibility, which are rapidly gaining strength. This
political economy, furthermore, creates status hierarchies that operate internal to the logic of
circulation; hierarchies that, while they may be linear in terms of their social stratification

5

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, 164.
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effects, might still constitute a dynamic open system oppression, where those who hold power,
both within and without, might exert dominance over bodies that lack access to power.
Consequently, war has evolved to the point where our very bodies and the skin we live in have
become targets of its violent inertia. One’s relative position in the status hierarchy thus is never
fixed, but is fluid and subject to change. Institutions, nonetheless, retain monopoly influence
over the mechanisms of violence that oppress bodies ranked lower in the status hierarchy.
Violence perpetrated upon low ranking individuals and groups by high ranking individuals and
groups is considered normative and in some cases, as may be found among social groups of
soldiers, confers status honor. For similar reasons, violence sanctioned with imprimatur of the
state becomes functional under the aegis of good governance. Violence is thus accepted as part
of the normal order of things.

In view of these developments, this research will make an effort to show how the problem of war
and violence is not really a simple problem of the body in a theoretical or abstract sense; rather,
it is a practical problem of all bodies. Ultimately, we must all wage war as a radical politics of
resistance to war. This means we must stop being “cheerful robots” who rationalize and on some
level lust for the cleansing violence of war. With that, I am an advocate for what some might call
“redistributive militarism.” That is to say, I support, as a matter of policy, that money earmarked
for war be allocated to social needs, including education, medical research and other social
programs that contribute to human health and well-being. But to do this, we must stand on firm
ground and reject the ethic of violence that infuses our institutions and underlies many of our
social policies. And lastly, if only because our very lives depend on it, we must find a way to
invest national resources in the service of people for the betterment of our communities and
8

social needs, instead of funding innovation through economic determinism committed to the war
machine.

Overview
Much like any other good mystery, the story of war – a good war story - is one that begins and
ends with a body. Yet to speak of this body ― to write the record of its travails and traumas ―is
to enter the landscape of a minefield of sorts. The distinctly boundless non-linear topography
defies conventional problem solving analysis, given how it comprises hidden obstacles,
discarded weapons, broken bodies, frustrated desires, and shattered dreams. Anyone that aims to
understand the practices and process that produce the body that is a casualty of war must be
prepared then to employ the breaching fundamentals that are necessary to overcome the barriers
that inhibit comprehensive understanding.

In recognition of these barriers and contradictions, the questions that drive my study are not only
addressed to problems that concern bodies and war; they also speak to issues knowledge and
power and what it means to be human. Yet in defining the key concepts of the study, I found it
necessary to confront numerous contradictions in the process of deciding where and how to
introduce concepts (the cut) of measure. The difficulty of this undertaking was rendered more
challenging by the fact that there is no shortage of ways one might come under attack and
become a war casualty – advances in the technoscience of war mean killing and injury are not as
straightforward as we are often led to believe.

9

Setting aside issues of nominalism for the present time, I am going to suggest we think of the
wounded bodies produced by war as not only bodies in an abstract sense, but as living matter that
comprise a capital circulation. Such bodies, as I will conceive them here, are moving subjects
and objects, whose boundaries may become fragmented. I am further interested in how they
become targeted by institutions, who I find adapt their practices and employ violence as a force
multiplier, to render bodies in general more productive and useful to their purposes. Some bodies
are killed quickly on battlefields with their lives variously mourned and celebrated. Others, to
use Lauren Berlant’s term, are “killed slowly,” where the suffering body is compelled to remain
invisible.6 Superficially, the bodies appear different and claim different social identities, differing
in kind based on the social context of the war in question ― black, white, and brown people;
men, women, and children; heroes, savages, and terrorists. Differences notwithstanding, this
research will illustrate how they are all taken up into the political economy of wounding that is
created by the institutional alignment of war and medicine.

This approach supports a general aim to theorize as well as demonstrate by praxis how military
institutional policies and everyday practice might influence what are traditionally assumed to be
civilian social spaces. In the process, wounded soldiers were to some extent commodified as they
became significant to the acquisition of bioscientific knowledge. In other words, I present
arguments that demonstrate how an interlocking succession of social dynamics, brought about by
socio-political conflict, helped make war infrastructural to medicine’s practice and progress.

Lauren Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency).” Critical Inquiry (Vol. 33, Number 4,
Summer, 2007).
6
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With that, this dissertation will take into account a wide spectrum of social relations to
demonstrate the different linkages between war and medicine.7 As part of this project
undertaking, I illustrate how war’s human terrain compliments the development of an
institutional system architecture, over which stands guard a host of enforcers – soldiers, doctors,
bankers, politicians, and government bureaucrats – all of whom work together to create what
amounts to a the status-quo hierarchy of governance and control.

In order to understand these process dynamics, one must, I think, come to terms with the
epistemologies of violence embedded in social relations that Bruno Latour conceivably might
say permit people, objects, technologies, and practices to “hang together.”8 Latour’s ontology in
this instance is potentially helpful for two reasons. First, his framework positions thinking about
how “the social” does not lie outside the realm of “things” that we might take as objects of
analysis. Second, this view does not stipulate that we privilege minds, bodies, or tools. Societies
are rather made through a combination of hybrid performances and material constructing
practices.9 Latour’s work contributes a framing influence to my examination of the fragile human
body as it lies within the dynamic social context of war. Likewise, I draw explanatory power
from Arun Appadurai (1986), who argues that every object in the world might be thought of as a

My use of the term “medicine” in this project is broadly conceived, as it refers a wide spectrum of
institutional practices and industry developments, which have over the course of time become expanded
and are more often referred to in the literature using the term biomedicine.
7

8

Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford: New York,
Oxford University Press, 2005.

Baerenholdt, Jorgen Ole. Coping with Distances: Producing Nordic Atlantic Societies, Berghahn Books,
201).
11
9

commodity that can be exchanged for value; one that significantly also has a social life – a social
life that can be looked at in terms of how it might be related to other bodies, object and things.
Conventional assumptions scientific progress, the role played by the “free market,” and other
mythic beliefs and narratives that describe the founding of the United States will be further
singled out for critical examination. I intend to show how ideals like “democracy” and
“freedom” became incorporated into affect economies that helped normalize war and violence to
achieve medical innovation (Ahmed, 2004). The same philosophical concepts are found in other
narratives that frame war as morally essential to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.10 Yet
as it turns out, these narratives tend to be more aspirational than practical when we look at it how
they are taken up within modern forms of governance. Alternatively, I argue that the pursuit of
violence and war for profit, not democracy and freedom, furnish a better explanation for the
progressive impulse driving medical social organization and progress.
.

Typically, studies in medicine, health, and illness do not provoke critical reflection on the
problem of war. Thus, whereas other realms of scientific endeavor, like physics for example, are
more easily imagined as sharing a connection with what is sometimes referred to as the “military
industrial complex,” the connections to medicine are not always easily recognized. Instead of
arguing that these social dynamics belong to distinct institutional orders, I aim to how the operate
as circulations that might be brought together. Put differently, I am interested in how narratives
of “progress” have been steadily advanced absent a critique of how they are born out of circuits

International Relations disciplines are prone to do the same, calling upon “just war” theory to
accomplish similar goals; however, the focus here tends to be on rationalizing the actions, strategies, and
practices of state actors.
10

12

of violence and injury. For all the discussion of issues like “states ‘rights,” the global war on
“terror,” and “homeland security,” there is a disturbing lack of insight into the process by which
violence becomes normalized within some of our most cherished domestic institutions. For
purposes of analysis, I think much can be learned when we probe social spaces that are not
conventionally associated with war; spaces that give the appearance of being removed from
violence and war―like medicine. To this end, I aim to explore the long chain of events and
social processes that contribute to a political economy that benefits from injury and war.

The fact that up until now these developments have remained unseen is perhaps a function of
what sociologists like Bryan Turner argue has a lot to do with the fact that medical institutions
are accepted as normative and legitimate in society; consequently, they are not associated with
authoritarian discipline, coercion, and violence.11 Adding to the problem is the fact that scholars
who write about the history of war are not the same scholars that study the history of medicine.
Debates in what are essentially two separate academic fields rarely overlap. The same holds true
for study in sociology. Unfortunately, these academic fault lines are themselves part of the
problem, making it difficult to understand more deeply how conflict dynamics shape our
important institutions. My research aims to overcome what amounts to an intellectual blind spot
in this regard. To do so, I employ a combination of ethnographic and interpretive methods to
analyze the problem of combat casualties, where I trace the evolution of military influence over
medical social organization. Theorization and analysis are based on case illustrations that

Turner, B.S. “Foreword: From governmentality to risk, some reflections on Foucault’s contribution to
medical sociology,” in A. Petersen and R. Bunton (Eds.) Foucault, Health, and Medicine (London and
New York: Routledge, 1997: p. xiv).
11
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illustrate the social dynamics of bioscientific knowledge production, where I show how the
bodies of wounded soldiers helped to advance medical social organization and progress.

One problematic development I call attention to concerns how domestic medical institutions, the
foundations of which are predicated on an ethic of “do no harm,” were over the course of time
influenced by military practices that function on the basis of “doing harm.” Thus, while changes
in medical practice might be linked to efforts and innovations aimed at saving and even
“making” life; they nevertheless share this history of violence. Domestic medical institutions, in
this respect, play a both a functional as well as a strategic role in helping organized violence
appear normal and “useful.” Consequently, the notion of “sacrifice in the name of progress” was
thus incorporated into a new work ethic―one that justifies violence as a means to get things
done.

Pursuing this line of inquiry not only calls into question the process by which wounded soldiers
are produced; it tells us something about war as tool of governance. War is in this regard
potentially shaping our all of our bodies and determining how we live. In a similar fashion, it
shapes affective landscapes that influence how we think and feel about war. Nevertheless, even
as I call attention to these issues and problems, I would like to clarify it is not my intent to argue
that the process is so overly determined that innovation outcomes were achieved solely as a
result of war.12 Critics of the rhetorical tendency to over-determine describe this rhetorical

12

Any time outcomes are theorized in such a manner that they may be overdetermined, we are on solid
ground to critique it as a flawed construct. Althusser, however, furnishes an argument that parses the
problem, as he argues there is a tendency for social figurations to reify a thing in itself through a process
that feeds back into its affects, which comprise material as well as immaterial processes. In his view, the
contradictions of the social formation might be neutralized by a process of displacement, whereupon he
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tendency as a form of ‘narrative imperialism’ (Bamberg 2004, 2010; Phelan, 2005; Sartwell,
2000; Strawson, 2004). Thus, instead of emphasizing causal-linear determinative relations, I aim
to illustrate how bodies are caught up in dynamic, relationally contingent, political economic
circulations.
To summarize briefly then, it is through this focus on Benjamin’s fragile human body that I am
able to advance a de-centered relational theory of violence to explain how institutions produce
injury through a praxis that implicates knowledge and power. Analysis evaluates the impact of
war stimulus on institutional social dynamics which further benefitted from bioscientific use of
soldiers’ bodies. Thus I argue there is a functioning political economy of injury that operates
intrinsic to both war and medicine. Different bodies or what I will call “models of the body”
were produced during different times in history.

With that, this research will challenge the idea that combat casualties and the radical undoing of
bodies in connection with war are “accidents.” They are not. Rather, they are produced through
the social alignment of institutional practices that, over the course of time, became infrastructural
to medical innovation and advance. This leads me to conclude that war and medicine, through
the biopolitics of making and managing injury, are implicated in shaping what it means to have
and be a body. That is to say, war influences the conditions of possibility for what it means to be
human. Such developments, while they may not be fully determining or totalizing, constitute a
functioning political economy of injury that lies within a medical governance of social control.

conceptualizes their fusion as a revolutionary rupture. Published in For Marx, 1968; English translation
1969.
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Previous Research
This dissertation builds on previous work pertaining to the broadly defined history of war and
wounding, though it concentrates on providing a contribution to critical discourses in sociology
that address the politics of war, science, knowledge, power, and affect (Clough, 2012; Martin,
2007; Orr, 2006, Aronowitz, 1988). More traditional approaches outside of sociology have
tended to look at combat injury in connection with policy issues as they concern veterans’
disability and clinical care issues, or they look at problems that include medical rehabilitation
and social reintegration (Messinger, 2002; Kinder, 2015; Wool 2015). Cultural studies
approaches have focused on the history of specific developments in addition to social identity
issues (Ott, 2002, Serlin, 2002; Terry, 2009). And in a more recent turn, Cassandra Crawford
(2014) explores the biopolitcs of biomedical encounters with prosthetics. Alternatively, feminist
scholars like Angela Davis and Cynthia Enloe (1993; 2000) have focused on the gendered
contours of violence produced by war and militarism. They argue that the U.S. military benefits
from structured inequality that is a feature and not a byproduct of war and violent political
conflict. I aim to build on this collective work, though I am principally focused on the political
economy that binds combat injury with medical social organization and progress.

History shows that working class and poor males faced greater exposure to risk, death, and
injury, for reasons that military service has traditionally functioned as a back-door poverty draft.
Lutz’s (2008) research on military service enlistment patterns proves that a disproportionate
numbers of service members are recruited from what are recognized as traditionally
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disadvantaged groups.13 My case findings demonstrate that the same demographic patterns are
shown to be reflected in combat death and injury. Contrary to altruistic claims that service is
motivated by a “desire to serve,” this research documents that material needs like access to
education and healthcare often drive decision-making for economically precarious individuals,
who see military service as a viable and respectable means of escape. The military is in this sense
an employer of “last choice” for groups seeking access to benefits and training they perceive
might improve their life chances. In other words, individuals who are already economically at
risk become “volunteers” and thereby expose their bodies to increased mortality risk. Not only
do they risk exposure of death and injury on battlefields, they are potentially subject to other
risks associated with having their bodies used (with and without consent) for medical human
subjects experiments.14

Amy Lutz’s 2008 study looked at the extent to which poor and minority individuals were potentially
disproportionately selected into the military. Writing that relatively little research has examined the
question empirically, Lutz points out the information is available from the Department of Defense, who
keeps records on the race and gender of military personnel. Her study examined ethnicity, immigrant
generation, and socioeconomic status in relation to military service. She found that significant disparities
exist primarily on the basis of socioeconomic status, as “the all-volunteer force continues to see
overrepresentation of the working and middle classes, with fewer incentives for upper class participation.”
13

14

While the history of what amounts to non-consensual human subjects testing, which used soldiers as
test subjects, is expansive, a more recent example of this was documented by Raffi Khatchadourian in
the article “Operation Delirium,” written for the New Yorker Magazine. Khatchadourian was granted
access to the personal archive of retired Army Colonel James S. Ketchum, a psychiatrist who worked at
an Army research facility, Edgewood Arsenal, located on the Chesapeake Bay in Maryland. Ketchum and
his colleagues performed and documented thousands of risky drug experiments on healthy U.S. soldiers,
who were pressured into becoming volunteers. Downloaded from the publisher’s website:
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/12/17/operation-delirium Last accessed May 20016.
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Table 1

Table 1. Distribution of Active-Duty Enlisted Women and Men in the U.S. Military in 2010, by
Race and Ethnicity.
Source. Table produced by the U.S. Department of Defense in cooperation with the Pew
Charitable Trust, 2015.

Soldiers are in this sense classic “risky” bodies that enter into the speculative body politics of
military service, which demands they sublimate self-interested goals in order to satisfy the
institution’s needs for self-sacrifice. And herein lies a contradiction that cannot be overstated:
military institutions operate from an ethic of “doing harm,” whereas medical institutions are
supposed to operate from an ethic of “do no harm.” My work examines this fundamental
contradiction and ultimately challenges a funding model for medicine tied to investment in the
technoscience of war. Efforts to manipulate casualty statistics are another area where we see a
profound lapse in ethics. Body knowledge here is not only manufactured and politically
contested; more pointedly, efforts to know the body are themselves indicative of power relations
that seek to manipulate the truth of the body in an attempt to convey the truth of the war.
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I should offer one point of clarification here, which is to say it is not my intention to suggest
problems of failed practice or policy should not be looked at―far from it. While the particulars
of policy are not a primary focus of this study, I remain committed to efforts to reform the social
landscape that shapes policy. The ongoing failure to remove money from politics is perhaps the
ultimate policy failure, given how it influences lawmakers to prioritize their personal economic
interests in the form of policies that promote ongoing war. Similarly, one might allege it to be a
failure of governance when young people, who when faced with limited social mobility and
economic choices, find it difficult to pursue career options outside of the military. Many are, of
course, convinced that military service is a failsafe way to achieve both financial stability and
status. As Alan Badiou observes, "Young people are wedged between, on the one hand, the
mortifying possibility of a return to tradition — which is always a matter of resuscitating a
corpse and bringing ghosts to life — and, on the other hand, the possibility of taking a place in
the general competition and struggling for their own survival therein, to the sole end of not being
a loser.” Military service, he goes on to say, at one point helped young men in particular to
socially locate themselves; it was a form of “initiation” into manhood and this threshold act is
now missing for many, which creates confusion and affective dislocation.

Notwithstanding then, it is also a policy failure to not address this problem and, likewise, to not
as a nation help inculcate community values, where citizens might serve their communities and
connect with each other on an interpersonal level in ways that are meaningful, thereby
eliminating military service as the default mechanism to achieve affective social bonding. The
desire to “serve” when it is coupled with the programmatic extermination of other humans is
perversely at odds with the very idea of service to humanity, as many profess to want to feel
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connected to a cause that serves a purpose larger than themselves. The ultimate irony, of course,
is that many young people, for lack of options, are being set up to pursue self-interested needs
through service that too frequently compels their self-sacrifice. Though it is beyond the scope of
this study, future research might inquire into thought process by which young people engage the
social mobility narratives that lie at the heart of the risk reward cycle, which in the case of war
and military service entangles their very lives and limbs in a political economy that profits from
their destruction.

Another purpose of my research is to pursue a critical theory of combat injury in order to address
systemic issues of social inequality. Reflecting on the core interest of sociology, which is to
address issues of social inequality, I want to call attention to how casualty patterns map onto
bodies in ways that reflect power relations and hegemonic relations of dominance and
subordination based on race, class, and gender. Study findings and analysis shed light on how
war and medicine became intertwined; how both rely upon as well as reproduce large-scale
social inequalities that feed profit while they foster the conditions of possibility for ongoing war.

In taking this approach, I hope to invigorate debates within sociology as a discipline, which has
tended to marginalize critical military studies perhaps for reasons that defer to institutional
funding priorities. It is in the service of this aim that I aspire to the standard set by C. Wright
Mills, who addressed this problem in his work. Mills understood the importance of recognizing
that war was both an individual problem and a public issue. My research is in this regard deeply
political, as it aims to contribute complexity as well as nuance to understanding how non-linear
social dynamics can produce injury and innovation within the same political-economic
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circulation. Through this critical investigation I hope to inform discussions about war, medicine,
and health, which until recently has been overlooked and under-theorized.

Recovering the Body
If one purpose of this study is to recover the wounded body from the carnage of war, I think it is
important to acknowledge one major limitation of the study – finding both a singular and
collective “body” is not theoretically or empirically attainable. I discovered like others who
mounted the effort to study war casualties before me that not all casualties were soldiers, not all
bodies are counted as casualties (some bodies count more than others), nor were all wounds
counted as injuries. Likewise, not all soldiers were/are subjected to medical procedures, so not
all soldiers are medical subjects. War thus does not produce “one” body, in a universal sense, nor
does it simply produce “many bodies” as a function of scale and arithmetic. War produces many
bodies and those bodies, distinctively, share a common genealogy of violence, as they are
dynamically produced together as part of a political economy of relations.

Rarer still, I found it was difficult to produce unmediated physical evidence of the toll that war
extracts on a body. Not only do the bodies themselves tend to retreat and remain hidden; what
rises in effigy then is not a singular body, but “many” bodies ― discursive bodies, statistical
bodies, and affective bodies to name a few (Shilling, 2013; Blackman, 2008; Featherstone, M.,
Hempworth, M. and Turner, B.S., 1991). These different bodies, I will argue, are subject to a
process where they are broken down into pieces and parts and are subject to reassembly, digital
and otherwise. The life of such a body— its vitality and productivity — are cleaved from
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somatic substance and redeployed as part of an affective economy that circulates independent of
the body itself.

It is this affective economy that I want to call attention to, for reasons that it is bound up in the
existential need to secure the life of the body within a body. We all want to feel safe in our
bodies; thus, there is considerable anxiety around maintaining “safe spaces” to secure what is
recognized as bodily integrity. Affect, as such, feeds into war’s precarious politics of keeping
safe, as it promises to minimize danger to the body, even as it destroys them on a mass scale. The
essential “con” of war then lies in its ability to maintain the illusion of bodily wholeness in the
face of conflict and violence, which this research will argue is implicated in the process of
breaking down bodies and re-organizing them. The body in terms of its affect is thus materially
relevant to the political economy war, which strategically focused on producing bodies for
ongoing war. The failure to “see” the body as it were and how it became important to war is
itself one of the material consequences of the failure to link affect to war.
War’s visual pedagogy teaches us to celebrate, even worship, soldiers whom we have come to
regard as duty-bound to keep us safe in our bodies. To this end, we “celebrate” wounded soldiers
as heroes. Our media and discourses are saturated with unrelenting appeals to “support the
troops.” To be sure, popular dissent and even anti-war discourses are tolerated within limits,
however, it is difficult for them to gain traction and find an audience in an era where corporate
media dominates and emotional narratives prevail. Sentimental, enforced, non-reflective
patriotism here serves to blunt if it does not entirely override the impulse toward critical
reflection. This is why instead of thinking critically about combat injury, we are encouraged to
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salute the flag and pray for wounded soldiers. Hollow symbols that include yellow ribbons,
plastic car magnets, and troop worshiping sporting events —all of these things all brought
together in an affective economy that masks one of the key problems my research identifies:
the public’s passive refusal to examine the degree to which war and violence have become
infrastructural to the American way of life.
Violence, as conflict theory so often illustrates, is hard-wired into the system of capitalist
exploitation. Paradoxically, the very same affect economy that generates support for wounded
soldiers also generates support for ongoing war – the very activity that produces large scale
injury. Not surprisingly then, one of the violent outcomes of “crisis capitalism” is that it
produces economically vulnerable and in many cases “aggrieved” bodies and subjects, who
retain little agency or recourse, other than to “volunteer” for military service. Soldiers, as it has
been demonstrated by research, are in many cases weak economic actors, who trade control of
their personal autonomy, which is to say their body, as part of an effort to regain that control,
which was never really theirs in the first place.15 The affect economy of war effectively (and
affectively) works to distract people who might otherwise question this system of social
organization that exploits vulnerable populations in order to profit from human suffering and
sacrifice. Recovering the body, and in the process relocating war casualties to the center rather
than the periphery of war and conflict, can help serve as a corrective.

Michael Kimmel’s work explores the notion of what he calls “aggrieved” entitlement among white men,
who are in many cases disposed toward violence and the taking up of arms as a means to compensate
for what are essentially economic moral injuries. For more on this, see Michael Kimmel, Angry White
Men. Nation Books, 2013.
15
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Celebration narratives and mythic reasoning are, however, difficult to displace. Both provide an
affective satisfaction that facts, data, and evidence do not often provide. In our contemporary
culture, the denial of basic fact has become troublingly coupled with the idea of military service
as a “sacred” calling. While emotionally satisfying, this has contributed to a denial of reality that
has become essential to the American national identity project. Ubiquitous appeals to flag and
country wrapped around the bodies of wounded soldiers, effectively cosset a politics of
nationalism, nativism, and heritage that belies our collective complicity in the project to kill,
torture, and maim millions. The body politics that dictate the terms of the trade are thus made
clear: it is only by removing others from the container of their body that we might remain safe in
our own skin and bodies. Or so we are led to believe.

By teaching people to love the battle, the soldier, and everything related to war, our failure to
“see” the body as it were means we are all “cripples” to some extent. For that which we cannot
see we cannot know. Nevertheless, in our failure to see what is hidden in plain sight, there is a
logic operating: we refuse to confront the specter of the wounded body’s frailty, because in
recognizing that frailty one is forced to acknowledge their own finite corporeal limitations.
Counter-narratives, such as that which I aim to provide here, are therefore important because
they can counteract and help displace myth-driven logic, which not only does not help, it often
hurts soldiers. My investigation calls attention to the social context of these relations and,
likewise, demonstrates how assumptions about bodies and power have become infrastructural to
ongoing war.
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This is why it is necessary to both recover and to some extent “re-assemble” the wounded body
of war. One must perform a substantial amount of excavation work to get out from under myths
and meanings that render such a body intractable. The focus on soldier’s body here serves a
larger goal to recapitulate the significance of war and combat injury to problems that extend
beyond institutions and incidents of injury, so as to realize their full import in terms of the
political economy of war. Yet in doing so, one must also make an effort to retrieve “the body”
from the margins of sociology. As other scholars have noted, the social science discipline’s
traditional focus on what is generally referred to as “the social” and problems of policy has
imposed limits on study of problems that concern the body (Shilling, 2013; Crossley, 1995).
Ultimately, the evidence suggests to me is that deep within in medicine’s wheelhouse of
progress, there resides a functioning political economy of injury, where important innovations
that have shaped what we now recognize as the edifice of modern medicine were erected in
many respects on the backs of combat casualties.

The Techno-Science of War
Studies of war, combat injury, and medical science and technology generally do not converge.
War, nonetheless, creates a demand for technology modernization. As others before me have
noted, technologies originally designed for military use are frequently later adapted for nonmilitary use. I wanted to call attention to these relationship dynamics and articulate how the
bodies of soldiers (and potentially all of us) are instrumental to a process that relies on ethics of
violence to achieve institutional goals and objectives.
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There are numerous famous examples that demonstrate how war influenced developments in
medicine as well as other science related industries like computing and telecommunications. Not
surprisingly, the discourse of tech innovation is attributed to "great men of genius" (i.e. Steve
Jobs, Bill Gates); it is a story that is repeated over and over again, through a combination of
narratives that celebrate the triumphs of capitalism and link this to American ingenuity. The
facts, however, tell a slightly different story, as foundational development work in industry was
often accomplished by government investment in war science. Thus, were it not for massive
defense infrastructure investment, which facilitated early-stage technology (think, for example,
how the Internet was developed from technology produced by the advanced research projects
agency -ARPANET; Apple's Siri, likewise, was a product spun-off from CALO, a project funded
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency - DARPA), many of these industries might
never have gotten off the ground. Put another way, World Wars I & II gave us “tech miracles,”
including the iPhone, the Internet, and personal computers. The marvels of modern medicine
share the same legacy, as the war years were responsible for improvements in everything from
plastic surgery, to orthopedics, MRIs, pharmaceuticals. More recently, biotech advancements in
organ as well as nerve tissue regeneration owe their development to military spending associated
with war (DARPA is presently one of the largest single investors in technology focused on limb
regeneration and haptic/sensory prosthetics).
History, however, is rarely simple. The military industrial complex as it has come to be known
now encompasses a wide range of technology and industry that exceeds by far the simple
manufacturing of bombs and military hardware. Mainstream narratives about combat injury tend
elide this history in a way that oddly parallels the way slavery and white supremacy tend be
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overlooked in how we understand the history of war and medicine. Instead, these narratives
celebrate war and wounded warriors and in the process occlude the social relations that this
research aims to bring to light. Remaking our popular understanding of this history means,
however, that I must challenge our understanding of how medical scientific knowledge is
produced, as this too has been compromised by war.
What remains to be understood then are the precise means and mechanisms by which
knowledge-seeking and the techno-science of war shaped medicine. To address these issues, my
research will move back and forth between the corporeal specificity of the wounded soldier’s
body and social frameworks, including the larger currents of political economy. In documenting
the contradictory practices of war and medicine, I point to theoretical work that argues
ontologies and epistemologies implicit to the production of violence and scientific knowledge
have been historically compromised (Clough, 2012; Martin, 20008; Aronowitz, 1988; Orr,
2006). On this basis, I advance argument and illustrate the anatomical logic of war, which targets
bodies for killing, wounding, and maiming on a grand scale, produces an ethical (or unethical)
medical practice that subscribes to the same logic. Innovation thus is no more the result of
chance breakthroughs, medical entrepreneurship, or feats of individual skill than combat injuries
are merely unfortunate “accidents” of fate. These outcomes are indicative of a praxis of violence,
which reflects the calculated application of military strategy and practice to medicine.

The implications of this are significant, as medical knowledge acquired from combat casualties
was eventually put to use in ways that benefited all bodies, not just soldiers’ bodies. It is through
the making of this connection that I am able to further consider how military medical technology
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and practice—the “techno-science” of war — is not only embedded in medical practice and
progress, they are also implicated in human transformation. War is in this sense changing what it
means to have and be a body. The case illustrations that follow later call attention to this process;
it is a process I claim was facilitated through institutional practices that solidified a mutually
profitable relationship between the profession of arms and the profession of medicine. From
here, I move to a consideration of how combat injuries and wounded bodies are functionally
produced―assembled even―which is to say that they are made.

Finally, I want to point out that the political economy of injury is propelled by an important
underlying policy failure ― the failure to prevent war. The result, of course, is that casualties
continue to be produced. Tragically, medical innovation outcomes are facilitated by the failure,
not success, of domestic and international foreign policy. This is why the story of war and the
body cannot be told through simple analysis of statistics; nor can we rely on the subjective
accounts of wounded soldiers, as some sociologists and ethnographers might suggest. We might
do well then to consider the following question as we move forward: How does the coupling of
war with medicine dispose the latter to in some aspects be authoritarian and perhaps even
totalitarian?

What is War?
Depending on the definition of “war,” U.S. military forces are presently involved in more than a
hundred wars or none at all. Save for limited engagements with Grenada (1983) and Panama
(1989), the U.S. has not decisively “won” a war since World War II. Such details might seem
inconsequential, if not wholly irrelevant, to a study about the history of war and medicine.
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Certainly, it might be argued they lie outside the customary disciplinary focus of sociologists,
who tend to engage study of social justice issues and problems of social inequality. I am going to
maintain here, however, that critical engagement with the problem of war, including issues of
epistemology and problems of embodiment, are in fact squarely situated within this realm of
emphasis. How we think about war and, moreover, how war makes us think are relevant to
establishing the theoretical foundations of this inquiry.
Policy studies, as I have stated, are not the focal point of this study. But that is not to say we
cannot think of them in light of their relation to the affect economy of war that I will attempt to
describe here. Modern-day American Exceptionalism, as expressed in the mantra “Let’s Roll,”
epitomizes the social hubris that underlies so much of our contemporary military and defense
policy, where war is defined as the medical "cure-all" for social needs and problems. Thus we
find now that regardless of whether the perceived problem is illegal immigration, youth violence,
public shootings, and school shootings in particular, lawmakers, policy planners, and other paid
experts demonstrate almost daily there is no problem that cannot be solved by more weapons,
organized violence, and war. What these brief examples illustrate is that the body itself is the
ultimate trophy by which policy success or failure is often gauged. Medicine, I will argue, is
similarly drawn into this contradictory social matrix and the results are the same: war is shown to
be the default policy mechanism by which important problems in medicine are solved; soldiers’
bodies furnish the blood currency that is used in problem solving. Their wounded bodies lie at
the crossroads of these dynamics. In short, we are using medicine to solve problems of the body.
War, consequently, is an ontological weapon in an arsenal primed to take life, make life, and
solve the problems of the human condition.
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War is clearly failure as a policy solution when it comes to securing anything that approaches the
definition of “the good life” for the vast majority of people. This is important to think about
when we consider the existential definition and purpose of war in contemporary American
society, as it continues to demonstrate power militarize and colonize our life worlds. Social
relations predicated on violence have become the primary basis for human interaction and
problem solving. War might thus be attributed as both the cause and effect of ongoing war; war
is in this sense tautological. Conventional academic discourses that address the history of war
and its political economy (especially those advanced by conservative scholars) have proffered a
sanitized and decidedly linear history of war. War defined as such, using discrete terms and
concepts, merely adds to the problem of conflict for reasons that such a conceptualization tends
to reify the causes, effects, beginnings and endings of wars.
Discourses in studies of science and technology and biomedicine have tended not to fare much
better when it comes to situating analysis of developments and innovation within a broad sociohistorical context that takes into account of the role played by war. This lack of depth perspective
is often further hampered by the lack of a well-developed theoretical/conceptual approach to
study. These general shortcomings find their mirror in other mainstream discourses of science
and technology, which tend to portray them as unproblematically bound to notions of rational
scientific progress. Systemic violence is often either not acknowledged at all, or is assumed to
exist conceptually “outside” of progress. Consequently, in much the same manner as many
people in the United States assume the unambiguous separation of church and state, scientific
advances, especially those in medicine, are assumed to be separated from problems of state, war,
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conflict, and violence. Innovation occurs on an event horizon, where it arises from the sheer
force and inertia of the progressive impulse of science.
In spite of the evidence that war is indicative of overwhelming policy failure, enthusiasm for war
combined with a desire to use military solutions to solve welfare state problems remains at an
all-time high in the United States. No longer a policy of last resort, war is now the industrial
policy of preference; one that has managed to work its way into nearly every aspect of social life.
The question is: can we afford the alternative, which is to say, can we live without it? How do we
live without war when war is how we live? Public awareness of how these issues and problems
enfold one another appears to be negligible, as many appear reconciled to the Hobbesian world
view, which understands war and violent conflict as both natural and rational. Content then, if
not distracted, in their efforts to pursue self-interested goals of wealth and material success,
Americans have become habituated to a way of being and living, where war in all of its forms is
the natural state of affairs. As the American Dream becoming increasingly unattainable for many
people, the problem of war continues to grow exponentially and it is met with even greater
resolve to engage problem solving through war and violence. When every soldier becomes a
hero, war becomes an accepted norm. And so we find there is unflagging support for conflict that
empties the country of its most precious human resources, as policy makers resort to war as the
preferred means to extract them. War has in this manner become “naturalized” while being
rendered infrastructural to American society and its success (Masco, 2013).
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Why Soldiers?
According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, as of Jan. 31, 2015 there were approximately
1.4 million people serving in the U.S. armed forces. This means that during this time frame, less
than 1% of the American population was actively serving. Combat casualties represent an even
smaller number. If we were to look at the Gulf wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, VA reports indicate
approximately 5% of all currently serving members are counted as dead or injured.
Table 2

Table 2. U.S. Casualties in War, from the Revolutionary War to Iraq.
Source. Statistics published by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. For more on this, visit
their website: http://www.va.gov/ Last accessed May 2016.

Statistics like this are subject to fluctuate by wide margins for reasons that they are contingent on
how casualties are classified and counted. So for example, the chart above reflects casualty
statistics for “lifetime” veterans based on the conflict in which they served. If we were to instead
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calculate casualty Iraq and Afghanistan within the context of the lifetime number, their
proportional representation would clearly decrease.16
The research that I will present here will argue that the bodies of wounded soldiers helped spur
changes in the social organization of medicine. In other words, important innovations in
medicine were achieved during those time frames when mass casualties were suffered in
connection with war. These changes, furthermore, could not have been as easily achieved with
civilians, because the principle of mass is important. Likewise, the unique relation of a soldier’s
body to power and governance is also important: soldiers (their body and subjectivity) are
material assets of the state. This means their body is, for all intents and purposes, owned. In light
of this, I find it is necessary to talk about war and wounding within a social context that looks at
how war interprets the ownership of bodies. Dynamic relations of domination and subordination
must similarly be taken into account. Thus, I aim to illustrate how war facilitated the formation
of relational social group identities and social hierarchies which created distinct hierarchies of
wounding.
Simply put, wounded soldiers were and continue to be human test subjects. As test subjects, they
are not alone, but share a relational history with other social groups who have been similarly
exploited and had their bodies used without formal consent. The medical subjection of slaves
offers one example of this. In the long run it was soldiers, however, who were more ideally
suited for the role. Thus, I argue that for the better part of a century, it was their bodies that were

16

Service data noted here in Table Two are provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans affairs. Graphic
provided by fivethiryeight.com. Downloaded from http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/what-percentage-ofamericans-have-served-in-the-military/ Last accessed March 2016.
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positioned at the forefront of medical intervention efforts. They were in this sense canaries in the
coal mines of conflict. Soldiers’ bodies were medicalized, hybridized, and technologized, as war
forged new opportunities to fashion bodies that were broken and damaged on battlefields. In
view of this, my research aims to uncover the systematic process by which this occurred. It looks
at how soldiers, who are to some extent the failed products of military-industrial miscegenation,
were produced within a continuum of institutional relations, whereby those institutions
ultimately achieved growth and expansion through their connection to mass injury.
This work follows soldiers and their bodies over an extended period of time ―a group I should
add that is not prioritized in social science studies of social inequality. In doing so, I look at how
their bodies constitute landscape, figure, and ground for injuries that were instrumental to the
institutional functioning, expansion, and growth of medicine. It is through this examination of a
particular intersection of developments—economic, political, military, and medical—that I am
able to account for not only the material and somatic aspects of bodies, but also the immaterial,
non-corporeal, and affective social dynamics that imbricate bodies with war. Case analysis will
emphasize how the U.S. state, as a function of governance, progressively invested in ownership
and control over soldiers’ bodies. This relation, I will argue, is not merely political, but is
biopolitical. To this end, I aim to show how military and medical institutions, under conditions
of neoliberal governance, not only worked (and continue to work) together to regulate the life of
soldier’s bodies, they use war as a tool of politics to secure profit from that investment. Cases
advance a claim that major wars over the course of the last century were in fact waged as
biopolitical race wars. Soldiers were/are imbricated as paradigmatic “biological citizens” in a
militarized medical economy that was, regardless if actual intent was lacking, progressively
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calibrated to achieve profit from injury. The resulting institutional alignment produced nothing
short of an elaborate and sophisticated medical supply chain; one that connected the body to the
battlefield and the medical and life sciences.
Soldiers in the United States, as it stands presently, are all volunteers; in that sense, they are not
as I have already pointed out classic “victims” of this process. In spite of their having been used
as test subjects, often without consent, they nonetheless retain a modicum of agential capacity to
resist the control domain that designates them, more or less, to be agents of capture. Many
soldiers, again, over the course of the course of the twentieth century, tended to represent
disadvantaged social groups, who were economically disenfranchised. In this respect, they share
much in common with economic refugees and displaced persons. Many soldiers enlisted service
to seek refuge from social landscapes that bore the brunt of de-industrialization and economic
restructuring. While these landscapes were not literally “bombed” by artillery shells, many
soldiers are among the inheritors of failed agricultural policies, which were driven by a landed
aristocracy that pre-dates the U.S. Civil War; others are the less-fortunate cast-offs of advanced
industrial capitalism.
This leads me to another point of emphasis. I aim to demonstrate how economic structural
violence might be individualized to a body at the same time as it massifies groups of bodies.
Socio-economic precarity too easily yields to corporeal sacrifice, causing vulnerable groups to
risk life, limb, and blood to uphold an economic order from which they derive little benefit. It is
as if “all the king’s soldiers and all the king’s men” were brought together by war, so that
someone might take them apart and reassemble them again. Violence here respects no boundary,
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as soldiers become caught up in a confluence of social forces, not all of which are subject to their
agency. They are at once perpetrators of violence directed against the world’s poor and
powerless, which in turn impacts global stability and inequality, and thereby they perpetuate
ongoing war, conflict, and violence, which comes around eventually to target their own bodies
for destruction.
I would be remiss here if I did not acknowledge that soldiers, very clearly, are not the only
bodies that are injured as a result of war. This particular distinction, in fact, has surfaced as a
point of contention in preliminary presentations of my research. Scholars and activists in
particular are somewhat single-minded in their concern for the people that they perceive to be
war’s real victims, the overwhelming number of which statistics establish are civilians, not
soldiers.17 But as I indicate here and will argue again later, who we count and how we count
them matters a great deal. To only argue and articulate a view focused to only one side of the
civilian/soldier dichotomy―the civilian side―is I think short-sighted. This particular distinction
is one that must be unpacked further, for the difference is not always sustainable. Non-combatant
civilians are in many respects not distinguishable from soldiers; reversible as is the case of flesh,
where each side might be shown to form the outside of the other. My pursuit of a line of
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Physicians for Social Responsibility conducted a study, which included analysis by Nobel Prize winners,
who determined that at least 1.3 million people have died as a result of war since Sept.11, 2001,
speculating that the real figure might even be as high as two million. The study represented an effort to
address gaps in existing research, including studies like the Iraq Body Count,” which puts the number of
violent deaths in that country at about 219,000 since 2003, based on media reports of the time period."
For more on this, see the article “Do The Math: Global War On Terror Has Killed 4 Million Muslims Or
More.” Downloaded from
http://www.mintpressnews.com/do-the-math-global-war-on-terror-has-killed-4-million-muslims-ormore/208225/ Last accessed August, 2016. Also, refer to the article by Stephen M. Walt, “Why They Hate
Us (II): How Many Muslims Has the U.S. Killed in the last 30 Years?” Downloaded from
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/30/why-they-hate-us-ii-how-many-muslims-has-the-u-s-killed-in-the-past30-years/ Last accessed August, 2016.
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questioning that privileges military subjectivity and embodiment does not then, in my view,
preclude recognition of the injuries and disabilities suffered by others that lie beyond the
recognizable bounds of this exclusive group classification. Highlighting the limitations and the
contradictions inherent in “groupness” enables me to explore social identity concepts in ways
that call attention to the problems inherent in more conventional understandings of the
civilian/soldier dichotomy.
Studying soldiers as a bounded social group, as an exercise in empirical methodology, exposes
important contradictions that my research will call attention to by way of illustration;
contradictions that point to the instability of rigid social identity categories that are
conventionally ascribed to soldiers. In light of this, my analysis will emphasize that that soldiers,
like many other social groups, are dynamically produced. The social identity category “soldier”
does not then reflect exclusivity; but rather, demonstrates evidence of relational contingency,
which my research demonstrates evolves and changes over time. In other words, soldiers as
bodies, figures, and subjects do not have fixed boundaries; boundaries as such are fluid,
permeable, and unstable. Soldiers here embody how history is perpetually in motion; they
dynamically illustrate that history does not move simply in one direction, but instead traverses
time and space in such a way as to bridge history with ontology. Social groups engage a process
of binding and unbinding, forming assemblages that potentially pursue multiple, different, and
simultaneous trajectories of development.
Lastly, I should say that in pursuing a critique that is sometimes centered on soldier’s bodies, it is
not my intention to reify bodies and subjects and thus by extension privilege the human. On the
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contrary, I argue against such a reified understanding of a body as a discrete body, so that I might
take into consideration social dynamics that operate in excess of the body. For it is only by
moving away from a universalized understanding of a unitary body that I am able to conceive as
well as explain how more recent developments that indicate potentially more radical oppositions
of soldiers, civilians, weapons, and bodies might be brought together and enter into nonoppositional circuits of material and affective relations.
War and Affect
This research, as I have already pointed out, represents a departure from previous work to the
extent it aims to explain the problem of war and wounding not only in material terms, but in
terms of affect, which I do not theorize as separate from material issues of politics and economy.
For what is war if it is not above all things, a radically embodying, intrinsically affective, sensory
experience? War takes lives and eviscerates bodies; it arouses hatred, fear and pain; war conjures
blood-soaked images of bodies missing parts, flesh descending from bone, twisted faces and
silent screams.18 Wounded soldiers are “meat things.” Bodies are cut open. Friends bleed. And
many are wounded to point of death. War, in terms of its affect, vividly illustrates how a body
might be visibly, viscerally, and forcibly undone. Regardless, however, how many rockets,
bayonets, and knives might render skin from bone, no study of combat injury can convey to the
uninitiated the brute nature of war’s slaughter —that alone remains the sole possession of the
body that bears witness to war. This is why we are left with a lingering sense that we cannot

Elaine Scarry (1985) writes that “war is a radically embodying experience.” Furthermore, while this
paragraph does not replicate text from Gilles Deluze’s (2002 [1981]) “Francis Bacon,” I am drawing here
from the imagery suggested by his work.
18
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know enough about what is done to a body that is wounded in war. The body itself remains
“elusive” (Crossley, 1995).

When it comes to war then, many of the more traditional discourses, public as well as academic,
fall short of the mark of helping us learn how to “see and to feel about war” (Kaplan, 2013).
There is a general tendency here to reduce sacrifice, suffering, and the body to a number/statistic
or to a mathematical model, which in my estimate renders skin from bone in ways that are
equally destructive, as they subdivide their human digital remainder into oblivion. This affective
re-ordering and re-assembling of the body is often facilitated by visual imagery and other
artifacts that include bumper sticker slogans like “support the troops.” And so, I want to call
attention to these social dynamics, as I understand material economic relations and affective
processes to be enfolded together; they are not separate, but rather work together to create
differently articulated affective economies of death and injury.19

Combat casualties might thus be shown to embody the contradictory logic of capitalism. As
“meat things” they are knowledge objects that are effectively “harvested” in a process that
empties them from the container of their skin in order to advance medical social organization and
profit. Soldiers’ bodies are thus not unlike bullets that are easily used and discarded. They are in
this sense “Empty Metal Jackets.” The term here refers to a type of standard issue bullet
commonly used by the military called a “full metal jacket” (a FMJ is a soft lead bullet encased
inside another, and so it is a hybrid/composite bullet); the empty metal jacket/shell casing ejects
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Ahmed, Sara. Social Text (No. 79, Volume 22, Number 2, Summer 2004), pp. 117-139.
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from the rifle after the round is fired.20 The apt metaphor in this instance is further suggestive of
Freud’s concept of the “skin ego” —a term he employed to overcome the problem of mind-body
dualism, which conceived as “a mental projection of the surface of the body.”21 The empty metal
jacket might thus be thought of as a hard surface case that functions to reinforce the skin of the
bullet-body. The term, likewise, is descriptive of the body in terms of its affect, as it
encompasses the conceptual interface between inside and outside, which Freud understood was
relevant to understanding the container/contained relationship, which was essential to psychic
development.
“Empty Metal Jacket,” thus functions as both title and metaphor to suggest how my work aims
to address the problem of combat injury on multiple and simultaneous levels ― material,
affective, mind, and body. The soldier’s body, in my view, functions as a model of sorts; it is an
overlooked by important model and one that we might look to understand the political economy
of war. Consequently, while problems of war and the body may be superficially historical and
materialist, it become furthermore incumbent to engage problem solving in such a way that the
body might be understood of its affect. Wounding, as I will point out, sometimes produces a
state of embodiment and being that might not always align with a fully articulated individuated
body. Affect theory here helps bridge the analytical gap, as I move to consider how wounded

Full metal jacket bullets were originally designed during the time period of the late 1800’s for use in
military rifles. The Hague Convention in 1899 handed down a ruling that bullets that expanded (and
thereby caused more damage) were not legal. Signatories to the Convention were required to abide by
this stipulation.
20
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Freud, S. The Ego and the Id. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.). The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 19, pp. 3 - 66. London: Hogarth Press, [1923] 1961.
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soldiers may be caught up in overlapping economies that produce differently articulated bodies,
forcing people to confront different “in-between” states embodiment and being.
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CHAPTER II
Methods

Roger Cooter (2004) once wrote about how one of the unfortunate ironies of life is that “modern
medicine owes some of its existence to the “deadly cancer of war.”22 Richard Barnet (1972)
found irony in a different problem when he questioned how it had come to pass that "...at the
very moment the number one nation has perfected the science of killing, it has become an
impractical instrument of political domination."23 This research undertakes to explore the
contradictions implied by both statements, as it investigates a fundamental paradox: how war,
killing, and wounding are relationally connected through medicine.
Research Purpose & Questions
“Empty Metal Jacket: The Biopolitical Economy of War and Medicine” studies combat
casualties—the wounded flesh of soldiers—which I argue serves as a material nexus for medical
knowledge production. I situate important developments in medicine within a historical,
economic, and political context and show how war and military ideas not only were extended
into the social spaces of everyday life, they advanced in such a way as to help determine the
conditions of possibility for life, living, and what it means to be human.
First and foremost, I look at the important instrumental role played by wounded soldiers in the
political economy of medicine. I present case data to establish the former, where I locate this
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Roger Cooter, “Medicine’s Militarization?” 2е Journée Guerre et Médecine – 7 février-Paris, 2004.
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development within an evolving military strategy: one where wounded soldiers, through the
anatomopolitcs of making and managing injury, were made to constitute a vital biopolitics. Here,
I trace the social importance of what Marcuse once referred to as “the human factor” and link to
military science, technology developments, and innovations in medicine.24 War, I argue,
established the terrain of the human as a legitimate “theater of operation,” whereby the full
dimensionality of the body – its substance, soma, and affect – became incorporated into a
militarized medical economy of knowledge, power, and control. In light of these research
objectives, I forego efforts to establish causation and reject determinism in order to focus on how
the problem of injury unfolds across multiple and overlapping social landscapes ― material,
immaterial, psychic, embodied, and affective.
How do we know what we know when it comes to combat injury and war casualties? The lack of
critical inquiry has unfortunately produced a situation where knowledge too often comes from
sources like faith, tradition, media and entertainment, which in the case of the latter lean toward
propaganda. Much of it, moreover, relies on story-telling and the power of affect economies.
Thus we find in humanistic approaches to the problem of injury, there is a tradition of locating
the suffering subject in the center of the narrative. Recent work in the social sciences follows this
path of investigation to pursue a policy-centered approach that puts “veterans” in the center of
the narrative (Wool, 2015; Kinder, 2015). Cassandra Crawford (2014) takes a more critical

Herbert Marcuse elaborates the relevance of the “human factor” to the construction of the Great Society
in his essay “The Individual in the Great Society,” 1965.
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theoretical approach when she addresses the biomedical biopolitical aspects of prosthetic
enhancement.25
The problem with academic disciplinary approaches, as I have already mentioned, is that they
sometimes fail to make important connections that lie beyond the boundaries of the discipline.
Mindful of this, my research endeavors to look at the political economy of combat injury, where
I aim to advance a de-centered relational theory of violence; one that highlights how institutions
produce injury through a praxis that imbricates issues of knowledge and power. The disciplining
of the discipline of sociology casts a long shadow here; thus, I intend to question the research
ethics, methods, and alleged “neutral” values” that bound up in the prevailing narrative of the
discipline’s contribution to research. Sociology too, I will demonstrate, was shaped by war,
particularly in the years leading up to and after World War II.
That changes in sociology were played out against the backdrop of war is a matter of record,
even if this is not often acknowledged or discussed. War, I will argue, created an environment
for knowledge seeking that privileged a narrow focused quantitative empirical research
methodologies. These approaches eventually became institutionalized as doctrinal. During the

This research does rely on theoretical constructs like “social construction” to explain social phenomena.
Traditionally, social construction, as concept, is used in sociology to challenge the given nature of
phenomena; typically, the concept illustrates how individual actors actively “construct” a social world
through meaningful social encounters and actions; language/discourse is often a primary mechanism
through which this occurs. To be sure, my work here will recognize the power of discourse, though I will
emphasize how it operates in dynamic interaction with other actors, objects, and practices, where there is
a discernible relational ontology that functions as a political economy of relations.
25
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period leading up to and immediately after World War II, sociology normatively favored theories
of the “middle range” which I will elaborate in the next chapter.26
Suffice to say, critical theorists were marginalized in the discipline. As Stanley Aronowitz
(1988) points out, this occurred even as it was effectively argued that methodological positivism
failed to adequately address issues of knowledge and power; it failed, likewise, to address
feelings, behaviors, and affects that scholars argued could not be reduced to numbers and
discrete variables. This distinction is important to my research, because paths of inquiry that
privilege linear thinking and instrumental rationality are, as Aronowitz argues, not only
inherently problematic; they may be self-destructive when it comes to the bodies and subjects
that are the target of investigation.27 Problems of reification, for example, become unavoidable
when the logic of efficiency and predictability are privileged to the extent they are now. Another
problem is "objectification" – which is to say, the body itself is reduced to a fetish object. All of
this is potentially compounded by research ethics that value “neutrality,” “mutual exclusivity,”
and “exhaustiveness,” which ultimately take on a mythic character that may be more aspirational
than practical.
Unrivaled U.S. power produced in the wake of two World Wars helped contribute to a growing
technological hubris that helped feed a similar dynamic in the social sciences – especially
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Sub-disciplinary approaches to problem solving in the social sciences have historically followed
different paths. Anthropology favors ethnographic approaches and the emic perspective. Although often
criticized because the method confers no guarantee that study findings are falsifiable, the rich data
produced compensates for these risks, as they cannot be captured by statistical approaches to problem
solving.
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Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society, University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.
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sociology. This development trajectory, which simultaneously deemphasized critical theory and
grand theorizing, fostered the entrenchment of a disciplinary ethic – a revived utilitarianism –
such that now in the present day, middle range theories serve not only a practical but also
symbolic function: they signify that one is “doing” social science. Consequently, in much the
same manner as the U.S demonstrated superiority in efforts to develop nuclear weapons,
sociology acquired its own post-war consensus and hubris.
Put another way, middle range theories and long-range missiles were produced through a similar
industrial procreation process. They share an affinity to the extent both were calibrated to target
bodies and populations; one produced mass casualties and the other counted them. This alliance,
although considerably evolved, remains intact today, as it stands guard over the epistemic
ramparts of the discipline and shapes the contours of research and inquiry. It is with respect for
this history that I link empirical research methodology in the social sciences to the problem of
war in society. This linkage, I might add, is not ancillary to my research problematic. Rather, I
see it as crucial to understanding how sociology as a discipline circumscribes the definition of
social problems as well as what kinds of research questions might be asked.
Questions
My research begins with the question: how are war and wounding bound up with changes in the
social organization of medicine? From here, I move to a consideration of the following: How are
human geographies bound up in violence and war? How are soldiers’ bodies “made” and
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“unmade” within the context of war28 What kinds of knowledge might be produced by these
encounters? Whose life is valued and whose life counts?
Put another way, my research questions what happens when war becomes the primary engine for
scientific endeavor and discovery. That is to say, it considers the possibility that war and not
reason might be the engine of social progress. As such, there are additional ethical problems to
consider. For example, can medicine be truly ethical if war and violence underlie its practice
and advance? How might the neutrality of science and the ethical foundations of research
become subverted to the point that they become performative? Can medicine become totalitarian
if it is coupled with war? The danger here lies in the fact that when it comes to medicine, we tend
to assume institutional benevolence; we don’t attribute their functioning, funding, and profit to
war, and so they are to some degree compromised —they effectively rationalize the violence in
the system.
These are not esoteric questions. How we acquire knowledge of such things, as I will explain,
has a lot to do with how we conceptualize bodies, war, institutions, and even history. In the
words of Noam Chomsky, institutions are not fixed; history is not at an end.29 In light of this,
my approach proceeds from one basic assumption, which is that combat injuries cannot be
thought of as independent and detached from the political economy within which they function.
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It is further interesting to consider, in terms of epistemology, how soldiers might be produced as
knowledge objects through a process of what Foucault, the son of a surgeon, described as “cutting”
knowledge.
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Diane Chomsky writes in her book preface that Norm Chomsky ended his Managua lectures on this
note. The book, comprised of lectures given in 1986 during the peak of the Reagan-era proxy war waged
war in Nicaragua, is entitled Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (Haymarket Books; Second
Edition, 2015).
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Injuries are not mere accidents that stand “outside” history. Rather, they are an outcome of
military and medical strategy and practice. With that, I move to investigate the process by which
wounded soldiers came to play an important instrumental role in advancing medicine. Drawing
from Foucault’s war model of power, I theorize, medicine was militarized as the bodies of
soldiers were medicalized. Ultimately, I argue an epistemic shift occurred from medicalization,
which emphasized diagnosis and treatment, to biomedicalization, which saw the synergistic
resources of military and medical knowledge production brought to bear on governing the
bodies, life capacity, and human performance soldiers.
Medicalization and subsequent biomedicalization thus led to important advances in the social
organization of medicine. Put another way, military strategy was expanded over the course of
time in such a way as to broadly encompass soldiers in addition to other human landscapes. In
what is perhaps the defining contradiction that propels this study of contradictions, I examine a
crucial paradox: How is the science of destroying bodies and the science of healing bodies
potentially connected? How did an institution, whose practices were focused on the mass-scale
taking of life – the military – become invested in medical- scientific efforts to create as well as
extend life? In other words, how did the techniques of warfare become focused on t the
transformation of the body, the species and life itself?
Frankenstein’s Paradox
As stated, one of the primary objectives of this research is to take the problem of combat injury
and look at it outside of the narrow parameters that presently define policy studies and studies in
biomedicine and disability. Treading lightly on the path of social reproduction feminists like Lisa
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Vogel, I concern myself with wounded bodies, where I examine how war determines the
conditions of possibility for bodies and their labor power to become transformed. Wounded
bodies and their labor power were (and continue to be) biologically, socially, and generationally
produced in connection with war.30 Like Frankenstein’s monster, bodies are broken down, taken
apart, and re-assembled again.
The legend of Frankenstein unavoidably then haunts my research undertaking, as I set out to
explore the minefield of moral, ethical, and material conflicts that result when medicine aims to
create life not from biological reproduction with women, but from death – it turns men into
monsters. As a feminist writing more than 200 years ago, Shelley’s novel predates contemporary
academic fascination with the study of techno-scientific life interventions and prosthetic medical
encounters. I suggest a return to the myth of the monster that infuses her classic novel
“Frankenstein; or the Modern Prometheus, to look at the Prometheus narrative upon which it is
based, so that I might also consider the links between creation, birth, and death. Frankenstein
richly illustrates the ethics (and potential immorality) of creating life through non-biological
reproduction. Likewise, she demonstrates the violence embedded in such an encounter, which
were unleashed upon an unsuspecting public as a result.
Donna Haraway, in her acclaimed Cyborg Manifesto gave the story a postmodern inflection,
when she proposed the Cyborg model of the body to challenge fixed identity categories in
connection with bodies —“natural,” “artificial,” and “technical” (and thus inert and/or dead) —

Lisa Vogel’s classic work Marxism and the Oppression of Women explored “the woman question”
through socialist theory. She draws from Marx's Capital as a means to theorize gender and the social
production and reproduction of material life. Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary
Theory. Haymarket Books, 2014.
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might easily be subverted and blurred. And we might recall that Sigmund Freud was also in
some respects trying to solve a similar puzzle, where he aimed to understand how humans
reconcile the social forces and impulses that underlie the contradictory pursuit of war and
civilization, articulated in his theory of the death drive.31
Body-making and self-making, I will point out, have a troubled history when it comes to war,
insofar as making war and making bodies is not a gender neutral process. For it almost always
refers to the making of a man. Military medical science, not surprisingly, is the undisputed leader
when it comes to funding technologies, which are essentially “engineering humans for war.”32
Evidence and analysis presented in the case studies that follow will suggest that medical
knowledge acquired from wounded soldiers helped advance healing, recovery, and fitness
regimes, all of which contributed to developments in specialized fields, including
anthropometrics, biomechanics, and bioengineering.
Critics, nonetheless, have argued that human performance modeling has tended to be based on a
male model ideal; a development practitioners explain is merely indicative of the fact that the
vast number of war casualties continue to be male. Despite this, trends indicate that bodies are
being imagined and engineered in ways that suggest they at some point may no longer be
restricted to the limiting concepts of social identity. More to the point, they may no longer be
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limited to conceptual understandings that model the body based on a system of enclosure.
Questions remain, however, about how these developments will unfold. Researchers must, as a
consequence of this, remain focused on the study of complex ontologies of embodiment and
subjectivity that might be produced as a result.
Looking at how bodies are “made” and “un-made” within the context of war sheds light on what
is to some extent a neglected area of focus in studies of governance and war: the militarymedical industrial complex. I examine these developments through a feminist “body centered”
approach to the study of institutions, which I argue practiced on wounded soldiers to further their
vital economic interests. I take inspiration from Haraway’s Cyborg feminism to consider how
different models of the body were created from the cut-up disarticulated pieces of wounded
bodies. Combat casualties constitute a corporealized minefield of sorts; embodied contradiction
and discontinuity are normative and not exceptional.
To illustrate how material and immaterial processes of production are brought together, I draw
from Randy Martin’s (2007) work that looks at financialization processes in connection with
war.33 This work, when read through Clough’s (2008) work on bodies and affect,34 helps
position arguments I make later about how bodies and bodily matter produce “flesh economies”
of war, where humans are not only valued as bodies, but also as “parts.” I build on their
collective thinking to advance a theory of how combat injuries and wounded bodies furnish a
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somatic contribution to social and economic circulations. Soldiers and mass casualties I will
argue were produced as “bulk commodities” in a circulating economy; one that employs
mathematical calculation practices to quantify human assets that are subject to be re-cycled
through a process of “productive” violence that history demonstrates conforms to a pattern of
breaking down bodies in order to increase capital flows. Wars in this manner, plays a role in the
demand economy – one that both produces and generates demand for human bodies.
This literature helps me to analyze the interpenetrating dynamics of institutions predicated on
violence in order to assess not only how they influence each other, but how they might also
materially impact individuals and social groups. This helps me to further my aims to recapitulate
the significance of war to the social organization of medicine, medical innovation, human
transformation, and bodily change; it also helps me fulfill another goal of my research program,
which is to extend conversations in the social sciences, especially sociology, so that it might be
more inclusive and attuned to critically addressing the military dimensions of society.
My feminist approach conceptualizes combat injury as a problem of war and a problem of the
body, where I open up the problem of injury to consider its wider social context. This research
problematic forms the basis of my inquiry, as I look at how military and medical institutions
acquired a progressive strategic interest in targeting the physical bodies of soldiers.
Conceptualizing the problem this way permits me to shift inquiry away from the more traditional
institutional focus on veterans’ disability issues, so that I might instead look at look at the role
institutions play in the social reproduction of bodies as a function of political economy. This
epistemology is important, because it illustrates the productive role played by violence. With
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issues of consent rendered more or less irrelevant, I argue that wound soldiers were produced as
human test subjects.
In taking this approach, I challenge the medical model of disability, which traditionally
medicalizes injury in ways that do not always question issues of knowledge and power. Case
studies illustrate, using heuristic, or what I call Homo Vulneratus, the different models of the
body that were produced by the Civil War - the slave model and the model of the wounded
soldier. These models, argue were transformed over time. It is here that I begin to trace the
gendered contours of these developments; however, I do this in a manner that reveals how
gender was progressively undone by injury, to the extent that social identities, traditionally been
confined to being in a body as male or female, is no longer determined as such. Bodies, under the
influence of war, were over the course of time produced as medical knowledge objects; one
result of this is that social and biological production was positioned to occur outside of
traditional processes of production.
Key Concepts
There is a need, I think, to further clarify some of the key concepts and definitions that will be
discussed in the case studies that follow. Working through the research problematic as I have
thus far defined it required me to work across disciplines and through different levels of analysis,
as I consulted an extensive literature to help support my research claims. Engaging with
questions of war and the body inevitably required me to, furthermore, engage with philosophical
questions about ontology and epistemology. And so I found it necessary to deploy the key
concepts of the study in such a way that I was able to look at war, bodies, injuries, and medical
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practices in dynamic relational juxtaposition – a political-economic circulation – where each key
element of interest is not looked at as residing “outside” and/or separate from social realms. To
this end, I aim to show how war’s invasionay powers effectively penetrate “inside,” colonizing
our bodies, institutions, and most private domestic realms of daily living.
As was shown in the previous chapter, a necessary first step in the process is to clarify what
appear to be simple definitions in regards to what is war and what is a soldier. Mapping
interpenetrating social relations, which I argue are bound up in the power to classify and count is
not a trivial matter. Distinguishing the different social dynamics that help bind war to
knowledge-making practices in medicine is, I think, fundamental to understanding how combat
injury functions within a political economy of relations. In defining war as a problem of the body
(and vice versa), my research moves to a consideration of how not only combat injury but “the
body” itself became a problem for war to solve. The bodies of soldiers in particular, I will argue,
while not the only or even the first bodies to be targeted were, nonetheless, introduced into a
medical regime of control, which aimed to produce them as legible, knowable, so they could be
brought into the realm of calculation and profit. Thus, I treat wounded soldiers as a distinct social
group. Over the course of time, my research illustrates how these social identities are not always
distinct. The wound bodies of soldiers will thus be shown to be produced as part of a circuit of
relations that is progressively taken up by the political economy of war and medicine.
As I have already started to discuss, nominal definitions for what constitutes war, a soldier, a
casualty, a body, and even a human for that matter are all subject to debate. In the case of the
latter, the entire canon of the humanistic disciplines devoted itself to trying to elaborate on the
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puzzle of what makes a human, in fact, human.35 As I will illustrate later soldiers, slaves, and
humans have all at different times and in different ways been emptied of their humanity, reduced
to mere numbers and abstractions. This process of objectification further imbricates the practice
of counting combat casualties, which is in no small way dependent operational definitions of
how one classifies and counts a soldier/casualty/body and even a war to begin with. For one
finds debates over the official beginnings and endings of wars are often a matter of dispute.
Narratives that speak of them all in absolute terms or those that might reduce them to discrete
variables thus problematic, especially when you consider how their nominal classification
functions as a discursive signpost, and thereby represent one of the more significant "cuts" of
measure when attempts are made to record casualties. Problem solving thus cannot proceed here
on the basis of causal-linear logic; historical continuity is itself is marked by legacy of volatile
intellectual dispute. Wars without end and military deployments that similarly do not end for the
soldiers that serve them are rather like conjoined twins that resist separation and sometimes defy
analysis.

Humanism aimed to elevate “the human,” the sacrosanct individual, and the liberal subject to the extent
that it privileged human agency over divine and spiritual forces; is a product of the thinking of successive
intellectual traditions, which historians trace from Renaissance Humanism, to the time period during the
19th c. that pre-dates the French Revolution (where it arguably achieved its greatest impact), culminating
in modern humanism. The 19th century Humanists were men of letters, who professed faith in the value
and inherent goodness of human beings; likewise, they emphasized rational ways of solving human
problems – rational consciousness - in conjunction with an emphasis on individual speech acts.
Humanism was in many ways a reaction to scholasticism and despotism of ecclesiastical authority, which
was found lacking for many reasons beyond the fact that it was determined to be standing in the way of
social progress. It was, likewise, very much a middle-class European male movement, though it later
came to be identified with non-male and non-European concerns, taking up the causes of minority social
identities and more recently hybrid forms of human identity. In terms of status hierarchies, humanists
have traditionally looked for ways to elevate the human over other living creatures and to differentiate
humans from machines and other objects that are understood to be comprised of non-vital inorganic
matter. Contemporary humanists, nonetheless, still manage to cling to the belief that humans are
somehow special.
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These contradictions illustrate another problem; namely, that when discussing the problem of
“the body” in relation to soldiers, there is in reality a problem of many bodies. Efforts to isolate
them, sort them out categorically, distinguish individuals from social groups and social groups
from populations, expose on ongoing tension in the study. Social identity categories, as I will
show later, are rendered easily unstable, as are social group boundaries and the boundaries of the
body, all of which can be shown to become destabilized, as they are transformed and change
over time.
The use of terms like “wound,” "casualty," "fatality," and to some extent “trauma,” while they
may proliferate in public narratives and appear to be non-controversial, nonetheless, they also
require added clarification. Wound and trauma are defined interchangeably as the manifestation
of injury, where skin or another external surface might be torn, pierced, cut, or otherwise
penetrated and opened. Medical definitions extend this meaning to be inclusive of any break in
the skin or an organ or part as the result of violence or a surgical incision. Already, one notes the
conflation of wound and trauma and the association of violence with medical epistemology.
These relations are not insignificant. Similarly confusing is how the term "casualty" denotes both
dead and wounded soldiers, whereas "fatality" refers to only to those soldiers counted as dead.
Despite this, people tend to misinterpret the meaning of casualty to designate soldiers killed in
action. The misapprehension, I want to argue, is indicative of more than simple oversight; it
suggests there is a linguistic hierarchy of difference implied in the interpretive act ―one that
registers an order of priority of acknowledgement, where the dead count more than the wounded,
whose status, not having made the ultimate "life " sacrifice, is accorded secondary recognition.

56

Problematizing the soldier's wounded body assumes the operational step of combining the two
concepts, soldier + wound. The assemblage of the two suggests an epistemology of the body that
is perhaps more complex compared to bodies in general. They produce what I will refer to as the
“militarized medical model of the body,” which as a model is useful to compare changes with
other bodies and models. Consequently, I don't think it is useful or even relevant to elaborate a
distinctive typology of the body. Rather, I want to argue that the incident of wounding, which
under conditions of war takes place under distinctively violent social circumstances, demands we
re-think the epistemological assumptions that underlie methodological practice in regards to how
we measure, cut, and count bodies--particularly the wounded body, because this body is rife with
ambiguity, contradiction and uncertainty.

Further, I will argue that the incident of wounding, which transpires under distinctively violent
social circumstances, demands we re-think our epistemological assumptions about not only
soldiers’ bodies, but bodies in general. Setting aside the more traditional event-based teleology,
which assumes that the empirical injury “depends” on a precipitating event, I aim to advance a
theory of injury that takes into account the epistemic relation of trauma and injury to political
and economic social dynamics that are amenable to the concept of circulation, or what
sociologists sometimes refer to as social reproduction. Looking at combat injuries in conjunction
with changes in medicine reveals the emergence of an important onto-epistemological shift that
took place; medicine evolved from “knowing” to “making” over the course of time. Changes
with regard to bodies in general became possible on a mass-scale, which prompt questions about
how human transformation occurring in concert with economic developments may be emerging
as a form of neoliberal governmentality in connection with war.
57

The terms medicine, medical practice, and biomedicine are also variable and reflect changes over
time. Medicine and medical practice in the 1850’s and what passes for medicine in the present
time are categorically and fundamentally different, as they bear little resemblance to today’s
multi-billion dollar biomedical industrial complex—biotech, pharmaceuticals, plastic surgery,
neuroscience, genomic research — or as many simply refer to it: Western industrialized
medicine. Different conceptual and nominal understandings of medicine, when combined with
different narratives about what constitutes a war, a soldier, a wound, and casualty, all create
problems for analysis. Unstable identity categories like "civilian" and "soldier" are similarly
problematic. And then there is the issue of temporality, which I argue later is also variable and
subject to various continuities and discontinuities. All of this works in opposition to efforts that
would aim to bring them into the realm of calculation. Assuming stable conceptual categories for
purposes of testing hypotheses within a framework that is repeatable and falsifiable here would
be something akin to building a foundation on shifting sand. Discourses that report casualties and
contain body counts are thus more than a trivial conceit; they represent nothing less than an
empirically fraudulent exercise of power. I call attention to these contradictions before moving
forward for reasons that it is important to understand them in light of their influence on how I
measure, count, and document combat casualties.

Combat injuries are, furthermore, understood to occur within a dynamic ever-shifting social
context. A such, I document the process by which wounded bodies and medicine became
incorporated together, not monolithically, but selectively, incrementally, and discontinuously as
part of a military strategy to effect bodily change through a medical governance of social control.
The bodies of soldiers, as I will demonstrate, are relevant to this process; thus, I show how they
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were used almost routinely throughout history to advance medical practice and progress.
Medicine was to some extent militarized, as the bodies of soldiers were medicalized. As a result,
the body itself became incorporated into a larger biopolitical economy of power and control.
War, in other words, helped establish the human terrain of the body as a legitimate theater of
operation.

Finally, it is perhaps a little bit ironic that my research reduces the problem of combat injuries
and wounded bodies to their conceptual component parts, only to reassemble them again in order
to show how they became biopolitically useful to a medical governance of control. Yet I find we
must here to some extent “disembody” the body, sometimes reducing it to something less than a
whole body, in order to understand the nature of the important developments that are taking
place that suggest we may be “losing the body” to war.
Keeping Score with Bodies
Wounded bodies are, I will argue here, for reasons that derive from their material and immaterial
production, are wont to resist both empirical and linguistic capture. Counting and measuring
wounded bodies is rendered progressively more difficult when one considers that not all wounds
"count" as a casualty. Body counts are typically registered in terms of the aggregate numbers of
individuals killed, wounded or missing; statistics might also be reported in terms of ratios and
rates. In some cases, it is the total number of incidents of wounding that are counted, rather than
the individual wounded bodies. Each successive counting operation, in the pursuit of human
aggregates and equivalents, employs mathematics that are progressively complex, such that the
body is effectively transposed by the number.
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Wounds as they are traditionally defined and counted are compromised by a built-in bias that
demands they be physically observable. Yet we know soldiers experience what are essentially
"invisible wounds" like PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) and TBI (traumatic brain injury).
Significantly, these wounds are not fully represented in statistical reporting of combat casualties.
But there is more going on here than the mere politics of visibility. Brain trauma (Traumatic
Brain Injury –TBI) and psychic trauma (i.e. PTSD) are understood differently. So whereas TBI is
understood to be physical in nature, PTSD is assumed to be a psychic trauma -- an affliction of
the mind – thus, it is accounted for differently than other body-based injuries. In this instance, we
see evidence of a resurgent mind-body dualism that operates ideologically and in an manner that
influences how we count combat casualties. This occurs in spite of an increasing body of clinical
evidence that confirms PTSD entails a significant physical component. Injuries that afflict the
mind are essentially "wounds without a body" and so they are accorded less recognition
compared to physical injuries. All of these complications and contradictions degrade empirical
claims of accuracy when it comes to reporting combat casualty counts.

Counting fatalities and counting the wounded thus are not only both body-centric activities,
recognition as such is tied to their association with conventional conflict zones and fighting
landscapes that, much like the body, are rapidly undergoing reorganization and change. The
same logic explains why psychic trauma, unlike body trauma, doesn't arouse public empathy to
the same degree as physical trauma -- there is no sign of bodily injury. Evidence of this can be
seen in the case of amputees, who garner a great deal more public recognition, despite the fact
that they register fewer in number when compared to the larger population of wounded soldiers,
who suffer from a variety of other types of war injuries.
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Linear measure thus is not well-suited to address problem of combat casualties. To overcome
these contradictions, I propose instead what Clough calls "affective measure."36 Affect, as both a
theory and means of measure can address non-linear social dynamics, material and immaterial,
that operate dynamically as part of a circulation. Affective measure, according to Clough,
measures the "immeasurable" as it takes into account social dynamics that occur "in-between"
what empirical measures are designed to count. In this respect, affective measure can help
overcome one of the inherent weaknesses of empirical measure, insofar as it does not seek to
quantify and statistically model a war experience that cannot be observed and is not always be
quantifiable. Methodological empiricism, on the other hand, reduces pain, trauma, event, and
wound, such that we are left with disembodied concepts in series. Under this approach, the
soldier's body, particularly the wounded body, is variously counted/not counted or is rendered
missing. The search for the original event or original trauma -- that one that compels the entire
causal chain of events ― necessarily imposes causality and finitude upon that which resists and
escapes it; such a dynamic, according to Foucault, is indicative of "a play of correspondences"
that deludes us.37 For this reason, I am suggesting affective methodology might be used to
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Clough provides an account for what she calls infraempirical “affective measure” in this article that
reviews the relationship of methodological positivism and post-World War II U.S. sociology. Here, she
notes important transformations that occurred in the discipline during the last three decades of the
twentieth century. This work makes a significant contribution, to the extent that it proposes a new
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capture the full range of social dynamics that imbricate war, bodies, and medicine in an affective
circuit, which is modulated by violence, killing, wounding, fear, and pain.

Yet whereas Clough distinguishes affect from emotion as pre-individual, pre-linguistic, and nonconscious, registering outside of awareness, I wish to clarify my view, which seeks to elucidate
how affect operates in accordance with a relational ontology and political economy of the
body – an “affect economy” as Sara Ahmed calls it - where affect denotes bodily capacity and
bodily potential. Affect, as I employ it for purposes of measurement in this study, might operate
independent of a given individualized body, whose inherent transformational capacity exceeds
the physical limitations of human embodiment, even as it nonetheless remains a body. Affect
might also register as emotion, as individuals and populations respond to the visceral horrors
visited by war. Following anthropologist Kathleen Stewart, who writes “power is a thing of the
senses,” I think it is similarly important to acknowledge how affect might be modulated to
coordinate emotion into a series of performances.38
This view of power stands in contrast with way power is typically understood in connection with
war – top down, overwhelming, deadly force that is means-end focused and generated to
accomplish a political objective; it resonates more with Foucault, who understands power can
flow from multiple and different directions. Donovan Schaefer contributes an important
distinction that I aim to incorporate in my own analysis when he says “whereas rhetorical

Donovan O. Schaefer cites this passage from Stewart’s book, Ordinary Affects, p.84, in a blog post for
Duke University Press, where he discusses affect theory, power, and performance. Downloaded from:
https://dukeupress.wordpress.com/2016/02/15/its-not-what-you-think-affect-theory-and-power-take-to-thestage/ Last accessed May 2016.
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analysis asks how affects are being mobilized to achieve certain political objectives, affect
theorists argue that politics is being done in order to achieve certain affects.” Thus he continues:
“What affect theory shows is that a political formation is best understood not as a package of
more-or-less coherent ideas but as a swirling vortex of emotions.”39
In taking this approach, I think it is important to recognize that affect is not limited to bodies and
subjects, which are inclined to effectively resist capture by rational empirical measures focused
on probabilistic outcomes.40 Combat casualties might be understood as performative, where they
operate outside of linear dynamics in an effort to seek an audience. With that, this research does
not employ quantitative methodology, although it will engage in secondary analysis of war
casualty statistics. My effort here to advance a critical theory of combat injury will emphasize
the theoretical as well as pragmatic intersections of knowledge, power, and bodies. The
production of war casualties as statistical bodies will be examined critically as part of this focus.
As a practical matter, I want to point out that there are no undisputed sources one might
reference to cite an accurate tally of war casualties. Scholars of military history have tended to
agree here more or less that casualty reporting discrepancies are characteristic of all wars.
Problems in operationally defining “war” and “casualty,” as I have already explained, have also
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worked to preclude this to some extent. But that never stopped anyone from keeping score with
bodies.
U.S. government casualty documentation records begin with the time period that pre-dates the
Revolutionary war. Experts again agree that despite efforts that were made to obtain accurate
body counts, the results do not reflect systematic accounting and documentation. Embarking on a
count, for example, of casualties from the major wars entails that one first recognize there are
only five wars in which the United States formally declared war. They include: The War of 1812,
The Mexican-American War, The Spanish-American War, World War I and II. The American
Civil War, for example, was technically not a war according to international laws of war,
because the Confederate States of America were never granted full diplomatic recognition as a
stand-alone government by other sovereign nations. Other conflicts fall into the nebulous
category of “military engagements.” Military action was undertaken subsequent to authorization
by congress, despite not being accompanied by a war declaration. These engagements include
the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They
are not in the strictest use of the term "wars," because they occurred without a formal declaration
of war. In the case of Korea, only a signed "armistice" agreed to in 1953 is in place, which means
technically this particular conflict is not concluded and continues in the present day.
More recently, critical revisionist efforts by historians like Edward Baptist, Josh Howard, and
others are challenging the casualty narrative by calling attention to accounting problems.
Noteworthy are their efforts to do the trench work of combing through diaries, military, hospital
and cemetery records to demonstrate how what has traditionally been accepted as empirical truth
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is in fact riddled with discrepancy. My research will argue further, however, that errors of this
nature cannot be dismissed as benign oversight or attributed to simple human error. Error as such
is rather an expression of knowledge and biopolitical power relations — the power to determine
whose life will be counted, whose life matters, and who is human.
Human Subjects
One reason this research does not include human subjects is because one of my objectives was to
move beyond the rigid conventions implied by social group identification, identity politics, and
other problems associated with the reliability of speaking subjects. I wanted to look at soldiers
not as heroes, warriors, or sympathetic victims of injury; but rather, I wanted to explore them
genealogically in a context where their bodies were used as medical test subjects. Soldiers under
capitalism, and perhaps neoliberalism especially, are expendable assets. To put it bluntly, they
have become cheap meat-shields or what I refer to as “Empty Metal Jackets.” The fact that they
have been (and continue to be) so easily used, often without consent, is often overlooked. War
stories instead are focused on celebrating heroic embodiment. These trauma discourses also
function to some extent as redemption narratives: soldiers are wounded and injuries are
transcended; disability and adversity are heroically overcome and thereby attest to the virtue of
the suffering soldier. Medical science and technology here take on fetish-like qualities in the
sense that wounded soldiers are often portrayed as physically transformed and even “better than
new.”

By bringing these relations into greater relief, I aim to challenge conventions and at the same
time contest the political, moral, and ethical foundations of institutionalized military and
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biomedical practice. The sciences in general, but especially the biomedical sciences, are
conventionally predicated on a politics and ethics of morality. Yet as I will demonstrate,
biomedicine is not value-neutral, because it shares war’s history of violence; it capitalizes on war
(which advances its own ethics of morality via “just war theory”) in order to produce knowledge.
Both war and biomedicine profit by producing a wounded body. The biomedical ethic of “do no
harm” is here called into question, because medical institutions have relied on harm to occur in
order to achieve progress. Thus I find medical knowledge production and institutional growth
was achieved in the same social space that accommodated the lethal practices of war. The
increasingly sophisticated deployment of weaponry - what were essentially innovative “killing”
technologies – were here accompanied by parallel advances in medicine. Wounded soldiers were
and still remain located at the crossroads of these efforts.

With that, I find war introduces what can only be described as a productive destructive tension
into the process of medical discovery; a tension I might add that is observable because it
potentially embodied and being lived. The resulting liminal zone of embodiment, where bodies
are caught up between life-making and life-taking, furnishes the substance for much of my
analysis that follows. Accordingly, the discontinuities and accidents that comprise war’s
discontents also constitute a veritable repository of information, which provide for a more
nuanced understanding of how war might act as a stimulus for scientific enterprise. The paradox,
to clarify, can be summarized as follows: war is destructive but it is also generative; war is not
only creative, it is pro-creative; war makes life and war takes life; war and medicine are both
premised on an ethic of violence. Technological rebirth might thus occur through both war and
medicine. The argument that I will advance here then is supported by theory as well as by
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practice — military science is a life science, or as urban theorist Stephen Graham asserts: “life
itself is war.”41

Theory and Methods
Given how American history in sociology is often viewed through the narrow lens of movement
identity politics or to put it in the public parlance “the culture wars,” I find it is necessary here to
take a more comprehensive approach. While the importance of such studies cannot be overstated,
I cannot help but to observe that research design too often seems burdened by efforts to reduce
social problems to effects that might easily be traced to race, class, and gender variables. My
research methodology aims to focus on a more diverse array of concepts and epistemologies,
which I borrow from the social sciences, literary studies, science studies, body studies, and
studies of political economy. In probing my subject matter, I employ historical-genealogical,
biomedical, feminist, affect, and new materialism theoretical perspectives to both critique as well
as explain how combat injuries are imbricated in a political economy that links the history of war
with the history of medicine.
The links between the “politics of the body” and the “politics of the garrison state” cannot be
over-stated; as Roger Cooter argues “it’s there if we choose to look for it.” (Cooter, 2004: 2).
With that, I combine theory with a specifically articulated research methodology to look at a
problem that I define as follows: I examine how war stimulus and military institutional practices
spurred innovation in the social organization of medicine; further, I look at how these
developments helped stimulate life-saving products of medical advance. Case studies illustrate
41
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how wounded bodies – the wounded bodies of soldiers in particular – were instrumental to this
process, to the extent that soldiers became human test subjects. These developments, I argue,
suggest we may be forging an iron cage of medicine from which escape is all but certain.
Previous scholars, who have looked at developments in medicine, have found it useful to draw
from Foucault’s analysis of knowledge/power (Turner, 1992; 1995). I also draw upon this work.
Foucault’s understanding that discipline and biopolitics are essential technologies that underlie
the practice of medicine, modern day forms of governmentality, and neoliberalism crucially
inform my efforts here to understand the social dynamics that link war and medicine. To be
clear, my concerns are not to either allege or prove there is evidence to suggest a conspiratorial
relation between military and medical institutions; nor do I suggest we celebrate war for having a
stimulative effect on in innovation in medicine. Rather, I will suggest these developments are
emblematic of the diffuse ways power operates and normalizes violence through institutional
practice. Analysis aims to balance theoretical and epistemological issues with practical issues of
wounded embodiment that concern soldiers.
I should like to point out here that unpacking theoretical from practical concerns can be as
difficult as delineating bodies from subjects and distinguishing the biological from the social.
Notwithstanding, I will present a theory aims to address these challenges. My approach
combines a critical historical materialist study of war and medicine with secondary analysis of
U.S. war casualty statistics. In terms of method, previous studies that will be cited here in
biomedicine, disability studies, and science studies looked at different aspects of the problem of
war and injury. Taken on their own, each of these approaches has limitations. Reading them
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together allows me to work through the problems they distinguish while taking into account
different levels of analysis, as I illustrate how the radical undoing of bodies in connection with
war became relevant to the social organization of medicine.
In pursuing this research agenda, I found it necessary to reconcile questions of theory and
method with taxonomic questions that cut to the heart of conceptualization, operationalization,
and measurement issues, which I found required clarification. Questions like: What is a soldier?
What is a civilian? What is war? These are questions that have indirectly been taken up by other
theorists who address issues of the body and mind-body dualism in particular, which might be
reduced to a central question dating back to the period of the Enlightenment and the foundations
of Western philosophy; that is—how do we think about the human? These questions are
important, to be sure, though I discovered while in the pursuit of this study that there are other
related questions that might be taken into consideration, namely: What is a casualty? What is a
wound? The answers, as I have already illustrated, are not readily attainable. Yet they are
important to think about, because they speak to war’s relation to the human and what amounts to
a military strategy to transform and control all social life.
Lastly, although this research primarily questions the relation between war and the social
organization of medicine, it suggests there may be other areas of inquiry worth pursuing. One
might also ask: How do military patriarchal and hierarchical systems of social organization
furnish an authoritarian bureaucratic model for medicine? How are social relations of inequality
reflected in combat casualty outcomes? And more generally, how might soldiers and their bodies
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serve as bearers of capitalist social relations? With that, I move to consider how the institutional
practices of war and the institutional practices of medicine might productively be linked.
Comparative Historical Methodology
I present data in the form of two case studies that focus on wars in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Cases are designed to illustrate the progressive impact of combat injuries on multi-level
institutional configurations and practices, where each case demonstrates how war and wounded
bodies impacted medical social organization and progress. The case study format is conducive to
illustrating the violent social context that helped bring about major changes in medicine. They
highlight the different ways that wounded bodies were produced, not as “accidents,” but as a fact
of calculated institutional strategy and practice. Here again, my aim is to demonstrate by way of
comparison how different social phenomena —war, injury, bodies, medicine, science and
technology — constitute a political economy. Medical knowledge production and innovation are
the productive outputs of this economy, which evolved over the course of time to foster a
biopolitical governance of power and control.
Crucially, I note the historical specificity of the soldier’s body while at the same time I take into
consideration this relation to other bodies and populations. Injury and disease patterns are noted
comparatively alongside specific medical practice innovations and institutional developments.
Taken together, the cases illustrate how the underlying social division created by war, along with
the progressive development of strategies, tactics, and techniques of warfare all correspondingly
contributed to medical social organization and progress, Conflict, violence, and injury are thus
linked to the development and success of modern medicine. The cases each close by offering a
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summary analysis that reflects on the impact of these developments to a governance of control
and illustrate the instrumental value of the soldier’s body, both to medicine and ongoing war.
Comparative historical research methods offer a number of advantages that support the goals of
my research program. Such methods are generally well suited to the evaluation of social
processes that develop over an extended period of time. I chose this method in lieu of other
methods (i.e. interviews) because its interpretive framework helps prevent the foreclosure of
understanding how the developments that I call attention to are contingent outcomes of an open
process – a circulation – which can and does produce bodies that reflect principles of diversity
and multiplicity. Yet this methodological choice, I should also point out, does not support claims
to generalizability to populations that lie beyond the historical groups identified in the study.
First and foremost, however, case data to support claims that soldiers’ bodies were instrumental
to advancing the cause of medical scientific innovation and progress; a cause I will argue
distinctively benefitted from the mobilization of human corporeal resources and blood sacrifice.
Comparative case studies furthermore enable me to distinguish how different body productions
line up with different wars and conflicts; here again, they help illustrate how bodies are made by
means of a contingent process predicated on violence and that this process is not determined but
is rather contingent and changes over time.
Case selection was driven by criteria that privileged wars that registered high incidents of
casualty counts, because this afforded the best opportunity to analyze social patterns in
connection with war casualties and medicine. So for example, the first case looks at combat
injuries within the general context of the U.S. Civil war era. I look at soldiers primarily, but
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contrast them in relation to slaves, as I consider how the bodies of all, albeit in different ways,
were rendered productive to an economy founded on settler colonialism and chattel slavery,
which helped to further foster medical innovation during this time period.
The study design incorporates analysis of individual as well as group level social dynamics,
which I found during the course of investigation could not be easily separated. Soldiers are
individuals who are members of populations that are not always categorically distinct. That is to
say, their bodies as well as their identities often overlap with other social groups (i.e. civilians,
slaves, prisoners, and immigrants). Cade studies illustrate the historical process by which
soldiers’ bodies were (and continue to be) deliberately “made” and “un-made” through a process
of co-production with other bodies and populations.
I undertook a deliberate decision to avoid reifying a linear chronology of war. To accomplish
this, cases were designed to look at developments within the context of a general time period,
and therefore preclude confirming a continuous representational history. Historians, it was
pointed out, as a result of favoring a continuous linear approach, can in many respects distort
war. Contriving sequential narratives to conform to causal linear logic interjects power and
meaning into the process, as it aims to render history “readable” and unambiguous. Again, this
design supports my goal to convey a sense of what is decidedly an historical but distinctly non –
linear social process.
This means I am working against the grain of Enlightenment evolutionary narratives that assume
an inevitable upward curve when it comes to issues of scientific innovation and progress.
Nonetheless, I am suggesting there are potentially productive links between the seemingly
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retrograde influence of war and medical progress; or, as Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno
once argued, the progressive path might be linked to social forces of violence.42 Consequently,
even though the chapters presented here rely on identifiable elements of chronology and time
sequencing to facilitate moving the narrative forward, the presentation format does not confirm a
continuous conception of history, as this would undermine the power of genealogical methods.
Genealogical Methods
As we know from Foucault, the body is perhaps best approached genealogically. Foucault’s
socio-historical work on health and illness serves as a reference point for my work; yet, whereas
he identifies the clinic as an expressive site of power, I extend his original vision to more
specifically address the social dynamics of the battlefield. Using genealogical methods, I use the
wounded soldier’s body a point of entry to analyze the problem of combat injury; I look at how
this particular body, over the course of different wars, became crucial to medical knowledge
production, technology development, and histories of scientific progress.43
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Early French historians of the Annales School are known for their work, which distinctively combined
social scientific observational methods with historical documentation practices. Arguing against humanist
traditions that made the conscious rational mind and free will in the center of human affairs, members of
this school of thinking espoused the view that impersonal forces of geography and demography governed
mankind’s destiny. Founders Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre further advocated for the breaking down of
barriers between history and other disciplines, as they drew from ideas in literature, psychology,
medicine, and the social sciences as part of an attempt to synthesize historical patterns, or what they
called “mentalités” of particular time periods. Having survived two world wars, the Annales historians
argued against a view of history based on notions of discontinuity and multiple ruptures (such as posited
by Foucault), preferring instead to characterize historical time in terms of interval, or what they referred to
as “durée.” After 1945, theorists like Ferdinand Braudel argued that continuity was the chief characteristic
of social structure that contributed to the formation of history. They similarly maintained that social
upheaval and the failure of institutions, or the superstructure to use the Marxist vernacular, was of little
significance, because history itself was more powerful and determining than individually conscious social
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Documenting this history of practice developments supports an aim to draw into greater relief the
historically profitable relation between the profession of arms and the profession of modern
medicine. Such methods are well-suited to demonstrate how war progressively engaged the
human terrain of the body as a domain of social control. I illustrate how, over the course of time,
wounded soldiers were taken up by normalizing discourses of health, medicine, science, and
technology, in addition to traditional discourses of identity and citizenship, all of which
combined to produce the soldiers as a wounded body, figure, and subject.
Genealogical and hermeneutic methods are both in fact well suited to task of challenging what
Foucault once criticized as “the false interpretation of progress.” Todd May (1955) points to
Foucault in the following passage, where he relates the idea that history might be thought of as
“a kind of error.” Such an error, May argues, engages positive as well as negative social forces
and d incorporates alternating elements of domination and interpretation, which challenge
dominant progressive narratives built on assumptions of historical continuity:
“The will to knowledge is not merely a desire to know, a desire for understanding,
although it is that too. Entwined with this desire for understanding is a desire for
appropriation, a desire to seize the means of understanding and mold them to
interpretation. Thus, since knowledge and interpretation are inseparable (indeed all
knowledge is an interpretation), the distinction between wanting to know and making an
interpretation cannot be made….The will to knowledge is a domination that is at the
same time a will to interpretation. Knowledge does not stand outside the fray in order to
produce its truth; it is not an observation from above, but a weapon used below:
‘knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.’ (Foucault, 1977:154)
And genealogy is the record of those forces which have had their hand upon the knife.”44
actors. Revolutionary politics and Marxist theories of conflict and social change were on this basis
rejected. Thus, they acquired the reputation among Marxist scholars as being “conservative.”
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History, in other words, should not be interpreted as a linear phenomenon that unfolds across a
continuous and uninterrupted line of progress, resulting in the terminus of the present. “Natural
history,” as it was traditionally identified, was according to Foucault, “nothing more than the
nomination of the visible.”45 As a result, the area of visibility where observation assumed its
powers “defines natural history’s condition of possibility.” Non-linear history, on the other hand,
suggests alternative conditions of possibility, where history is understood to be punctuated by
numerous anonymous social forces that are discontinuous, not in alignment, and thus are not
always predictable.
Deleuzian ontology takes Foucauldian ontology one step further, as Deleuze’s transcendental
empiricism challenges the very conditions of possibility of sense experience and observation,
particularly where this relates to events and bodies. Whereas Foucault’s empirical critique
emphasizes discontinuity, even as he retains the body, Deleuze emphasizes difference,
dissimilarity, and variation when it comes to each individual event and encounter. The concept of
“event,” as he understands it, bears upon my own conceptualization of the term, as I will argue
later that events in connection with war are distinguishable and unique, even as they remain
unbounded. Both Foucault and Deleuze suggest here that there is a need for interpretive methods
to describe a “process” without the resort to concepts that are linear, fixed and rigid. Philosophy,
in their view, employs concepts to express events, which Patton (1997) suggests may provide a
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means to “engage with everyday social and historical reality in a manner which would challenge
received ideas about the nature of events.” 46
Patton points to Deleuze’s concept of event, as expressed in The Logic of Sense, where he cites
Deleuze’s argument that the Stoics were the first to create a philosophical concept of the event,
described as '... an incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure
event which inheres or subsist in the proposition.' Patton illustrates with his own example:
“a knife opening up a wound in flesh is an attribute of the interpenetration of bodies, but
the event of 'being cut' is what is expressed by the statement 'He was cut with the knife'.
The fact of being cut is a property of neither the flesh nor the knife, it is an incorporeal
attribute of the flesh. It is an event which may be expressed in a variety of ways, for
example in the statement that ‘he has a wound.’ On this account, events are the
epiphenomena of corporeal causal interactions: they do not affect bodies and states of
affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses and actions of agents. Pure
events are both the expressed of statements and the 'sense' of what happens.”47
In this instance Patton’s phenomenological reading imbricates the concept of event with wound.
Bowden (2011) undertakes a reading of the same passage, though his interpretation finds in
Deleuze’s reading that the Stoics were “the first philosophers to consider events as ontologically
irreducible to 'things,' whether material or ideal" (Bowden, 2011).48 This particular reading puts
emphasis on the idea that they (Stoics) identified two realms of being: the first denoting the
material realm of bodies and states of affairs, with the second referring to the incorporeal realm
of events. Bodies and events conceived as such suggest multiple ontologies of being. Patton’s
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phenomenological interpretation, by way of contrast, evokes concepts of event and embodiment
that evoke a relational ontology of intercorporeal penetration. Bowden’s reading, on the other
hand, is more suggestive of Deleuze’s ontology of becoming, posited as a post-biological
threshold that does not individuate bodies and subjects. Now, by reading Foucault through
Deleuze, one might arrive at an understanding of history and event as the “doubling of
emergence,” where history sums up the past even as it shapes how people might live and act in
the future. This is because for Deleuze, history represents a “fold” or a series of surfaces through
which different foldings and unfoldings produce a new relation of being.
Knowledge making projects very clearly then are not linear in terms of their operation; likewise,
they are not objective, neutral undertakings. Referring back to May’s example, the knowledge
and interpretation to which Foucault refers belongs to the realm of power, which manifests as the
will to dominate and control. The distinction that Foucault makes between knowledge “made for
cutting” as opposed to “understanding” is an important one that bears on my study, because of
the violence that is implicit in cutting methods. Knowledge made for cutting correlates with
empirical methods and the cut of measure; knowledge made for understanding refers to
hermeneutic methods of interpretation. In the case of the former, Foucault acknowledges the
violent epistemology inherent in the knowledge making process. This distinction as well as the
epistemological violence it entails, I will argue later, tends to escape observation because of
methodological positivism’s need to appear ethical.
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Feminist Methods
This research shares common ground with other feminist work on war and militarism. Scholars
have noted these developments in work that spans a wide spectrum of topics that focus on
everything from hegemonic masculinity to the gendered dimensions of violence in connection
with war (Enloe, 2000, 1993; Davis, 2005, 2007; Mckelvey, 2007). Comparatively, they
represent a small subset of experts, who have made military issues and problems a central part of
their work. It’s as if to talk about war is to talk “the boys talk.” Yet in avoiding the subject,
whether it is by choice or the disciplining of disciplines, women and women’s voices have been
marginalized on a topic that is of global significance. Having said this, I would be remiss if I did
not note that when it comes to issues of gender and war, there is a noticeable division of labor
reflected in terms of published scholarship.
According to Chris Hables Gray (1997) “wars do make men.”49 And to this I might add —they
make women too. Despite this, the body politics of war and self-sacrifice do not admit women as
equal opportunity casualties. And so my research aims to call attention to what amounts to an
embodied “soft” form of gendered supremacism. For even though women play a prominent role
in the contemporary constitution of the military’s armed forces, their sacrifices are often
diminished and sometimes are not even recognized. Erasing women’s bodies, I find, serves a
purpose and a function: it makes it easier for wounded male soldiers to locate themselves within
the military service status hierarchies – he is the one who sacrifices life, limb, and body for cause
and country. Redemption stories based on the myth of male sacrifice are, of course, long
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established. They take on many different forms and operate through different discourses. The
symbolic marker of the wound becomes incorporated into self-making projects, which
importantly enables them to distinguish themselves from inferior Others – women in addition to
others located at the bottom of social ladders. They do so as men, wounded but empowered to a
degree, even as they occupy precarious positions that may be socially located barely a rung
above such others.
My research here calls attention to these different social dynamics, although my intentions are to
emphasize heterogeneity and discontinuity in the breaking and making of bodies in connection
with war. Consequently, my work reflects overlap with the concerns of body studies theorists,
whose work I review more extensively in the chapter that follows this one. In addition to these
feminist objectives, I aim to articulate a theory of violence, where the ontological importance of
violence to the making of male and female bodies functions at the level of identity and in terms
of affect. Specifically, I focus on the institutional practices, military as well as medical, that
cultivate male participation in what amounts to a “cult of violence,” which confers social honor
upon men, whose status seeking behavior is too often accomplished at the risk of harming others.
The issue of gender as it pertains to war, injury, and medical practice thus represents a key area
of inquiry. Yet while I will call attention to these issues, I also aim to move beyond them in an
effort to demonstrate the relevance of masculine epistemologies to making war and making
bodies. Social reproduction feminists, as was stated earlier, aimed to explore the conditions of
possibility for labor power to become transformed (Vogel, 1983).50 This study, however, does
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not confine itself to a Marxist analysis of labor power; rather, it calls upon a wider range of
theories, feminist theories among them, to explain the biopolitical social dynamics that render
combat injury discontinuously productive, reproductive, and pro-creative. Consequently, it is not
enough to talk about labor power here in the traditional sense. What is important is to look at the
different ways a body might be put to labor, considering how the means to do so now are
potentially vastly accelerated by war and organized violence working in concert with medicine.
Combat injuries are emblematic of how a body might be broken down and re-assembled again.
Soldiers used as test subjects are medically laboring bodies; knowledge taken from their bodies
enters into what I have stated I will theorize is a circuit of relations. As such, this research aims
to understand how combat injury functions as part of a political economy, where labor power is
biologically, socially, and generationally produced in connection with war. This is why, for
example, social identity theory alone is insufficient to trace the rapidly changing gendered
contours of these developments, which cannot be confined to male and female bodies. Fully
articulated gendered bodies are not necessarily produced by the present moment in capitalism,
and so a new theory is needed to explain social and human transformation.
War is SCUM
Valerie Solanas, writing at the height of the Vietnam War, expressed a unique if not drastic
vision of a world without war when she conceived “the Society for the Cutting Up of Men”
(SCUM). I call upon her radical critique, which might also be read as a critique of war, as I
theorize and advance my own criticism of war's impact on the gendered body. Using “cutting”
words and decidedly more colorful language than I do, Solanas imagined a world without war; a
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world she envisioned might be realized by establishing what she called "the Society for the
Cutting Up of Men (SCUM)." The central argument of this work, of course, was that men ruined
the world, leaving only women to fix it. As for war, she was clear about the role men played:
they were compensating for not being female, as they were intent only on one thing — getting
their “Big Gun off.”
The feminist vision that my work conveys demands we rethink the problem of war through a
focus on the body; this requires a feminist epistemology and methodology — a feminist theory
of war — one that can break down gendered ways of knowing that undergird the logic and ethics
of not only war, but as I also illustrate medicine. In suggesting this ontological turn, I return the
problem of war to an analytical ground more traditionally associated with women – to the body
and life itself. I argue that war's human terrain demonstrates how institutions do not aim fully
assimilate and/or incorporate female identity- one of the assumptions of progressive politics - but
to distinguish it, even as the identity becomes unstable, so as not to discard it as a productive
mechanism of social control. Military and medical institutions, I argue, work together to
facilitate their social reproduction through means that approximate techno-industrial
procreation - a process that historically and perhaps now more than ever depends on the
mutilation, suffering, and cutting up of men.
This research has implications here for gender theory, as my framing of the problem of war as a
problem of the body does not rely exclusively on the more classic identity critique of “boys” and
“girls” bodies. The theory of violence I conceive explains war and wounding as a circulation of
capitalism which has become accelerated under neoliberalism, as it increasingly demonstrates it
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no longer needs to produce distinctly articulated bodies. Bodies, I argue, are progressively
undone and valued on the basis of their pieces and parts; whole bodies are not essential nor are
they always essentialized. With that, it is through this effort to link war with subjective,
ontological, corporeal, psychological, and affective social dynamics, that I make a feminist case
for why it is essential to understand the wounded body and war for social theory in these times.
Military & Medical Masculinity: Fragile Men, Fragile Bodies
This work in many respects tells a story of how elite men, men we might think of as the “Great
Men of War” and the “Great Men of Medicine, essentially worked together to help launch a
revolution, so to speak, in military and medical affairs (RMA).51 Overlapping institutional
hierarchies significantly contributed to the development of medical knowledge making practices,
which helped to create and foster ongoing power arrangements that were further supported by
reciprocal acts of maintaining/tearing-down social identities based on race, class, and gender.
Surgery in particular became a vehicle for a male gaze hat was focused on war and the
domination of bodies. Surgery as a practice helped surgeons mark their social status and
establish them as an authoritative subjectivity.
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On another level, it is quite simply a story about men, their fragile bodies, and fragile
subjectivity. To be sure, women have sustained injury in combat; although, it cannot be disputed
that for the largest part of U.S. history, the vast majority of casualties have been men. Gendered
values of physical strength and bravery associated with male identity are, furthermore,
contributive to the social reproduction of violence that functions on both the structural and
interpersonal levels of social interaction. In view of this, medical research not surprisingly
focused its efforts on attending to the problem of the wounded male body. Trauma research
follows a similar pattern, as it too reflects a pronounced gender bias that conforms to a
longstanding trope in the literature, where the “trauma hero” is almost always a man – a man
whose body is in pain, and often in pieces, who suffers for us all. This discourse, I will argue, is
consequential to the political economy of injury, to the extent that it functions as part of an affect
economy that legitimizes violence as means to solve problems: fragile men are compelled to take
up guns in order to save the world by killing everyone. In the United States, perhaps more than
other countries, this discourse remains powerful to such an extent it arguably informs the
socialization of males in general, but especially males in American society, where hypermasculinity, male violence, dominance, and gun worship inform the culture to its great
detriment, such that the U.S. now claims the highest rates of death by gun violence in the
industrialized world.
If we were to think of these cultural dispositions as occurring on a spectrum, military masculinity
stands out at the far end of one pole. Not surprisingly, military masculine identity is an achieved
status that might be shown to be accomplished through sanctioned forms of gendered violence,
including rape and murder, all of which produce war casualties that I will argue occur within a
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social matrix that remains malleable and is subject to change. Violence, however, should not be
seen here as being confined to representational body politics; one must, I think, also evaluate its
material and affective impacts, which I will do later as part of an effort to theorize the
relationship between violence, bodies, subjectivity, and war. By many accounts, violence
facilitates a form of social rebirth for many men―a birth I might add that is significantly
accomplished without the need for a woman or a mother, and thereby reactively preserves war as
an exclusively masculine field of endeavor. Violence might thus be thought of as self-actualizing
in the act of reproducing itself; it is in this sense auto affective.52
Considering how most wars are fought by men and that war is on some level murder, I suggest
we think about mass casualties through the work of sociologist, Michael Kimmel, who argues
that mass murderers are almost always men. Kimmel explains in his book Guyland that when
boys grow into men, “they learn that they are entitled to feel like a real man, and that they have
the right to annihilate anyone who challenges that sense of entitlement.”53 War hero narratives,
I want to point out, play a part in that socialization process; they encourage men to achieve
rugged self-definition, independence, strength, and a sense of purpose through violence. Military
service and war fighting represent the pinnacle of this ideal. Male subjectivity is normatively
achieved through the violent subjugation of those who are assumed to made of weaker substance.
Women thus have traditionally been easy targets. That rape is the most commonly deployed
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weapon of mass destruction goes without saying; such a crime demonstrates the need for fragile
men to declare sexual ownership over women’s bodies. The record of rape committed by U.S.
soldiers has been consistent over time. As a group, they are no more “civilized” now than they
were in past wars.
Yet in our contemporary time, we can see how hyper-violent masculinity, facilitated by war and
militarism, works across the terrain of human endeavor. Military masculinity flourishes not only
in the military, but in social spaces that are configured far outside the boundaries of military
institutions. Medical schools, hospitals, college campuses, court rooms, and board
rooms ― almost everywhere women are subjected to sexual harassment― one can observe trace
evidence of military patriarchal social structures flourishing. In such places, the violent practice
of dominating women’s bodies has become infrastructural to institutional operations.54
Consequently, it matters not whether one is located in the barracks or on the battlefield—the
body will be taken as a trophy. Too often this body is a woman’s body; it remains a coveted
object; the ultimate signifier of armed conquest.
Gender and Desire
Overturning the history that traffics in the drug of normalized masculine violence is no easy task.
War and wounding are deeply woven into the U.S. social fabric of nationalist fantasy and mythmaking. Affective narratives of desire, nevertheless, might be shown to evolve over the course
time. In the present time, they remain a prized trope in the cannon of made-up stories Americans
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tell themselves about their exceptionalist role in the world – guardians of freedom and
democracy. That this is done as part of an effort to preserve tenuous claims to individual and
national self-hood, which must at all costs remain intact (despite evidence to the contrary) will be
shown to be an illusion. Both the war hero and trauma hero narratives traffick in the trope of the
injured hero, where injury can be both physical as well as moral. This hero is almost always
vindicated as morally superior, virtuous, and just – he is the “good guy with the gun.” Again, we
are almost always talking about men here — men whose sacred calling is to inflict chaos, injury,
and death on the evil doers of the world.
Undoing Gender
In training a feminist perspective on this subject matter, I recognize there is also a need to move
beyond issues of concern with gender identity. Ontological distinctions based on competing
dualisms, i.e. black, white; male, female, are easily proven to be unstable. My analysis will thus
on one level set aside concerns with “boys and girls bodies” in order to focus on developments
that demonstrate the increasingly complex ways that war objectifies and produces bodies across
a more diverse relational spectrum. Fixed identities and gendered notions of personhood, thus,
while they may be superficially meaningful to many, cannot alone sufficiently explain the
contradictions of embodiment and subjectivity when it comes to war. Battlefield scars can
themselves be put to labor in ways that both reify and obliterate gender, and thereby challenge
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the very idea of “who makes and who is made.” 55 Gender critique then, particularly identitybased critique, must therefore adapt in order to be relevant.
In spite of these developments, gendered ideals of what constitutes an ideal male and female
body remain and are not easily displaced. Moreover, I find they are deeply embedded in the
interpretive fames that inform our understanding of wounded subjectivity and embodiment.
Hegemonic understandings about masculinity, which include ideologies of rugged individualism
and independence, infuse as well as structure injury and rehabilitation narratives. Notions of the
ideal man, the ideal woman, and even the ideal wounded soldier are concomitantly bound up in
what it means to have and be a body that is injured in war. This is why contrary to the politics of
gender egalitarianism that proliferates in our present time― politics that promote “equal
opportunity” for women to serve alongside men and inflict injury, torture, and suffering upon the
bodies of others― it is still generally accepted that “real men” bring the pain. Women, by way of
contrast, are pain; their bodies and embodiment are historically associated with childbirth.
Women give life. Men take life.
These narratives, as the cases illustrate, are subject to be disrupted, as bodies and their parts
cannot always be mapped neatly onto dichotomous understandings of gender. I explore these
contradictions when I look at the different body productions manufactured by war. So, for
example, the idea of a masculine body as fixed, self-governing, independent, and powerful,
opposed over and against a feminine body, constituted as weak, dependent, and helpless, subject

Donna Haraway. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- Feminism in the Late
Twentieth Century.” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge,
1991: p. 219.
55

87

to analysis, reveals this might be easily be subverted and broken down. In light of this, I think it
might be better for purposes of analysis to consider how wounded soldiers are potentially
“moving subjects.”56 The physical and emotional changes they undergo as bodies and subjects
can be better understood by refusing terms that imply fixity, favoring instead concepts of
fluidity, indeterminacy, and multiplicity.57
I listed here a number of problems that a feminist methodology might address, beyond the
obvious of which is to call attention to the near erasure of women’s voices and experiences from
war. However, it is my goal to overcome the limitations of more traditional feminist analysis of
social identity by embracing more dynamic open-ended theoretical frameworks. Feminist
methods can inform a robust critique, although the task here is not merely to render women’s
subjectivity and experiences visible. War, militarism, and violence are woven into the fabric of
social life. In recognition of this, my feminist narrative makes the political personal and grounds
the problem of war in the body and life itself. I am suggesting that we think about war and
combat injury as part of an affective relational ontology, where embodied social encounters are
understood to be shaped by violence across different typographies and scales. Institutional level
policy conversations about structural violence must be informed by a more complex
understanding that takes into account intimate, individual-level, embodied social interaction.
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In light of this, I aim to further demonstrate how gender and the notional excluding war from
domestic and private spaces operates as part of a military logic to control bodies through
biopower. Looking at medical subjectivity becomes important then, because it helps illustrate
how war, gender, and violence might be imaginatively intertwined. In the case studies that
follow, I discuss how capitalism evolved to obviate the need to produce a distinctly articulated
whole body. Over the course of time, bodies were increasingly valued on the basis of their pieces
and parts; whole bodies were rendered less essential, even as they continued to be essentialized.
Returning war to the terrain of the human body, linking foreign conflicts with domestic social
spaces, showing how war is being waged within and through bodies — all are objectives that are
central to my feminist critique. In doing so, I am able to open the door to thinking about how
other forms of violence can be seen to conform with similar logic. Combat injury and violence,
which I subsequently demonstrate operates within medical institutions, can be similarly linked to
other social spaces not traditionally linked to war: school shootings, psychological terror, street
violence, incarceration, human slavery, the trafficking in women— all offer testimony to the
permeability of boundaries where war is concerned; all produce rosters of victims that might on
some level be understood as war casualties.
Finally, without reifying the opposition of domestic/public, masculine/feminine, mind/body,
human/non-human, self/other, and inside/outside, I use case data to help shift the focal point of
debate about war away from the terrain favored by traditional conflict and international relations
theorists, who have tended to view war as a state-centered phenomenon. Traditionally, many of
these theorists have defined war and violent conflict as a phenomenon that occurs on battlefields
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and between nation states. As a feminist, I am arguing for an understanding that respects nonlinear topography, where war’s powers of invasion are diversely focused and include the intimate
spaces of the body. Briefly put, I aim to convey a richer understanding of war by considering the
different ways the body might be received given its intimate relationship to war.
Of course, one latent danger in all of this is that I am unavoidably engaging in a “criticism” of
the wounded themselves. Such a move is bound to provoke dismay and disapproval from those
whose preference is to indulge in hagiographic celebration of soldiers, where their lives and
sacrifices are put on a pedestal to such an extent that they are beyond criticism. Critique, I should
emphasize, is not the same as criticizing. The challenge here lies in subordinating the ideological
imperative of celebrating “duty” and “service,” replacing them with reasoned critique that might
succeed where worship fails.
Outline
Preliminary inquiries suggested four problem areas might be examined. First, there is the
problem of war and history. I situate the problem of combat injury within a historical material
context, as I move to consider how war impacts not only the social organization of medicine but
also the bodies that become caught up in overlapping institutional practices. In documenting
these interaction effects, I set the stage for a general inquiry that asks: what kinds of knowledge
might be produced by these encounters? The aim here, as was the case with Marx’s historical
materialist inquiry, was to reveal that things (including humans) are not as they appear.58
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Consequently, I find as a result of documenting this unique chain of material relations, I am able
to bring into greater focus how a domestically affiliated institution like medicine was able to
accrue significant benefit from war. Material changes in bodies are also documented and shown
to be taken up within this process. The bodies of wounded soldiers are thus shown to serve as a
material nexus for medical knowledge production.
Second, there are problems in connection with bodies that I investigate, which result from them
being targeted as objects of military strategy and practice. This leads me to explore other
problems as this relates to problems of ontology, and epistemology. This leads to a third
problem, that of violence, which leads to ethical problems that cut across institutions. Violent
epistemologies – ways of knowing that I will demonstrate are materially significant to ways of
seeing as well as making — are not only constitutive of institutional social dynamics, they also
constitute bodies and create other forms of contradiction that are critical to how these different
institutional orders (military & medical) reproduce themselves. War, through the forces of
violence, transformed them together. Case analysis examines how knowledge frameworks
produced by the dynamic interplay of war and medicine operate as political economy, where
biomedical and scientific knowledge were produced in such a way as to effectively “make”
bodies to fulfill the needs of capital and profit. Likewise, I aim to document the ethical
contradictions that result when institutional advance is predicated upon an ethic of violence.

Marx to explain this relation and call upon others, including Foucault, to explain the anatomopolitcs and
biopolitcs of this relation.
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Finally, in what constitutes a fourth problem, I look at combat injury discourse as part of an
effort to understand how heroic narratives function within the political economy of injury to
produce an affect economy of desire. These discourse, I argue, work to inhibit the production of
alternative critical discourses as this pertains to combat injury. There has been a tendency here
(especially among historians, but also sociologists) to not only limit critique, but to focus on the
cause-effect linear aspects of event sequencing, which precludes understanding of how what are
thought to be non-material social dynamics, like affect and desire, are in fact part of the material
political economy of war. There is, I find, a deferential tone that overhangs these narratives,
which betray a tendency to dwell in the cultural trappings of legend and mythos. “American
Celebration” narratives, to borrow C. Wright Mills term, and more recently “Wounded Warrior”
narratives here evoke different forms of the Horatio Alger myth to tell the story of war and
combat injury. They follow a predictable narrative arc, where the wounded overcome injury
through their own heroic efforts. In what amounts to a veritable physical rebirth, they are shown
to achieve transcendence through a combination of rehabilitation and technological
enhancement. These redemption narratives, what Casandra Crawford refers to as “prosthetized
rebirth,” are problematic for reasons that they are at their core non-critical. The time period after
World War II has been especially damaging in this regard.
This particular mythic world view has been critiqued by sociologists focused on problems of
social mobility, where aspirational desires may conflict with mobility ladders. While narratives
that traffick in notions of rugged individualism (i.e. self-made man narratives) may be normative,
they tend to conflict with narratives that social cohesion and community. For similar reasons,
gender norms that cultivate performances derived from hegemonic masculinity are potentially
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also problematic. I point to these narratives in my evaluation of how the social identities of
soldiers may be influenced by these narratives, particularly as social roles and identities changed
over time in connection with developments in political economy under neoliberalism.59 Four

Throughout this study, I use the term “neoliberalism.” Though the term may be widely used, it means
different things to different people. Thus, it requires some clarification. I developed by understanding from
David Harvey. As a former student of his, I appreciate his point that it is important to distinguish
neoliberalism as a theory and practice. In his book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, he says
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory, but it is also a political-economic project,” one which
adheres to operating practices advocated by a corporate capitalist class. Superficially, these practices
reflect an ideology that human well-being can be advanced by “liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets, and free trade.” The role of the state, as he describes it, is to “create and preserve an
institutional framework appropriate to such practices.” Towards the end of the 20th century, during the
1960’s and 1970’, Harvey maintains that the capitalist class felt increasingly threatened, politically and
economically, efforts were made to curb the power of organized labor. It was in response to this that the
capitalist class developed a multi-faceted strategy —political, economic, and ideological—in order to curb
the power of labor. Out of this, he says, emerged the political project of neoliberalism.
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Others, like Wendy Brown draw from both Foucault’s treatment of governmentality and Marx’s analysis of
capitalism to articulate her understanding of neoliberalism as a governing philosophy, which she
understands “economises” everything, including politics and democracy. Brown says neoliberalism
reduces social relations to market relations, and thereby compels humans to behave as market actors.
Importantly here, she points that unlike older Marxist depictions of capital’s transformation of everyday
life, neoliberalism construes non-wealth generating spheres (i.e. learning, dating, exercising) in market
terms, submits them to market metrics, and governs them with market techniques and practices. Under
this formation, people are treated as human capital, who must constantly tend to their own present and
future value.
The ideological aspects of neoliberalism are interrogated by Corey Robin points out that the term was
originally coined by a group of mostly conservative free market intellectuals, who met in Paris in 1938 at
the Colloque Walter Lippmann; they were interested in finding a way to counter the rise of democratic
socialism and welfare-state liberalism in Western Europe and the United States. Eventually, that group
would coalesce after World War II as the Mont Pelerin Society, with Friedrich Hayek at the intellectual
helm.” He goes on to say that while the term is most often associated with conservative “right” politics in
the U.S., it is also associated with “the name that a small group of journalists, intellectuals, and
politicians on the left gave to themselves in the late 1970s in order to register their distance from the
traditional liberalism of the New Deal and the Great Society.” Neoliberalism also refers to a doctrine of
governance; one that as Harvey points out, came into being in the latter part of the 20th century. Citing
Charles Peters’ 1983 "A Neoliberal's Manifesto," Robin says the work “inspired the first generation of
neoliberal Democrats, who sought to distinguish themselves from traditional Democratic Party liberalism”
Yet whereas Harvey makes an effort to distinguish the different conceptual aspects of the term, and
Robin takes care to trace the term’s ideological history, others have been less careful and often prone to
conflate neoliberalism and capitalism. New Yorker columnist, Jonathan Chait (to whom Robin addresses
his critique) is dismissive of the term, as he refers to it as “the Marxist epithet for open capitalist
economies.” There is a tendency, as Robin says, for people to dismiss the term as meaningless jargon,
among the “made-up words leftists use to abuse liberals like Chait.”
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Mainstream use of the term neoliberalism, for the most part, understands neoliberalism as referring to a
system or an economic order that values individualism, rational choice, unfettered free markets,
privatization, and deregulation. Although, this understanding refers more the doctrine of neoliberalism as
differentiated from the philosophy of classical “liberalism”—the latter being a state-centered philosophy
that calls for regulated capitalism, where it is managed by the institutions of civil society. Thus, whereas
capitalism is often understood to refer to a belief in sanctity of free markets and individual private
property; this notion is again more appropriately attributed to “liberalism.”
Classical “liberalism” characteristically favors state regulation of markets and the economy; whereas,
neoliberalism cleaves to the view that society prospers best when markets are liberated from government
intervention and individuals are free to make their own self-determined rational choices. Alternatively,
neoliberalism (again in theory not always in practice) advocates for limited government. Market rule is
characteristically preferred over state rule. Strong private property rights, increased competition and open
exchange (free markets and free trade) are understood to be the ideal means to create knowledge and
distribute wealth. The role of the state is to create and preserve institutional frameworks, which may be
appropriate and facilitate such practices.
Neo-liberalism, as explained by William Deresiewicz, “tends to reduce all values to money values; the
worth of a thing is the price of a thing; the worth of a person is the wealth of the person.” In this respect,
neoliberalism summons a belief in market mechanisms to cure all social problems. But to solve problems,
governments must remove all controls that prevent the unfettered accumulation of capital. The preferred
means to do this is through policies and practices that are oriented toward privatization (transfer of the
public commons to private ownership), deregulation of financial markets, and other policies that enhance
the accumulation of finance capital through banks, hedge funds, etc.
Philip Mirowski argues similarly that there is a tendency to confuse the two governing philosophies
(classical liberalism and neoliberalism) by over-simplifying them and identifying them with misguided
notions of left-right politics. Liberalism, he says, is often negatively associated with the failed policies of
the “welfare state,” whereas neoliberalism and its incumbent austerity policies are thought to be the
corrective to liberalism. Michel Foucault, whose work I discuss later, of course famously critiqued
neoliberalism and classic liberalism in his series of lectures published as The Birth of Biopolitics. Mirowski
challenges Foucault’s use of the term “neoliberalism” in way that is potentially helpful. According to
Mirowski, “if such a thing [neoliberalism] does indeed exist, it is far too uneven and inconsistent to count
as a serious analytical category; attempts to provide an intellectual history and conceptual of the
movement are in vain.” This, I should point out, is not the same as saying Foucault’s critique is without
merit. There is much rather that we might take from Foucault’s interpretation, even as we remain mindful
of the dangers of reification. Such a term, it is argued, conjures a plethora of meanings and
interpretations too diverse to warrant capture by the use of one term. William Deresiewicz, “The
Neoliberal Arts: How College Sold its Soul to the Market,” The Atlantic, 2015. Mirowski & Plehwe, “Making
of the Neoliberal Thought Collective,” 2009; and Philip Mirowski, “Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste:
How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown.” Verso Books, 2013.
Given the contradictory meanings of the term, I want to make clear that I use the term in a manner that is
consistent with both Harvey and Robin to describe the dynamic aspects of contemporary developments in
political economy. I am particularly interested to use it to underscore changes that I am arguing were
brought about by war that further reflect economic developments in particular time periods. I argue, for
example, that core concepts associated with classical liberalism and humanism (i.e. “freedom,” “liberty,”
and the rights of the “liberal subject”) during the New Deal era were subverted by neoliberalism, such that
now notions of who is a good soldier are easily conflated with a welfare state and warfare state that have
become one and the same. These changes have been so dramatic that now the meaning of the word
itself – neoliberalism – is becoming undone to the point that its core concepts are signified by their
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decades of neoliberalism have made it difficult to engage deeply with critical concepts and ideas
that might call attention to how the problem of combat injury is not only a problem of the
individual; it is also a problem of society.
The interplay of problems and social dynamics that I call attention to here are perhaps strangely
reminiscent of a problematic previously suggested by Herbert Marcuse, whose work underscored
a fundamental contradiction of capitalism, where there is an inherent conflict “between the work
of national defense and the work for corporate gain.”60 The material needs of both, as I will
demonstrate, may be continuously and discontinuously aligned. Materially significant
distinctions that demarcate institutional boundaries are simultaneously shown to be subject to
break-down. And so to it follows the boundaries of the body are similarly being reorganized and
may be blurred. Tracing the impact of these multi-level institutional configurations (military and
medical) on key developments in medicine here helps inform a biopolitical analysis of how this
political economy also functions as a medical governance of control.
These issues, I want to argue, are not unrelated to developments in research methods in the social
sciences. They lead me to further question the relationship of methodological positivism to war

opposite. That is to say, the core principles of classical liberalism, under neoliberalism, are now used to
justify hierarchy, oppression, violence, and war.
For more on this, refer to David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005) Additionally, refer to Harvey’s article in Jacobin Magazine, “Neoliberalism is a Political
Project.” Downloaded from: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/david-harvey-neoliberalismcapitalism-labor-crisis-resistance/ Last accessed August, 2016. Likewise, refer to Wendy Brown’s
(2015) book, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books) and
Corey Robin’s blog post: “When Neoliberalism Was Young.” Downloaded from Robin’s blog:

http://coreyrobin.com/2016/04/27/when-neoliberalism-was-young-a-lookback-on-clintonismbefore-clinton/ Last accessed April, 2016.
Herbert Marcuse, One –Dimensional Man: Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London:
Routledge 1964: p. 9.
60
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and military history by asking: what kinds of knowledge might be produced by these encounters?
War, I found, played a socializing role within the discipline, to the extent that it influenced
academic problem conceptualization and problem solving. As a social scientist, it bears
mentioning that I myself am trained to understand that theory and method are always linked.
And so I devote one chapter to looking at the role played by war in shaping social science
methods of inquiry, as this too perhaps constitutes a form of institutional violence. Drawing from
my own first-hand observations of military knowledge production, I demonstrate how research
methods that have been employed in distant war zones are not insignificant to domestically
affiliated academic research projects. Thinking of these different research operations as having
no or limited interaction belies a greater significance that is not recognized. Research in war
zones is well-positioned to shape social science research as both a practice and a discipline.
With that, I suggest in the conclusion that we are moving in the direction of realizing a
radicalized onto-politics of war and political economy. Recent innovations in biomedicine and
biotechnology are effectively implicated in producing not only soldiers’ bodies, but non-human
bodies and populations that do not always coincide with a somatic body. Thus, instead of
understanding soldiers and weapons as bodies and objects as dissimilar discrete entities, I
suggest an alternative conceptualization, where we think of entanglement as a social process and
corporeity as circulation and/or flow. In proposing this theory of the body, I move beyond
looking at simple discrete material relations between, for example, bodies and machines and
humans and prosthetics. I suggest an ontology of the body, where embodied being — the
experience of being in a body — enters into a relationship continuum with other bodies,
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weapons, and objects; one where war and epistemologies of violence are not unfortunate
“accidents,” but are rather becoming salient to the body’s ongoing fashioning.
Contribution

This research is grounded in the vibrant tradition of the sociological imagination that operates
from the imperative to situate everyday life in the complex structures of history and social
power. My work thus helps extend debates in the social sciences about war and socio-political
violence beyond a mere focus on institutions and policy, as it aims to question empirical research
methodology and the boundaries of the discipline itself. I aim to invite wide-ranging readership
among scholars interested in the sociology of the body, science and technology studies,
contemporary theory, medical sociology/anthropology, and critical trauma studies.

The work makes a significant contribution to knowledge on a number of different levels. To
begin, it integrates a contemporary focus on war and social conflict ― subjects that currently
dominate media narratives and foreign policy debates ― into study that addresses mainstream
sociology concerns about social inequality. At the same time, it calls attention to a functional
ethic of violence that informs institutional practice dynamics that are shared between military
and medical organizations. These practice dynamics in turn shaped and continue to shape the
social organization of medicine in ways that finding support the claim for an instrumental role
played by soldiers and combat injury in the political economy of medicine. Fundamental to this
shift has been the radical undoing of bodies in connection with war, which the research
demonstrates constitutes a locus of power from which institutions like medicine effectively
developed and ultimately profited from injury. The unraveling of boundaries and distinctions
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between “inside” and “outside” as well as “human” and “non-human” are shown to be in
dynamic tension, but without reducing these relations to opposition. Likewise, I show how
wounded bodies, through the materiality of their lived experience, which helped demarcate social
divisions, reveal evidence of having been undone in ways that betray their importance to
capitalism’s external as well as internal projects of colonial endeavor.

Showcasing as I do here the different ways war impacts medicine, my scholarship contributes
new perspective to social science studies of medicine and health. Traditionally, biomedical
studies have used the lens of medical imperialism to look at the damage inflicted globally when
Western concepts of health and illness are imposed on the rest of the world. By way of contrast, I
contribute an understanding of how medical imperialism operates in conjunction with the
political economy of war and wounding to facilitate medical practice and progress.
Consequently, I suggest we rethink wounding in light of its importance to the transcendence of
medicine through war and capitalism.
Metcalf’s notion of “war as cancer” is here an apt metaphor, because it invites thinking about the
medicalized aspects of war and wounding. Thus, whereas previously others like Emily Martin
(1994) noted how biomedical professional discourses use language as a symbolic weapon of war
so to speak – injuries and diseases like cancer, for example, are understood as nothing short of a
full-scale “invasion of the body” — my research looks at a reversal of this process. I aim to go a
great deal further to understand how war shapes epistemology - what we can know about
wounding and bodies and ultimately how we might employ this knowledge to engage in the
material practice of making bodies and “life itself.” Thus, my work contributes an analysis of
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the institutional influences, which helped redirect war and military strategy to the terrain of the
human body. Here again, I contribute to theorizing how these changes function within a
biopolitical economy of developments, to the extent that I illustrate war is more than a violent
socio-political phenomenon; it is nothing short of a medical phenomenon entangled with the very
fabric of social life. I show how a soldier’s body— all bodies for that matter— become a site for
the interplay of sociality, militarized power and economic interest.

With that, rather than understanding war as an event waged by one sovereign power or state
against another, pitting body against body, my work contributes an understanding of war as a
social phenomenon waged within and throughout the body. This positions me to argue that
military science is a life science and that life itself might be mobilized for war. Calling attention
to the “anatomical logic” of war in this instance leads to understanding how war facilitates a
medical governance of social control; how it operates as a circulation, where material issues of
political economy imbricate affective economies of desire and control.

Additionally, by underscoring the relevance of war and violent social conflict to medicine, my
research contributes a critical discourse to counter the non-critical “hero” hagiography that too
often now characterizes discourses about war, wounded soldiers, and wounded embodiment.
These discourses are problematic, because they lack the critical nuance, context, and subtlety that
are necessary to inform the kind of debate can lead to political compromise. In shifting focus
away from emotive discourses that celebrate the overcoming of adversity, where injury and
rehabilitation narratives invoke Horatio Alger stories, I redirect emphasis back to the body itself.
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In doing so, I find there are implications here for gender theory. Thus, my work contributes a
feminist analysis by calling attention to the different ways war might be experienced as a
domestic or private affair. Distinctively, my framing of the problem of war through the problem
of the body does not rely exclusively on the more classic identity critique of “boys” and “girls”
bodies. This further informs my theory of violence, which explains wounding as a function of the
political economy of capitalism accelerated under neoliberalism. These developments, I argue,
demonstrate there may no longer be a need to produce distinctly articulated bodies. Bodies, I
demonstrate, are progressively undone and valued on the basis of their pieces and parts; whole
bodies are not essential nor are they always essentialized.

Finally, I should like to point out that my research contributes to the fostering of a critical
discourse, as it seeks to escape a problem that afflicts critical theory in general and writing about
science in particular: it avoids a one-dimensional focus on “negative” critique. Suggesting that
we look at synchronous developments in war and medicine is not the same, however, as
suggesting that we rehabilitate war and violence; neither does it suggest evidence of a militarymedical capitalist conspiracy. Thus, I aim to move beyond linguistic turns and metaphorical
encounters, as I move to consider how a socio-medical phenomenon like war employs violence
to shape the non-human characteristics of being human in modernity.

Herstory Meets Biography
A good social researcher ideally writes about what they know and studies social groups to which
they might easily gain access. I was motivated to pursue this topic for reasons that relate to my
own history. Moreover, I was troubled by the lack of institutional focus and scrutiny in the social
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sciences with regard to addressing the military dimensions of society. The military is like no
other institution. Whereas many would have us believe this institution levels social divisions,
espouses egalitarian ideals, such as those celebrated by liberal democracies, and in the process
creates opportunity for social mobility; I will present evidence that shows it actually does the
opposite. The United States military was founded upon relations of social inequality, insofar as
the military as an institution along with other partners that include the country as a whole
together achieved growth, expansion, and prosperity through orchestrated acts of violence and
war.
The fact that I enter into this area of inquiry as a woman and former Army officer should be
incidental; however, gender is not incidental among the cadre of writers, experts and critics who
claim war and soldiering as their realm of expertise. Notwithstanding recent legislative efforts to
legitimize women’s participation in direct combat, war is understood to be the ultimate proving
ground for men. Men, as such, are historically associated with the realms of life and mind, and
women are confined to the lesser domestic realms, which include the body. Traditional studies of
war, disability, and injury tended to favor male subjectivity, and have thereby effectively
occluded female subjectivity. Masculine epistemologies, not surprisingly then, dominate the way
we think and feel about war. Gender binaries are merely a reflection of mind-body dualisms,
which exert a similar influence over the production of medical knowledge, as injuries that affect
the body are often privileged over injuries that affect the mind.

In the interest of full disclosure then, I should say that as one whose body continues to live out
the experience of adjusting to injury, I draw from this experience to reflexively consider what it
feels like to be in the skin of another —to live a life in a body that is wounded and disabled by
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war. The entangled nature of the social, political, and economic contradictions that I write about
are in this respect embodied in myself as well as my research subjects. I find this adds yet
another dimension to my work, which seeks to understand how not only gender, but also race
and class differences travel on the body and enter domains of social control.
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Chapter III: The Problem of War

War is unequivocally a social problem. Yet it is a problem that inexplicably resides on the
margins of study in the social sciences, particularly in sociology. As for the problem of combat
injury, there is no single literature or academic area of study dedicated to research on the topic; at
best, the subject is interdisciplinary, with studies published across disciplines that include
anthropology, American studies, cultural studies, media studies, and science studies.61 C. Wright
Mills is perhaps the only sociologist with legacy standing who pointed to the problem of war in
society; though he was for various reasons marginalized for many years by his peers with whom
he often engaged in open conflict. An often strident critic of sociology, Mills made an effort to
link the problem of war to institutions, whose interpenetrating influence he wrote about
prolifically in works lie The Power Elite.62 Mills, furthermore, called attention to war’s impact
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Work undertaken by historians, not surprisingly, comprises the largest body of scholarship that takes up
the study of war and violent conflict. Other sub-disciplines that include political science, international
relations, and political economy are also implicated in contributing to the discourse, although the latter
place more emphasis on the role played by states, governments, and disembodied rational actors, where
they are looked at as the primary unites of analysis. More recently, it is not uncommon in the literature to
see where some researchers are developing algorithms and using quantitative methods to “predict” war
and conflict. Descriptive accounts of war, I want to point out, constitute a discourse that tends to be eventdriven; the bracketing of dates are among the discursive sign-posts used to document a given war’s
theoretical beginning, duration, and end. Quantitative studies of war have also been undertaken by
economists and political scientists, who have attempted to encode social factors as variables (i.e.
“democracy” and “ethnic diversity”) in an effort to see how the might serve as effective determinants of
war prevalence. See Ebrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution, (Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002: pp. 307-334). Their empirical analysis was intended to
demonstrate that the prevalence or amount of war observed at any given time is important. In this case,
they define war prevalence as the probability of observing either a new war onset or the continuation of
an ongoing war or both. Their study employs two economic theories of war, onset and duration, which are
combined to estimate the prevalence of civil war across more than 150 countries and over 40 years.
Findings reported here indicate that democracy and ethnic diversity are significant determinants of civil
war prevalence.
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C.W. Mills. The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, 1956.
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on the discipline of sociology itself by pointing out its influence on research methods and subject
matter focus.
The oversight here reflects a general trend in sociology, where military studies and problems that
impact military affiliated groups are not a core area of focus. Such studies, when they are
undertaken, tend to be restricted to a small group of well-funded specialists focused on
institutional problem solving. Recent empirical study has looked at problems within the
Veterans Administration itself, calling attention to bureaucratic failures and its impact on
families (Wool, 2015). In some cases, the disabled veterans themselves are problematized
Gerber, 2012). The interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter area means scholars and experts
from diverse fields, including science studies and cultural studies are employing critical
methodologies to engage problem solving. David Serlin (2002; 2004) and Heather Perry (2002)
draw from cultural studies of the body, disability studies, and science studies of prosthetics in
their work, which looks at the history of war, wounding, and disability experienced by soldiers
and war veterans. Both authors highlight the role played by social identity dynamics, like gender
and class, and call attention to how this shaped the post-war lives of veteran amputees. John
Kinder (2015) is critical of the medical model of disability. He looks at what he calls “the
veteran problem” within a historical context, tracing how disabled veteran identity has in many
respects been socially constructed since the time period of the U.S. Civil War. The collective
work represented by these authors working across the disciplines contributes an historical as well
as critical vocabulary that aims to situate the problem of disability and veterans within a dynamic
cultural-historical context.
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Perhaps most problematic is that while the war genre itself is not devoid of critique, there is a
noticeable privileging of a gendered discourse that tends to venerate and celebrate organized
violence as a means to solve problems. For lack of another identifier, we might think of it as a
discourse devoted to the study of the history of great men and great wars.63 Gendered discourses
are built on assumptions that talking about war is “men’s” talk. Expert knowledge and
subjective knowledge, moreover, feed into what has become an oft repeated critique of history
and historians, which is that the experience of war almost always reflects the perspective of the
declared winners. The fact that the winners are men need not be acknowledged because it is
assumed.
Notwithstanding sociology’s disciplinary aversion to studying war as a social problem, one
might still argue that mainstream scholarship in sociology indirectly concerns itself with the
problem, even if the links are not always fully explored. Studies in immigration, for example,
are sometimes linked to the problem of forced migration. Deviance and crime studies have
recently started to look at war veterans that have committed crimes, both during and subsequent
to active service; war crimes and torture, however, have received scant recognition. Gender
studies and feminist epistemologies have been used to look at institutional problems that foster
the social conditions that contribute to violence against women. All of these sub-disciplinary
areas of study are equipped with the empirical tools to look at the problem of war. The question
that remains is: why don’t they?
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Although there are many others, the work of John Keegan furnishes an example of this. See A History
of Warfare, Vintage Books, 1994.
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In light of the former, this chapter is organized in three sections. The first section undertakes e a
review of social science approaches to the study of war. Emphasis will be placed on the
evolution of thought paradigms in sociology, although I will briefly review developments in
anthropology and the emerging military and securities studies subfields. The literature as well as
my review of it is presented first and is intended to provide a socio-historical context for the
second section, where I present ethnographic participant observation data I obtained from covert
field research that I conducted in 2012 with the Human Terrain System (HTS).64 My
experiences and data are relevant to the larger study, because they served as window through
which to see first-hand the institutional practice dynamics that the research aims to document.
This sets up the final section of the chapter, where I relate institutional practice patterns and
developments in HTS to developments in the academy and academic disciplines, which I argue
are impacting on empirical research and knowledge-making across the disciplines.
Sociology
Historically, the problem of war has been marginalized in sociology. The “real” social problems
were understood to be in the cities – immigration, crime, and social disorganization. American
sociology was defined in many respects by scholarship produced by the Chicago school, which
focused on the study of racial and ethnic groups to quantify and map urban social problems.
Robert Park among others pioneered urban human ecology studies that featured the use of
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The Human Terrain System was a U.S. government sponsored social science research organization
that until recently conducted social science field research in Iraq and Afghanistan. HTS is interesting to
look at because it offers a practical illustration of how social science research is being adapted for military
purposes.64
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ethnographic research methods. Though not deliberate, one consequence of this is that the
problem of war in society was reduced to mere spectacle ―– a nationalistic side show― not
worthy of empirical study.
Columbia University initiated the “second” empirical turn. In the years leading up to and in the
wake of World War II, its thought leaders launched a wave of studies that were intended to make
sociology more practical and useful. Methodologically, work in this tradition relied primarily on
quantitative analytics. Signaling a decisive break from the tradition of grand theory and
theorizing of abstract social systems, they proposed theories of the “middle range,” which they
combined with random sample surveys to produce estimates of significance and equivalence.
This was how they envisioned sociology might position itself to be of service as an applied
practice. So, for example, quantitative methods and multivariate analysis grounded in symbolic
interactionism were employed to address issues of urban crime and deviance. A point of
emphasis worth noting here is that these developments did not occur organically; rather, they
occurred within a social context influenced by war and the ascendant new industrial capitalism.
World War II in particular provoked renewed interest in “mass society,” group psychology, and
public opinion studies (Orr, 2006).
Sociological concern with the problem of war was, by way of contrast, championed by C. Wright
Mills, who disagreed with his colleagues on important issues. Mills’ celebrated work The
Sociological Imagination makes an important distinction between what he termed are personal
troubles and public issues.65 War, he wrote, might be seen as a private individual matter – a
65

Mills, C.W. The Sociological Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1959] 2000, p. 8.

107

personal trouble; or it might be seen as a public issue. Such issues, he continued, are not defined
in terms of the everyday outlook of ordinary men, but are rather reflected in a crisis in
institutional arrangements. One result of the failure of people to connect the two – personal
troubles and public issues – and history with biography is that we are left with what amounts to
vacant “celebration.” One byproduct of this thinking, according to Mills, was that “fact and idea
are isolated, so the real questions are not even raised.”66
Mills critique here, it should be noted, was as much personal as it was professional. He was
famously dissatisfied as well as confrontational in regards to his fellows, whom he believed were
not sufficiently critical in their work. The celebration of market logic and rational actors was in
his view problematic, as was the failure to problematize the era’s social conformism and
unchecked militarism, all of which was accomplished under the aegis of corporatism and
bureaucratic financialization that were the harbingers of neoliberalism. One result of this, Stanley
Aronowitz points out, is that social science research fell into the embrace of the twin principles
of prediction and falsification; a development that positioned the discipline to eschew critical
theory as part of an effort to serve corporate industrial and military needs.67
The brunt of Mills’ critique was personally directed at his colleague, Robert Merton, who not
unlike Mills was dedicated to integrating the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of
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science. Merton’s middle range theories were grounded in observations of empirical phenomena,
which researchers used to compile data. Early public opinion studies undertaken by Merton and
Lazarsfeld were based on this approach and helped lay the ground work for reference group
theory; a theory that Merton and Kitt later elaborated in their contribution to the Stauffer (1949)
study, The American Soldier. Middle range theories continue to enjoy support in mainstream
sociological theory in the United States. Though it will be argued here that far from merely
aiming to satisfy a need to address the functionalist concerns that characterized their
development, middle-range theories now serve an important symbolic function — they signify
that one is “doing” social science.
Military Sociology
Setting aside for the moment academic rivalries and empirical turns, the post-war period also
saw military sociology become established as a specialized subfield in the United States. The
roots of contemporary military sociology might in fact be traced to World War II era concerns
that gradually gave way to Cold War fears. Unlike their European counterparts, who saw
questions of war and peace as central to understanding social evolution and change, American
military sociologists focused their attention on studies of the military as a social group,
profession and institution – the idea here was to influence institutional core functioning and
development.68 Studies proliferated in four major interest areas: 1) military institutional
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organization and structure (i.e. manpower policy, leadership studies, gender force integration); 2)
civil-military relations; 3) soldiers’ war experiences; and 4) state formation and the use of force
(Segal and Burk, 2012).69
Military studies in sociology tend to be addressed by a small group of specialists. The privileging
of population studies that employ quantitative methodology works to reinforce the position of
these specialists, who are able to leverage their access data. Research tends to be sponsored and
funded by the military/U.S. government with practitioners divided across work sites that
encompass research universities and non-profit groups (i.e. Minerva Program). Corporations like
RAND and research institutions like the University of Maryland and the Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral Sciences are traditional employers of military sociologists.70 71
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Segal and Burk, Military Sociology, Volumes 1-4, 2012. Volume I examines major trends in military
organization, the increased diversity of military forces and the military profession. Volume II considers the
military’s relationships with the larger society, as sociologists seek to examine public perceptions
regarding how the military is woven into the fabric of society (social integration/perception studies).
Volume III addresses the experience of war, in terms of whether or not experience is acquired through
direct contact, such as in the case of combat, or indirect contact mediated by social constructions of
language and other social symbols. Volume IV looks at concepts of force and the varying intensities of
conflict that occur across different force spectrums. Likewise, it examines the effect of war on state
formation as well as problems posed by chronic war, in addition to prospects for peacekeeping.
The mission of RAND Corporation as stated on their proprietary web site states “The RAND
Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and
analysis.” The website makes a further point of emphasizing that “as a nonpartisan organization, RAND is
widely respected for operating independent of political and commercial pressures.” Downloaded from
http://www.rand.org/about/history.html Last accessed January 23, 2013.
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Other federal government-base institutions like the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences, while not academically affiliated, nonetheless, are known to employ standard empirical
research protocols and work in accordance with human subjects ethical guidelines in projects that
encompass a wide range of issues that bear directly on the performance of the military as an institution,
which include: recruitment, soldier performance management, organizational effectiveness, and leader
development.
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This work stands in contrast with research undertaken in War and Peace studies as well as more
recent work in Critical Military studies (MacLeish, 2013). In the case of the latter, there appears
to be only a handful of scholars working on specialized aspects of military topics. There is no
research of a general sociological nature, which looks at the foundational questions of the
discipline in light of war. One might, for example, ask: how can the problem of social inequality
be linked to war? Likewise, how does war exert an impact on sociality and what it means to be
human? Scholarship that looks critically at the problem of how war influences human social
relations has mostly been undertaken by journalists, not academics (Hedges, 2002; Junger,
2010). But even here, there is a tendency to privilege narrative, anecdote, and personal
experience over arguments that employ a research methodology and point to data.
Trends in Methodological Positivism
System level critique in the tradition of Mills has in the present time all but disappeared; a
reflection of how the predisposition to methodological positivism runs now runs throughout the
discipline of sociology as a whole. Patricia Clough (2010) cites George Steinmetz who offers
one possible explanation for this. He accounts for key developments that may have incentivized
sociology as a discipline to move toward studies that privileged positivistic approaches:
“Method and the application of theory in the social sciences continue to be informed by
what George Steinmetz has recently referred to as a ‘methodological positivism,’ or the
various combinations of positivism, empiricism and scientism that serve as the
‘epistemological unconscious’ of Sociology, if not the social sciences generally…..
Steinmetz concludes that in the post-World War II period, Sociology embraced a
positivistic, empiricist, quantitatively oriented methodology, which it developed as it
aimed to be a predictive and usable social science, privileging researchers’ doing
organized full-fledged empirical studies to meet the needs of a Keynesian economy in
regulating business cycles and surveying populations to bring their practices in line with
mass production and mass consumption. Eventually, methodological positivism would
111

allow Sociology to cooperate with U.S. imperialism providing counter insurgency
intelligence in the context of internationalism of states with national economies pressured
to be responsive to modernization.”72
Put differently, the social and intellectual context that fostered a revival for the epistemological
project of methodological positivism in sociology (predictive methods in particular) was in no
small measure driven by the material needs of military-industrial expansion that occurred both
during and after the war.
Mills famously dim view of these developments was presaged in many respects by Randolph
Bourne, whose writing during the time leading up to World War One took similar aim at
academics, who co-opted to support the war effort. Bourne reserved his ire for the Progressive
intellectual movement, as represented by John Dewey. In essays that include “The War and the
Intellectuals,” “A War Diary” and the posthumously published “War is the Health of The State,”
he argued against Progressive support for war.73 This excerpt from “A War Diary” calls attention
to the quasi-state of “military state socialism” that Bourne found to be characteristic of the U.S.
and its economy:
If human resources are fairly malleable into the war-technique, our material resources
will prove to be even more so, quite regardless of the individual patriotism of their
owners or workers. It is almost purely a problem of diversion. Factories and mines and
farms will continue to turn out the same products and at an intensified rate, but the
government will be working to use their activity and concentrate it as contributory to the
war…it will be coercion from above that will do the trick rather than patriotism from
below. Democratic contentment may be shed over the land for a time through the appeal
to individual thoughtfulness in saving and in relinquishing profits. But all that is really
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needed is the co-operation with government of the men who direct the large financial and
industrial enterprises. If their interest is enlisted in diverting the mechanism of production
into war-channels, it makes not the least difference whether you or I want our activity to
count in aid of the war. Whatever we do will contribute toward its successful
organization, and toward the riveting of a semi-military State-socialism in the country. As
long as the effective managers, the big men in the staple industries, remained loyal,
nobody need care what the millions of little human cogs who had to earn their living felt
or thought. This is why the technical organization for this American war goes on so much
more rapidly than any corresponding popular sentiment for its aims and purposes. Our
war is teaching us that patriotism is really a superfluous quality in war. The government
of a modern organized plutocracy does not have to ask whether the people want to fight
or understand what they are fighting for, but only whether they will tolerate fighting. 74
Bourne, in other words, challenged the Progressive narrative of progress, as he argued among
other issues that progress was, in fact, linked to war. Much like Mills, whose work and writing
eventually followed him, he makes an important connection between the social and
psychological mechanisms that shape individual and collective action. Violence, Bourne argues,
is ultimately understood to be a “rational choice,” even a moral choice that the state justifiably
undertakes to solve social problems and conflicts deemed to be in its interest.
Middle Range Theories and Long Range Missiles
Mills’ critique has been validated in many respects and the American celebration continues.
The failure of sociology as a discipline to critique the mid-century’s militarism and social
conformism, much of which was accomplished under the aegis of corporatism and neoliberal
bureaucratic functionalism, is at least partially to blame for where the discipline stands today.
Doubtless, there remains an entrenched dogmatic emphasis on applied theories and methods:
publication, funding, promotion, and tenure are nearly fully contingent upon conformity in many

“A War Diary” was written by Randolph Bourne, and appeared in Seven Arts, Vol. II, September, 1917.
It is available in the Public Domain and is cited in accordance with Fair Use guidelines.
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respects. Middle range theories evolved to fulfill both a practical and symbolic function – they
signify that one is “doing science.” As for Mills other complaint, sociology continues to place
itself in the service of the war machine and the market, as the “modern” era of the discipline is
itself a product of war.
The history of war and the developmental history of the discipline of sociology are related.
Given this history, one might argue middle range theories share one thing in common with longrange missiles: both target populations and populations. Yet whereas one produces mass
casualties, the other counts them. In juxta positioning them, I mean to call attention to how war,
knowledge-making, and research methods operate together in a circulation. As an academic
discipline, sociology furnishes some of the glue that holds it all together. Likewise, it provides
the basis for critique, which can contribute to understanding the interpenetrating social dynamic
of institutions, which might be thought to operate independently of one another. In his critique of
science and power, Aronowitz (1998) calls attention to the violent underpinnings of knowledge
systems that evolve out of techno-scientific regimes of control. This system-level violence, he
says, lies at the heart of how empirical data are created in the first place, insofar as he argues “no
hypothesis is innocent of the telos of design as well as of method.” 75 Middle range theories then
accomplish a great deal more than to simply make social science practical and useful; rather,
they represent an intervention (or as Deleuze might say “a cut” of measure) that ultimately
conditions the purposes for which the research is conducted. Quantitative methods, in this
manner, far from evidencing that they are superior methodologically in revealing empirical
75
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“truth,” often accomplish the opposite: they employ means of averaging, where such averages
are alleged to represent “the social,” whereupon they are subsequently assumed to be fact. 76
Research is in other words “performed” in such a way that it cannot but help attain the ends its
models were designed to achieve.
In the section that follows the next one, I will look at how research methods were both
influenced by and incorporated for practical use by military strategists and researchers. Wartime
data collection and accounting practices, I will argue, were designed to give the appearance of
being rational and empirical, when in fact they were not. Such methods, instead, were employed
in such a way as to objectively render problems in human accounting, so that practitioners might
incorporate the equivalent of labor efficiencies into the kill chain. For now, I want to turn and
look at the discipline of anthropology to briefly review its engagement with war as well as
research methods and practice. Anthropology, as a sub-discipline of the social sciences,
traditionally calls upon qualitative ethnographic methods, although one notes there are important
key differences that surface when compared to sociology.77
Anthropology
Anthropology’s approach to cultural studies stands in marked contrast with sociology’s emphasis
on the study of urban problems and institutions. While there is some element of overlap, given
that there are sociologists who employ ethnographic methods in their work, ethnography and the
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The relative absence of work in sociology that undertakes to examine medicine’s institutional relation to
violence and war will be compensated in my study by engagement with literature across the disciplines,
including history, anthropology, biomedicine, disability studies and cultural studies.
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emic perspective are more traditionally associated with anthropology. Anthropologists like
Margaret Meade, for example, focused research on the study of human belief, customs,
linguistics, personality and meaning-making grounded in observations of local cultural contexts.
Qualitative studies of war and violent conflict have been victim focused—women, children,
indigenous, and displaced populations— where the narratives and perspectives of the powerless
are traditionally privileged over the powerful.
Catherine Lutz, for example, conducted an ethnographic study of a military community located
in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Her (2001) book Homefront: A Military City and the American
20th Century combines historical study with ethnographic interviews, wherein she evaluates U.S.
military basing strategy in light of its impact on the town and its residents. A (2009) book,
The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against Military Posts, presents a series of essays that
look at how and why people around the world rise up to combat U.S. military domination,
through means that involve base and installation politics, as well as training and control of other
country’s military forces. Both books offer critical insight into the different ways the U.S.
military became infrastructural to local economies as it shaped the contours of everyday life.78
Ken MacLeish’s (2013) ethnographic study of Fort Hood, Texas was conducted using similar
methods.79
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More that sociologists, anthropologists have been interested in explaining why violence happens,
how it happens, as well as the actual experience of violence (Povrzanovic, 2003).80 David
Vine’s work explores war from the indigenous perspective, where he takes a decolonizing
approach to study, using non-hierarchical methods of observation and analysis. Vine’s work
looks at the process by which the indigenous population of Diego Garcia was strategically
removed from the island in order to pave the way for a U.S. military takeover. 81 This brief
overview sheds light on how anthropology, as a discipline, has positioned itself at the forefront
of war studies. It might, furthermore, be argued that other sub-disciplines which lie beyond the
scope of this review —- post-colonial studies, refugee studies, and studies on forced
migration — also share common intellectual ground with war studies.82
Despite this outstanding and ground-breaking work, anthropology shares a dark history with
sociology, to the extent that both share a demonstrated history of complicity with empire
building. The historical association of anthropology with Area Studies and the direct engagement
of anthropologists with military counter-insurgency operations during the Vietnam era are all
well-documented in the work of David Price.83 During this time as well as the time period
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preceding it, anthropologists and other academics were recruited by the CIA and other foreign
intelligence organization to essentially manufacture research to support their policies and
programs. The CIA provided major funding for social science research throughout the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. Some of these programs, like MK Ultra, used U.S. soldiers as human test
subjects in a program that was designed, albeit with few controls, to perfect psychological torture
in addition to other mind-body control techniques. Franz Boas, of course, famously protested this
activity. His influence and critique remain powerful and inform present day debates about the
politics and ethics of anthropologists working with the military. There has been a resurgence of
counterinsurgency strategy in the Gulf wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Spearheaded under the
direction of General David Petraeus, these new conflicts have generated demands for
anthropologists and social scientists to assist military planners with the launching of studies
focused on local populations in those countries. The revival of this activity has prompted leading
anthropologists to call for sanctions against researchers who might have inclination to employ
their skills on the battlefield.
Unfortunately, despite worthy efforts to document this troubled history, academics have tended
to demonstrate a weak understanding of the “ground truth” as it relates the military’s use of field
researchers in conflict zones. Clearly, access is an issue, as are security clearances and other
logistical issues, which present effective barriers and preclude anyone other than specially
selected “insiders” from making objective evaluations. The next section of this chapter will look
at recent developments in a field I broadly interpret as Military and Security Studies. Following a
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brief review, I move to report my own ethnographic field observations, which I will later situate
in case study analysis. The chapter then concludes with an interim summary of findings along
with a review of recent critical work in sociology that contributes to my research project.
Military and Security Studies
It is important to note that the recently established Military and Security studies sub-fields
evolved out of a different intellectual history of problem solving , at least when compared to
more traditional social science disciplines like sociology and anthropology. Thus, while one
might think of them as disciplines “on the margin,” I want to argue that what is evolving here is
consequential, because it sheds light on an emerging trend in research that is further reflective of
the political economy of war and its relation to knowledge-making. Research in Military and
Security studies, in this respect, demonstrates a connection with the counterinsurgency history of
study in sociology and anthropology and might, likewise, be linked to funding developments in
the academy, which are similarly linked to the economic stimulus of war, as well as broader
social currents that link higher education to a governance of social control.
Military and security studies comprises a large and growing group of individuals, many of whom
operate outside of an institutional home in the academic disciplines of sociology and
anthropology, despite often being degree-holders in these fields of study. Credentialed
individuals, many of whom not long ago separated from military service in war zones, are
populating this growing field of study. Self-defined “warrior” scholars can superficially lay
claim to the title of “social scientist.” Researchers here, at least potentially, appear to cultivate
advisory connections and are willing to support the institutional needs of organization s where
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many may have been at one point employed. While it is too soon to evaluate, it is worth noting
and monitoring the social dynamics of this influence; how practitioners in this sub-field might be
called upon (and remunerated handsomely) to produce data, identify “risky” populations, and
define the terms of future conflicts.84
I want to emphasize here that I do not mean to infer these trends are universal, nor am I implying
that all work undertaken in this developing field of study should be written off as variously
unethical and incompetent, lacking substance and content. What I am suggesting, as a result of
my own first-hand observations working with people who identify with this field of study, is that
recent developments suggest important changes may be occurring in in military strategy and
practice. No longer content to operate simply in the political military realms outside of the
academy, the U.S. military has undertaken renewed efforts to integrate academic social science
research into its operations practice. Again, as I pointed out, this strategy was employed during
previous conflicts. But now, I want to argue, there is a different strategy afoot.
During the mid-century time period, social science research was conducted by institutional
affiliates of the academy (a practice that still continues). More recently, however, substantial
efforts and investments are being made by the military to essentially “grow their own”
institutional know-how. Social science research activities are increasingly being performed by
groups and organizations that operate outside of traditional academic institutions. Academic
social scientists need to step outside of what might be “fashionable” for one’s career or
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rewarding in terms of “impact” in order to address these problems, or risk having a watereddown version of social science incorporated into someone else’s project, who may not be
committed to maintaining professional research ethics. The choices here are stark – either lead
and set the standard for ethics and inquiry, or risk letting someone outside the discipline do that
while drive inquiry and serve their own interests in the process.
In the interest of moving towards a more comprehensive understanding of what all of these
different and perhaps seemingly disparate developments might mean, both within the context of
the disciplines and within the goals I have delimited for this project, I think it is important to
analyze the emerging group dynamics that characterize the research that is being carried out in
this rapidly evolving sub-disciplinary area of study. So for example, my observations led me to
conclude that it was not uncommon for individuals who identified affiliation with military and
security studies subfields to self-identify as sociologists and/or anthropologists, even as they did
not also claim an identity and/or an affiliation with a higher education institution. With
professional affiliation less of a concern, there was a corresponding (and not altogether
unsurprising) lack of emphasis on research ethics, publishing, and/or submitting findings to a
peer review process. In other words, all the distinguishing features of professionalized research
practice. I bring these distinctions into greater focus by drawing from ethnographic observation
data that I collected, which I think can shed light on developments in this burgeoning sub-field
that operates with one foot inside and another outside the academy.
As I continue here, I think it bears mentioning that my intentions are not to simply argue that
one heterogeneous group is doing “bad” science while the more traditional and homogeneous
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academics and are doing “good” science, for this would be a gross overgeneralization.
Nevertheless, findings suggest that what is often presented and discussed as “research” in
military and security studies is not in fact empirical research at all, at least in the sense of how
research is traditionally defined and practiced by academically affiliated social science
researchers. Rather, a lot of what gets labeled “research” in this subfield is perhaps more
accurately classified as a derivative intelligence “product.” The next section presents data and
analysis from my field work with the Human Terrain system, whose training operations were
based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The Human Terrain System
My time spent with the Human Terrain System (HTS) furnished me with enough data to compile
a quasi-case study of how social science research methods are used to count as well as account
for people in modern conflicts. Using qualitative methods, I employed convert means to make
unobtrusive observations for a period of three months.85 Observations consisted of content
analysis of classified and unclassified textual reports, of which I report on unclassified reports
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here. These observations helped further my aims to understand how social science research
methods are used to document the human terrain of war. In this particular instance, the research
methods and products as such were the targets of my research, not the human subjects and
employees of HTS. 86 87
HTS is one of the larger groups engaged in this type of work; thus, we might look to them as an
institutional exemplar of how the U.S. military and affiliated researchers in the military and
securities studies sub-discipline are using social science to inform research.88 Employees of HTS
were hired under a Department of Defense authorization.89 Technically speaking, HTS was a
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During the time of the writing of this manuscript, HTS was officially terminated as a funded DOD
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Published articles by HTS members are few and far between. Typically, they are restricted to small
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maintained geographic proximity, basing their operations in facility located not far from the military base.
The HTS group with which I was affiliated was not physically located on the TRADOC military base for
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government organization, although group members were not U.S. Government employees.
Rather, they occupied something of an “in between” status, where they were employed through a
defense contractor arrangement, that functionally attached it to the U.S. Army.
HTS group members engaged in military and security studies are different from practicing
researchers in sociology and anthropology in a number of ways that I think are important to note.
This includes education credentialing and subject matter expertise in addition to research ethics,
practice, and methods. My personal interactions with HTS group members and review of their
work products revealed there was institutionally sanctioned wide-spread lack of adherence to
professionally recognized research practice guidelines. Despite these shortfalls, considerable
effort was expended to maintain the pretense of conducting empirical research.
Many are by now familiar with the series of professional meetings and publications that engaged
vigorous debate over the proper role and conduct of professionally affiliated anthropologists. To
briefly recap, the AAA did not rule out the engagement of anthropologists with the military;
however, CEAUSSIC suggested the AAA cite HTS research operations in particular as being not
compatible with ethical disciplinary practice. In addition to citing the much discussed ethical
issues, they emphasized something my own observations support: that it is problematic to allow
HTS to define the meaning of "anthropology" within the Department of Defense (DoD).90

whose organization operations are engaged in producing cultural intelligence products. Critique of their
specific operations lies beyond the scope of the present study, thus I cannot confirm how their activities
differ from what might be found in the HTS organization. While it may be valid to argue that HTS is not be
representative of other groups performing similar research, the fact that they assumed a lead role and
were during this time one of the larger functioning social science research organizations on the battlefield
means we might still look to them to acquire insight into research operations.
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Anthropology, as a discipline, was far more organized and vocal in its formal opposition to the practice
of militarized anthropology; sociology did not register a commensurate response. Controversy over this
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I would add to this that it is further problematic to allow HTS to define the meaning of
anthropology in military and security studies. The group consensus that emerged from the
meetings was that adherence to the issued guidelines could not be legally compelled, but this
might be enforced informally through employment mechanisms. A formal decision was issued
that AAA members should not participate. 91

issue peaked in 2007 at the AAA meeting, which was fueled by concerns over ethical issues regarding
the deployment of anthropologists with U.S. armed forces fighting the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan. As a
result of this meeting, ethical standards were outlined and later announced in 2008, which essentially
forbid engagement by professionally affiliated anthropologists with programs like The Human Terrain
System (HTS), a joint program operated under the operational jurisdiction of the U.S. Army and the
Marine Corps. The Executive Board of the AAA during this time requested that the Commission on the
Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) review
the operations of the Human Terrain System (HTS) program, so the AAA might formulate an official
position on its members’ participation in HTS activities. The report detailing CEAUSSIC’s primary findings
can be found at the following link: http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/CEAUSSIC-ReleasesFinal-Report-on-Army-HTS-Program.cfm last accessed January 24, 2014. The key findings of
CEAUSSIC are summarized as follows: 1) HTS and similar programs are moving to become a greater
fixture within the U.S. military. Given still outstanding questions about HTS, such developments should be
a source of concern for the AAA but also for any social science organization or federal agency that
expects its members or its employees to adhere to established disciplinary and federal standards for the
treatment of human subjects. 2) The current arrangement of HTS includes potentially irreconcilable goals
which, in turn, lead to irreducible tensions with respect to the program’s basic identity. These include HTS
at once: fulfilling a research function, as a data source, as a source of intelligence, and as performing a
tactical function in counterinsurgency warfare. Given this confusion, any anthropologist considering
employment with HTS will have difficulty determining whether or not s/he will be able to follow the
disciplinary Code of Ethics. 3) HTS managers insist the program is not an intelligence asset. However, we
note that the program is housed within a DoD intelligence asset, that it has reportedly been briefed as
such an asset, and that a variety of circumstances of the work of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) "on the
ground" in Iraq and Afghanistan create a significant likelihood that HTS data will in some way be used as
part of military intelligence, advertently or inadvertently. 4) HTS’s collect sensitive socio-cultural data in a
high-risk environment and while working for one combatant in ongoing conflicts. Given the lack of a welldefined ethical framework of conduct for the program and inability of HTT researchers to maintain reliable
control over data once collected, the program places researchers and their counterparts in the field in
harm’s way. 5) When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to
external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of
counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic factors of the HTS
concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of
anthropology.
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It was determined that informal sanctions, rather than formal sanctions, such as one might find in the
medical or legal fields, where professional boards convene to discipline members who run afoul of
standards, rendering decision in some cases to revoke licensing privileges. Conversations about HTS
continue at professional meetings, as does publishing on the subject, with a majority of the focus turning
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I offer my observations and analysis to further dialog established in the AAA meetings that was
further supplemented by the work of many others. I offer this research, furthermore, as a product
of my own reflexivity, to the extent it is informed by my own background and experience,
having both worked as both a social scientist researcher and as military field service officer in
the U.S. Army in units that conducted intelligence data collection operations. This contribution
to research is somewhat unique, given that there few people employed in traditional academic
disciplines, who are positioned, willing, and able to engage in ethnographic observation of
organizations like HTS. Prior to this report, published information on the group’s activities
tended to rely on journalist reports, leaks to websites, as well as HTS’s own claims about their
research operations.92
What Were They Doing?
Given that a number of years had passed since the HTS controversy originally peaked, I thought
the time was right to revisit the issue, though I was interested in asking questions of a different

on different variations of the question of whether or not social scientists should play a role in the U.S.
military.
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Although I did not conduct foreign field research operations with HTS in Afghanistan as I had at one
time intended, I participated in extensive pre-deployment social science research methods training at the
organization’s headquarters operation in Leavenworth, Kansas during 2011. My experiences consisted of
three months working an estimated 10-12 hours a day preparing reports, which enabled me to engage in
textual analysis of additional research reports. I worked with other individuals who represented the
leadership of the organization in addition to other researchers who were distributed among two different
functioning research cohorts of approximately 70 individuals. Each research cohort consisted of
researchers, who were given occupational titles as follows: Social Scientists, Research Mangers and
Cultural Analysts. These three titles/positions represented the full range of social science sub-disciplines,
including: Anthropology, Sociology, Economics, Psychology, International Relations, in addition to various
other Area Studies specialists, all of whom displayed varying degrees of what was in many cases
incompetence in terms their language skills, cultural knowledge, and applied research skills.

126

nature addressed to practical research operations issues.93 Thus, instead of questioning the ethics
of whether or not social scientists should work with groups like HTS, who supported
counterinsurgency operations, asking “should they be doing this,” I posed the question — what
are they doing? And by this I mean, what they are actually doing on the ground, which my
findings revealed to be radically different from what HTS as an organization was claiming to do
as a matter of practice.
Based on my observations, I think it is both appropriate and necessary to distinguish that
“research” often performed by DoD and affiliated groups like HTS (and likely other research
conducted by declared military and security studies specialists) is a form of military intelligence
derived tradecraft. This type of work should be recognized as distinct from professional research
tradecraft produced by academic researchers and others with more traditional professional and
academic affiliations. To argue otherwise, would be to cede to the HTS organization a level of
credibility that cannot be supported by the conduct and outcomes of their research practice. As
others have pointed out before me, these differences should not be trivialized or dismissed as the
growing pains of a nascent organization trying to establish its bonafides. Rather, they are
intentional. The implications as such are far-reaching and, as I will relate here, portend long-
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The mainstream literature in anthropology that deals with the militarization of anthropologists reflects
the tone and substance of the AAA meetings. A significant amount of the effort has been expended by
this group, where there is debate about whether or not those who define themselves as professionally
practicing social scientists should be engaged in military research operations. Ethical issues, protections
for human subjects, and parsing the intentions of Franz Boas all foster the substance of what has been at
times very intense discussion. In bypassing these subject areas in my report, I do not mean to imply that
they are not important or relevant—because they are—rather, I wanted to devote time to a focus on
research methods, which has not been covered to a great extent. Likewise, I feel that the preoccupation
with some of these issues coupled with the demand that anthropologists not participate has in some ways
compromised critique, since it has in all likelihood prevented “ground truth” investigation of the HTS
organization’s operations.
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lasting impact on the very foundations of the disciplines themselves (Gusterson, 2008, 2009,
2010; Lutz, 2008).
Leading efforts to date that single out HTS for criticism are well established in the literature. The
primary strength of this work (especially Price) lies in its substantive historical documentation of
militarized anthropology in the context of global counterinsurgency (Price, 2008, 2011, 2016;
Gonzalez, 2004; Lucas, 2009; Kelly et al, 2010; Griffin, 2010). Not covered by this work and an
ongoing source of weakness in the critical literature with regard to HTS is that it tends rely on
secondary sources of information in the form of documents provided by “leakers” and
journalists. These critics, many of whom I agree with in principle, tended to accept at face value
the claims made by HTS about their institutional research operations capabilities. In other words,
there was an attribution of institutional competency, where claims were accepted as objective
fact, despite there not being a logistically feasible way to “fact-check” whether or not those
claims were supported by research practice.94
To give one example, the quality of the research and the qualifications of individuals employed
by HTS were widely criticized in the literature. My own observations concur with these findings,
but they are based on my evaluation of original documents and first-hand interactions with
researchers. In light of this, I argue the margin of difference between what HTS claimed as their
expertise and what they actually practiced was significant. More than this, I found that HTS
lacked sufficient human resources to conduct research operations. Many of the people I worked
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Anecdotal reports cited that skill sets among research team members varied widely throughout the HTS
organization. My particular findings resonate with previous estimates offered by Gusterson, who contends
there are only a “marginal handful” of anthropologists are engaged with the Human Terrain Teams
(Gusterson, 2010: 291).
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with had research credentials, but were not practicing (and many had never practiced) conducting
research operations.
As for training, there was no discernible emphasis placed on field research methods in the
training program that I attended while based in Leavenworth, Kansas. Research methods,
practices, and protocols did not reflect even a modicum adherence to professional research
standards and practices. My personal assessment of team member skills, people with whom I had
daily and direct interface, is that they ranged from below average to poor. Research projects were
led by individuals who appeared to lack basic-level training in research design and data
collection methods.95 Team members, moreover, demonstrated a profound lack of familiarity
with current relevant literature in the social sciences. I found this to be the case even when team
members possessed Ph.D. research education credentials, many of whom had obtained their
doctorates (if they had them) more than 25 years prior to their work with HTS. To this I would
add the vast majority of individuals in my research group were not professionally affiliated
outside of HTS. Efforts to cultivate professional contacts among established peers in their area of
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Judging from the quality of prepared research reports and plans I had the opportunity to review
(approximately 50-60) plans, I assessed the research products to be sub-standard and poorly conceived
overall. F Social Scientists and research group cohort members were unable at times to execute even the
most basic tasks associated with widely accepted social science research methods and data collection
activities. For example, research questions were often crudely conceived and were not well matched to
survey and interview protocols. Questionnaires were particularly riddled with common problems and
errors addressed in the disciplinary literature (i.e. ecological fallacies, errors in inference and
overgeneralization). Individual questions appeared often to reflect the cultural biases of the researchers
and analysts that conceived them. In the worst of such cases, research appeared to undertaken as a
means to validate or supplement pre-existing intelligence assessments, which were derived from
concepts and methods that were different, if not entirely opposed and foreign, compared to social science
research operations. In this manner, research methods and data collection activities inevitably reproduced the information they sought to acquire and independently confirm, as HTS researchers
appeared willing to distort and bend research efforts and data in such a way as to serve their military
client’s needs and purposes. Despite its many observed failures, however, HTS continues to be funded
and is now actively making plans to metastasize its operations and expertise to other countries and
nations that have expressed desires to implement similar research programs.
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study was similarly lacking, as evidenced by lack of publishing and/or lack of attendance at
conferences and professional meetings.96
In what was perhaps one of the more distinguishing features of the research training, an
inordinate emphasis was placed on the daily production of PowerPoint slides for command
briefings (more than, for example, the fundamentals of research). As much as 75% of any given
day was dedicated to the production of slides for daily presentations and briefings. This, I should
point out, was not merely a reflection of localized HTS cultural practice; the ingrained use of
PowerPoint is a problem within the culture of the military itself. Former defense secretary Robert
Gates is known widely for his disdain and harsh criticism of the practice, which he tried
(unsuccessfully) to ban from briefings at the CIA out of a concern that it threated the military’s
institutional integrity.

In the article “Doctors of Doom: What a PhD Really Means in the U.S. National Security Community,”
Alexa O’Brien reports on the lack of substantive PhD-level research credentials in the National Security
Community. In much the same manner that my own research was based on the research methods
employed by subjects that were available to me as a result of having gained access to HTS, O’Brien’s
reporting is based on sources that comprise a convenience sample of 90,000 member profiles working in
the intelligence community. Like my own research, this reporting does not make claims to
representativeness. But that is not to say her claims are not credible, considering that they call attention
to the same patterns my own research uncovered: with regard to PhD credentialing, as determined by my
own first-hand observations, many of the individuals that I worked alongside at HTS had obtained their
research credentials from online “diploma mill” sources. Thus, while critics might argue that absent the
ability to draw a statistically representative sample, the validity of such claims is limited. That is not to say,
however, that this work should be dismissed. Given the lack of transparency in the intelligence community
and the classified nature of the work, it is unlikely that any non-government source would be granted
access to procure such a sample. Working in the intelligence community, likewise, does not always
translate to holding a TS/SCI clearance. Most of the HTS team members did not hold such a clearance.
Provisional Secret clearances were granted to team members, who over the course of time, as they were
subject to investigation, would be granted those clearances after being vetted by government security
personnel. In short, while there is no way to tell whether or not O’Brien 90,000 profiles represent the more
than 1.5 million people who hold higher level security clearances, her reporting still calls attention to a
disturbing patterns.
96
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I further noted among research group members evidence that there was a considerable lack of
professional career affiliation. More interesting is that I did not sense this was a barrier to hiring;
in fact, the deficit was so universal, one might assume it was indicative of a hiring preference.
But what advantage does such a deficit in skill and professionalism offer? For one, it means such
an individual was less likely to register ethical complaints or experience role conflict when it
came to issue of conducting research on vulnerable populations.97 Researchers were not as much
“unethical” as they simply lacked any real developed appreciation or understanding of what
research ethics entailed. Not surprisingly, the group as a whole demonstrated a profound lack of
reflexive awareness, as many among them did not express even the least amount of concern that
their embeddedness as social actors in military units might compromise their role as researchers.
That is to say, they did evidence awareness of role conflict on any level, and how their very
presence on the battlefield might unfavorably influence research outcomes, negating the
possibility of obtaining empirically useful data.98
The failure of individual reflexivity, when combined with low levels of research expertise,
professional identity, as well as the failure to implement field appropriate research practice,
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Debate on this subject again is documented in the AAA meetings and in literature that has been
subsequently published. Despite howls of protest from those disavow these claims, the fact remains that
as of 2012, HTS continued to operate without oversight from an external IRB authority.
98

What is missing in examples offered by Griffin and others is a comprehensive sense of the process as it
relates to the conduct of social science research operations. Griffin in particular fails to question the lack
of a scientifically driven research framework; moreover, his work demonstrates an apparent preference
for military intelligence data collection methods, which differ substantially from social science research
methods, as he appears not to distinguish the difference, nor does he question their departure from more
standard methods and protocols in the social sciences. Perhaps most concerning is the author’s failure to
demonstrate critical reflexive capacity, which is essential to any ethnography, as he makes an argument
for a potential ethical basis for the work undertaken by HTS, as if military intervention might be sanctioned
as a form of benevolent humanitarian social policy.
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including ethical protocols (i.e. external review), suggests to me that HTS, as an organization,
appeared not to aspire, neither through intention nor practice, to engage in the practice of social
science research.99
As far as actual research reports are concerned, when reviewed them, I noted evidence of
confirmation bias evidenced by a tendency to ask research questions which would inevitably lead
to the gathering of data that would confirm those results; the results, in short, could be predicted
by the study design itself. Consequently, both the HTS organization and its research were more
or less functioning within a closed, self-referential, information loop. This distinguishing feature
of the research, more than any other finding, suggest that what the research does in fact measure
and attest to is the dysfunctional organizational culture HTS. Now I might add that whereas it is
easy to write off incompetent research practice and lack of organizational effectiveness to not
having the “right” people, I don’t think this explains what was going on here. Having established
then precisely what HTS was doing, I think it appropriate to consider why they did it. Why, in
other words, did they appear to fail so miserably? I am going to suggest now that we consider
how this failure might in fact have served a functional purpose.

Social Scientists were tasked to complete what were called “Baseline Assessments,” which inform the
research plan. Most of the information used to fill out baseline assessments were derived from open
source information (.i.e. Google). Information for the baseline assessment was collected in a manner that
conforms with data classification categories designated by the acronyms of ASCOPE and PEMESI:
ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events); PEMESI (Political, Economic,
Military, Social, Infrastructure, Information). These information gathering tools are not classified and are
documented in military publications and field manuals, which can be easily obtained online and through
print sources. Marcus Griffin’s essay also offers an illustration ASCOPE, which can be found in the edited
collection published by Kelly et al (2010) Anthropology and Global Counter-Insurgency.
99
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Why Did They Do It?

The answer to this question involves some reflecting back on the U.S. Executive level strategy
that was implemented in the days pre-dating the launching of the Iraq War. During that time,
research and intelligence data were produced by the Office of Special Plans as part of an effort to
justify an interventionist foreign policy—war to put it bluntly—to the American people. HTS
followed a similar model on a much smaller scale. Operating under the pretense of
methodological positivism, HTS research served the strategy to satisfy the “appearance” of
expertise, despite not following through with anything resembling substance. Using researchers
with professional academic credentials helped impart a veneer of respectability to HTS. Their
research products were, in turn, provided to not only U.S. military constituents, but to other
internal customers within the U.S. government that could potentially benefit from findings that
would justify sustaining a political agenda that benefits and profits from ongoing war.100
Professionally credentialed degree holders were not hired to conduct “research” operations; they
were hired role-paly as such, when in reality they were simply replicating methods and
procedures that are regularly engaged by unit-level military intelligence data collection
operations.
The fact that the “research” didn’t meet even minimal professional standards of competence is
irrelevant, when one considers the real aim was to collect intelligence data to help sell a policy
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For reasons that can only be speculated, HTS deemed it necessary to operate using deception to
represent their work as an empirical research product, when in fact it was nothing more than intelligence
product produced according to the data collection protocols of intelligence work. This deception, I want to
point out, extends to the people they hire. Among the new hires with whom I associated, the ones without
military background seemed to me to be the least capable of grasping the difference.
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that was already in place. Compromised research operations thus were not the simple result of
professional and ethical competency failures; they were the outcome of a larger political strategy
that sought to assemble information around a predetermined policy. Using untrained individuals
for an often hostile field mission was doubtless a despicable practice on a number of different
levels. But it represented nothing more than a functional elaboration of the larger deception upon
which the entire political project of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were based.
The original AAA mandate—that professionally identified social scientists should not affiliate
with these operations—is thus both appropriate and necessary. But not only for the ethical
reasons cited. HTS research operations were never intended to be social science research
operations. With that, the social science “research” produced by HTS was never and should
never be regarded as being of the same substance that characterizes work that is more
traditionally produced by professionally affiliated social scientists.101 102
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Researchers clearly do not operate as members of a monolithic practice; not even the academic ones.
Nevertheless, those who affiliate practice as members of a profession remain subject to credentialing,
peer-review, and other ethical research community practices that help ensure professional standards of
conduct in research.
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Specific social science research methods that were utilized by HTS research teams included
interviews, surveys, and participant-observation methods; this includes the infamous and deservedly
ridiculed “windshield ethnography.” For those less acquainted with the history of critique of HTS, this term
refers to the practice of driving through what were assessed to be potentially “hot” conflict zones, and
employing visual survey techniques from behind the protective glass enclosure of a moving vehicle.
Though the practice has been roundly criticized, both at professional meetings and in the literature, it
rather typifies the research failures of the HTS organization as a whole. Windshield ethnography is
ostensibly an improvised battlefield research technique that represents an effort to assimilate standard
social science research practices to the “ground truth” operating conditions and exigencies of the modern
battlefield. While I would argue that recording observations of any sort can be useful, to make claims that
those observations are indicative of empirical truth is disingenuous to say the least. Windshield
ethnography does not fall somewhere on a scale between bad practice and best practice; what is worse,
however, is that my interactions with team members established that many in the HTS could not/did not
recognize the difference between the two.

134

During the time that has elapsed since I completed this observational work, HTS issued a press
release confirming their organization identity a group that collects intelligence data for the U.S.
government. Up until this point they had forcefully and repeatedly disavowed any formal
connection with military intelligence operations. Critics had for years argued that HTS was doing
“bad science,” when in fact, based on my observations, it was evident they were never doing
science at all. As one who possesses training and certifications in the handling of classified
information, I can attest that HTS research protocols were indistinguishable from data collection
protocols that are common in military intelligence organizations. What was missed in all of the
heated debates that transpired at industry meetings and conventions was that it was never HTS’s
intention to execute empirical, methodologically informed, social science research operations;
rather, the aim was to satisfy the pretense of such. HTS, in other words, engaged in a
disinformation campaign to the extent it was only ever interested in serving the “appearance” of
conducting social science research operations.
Public disclosures of classified data and information by groups like WikiLeaks and other
whistleblowers are pulling back the curtain on the operations practices of intelligence gathering
organizations. They, furthermore, helped ignite public debate about the cooperation of domestic
corporations like Google, Verizon, and Facebook with domestic U.S. intelligence organizations.
These developments not only reveal how military collusion with private entities erodes
public/private boundaries through the militarization of what are thought to be domestic
operations, they demonstrate how the practice of legitimating “expert” knowledge built on a
foundation of secretly obtained data is not isolated to groups like HTS, who in the final analysis
was a small player in the scheme of things. The real power of these organizations is that they
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work effectively to mask the contradictions of public policy. Thus they remain a key component
of what is doubtless a key element of political and military strategy.
But I would be remiss if I did not also argue that secret social science serves another function: it
is an important weapon in an arsenal of tactics employed to affectively modulate public response
to failed policies undertaken by military, corporate, and government officials. Consequently, it is
only important to give the appearance of conducting empirically informed social science research
to inform public policy, because the real goal is not substantive; rather, it is to simply influence
how people think and feel about policy.
In regards to the issue of social scientists embedded with armies conducting secret work, there
can be no mistake that their work does not with any credibility reflect the ethical standards that
are standard among professionally affiliated research practitioners. This holds true even if it is
the case, as many argue, they are not carrying weapons. At the end of the day, weapons or no
weapons, they are occupationally and professionally identified with an institution whose
primary role and function is to restrict and inhibit the flow of information while providing
supporting to agencies that administer organized violence. What is perhaps most troubling here,
more so than the notion that social science research in war zones is being conducted by groups
like HTS, it is that the research practitioners themselves are embedded within and are actively
influencing the conditions on the ground they are ostensibly supposed to document.103

The politics of “keeping secret” in the United States are not obviously peculiar to HTS. The national
security apparatus of the U.S. government is extensive and includes not only the White House,
departments of state and defense, the Senate and House armed services committees, but others like the
alphabet agencies - NSA, CIA, and DIA, as well as the Department of Energy. Likewise, there is a
significant intelligence defense contractor community made up of private corporations and individuals.
103
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The chief takeaway from my observational experience was that war’s violent positivism enlists
academe as operational partner to help them to not only define, but limit the range of rational
scientific inquiry. In doing so, they govern what we can and cannot know about the social world.
Non-violent and non-operational ideas as such are considered “subversive.” 104 I saw
demonstrated first-hand how violent epistemologies – ways of knowing that this research
documents are materially related to seeing as well as making – not only shape institutional social
dynamics, they are, furthermore, essential to how these social orders reproduce themselves. One
way we can verify this is occurring is to point to the damage that has already been done. And so
my research aims to reflect on this history in the making. Here again, I find, the body in theory as
well as practice aims to resist capture. I want to turn now and in this last section contrast the
work I have thus far reviewed here with contemporary critical writing in the social sciences that
looks at the problem of war in society.
Critical Theories & Perspectives of War
While there is not a substantial body of sociological work on war, recent critical work within the
social sciences demonstrates a willingness to engage the subject of war and to some extent
redefine it while reflecting on its connection to theory and research methods (Clough, 2008,
2009; Orr, 2006, 2013; Martin, 2007, 2008; Masco, 2006, 2008, 2010). Theoretically, the
emphasis here is on historical traditions, where there is an effort to think about the imbrication of
war with affect and culture. In the field of International Relations, Graham (2010) integrates the
study of war with urban studies, while Campbell (1998), Dillon (1996, 2003), and Reid (2008,
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Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society.
Beacon Press, 1964, p. 14.
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2006) look at war in light of Foucault’s work on biopolitics and governmentality as they question
the role played by war in securing the conditions of human life. Methodologically, they rely on
interpretive methods.
The critique that I present here owes an intellectual debt to the groundbreaking work of these
authors, but perhaps most especially to Patricia Clough, whose work on affect theory and
psychoanalysis cuts across disciplinary boundaries in ways that are useful to my research that
aims to do the same. Whereas traditional thinking in psychoanalysis presupposes a traumatizing
event exists prior to the wound/trauma, implying a causal relation between wound and trauma, as
well as a bifurcated relation between mind and body, Clough suggests "the in-between" affect
potentially disrupts the traditional ordering of events. Like Scary, she also cites the problem of
language in the construction of subjectivity and how it is problematic to expect speaking subjects
to render articulate thoughts about traumatic events.
Clough’s treatment of trauma theory can be used to argue that wounding is neither a singular
event, nor can we count on its visibility by looking for the sign of a material wound. Jackie Orr’s
work on panic and war, likewise, lends support to this argument (Orr, 2006). Her book provides
a well-documented account of not only her own subjective experiences of panic, but also the
history of social science where it intersects Cold-War anxiety its relationship to military and
government efforts to control public feeling. In this approach, which engages a combination of
genealogical and biographical methods, Orr calls attention to the role played by social science
discourses (including mass psychology, Cold War cybernetics, and contemporary psychiatry) to
shows how panic became an object of military technoscientific management. Combining
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historical research with biographical narrative, Orr illustrates how public feelings and public
affect were manipulated by an economy of interests represented by the media, the social
sciences, and transnational drug companies, in addition to the U.S. government and the military.
Clough and Orr, both sociologists, distinctively employ auto ethnographic methods in their work
that looks at war, which they distinctively combine with psychoanalytic and affect theories to
illustrate how war configures an affect economy, which operates outside of the more traditionally
conceived geo-physical space. Their work describes a psychosocial landscape, where military
operations “trigger” a “reconceptualization of bodily memory and language.” 105 In ways that I
will argue more at length in the next chapter, they suggest that affect, trauma, and wounding,
operate outside of the causal chain of events originally imagined by Freud, who was interested in
explaining how war fostered the transmission of traumatic affect among the public at large.
Clough and Orr are joined by Joe Masco, an anthropologist, who likewise illustrates how affect
is imbricated in strategies of the national security state. From the era of the atomic bomb to the
present day “war on terror,” the mobilization affect, Masco argues, plays a central role in
militarizing everyday life and justifying war.
Randy Martin’s (2007) Empire of Indifference takes this form of critique in a different direction
when he looks at the intersection of globalization, empire, and war from the perspective of
international finance. Martin writes about military strategy as it relates to changes in war and
global finance. His analysis argues that the finance-based logic of risk control has become a
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P.T. Clough, “War By Other Means: What Difference Do(es) the Graphic(s) Make?” In Karatzogianni,
Athina and Adi Kuntsman (eds.) Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion. London: Palgrave (2012), 3.
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dominant force in the lives of Americans, to the extent that it influences U.S. foreign as well as
domestic policy. According to Martin, financializing processes of risk management create risk
economies that map onto social groups, whose social division is carved out on the basis of risk.
The more powerful social group, defined as risk-capable, is considered to be socially worthy of
protection. This group exercises secures its interests through public policy interventions and
capital leveraging actions that oftentimes take the form of war (or at least create the conditions
that make war and violent conflict a predictable outcome).
The less powerful social group, who he characterizes as risk averse or “risky,” is understood to
be threatening and dangerous; consequently, they are subject to more advanced social control
mechanisms. Having been labeled a social risk by the powerful group, this weaker group may be
sanctioned at a minimum if not also targeted for more aggressive policy intervention, including
repressive state-sanctioned violence. Martin’s analysis of contemporary American military
strategy distinguishes what he observes to be a new operating strategy; one that Randy Martin
argues employs finance-based risk control logic as part of an overall battlefield strategy. In this
case, risk management—the ability to adjust for risk and to leverage it for financial gain—is the
key armies operate in modern conflicts. As I will demonstrate in the first case study on the U.S.
Civil War, calculation tools calibrated to manage commodity trading in humans furnished a
foundation for the development of the personal finance tools and global market derivatives that
Martin discusses in his work. Over the course of time, battlefield strategies became less
concerned with holding territory, as the focused shifted to dominating people tied to the land,
their bodies as well as their vitality and productivity. Targeted populations were introduced to a
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governance of control, where they were encouraged to engage in self-management; failure to do
so puts that population at risk of having their life exposed to long-term risk and peril.106
Whereas Dillon and Reid address their critique primarily to arguments and debates within
International Relations discourse, my critique and subsequent line of questioning more directly
engages the discourses of Sociology, cultural studies and social theories of the body. Despite our
taking somewhat different approaches, their conceptual frameworks overlap my own in
important ways. One area in particular where we share agreement is the role played by war in
David Campbell, Michael Dillon, and Julian Reid all address their critique primarily to
International Relations discourses. All are critical of state-centric analyses that confine
discussion about war as well as perceived enemies to rigid boundaries. Campbell calls attention
to what he calls the “problematic of subjectivity in international politics” that register
prominently in traditional IR discourses that focus on “pre-given subjects.” According to
Campbell, subjective identity boundaries like inside/outside, self/other, and foreign/domestic are
less given than they are constituted “through the writing of threat.”107
Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, who like Campbell point to Foucault in their work, have
accorded lengthy treatment to the relation between war, military science, military organization
and life processes. Liberal regimes, they argue, have become increasingly adept at waging war
through the use of techniques and strategies that aim less to annihilate a population, than to
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manipulate and maintain power over the life of populations through more diverse matrices of
social control. Reid examines the evolution of war in connection with politics of liberalism,
where he critiques ideological assumptions that modern societies have progressed beyond the
notion of war as a foundation for society. On the contrary, he argues “liberal regimes have now
committed to war without end, temporally, spatially, and politically” 108
The individuals representing this particular body of scholarship are in this respect “outliers” in
the social sciences. I call upon them to help me shift the conceptual focus of military studies
toward an exploration of how war is imbricated in the body, subjectivity, notions of self, affect,
life, politics, economy, and ontology. Their work enables me to interrogate dominant narratives
and in the process “brush history against the grain” as I aim to provide a much needed
counter-history of war as it relates to the body. 109
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Chapter IV: The Problem of the Body

Having considered the failures of sociology to recognize war as a social problem, I want to turn
now and consider how, as Coates suggests, it “lands on the body.” This chapter will review some
of the relevant literature in this regard, calling attention to theories and frameworks that are
potentially useful to help explain how bodies are drawn into war and how this relates to
developments in medicine. I distinguish five different critical approaches to body studies, cutting
across different disciplinary sub-fields, that I call upon to inform my study: 1) sociology and
anthropology; 2) cultural studies, which includes critical theory, affect theory, psychoanalysis,
and cultural studies; 3) philosophy; 4) studies in science and biomedicine; and 5) disability
studies. While it is not my intention here to conduct a comprehensive review, I will nonetheless
point to key debates and problems that previous scholars cite in their efforts to advance the field
of body studies (Clarke, 2011, Clough, 2008; Blackman, 2008; Shildrick, 2008; Rose, 2007;
Thacker, 2006; Reid, 2006; Waldby, 2000; Dillon, 1996).
Taken on their own, each of these approaches has limitations. Reading them together helps me to
further open up the problem of the body and human transformation to a larger conversation about
the biopolitics of these developments, and how this is bound up in the political economy of war
and medicine. Marx himself once famously argued that discourses in political economy are
limited to the extent they fetishize markets and capital over human social relations. One might
argue similarly that discourses in philosophy are limited to the extent they privilege issues of
ontology over issues of embodiment; and that biomedical discourses also tend to limit inquiry by
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privileging the “bios” of bodies over social problems and issues of political economy. In the case
of the latter, despite the best efforts of medicine and health scholars, who are beginning to shift
their approach to look at how structurally rooted social processes work through biological
mechanisms to influence health and well-being, significant blind spots remain with regard to
how war, violence, and socio-political conflict potentially influence medicine, health, and wellbeing.
The literature on the body tends to overlap studies in literature and philosophy; likewise, it
overlaps cultural and critical studies of gender and sexuality studies, which are broadly engaged
across the disciplines.110 Body studies position my aim to look at how war and wounded
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2011.
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embodiment imbricate each other, as war produces injured bodies and re-organizes them across
different registers and spectrums of relationality: subjective, affective, corporeal, visual, digital,
and ontological.
In my efforts here to read across the disciplines, I endeavored to both pry the body away from its
social moorings and look it critically within its social context. In doing so, I found it necessary to
challenge the self-imposed epistemological boundaries that distinguish different disciplinary
approaches. Working across disciplines helps me, for example, to avoid the problem of mindbody dualism that body studies theorists seek to avoid, which can however be easily reproduced
through the process of “disciplining” within the disciplines. Problems of the mind, it turns out,
which were traditionally taken up by psychology, were often studied in isolation from problems
of the body addressed in the social sciences, cultural studies, and disability studies. In this there
is a debt owed to psychoanalysis, which aimed to bridge this gap by calling into question the
notion of bounded disciplines and discipline-based thought paradigms. Synthesizing ideas and
concepts across the disciplines helped me to, furthermore, fulfill one of the major goals of the
study, which is to understand combat injury in light of its political economy. Epistemologically
speaking, one cannot conceptualize the relation between war, combat injury, and medicine as a
linear relation. Thus, I propose understanding through a framework that operates as a relational
ontology, as such a framework breaks down conceptual binaries (i.e. human/non-human,
mind/body, self/other, inside/outside), and opens the door to how such divisions might be
collapsed and imaginatively intertwined.
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Sociology and Anthropology
Body studies in the social sciences have something of a tortured legacy. As was the case with
war studies in the social sciences, body studies were for a long time also marginalized. Lock
(1993) among others noted the tendency here was to cede the scientific study of the body to the
biological and natural sciences.111 While this is no longer the case, I note here that the failure to
privilege body studies, especially in sociology, follows a path similar to war studies, where I
noted there was a lack of sustained commitment to exploring the military dimensions of society.
Previous scholars attribute this to discipline’s focus on “the social” as its distinctive realm of
expertise.112 Noteworthy is the way classical epistemology in sociology emphasized evolutionary
theories, which were supplemented by agency-structure debates. Eventually, these currents of
thinking were moderated with the turn toward the symbolic interactionism of the Chicago
School, although they appeared in different form later when they were taken up again by social
systems approaches. After World War II, as was indicated in the previous chapter, there was a
shift in mainstream sociology toward the emphasis of middle range theories and survey-research,
which was advocated by scholars based at Columbia University in New York113 Each of these
developments had the effect of sidelining the importance of body studies, where again the
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tendency was to treat bodies as separate from nature, culture, and self.114 Bodies, if they were
considered at all by social scientists, were understood in functional terms as “naturalized,
essentially passive atoms or building blocks of society” 115 or they were simply “black-boxed.”
116

Christopher Schilling (2005) traced the classical influence of Hobbes on Talcott Parsons, who
reduced the study of the body to a problem of order; Hobbes had originally conceived the body
in terms of its risk as an agent capable of provoke a war of “all against all.” 117 According to
Schilling, “in one sweeping move, Parsons obfuscated the significance of the body to classical
Sociology.” 118 As such, the body itself was rendered a casualty of one of the dominant trends in
Sociology, which privileged theories that gave only token recognition to disembodied, noncorporealized rational social actors.119 In light of these developments, somatic matters as they
pertained to the issues and problems of “fleshy” bodies were taken up by other disciplines, like
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Anthropology, that prioritized the study of culture, and Feminist studies that emphasized the
body, especially women’s bodies, in studies of gender inequality.
Concern for the body then is only recent development in the social sciences. In the 1970’s and
early 1980’s, a number of scholars aimed to elevate the intellectual significance of the body as
part of an effort to rehabilitate classical theory and demonstrate its relevance to the Sociology of
the Body (Turner, 1993; Schilling, 1997, 2001; Yuill 2005). They endeavored to show how
bodily matters, despite a lack of theoretical primacy in the social sciences, were nonetheless
firmly rooted in the classical works of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Schilling perhaps described
it best when he noted that the body constituted an ‘absent presence’ in the literature. The goal for
this group of revisionists was to locate in classical theory “the embodied preconditions of agency
and the physical effects of social structures.”120 Nick Crossley (1995) furnishes yet an additional
substantive contribution here when he argues for the importance of an epistemological
framework that distinguishes between “the sociology of the body” and what he calls “Carnal
Sociology.” Whereas the former focuses on what is done to the body, the latter case focuses on
what the body does and can do.121 For it is only by calling attention to the active body, Crossley
suggests, where we look at what a body can “do” that Carnal Sociology can “restore to sociology
the body that constantly eludes it.”122
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Debates continue over how the body might best be studied. Yet it is Crossley’s suggestion that
we distinguish between the “lived” body and the body that is “inscribed” and acted upon through
various means of social construction and inscription that, it my estimate, opens up the body to
more complex theorizing. Here, in an effort to overcome dichotomous thinking derived from
competing dualisms, I follow Crossley’s suggestion that it is not necessary to choose between the
two; because approaches that incorporate both understandings can be “mutually informing and
complementary.” Of course, in this instance he is calling attention to philosophy’s major
contributions to body studies, as he looks at how Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the “lived” body
might be complemented by Foucault’s inscribed approach.123 My research draws from this
productive synthesis to theorize and applies it to an analysis of the soldier’s wounded body.

Alternatively, body studies in Anthropology date back to the beginning in the early 20th century.
Early studies focused on what Margaret Locke and Judith Farquhar (2007) refer to as “the body
proper.” Later, there was a shift in anthropology toward emphasizing the body’s immersion in its
social environment, where embodiment was perceived as “dynamic rather than static, as
experiences that vary over time and across the world are shaped by discourses, institutions,
practices, technologies, and ideologies. What has emerged is a multiplicity of bodies, inviting a
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great many disciplinary points of view and modes of interpretation.”124 Thus, on the one hand,
scholars note that “subjectivity and its relation to biology and society cannot be ignored.” 125
They, furthermore, argue it is “empirically impossible to maintain a marked division between the
biological body and its social context.”126 Social factors are among the most important
determinants of health to the extent that stress, for example, might be exacerbated by political,
economic, and environmental factors. In light of this, it is suggested that researchers take into
account “local biologies, social relations, politics and culture” as part of a comprehensive effort
to understand their role and influence over medical intervention and progress. These factors are
understood to be potentially further implicated in the production of biological difference.127

Biomedical Approaches in Sociology and Anthropology

According to Clark and Shim, medicalization theory is debated across the disciplines of
sociology and anthropology, and includes studies in medical sociology and the sociology of
health and illness (Zola 1972; Freidson 1970), medical anthropology (Hogle 2002; Lock 2001,
2004), studies in the history of medicine (Nye 2003; Sinding 2004), as well as medicine itself
(Chervenak and McCullough 2005).128 In another work, Clarke et al (2010) document key
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developments in the medical sector of U.S. political economy, which they trace to the time
period that dates the end of World War II.129

Hospital and clinical ethnographies draw heavily from body studies in anthropology to call
attention to issues and problems with veterans undergoing treatment and rehabilitation in
connection with combat injury. These studies tend to focus on a combination of the clinical as
well as policy aspects that affect medical care (Messenger 2010; Wool 2015). Not to be
overlooked in studies of combat injury are the contributions of body scholars whose work on the
20th century history of plastic surgery documents war’s influence on these particular
developments (Haiken, 1997; Jones, 2008). In the case of the latter, one of the major themes that
emerges from work is the idea that the body/subject/form is infinitely malleable. In our present
time, body contouring, liposuction, and breast enhancement have become almost de rigueur, thus
calling into question the view that biology is destiny, which now more than ever seems to be a
relic of past thinking.. Other feminist scholarship that addresses body transformation, particularly
that which undertakes study of the medical techniques, technologies, and practices to this end,
are also relevant to my approach to research. This includes the study of gender transformation
and sex reassignment surgery, diet and weight loss surgery, as well as re-constructive and
cosmetic surgery (Pitts-Taylor, 2007).
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medical innovation, although here progress is generally understood to have less to do with specific
technical innovations, than developments in public health and disease management.
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Critical Theory, Psychoanalysis, and Cultural Studies
Critical theory’s approach to body studies offers what may be the most comprehensive approach
to study. Its principle value to this research derives from its ability to synthesize Marx’s concerns
with ideology, exploitation of the laboring body, and the nature/culture divide with the ideas of
Weber and Freud. The foundational work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Fromm were
subsequently taken up by the humanities, which connected the work to psychoanalytic theory
and further linked Freud to others, including Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida. Foucault’s work
constitutes a strong current of thinking within critical theory as it continued to be developed over
time, eventually embracing what has been called “the affective turn” in critical theory.130
Affect theory furnished a bridging epistemology, which helped unite a more discursively
oriented critical theory with phenomenology and its concern with issues of embodiment,
embodied being, and embodied practice. Feminist studies among other multi-dimensional studies
of bodies and embodiment have also engaged critical theories and concepts. What all of this
work tends to share in common, however, is that it has been advanced for the most part outside
the disciplinary boundaries of sociology.131

In moving forward, I draw from the different strengths of critical theory to help explain how
wounded bodies are broken down; which is to say, I look at how bodies, along with weapons and
other objects, might be “made” and “un-made” within the context of war. This work enables me
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to examine more thoroughly concepts like wound, trauma, event, time, and duration, which are
not amenable to study using traditional rational-empirical concepts and methods. Whereas I draw
considerable influence from Foucault and Deleuze in my treatment of the body, there are others
that I want to review here briefly for reasons that they also make important contributions to my
research. I look to them all in this effort to link war, medicine, and capitalism. In advancing what
is one level a materialist history of war and violence, I propose an affective theory to inform a
biopolitical model of trauma; a theory that is also feminist and anti-racist in the sense that
patterns of injury are shown to reflect relations of domination and subordination derived from
ideologies based on patriarchy and white supremacy. I argue that military and medical
institutions, through a specifically articulated anatomopolitcs, capitalize on injury and trauma to
expand and extend their influence. To this end, I argue war became significant to the biopolitics
of human transformation. The biopolitics of making and managing injury through material and
immaterial praxis was thus made consequential to the process of waging war.
Foucault and Biopolitics

Foucault, for one, suggests temporality and spatiality are problematic in regards to how we
understand war, for reasons that is difficult to establish precisely when wars begin and end.
For similar reasons, I am arguing it may not be possible to ascertain where wounding begins and
ends. The indeterminacy of both war and wounding then, understood as normative, is suggestive
of the problems I have already raised with more conventional work that addresses both war and
the body. Likewise, it raises important questions for any study that would aim to account for as
well as document the wounds of war.
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Foucault was interested in the body as both a product and subject of discourse; he was likewise
interested in how it might be controlled. His initial focus on how bodies were targets of
sovereign power eventually gave way to a more specific consideration of sexuality as a bodily
capacity that was subject to various techniques of control. His concept of “Biopower” was
conceived as a control technology comprised of different techniques and practices that were
designed to manage populations. In this respect, control was not restricted to the body’s surface
or its materiality per se, but rather was understood to be distributed unevenly across, within, and
throughout bodies and populations to such an extent that control was simultaneously
internalized. As a result, one finds in his early work that he problematizes the subject through a
focus on the disciplines, as represented by prisons, hospitals, and schools. Discipline-based
practices, according to Foucault, were instrumentally involved in producing modern individuals
as both subjects and objects of knowledge. In his later writing, Society Must Be Defended and
Security Territory and Population, Foucault elaborates the relation between war, society, and the
body by focusing on the changing nature of power relations (Foucault; 2003, 2007).
Nonetheless, in spite of his pursuit of what is arguably both a discursively informed as well as
phenomenological approach to control, Foucault was primarily interested in subject formation.
His critique of knowledge power, which evolved throughout the course of his work and lifetime,
engaged genealogical methods to show how these processes came about within a framework
occasioned by political regimes of power. Noteworthy here is how Foucault, in contrast with his
predecessors, turned away from Max Weber’s means-end rational action criteria to describe
capital’s relation to war and the body as biological. He suggests we consider how the rationality
of capitalism that is embedded in war and violent social conflict operates dynamically in ways
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that are not limited to rational dialectical opposition. In short, Foucault understood capitalism
was changing. The vision that he articulates is one that understands modern forms of capitalism
are thriving by fostering the very conditions of multiplicity and open exchange that I argue takes
us to a place where capital may no longer require humans, bodies, and machines to be
ontologically differentiated. Consequently, they might be seen, if only theoretically, to reside in
concurrent relation with one another.

These developments are particularly consequential for gender. For if we consider how early
feminists argued that reducing women to their biological functions was a foundation for
women’s oppression, Foucault’s argument permits us to reimagine how war and capitalism work
together to facilitate bodily change, but in such a way that gender identity is no longer reducible
to the body. Applying similar logic, we might also think about what this means about race.
There is no disputing Foucault’s much analyzed and well documented approach to the genealogy
of the subject, which he undertook as part of a larger critique of knowledge and power. Foucault
also undertook extensive analysis of the history of medicine, which he looked at from the
perspective of an institutional model, distinguished by an array of different techniques and
practices that were focused on producing what he referred to throughout his work as the “truth of
the subject.” Arguing against a continuous notion of history and its concomitant notion of
Western rational subjectivity, Foucault advanced his idea of an alternative philosophy — one
where subjects are produced as an effect of discourse and power — instead of the reverse
process. Subjects, according to Foucault, are produced as a function of how we constitute
knowledge that is, furthermore, structured by power relations, discourses (narratives) and social
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practices. His work reflects and effort that did not so much aim to re-instate the human, as much
as it did render an account that was anti-humanist anti-phenomenological, as it evolved out of the
tradition of hermeneutic ontology. Though clearly there are strong currents of structural analysis
in Foucault’s writing, his onto-epistemology is more in line with poststructuralism’s critique of
metaphysical centricity, which displaces the Enlightenment ideal of an autonomous, agential
Cartesian subject. Here, I want to point out that the most productive aspect of his critique may
very well lie in its challenge to assumptions about the extent to which it is possible to produce
and rely upon reliable subjects and the dynamic array of subjective/inter-subjective meanings
that derive from their interaction, for Foucault undertakes to destabilize the very essence of
meaning attached to the mind, body, and life of subjects under neoliberal governance.

Tiziana Terranova (2009) argues, likewise, in her reading of Foucault. She emphasizes the
functional importance of these relations to the projects of liberalism and neoliberalism, which
she argues are deeply implicated in the redefinition of the vital, the natural and the physical.132
Terranova relates how Foucault’s work illustrates that the economic-institutional rationality of
capitalism goes far beyond merely subsuming life in economic production, but instead draws on
“life” itself as a means to define a new political rationality; one where economic and vital
processes are not separate, but have, from the beginning, been deeply intertwined. Of course,
like other important aspects of Foucault’s work, one appreciates Terranova’s reading because it
takes into account how his thinking progressed over time. In other words, she recognizes that
despite the tendency in his early work to reduce the subject to a function of discourse, which
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effectively separated the human from the economic and the political, his ideas evolve toward an
appreciation of how bodies and subjects might be differently constituted, under differing
contingencies and configurations of power — configurations that Foucault in his late work
identifies using the terms “episteme” and “social milieu.” Aside from this development, the
principal development that Terranova calls our attention to pertains to what is conventionally
referred to and understood as “the subsumption of life under capital,” where capital, she says,
betrays indication that it does not subsume life so much as it “draws on life,” which is not
peripheral to, but foundational to economy. This is not, she explains, a new development; rather,
it is a social dynamic that Foucault understands has been, to a certain extent, always been central
to the functioning of economy.
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault takes Socrates notion of “know thy self” as a point
of departure to question what calls “the historically different forms of experience of the relation
between the subject and truth.”133 Hermeneutics, according to Foucault’s view, represents both a
method of inquiry and an interpretive epistemology; one that endeavors to uncover important and
what are sometimes controversial assumptions about the ontological underpinnings of our being
in the world. “An historical ontology of ourselves,” he says, is “one of whose principal
questions concerns how we have constituted ourselves as subjects of knowledge and truth.”134
This view of history, as pointed out earlier, does not see history as continuous development
resulting in the terminus of the present. Foucauldian ontology thus suggests a more radical

133

Foucault, Michel. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982. Ed.
Frederic Gros; trans. Graham Burchell, New York: Picador, 2006: p. xxi.
134

Ibid, xxxiii.

157

approach to long-standing questions like: Who are we? What are we made of? What is our basic
nature? Are mind and body separate? What does it mean to be human? His line of ontological
questioning summons the mind-body problematic while at the same time it calls into question
issues of order, extension and substance. Later, in The History of Sexuality, he develops this idea
to consider how one might “care for the self” and ultimately questions the conditions under
which true knowledge is possible.135

Deleuze
In a move that is evocative of Spinoza’s single substance philosophy, Deleuze’s ontology is
founded upon a conceptual apparatus that foregoes traditional hierarchical understanding of force
relations. Instead, his critique of bodies and capital is conceived as an assemblage or network
model. As such, Deleuze, refuses the epistemic primacy of representation; he rejects onedimensional institutional macro/micro explanations as a means to account for social phenomena.
His work is conceptually relevant to theory building in connection with wounded bodies, because
of his emphasis on the re-ordering of the body, again also derived from Spinoza, whose
understanding of bodies posited a relation of movement, where bodies are differentiated not in
form, but in terms of their capacity to affect and be affected.
Deleuze understands a body as any whole comprised by parts, where bodies need not conform
exclusively to the hierarchical organization of organs that we understand to be a whole “body”
that is an organism based life form. Deleuzian ontology is in this regard less concerned with
issues of force, material substance, and teleology, but rather emphasizes terms of series and
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process, which are further predicated upon an ontology of multiplicity. According to Deleuze, we
are not, as bodies, discrete selves; yet neither are we indivisible entities. On the contrary, in his
view, we all potentially might be divided and subdivided endlessly.

It is, I think, worthy of note that Deleuzian ontology takes Foucauldian ontology one step further,
to the extent that Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism challenges the conditions of possibility of
sense experience and observation, particularly as this concerns events and bodies. Thus, whereas
Foucault’s empirical critique emphasizes discontinuity, even as he retains the body, Deleuze
emphasizes difference, dissimilarity, variation, and multiplicity as this may be applied to
individual events and encounters. His concept of “event” weighs heavily on my own
understanding and use of the term, as I will argue later that events in connection with war might
be simultaneously understood as distinguishable and unique, even as they remain unbounded.

Both Foucault and Deleuze are suggesting here that there is a need for interpretive methods
which are sufficiently flexible to describe a social encounter as “process” that is in motion, rather
than what accomplished by more traditional causal-linear methods, which seek to explain social
phenomena using terms and concepts that are fixed and rigid. Philosophy, in their view, should
employ concepts to express events that Patton (1997) suggests might “engage with everyday
social and historical reality in a manner which would challenge received ideas about the nature
of events.” In this instance, Patton is referring to Deleuze’s concept of event, as expressed in his
work, The Logic of Sense.136
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Psychoanalytic Theory, Trauma and Affect
Critical theory was never fully embraced by the social sciences.137 This observation perhaps
rings true even more so when we look at a variant of it —psychoanalytic theory. Yet I want to
call attention to how this particular theory might be used to explain political economic
circulations as a circuit comprises material as well as immaterial social dynamics. Questions of
agency and bodily integrity are also be addressed here in conjunction with issues of identity that
link bodies to normalization, discipline, and control processes 138 All of these conceptual
problems give way to problems of embodiment, and so I address them within the context of
wounded bodies, which I argue are facing the constant peril of being undone.

Psychoanalysis as a discourse, rather than as a practice, is helpful for reasons that it effectively
resists the methodological positivism that characterizes work in the social sciences. Clough, as
was explained in the previous chapter, cites Steinmetz’s work on the empirical turn to
methodological positivism as the reason for this schism, which he says was a development that
occurred as a result of the events of World War II. According to Steinmetz:
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“For, even as cultural studies has been engaged with the sociological or an analysis of the
social, it has not taken on sociology’s epistemological unconscious. Rather, cultural
studies has fought against being drawn too closely to sociology’s disciplinary center of
gravity—its methodological positivism, shying from a full critical engagement with it,
even dismissing its leaning on empiricism.”139
And so it follows that the epistemic foreclosure of critical theory from the social sciences was
further accompanied by the discipline’s eschewing of cultural studies and studies in
psychoanalysis.
Cultural studies, nevertheless, contributes one of the more trenchant criticisms of militarism and
empiricism, through its focus on the rationalizing frameworks of economics and politics; a
critique that it often couples with an analysis of the cultural and psycho-social processes that
bound up in mass violence and war. And while it may be true there is a lack of “body” focused
critique among early practitioners of critical theory, one might reasonably contend the efforts of
Horkheimer and Adorno to work through the Marx, Weber, Freud synthesis helped inspire others
to rework this problematic to the great benefit of body studies. I myself draw upon their critique
in many respects to formulate a critical theory of combat injury, which acknowledges the
physical and somatic aspects of wounding and at the same time accounts for the affective
dynamics that characterize the hidden nature of pain and trauma.
With that, I am suggesting there is much that we might take from psychoanalytic theories of
trauma theory to explain war casualties and how we account for them. So for example, I find it is
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the case for TBI (traumatic brain injury) and PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) that both
come under scrutiny and are subject to break down when affect is taken into account; the
affective disruption experienced in connection with trauma produces wounds that are often
invisible. As a result, those wounds tend not to be counted, and thus they escape traditional
means of measure. Injuries of this nature have traditionally defied even the most diligent
documentation efforts, because they are prone to rely on self-reports; reports that may be
discouraged by military culture itself, which is known for its disdain and some might argue overt
disavowal of injury and weakness, which hampers reporting.140
Psychoanalytic theory, perhaps most famously in the case of Freud, explored trauma in
connection with the wounds of war. Elaine Scarry (1985) undoubtedly derives some degree of
inspiration from him in her critique of the practice of torture and how it addresses the uniquely
unspoken nature of trauma and pain. On the subject of pain in particular, she notes the person
who hears about another's pain unavoidably "has doubt" because pain lacks objective certainty
for them. Pain cannot be confirmed by the one who is not in pain, despite the fact that it is
overwhelmingly present to the person who is in pain. Pain, thus, not only resists language and
expression, it resists acknowledgement, quantification, and interpretation because it remains
invisible to others. Scary illustrates by calling attention to the visual arts use of the "the scream,"

Additionally, I want to call attention to Marisa Brandt’s work, who looks at Trauma, PTSD and Military
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a recurrent trope that evokes the art work of Bacon and Munch, famous for depicting an open
mouth making a sound that cannot be heard. 141
Clough's (2009) work on trauma, affect, and enactive witnessing evokes a similar dynamic, as
she calls attention to the "unspeakability" of trauma in the witnessing work of psychoanalysis:
“It is the unspeakability of the unspeakable that is a challenge to psychoanalysis.
Or put another way, while long criticized for a distant perhaps even unresponsive
silence, the psychoanalyst who instead narrates or even helps the patient narrate his
or her story may fail to respond to a need to go beyond or beneath meaning and
simply witness unspeakable yet embodied wounds. Witnessing may well begin with
a refusal to think that wounds are necessary to becoming human – that they are
ordinary and thus their narration salutary, if not socially required. The thought that
wounding is necessary to human subjectivity feeds therapeutic aims converging with
the ambitions of analysts and analysands for curative explanation in an insistence on
a certain relation of the psychic and language. In recent times this relationship has
involved a privileging of language in the construction of the subject: bodily life
wounded by culture, subjected to language in the becoming of the speaking subject.
Even when it is accepted that the subject in trauma cannot speak, it is expected
that the body will and thus the expectation of speech remains the horizon. But if
witnessing does not use language to speak but to touch, to be affective, then a critical
engagement with the in-between affect and psychoanalysis may draw us to look
at practice, especially the performative aspects of the speechless but affective
relationship of enactive witnessing, where it may not be clear there is a witness, only
a witnessing.”142
Methodologically, the analytical distinctions made by both Scary and Clough are important to
my research, because they call attention the epistemological problems inherent in more
traditional linear and dualistic thinking as this relates to trauma. Clough in particular questions
the contingent nature of the relationship between event, wound, trauma, bodily life, and
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subjectivity. Catherine Malabou, likewise, questions the event sequencing in relation to trauma.
In her (2012) book, The New Wounded she calls attention to the psychic wounds suffered by
victims and others, some of whom incurred those injuries in connection with war.143 Malabou
here calls attention to what she assesses to be a failure of psychoanalytic approaches to cure
patients suffering from a traumatic event, whereas Clough combines affect theory with
psychoanalytic theory to illustrate the psyche's need to integrate events into its own history.
These distinctions are important, given how traditional thinking in psychoanalysis presupposes a
traumatizing event exists prior to the wound/trauma – a formation which implies there is a causal
relation between them and, moreover, a bifurcated relation between mind and body. Clough
suggests otherwise, as she calls attention to this ordering crisis, which fails to account for the
“the in-between" affect that disrupts the traditional ordering of events. Like Scary, Clough also
cites the problem of language in the construction of subjectivity. Language is particularly
problematic when there is an expectation for speaking subjects to render articulate thoughts
about traumatic events. Trauma theory and affect theory here work together and suggest that
wounding is not always a singular event; one that is, furthermore, dependent on the sign of a
visible wound.
Freud himself also argued this point. His writing about trauma and the repetition compulsion
associated with shell shock during the First World War attests to the elusive nature of traumatic
war injury. Freud calls attention to how wounding occurs within an indeterminate circulation or
repetition, and in so doing he provides us with a critique that says war and wounding,
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theoretically as well as practically, are endless and therefore will defy even our best efforts to
count. He furthermore points out that even when wounding escapes visual capture, individuals
are no less inscribed. I draw from his logic among other to argue later that regardless of whether
or not injuries are visible or invisible, counted or not counted, wounded soldiers are indelibly
marked by the "sign" of injury -- that is, the wound, the cut, and trauma, which is embodied and
affectively repeats, as it occurs within an indeterminate circulation. Every wound, in this manner,
is imbued with its own temporality, which renders casualty accounting a perhaps pointless
activity that merely satisfies a performance strategy.
Jackie Orr’s treatment of panic is consistent with Clough in her effort to conceptualize what she
calls “psychopower.” One of the book’s main arguments is that the modulation of affect is
central to military strategy and tactics, which operate on the basis of what she calls
“psychopower”—a power that “disdains the notion of a mind/body split.” 144 Orr lays out an
argument that demonstrates how warfare can be conducted in such a ways that the human psyche
is the target. She points out, however, that this can occur, despite the fact that conflict cannot be
localized to a head that is separate from a body. The affects of war are, in this instance,
distributed throughout the body, even as they at the same time exceed the body and are
distributed across the population at large. Psychopower thus works by “multiplying the possible
surfaces of contact between psychic powers and their regulation,” which she explains orient
toward “managing individualized disorders of affect and desire.” 145
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Orr’s work, like that of Clough, challenges linear and dualistic thinking in regards to trauma and
injury. Although Orr here takes the additional step of calling attention to the different ways that
trauma might be experienced as a collective perception, where trauma operates biopolitically
with respect to populations. Both Orr and Clough are suggesting here that trauma can be every
bit as damaging when there is failure to witness; that falling short of an act of witnessing does
not preclude such a trauma (wound) cannot be felt. The failure to witness and the failure to
remember, along with speech failure may be further indicative of what Orr refers to as a politics
of “oblivion,” where oblivion “operates through shifting, distributed economies of archiving and
forgetting” such that we forget details relevant to the remembrance of war, which serve to enable
a “permanent, racialized, everyday war.” 146 Perhaps more important, the psychic trauma to
which they refer operates outside of the causal chain of events originally imagined by Freud,
who similarly speculated that war potentially engenders traumatic affect among the public at
large.
This literature points to the importance of accounting for the problem of temporality as it relates
to injury and wounding. And so I want to suggest a new way of thinking about combat injury;
thus, I propose a theory that accounts for combat injury as relational phenomena, where the
experience of injury might repeat itself, thereby creating multiple injuries and even multiple
selves. Memory loss, speech failure, as well as time gaps and other coincidences, in terms of
temporality, are not merely accidents or problems that need solving; they may, in fact, be a
normative part of the experience of injury. We must, I argue, understand wounding as

146

Jackie Orr, “A Possible History of Oblivion.” Social TextPeriscope (Spring, 2013).

166

empirically boundless, where there are primary wounds, secondary wounds, and multiple
wounds; that is, there are an indeterminate number of wounds, all of which are subject to become
caught up in the political economy of war and wounding. Like affect, wounding and trauma
operate in ways that escape the confines of embodied capture.
There are practical implications for this literature that I want to consider when I look at how
medical practitioners have historically treated soldiers for trauma related injuries. Embracing
multiplicity as characteristic of normative embodiment might very well serve as a form of “cure”
so to speak, as it posits injuries occur within a cycle of repetition, where there is no longer
merely “one” wound, precipitating incident, or self to account for, but rather there are
theoretically multiple wounds, incidents, and selves which may be bound together. The question
that remains is: how might this serve the needs of military and medical institutions? How might it
function as a medical governance of control?
Psychoanalytic theory, as a critical theory, supports claims I make in subsequent chapters about
the failure of traditional empirical research methods to account for war casualties. Claims of
accurateness and representativeness run counter to evidence that demonstrates how such claims
are more generally indicative of military and political strategies that are bound up in institutional
power relations. Objectifying war casualties through representational and discursive means,
which are inclusive of statistical accounting practices, is itself trauma-inducing, to the extent that
it produces a form of spatio-temporal dislocation among those who consume the numbers these
practice generate as unassailable fact. One outcome of the manufacture of a statistical body is
that works in different ways to engender an affective disconnect among the population at large;
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numbers divert social attention away from the blood and viscera of body’s corpus and work in
conjunction with the rupturing of time and space to undermine critical thinking about war and
wounding. In short, they make it difficult for us to see and “feel” those bodies.147
Issues of embodiment along with concepts of space and time thus are emptied of content and
meaning. Casualties are themselves are continuously produced and reproduced as a result of the
process of measuring them. This is why Deleuze and Guattari describe “duration” in terms of
“multiplicity” — which they further define as a “smooth space” that can neither be divided nor
counted, because to do so is to forever change the nature of what is counted subsequent to each
division.148 In light of this, one can perhaps attain recognition on a practical level how a body
responds to linear measure: the wound, the cut, and the trauma cannot help but to resist and
evade capture. In doing so, they similarly escape history and memory.
Objective certainty, when it comes to documenting war casualties may not then be either
desirable or attainable, given the different ways that wounding resists quantification, language,
and expression. Doubt and uncertainty are all that remain to fill the void vacated by the wound's
ontology of absence. The art of Francis Bacon, whose figural work depicts the human body, is
perhaps more instructive than any discourse or critique: the painting below reminds us the
scream without a voice is perhaps one of the better illustrations of the struggle to depict in words
what war does to a body. In this case, we are left to confront the anatomical logic of war, which
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in many respects dictates that regardless of how many rockets, bayonets and knives might render
skin from bone, or how many accountants might be marshalled to document the number of
bodies laid to rest and waste, no written account of war’s managed murder can imprint the
psyche of the uninitiated so they might grasp fully the brute nature of slaughter; that alone
remains the sole possession of those who are witness to war. Consequently, we are only ever left
with an indeterminate sense of what becomes of body that is a casualty of war.

Science and Technology Studies
Donna Haraway’s (1991) work on cyborgs, Katherine Hayles’ (1999) work on technology,
Patricia Clough’s (2009) study of biomediated bodies, in addition to the scholarship of Manuel
DeLanda (1991), Nikolas Rose (2007), and Eugene Thacker (2006) are all an influence on my
research. This body of work helps me to work problems as they pertain to the role war plays in
human transformation, particularly as this pertains to new developments in science and
technology. I aim to build on this scholarship to consider not only how war facilitates the
development of human performance technologies, but to also consider the implications for how
these changes are being lived as human embodiment.

Recent theoretical work in body studies, which overlaps this work in some aspects, indicates
there is trend in the literature, where theorists are increasingly moving away from early Western
academic concepts that defined bodies. Where previously bodies were recognized as singular and
whole, defined by concepts of enclosure―a model of the body based on a notion of the “body as
organism”― such understandings may no longer be relevant. Instead, more fluid and diverse
notions of bodies and embodiment are being explored using concepts derived from notions of
169

multiplicity (Schilling, 2005). Shilling suggests a concept of the body that he calls “corporeal
realism” to denote how a body might be better understood as a multi-dimensional medium. This
work, importantly, takes steps to address the conceptual as well as embodied tensions that arise
from dualistic notions of self/non-self, self/other, in addition to other contradictions resulting
from binary constructs like human/machine, organic/non-organic, and actual/virtual.149
Clough’s work positions my efforts to look beyond social identity critique that relies on bounded
notions of subject identity and individualized bodies, as I aim to show how combat injury and
wounded soldiers are dynamically engaged with developments in science and information
technology in medicine. Her work makes it possible for me to envision how soldiers’ bodies
might be re-made through technological reframing, but in such a way that the organic,
physiological constraints and capacities of the natural body (body-as-organism) are exceeded
while remaining biological.150 Consequently, I do not limit study to social dynamics that
privilege only the material aspects of bodies, because I want to consider how the wounded body
is also a sensing body; a perceiving body; a body that can affect and be affected.151 Clough’s
work here might also be read alongside that of Nikolas Rose and Eugene Thacker. Rose (2007)
writes about the biopolitcs of genetics and medical technologies that are instrumental to self-
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modification, calling attention to the idea that they are “technologies of life, whereas Thacker
(2006) explores the material and immaterial relation between biology and informatics.152 With
that, Clough, Rose, and Thacker together provide concrete examples and analysis of how human
bodily matter (i.e. DNA/genetic material) enters into capital circulation and produces value by
enhancing the laboring capacity of humans through the application of advanced medical
technologies and practices.

Worthy of note is how these scholars, each in their own different way, engage a strong critique
of political economy. In doing so, they not only look at the body itself, but what lies beyond the
body, while not taking away from or negating living bodies that are fully embodied. The authors
likewise share an ontological focus; one that privileges vitality and over substance and
accentuates the body’s affective capacities and informational dynamics by calling forth this type
of body as an informational body. In this manner, by looking at the more dynamic aspects of
bodies, they instantiate a move beyond the oppositional theorizing of bodies, as part of an effort
to conceive the body in terms relative to its circulation, modulation, and molecularization. In
other words, they facilitate thinking about the body in terms of how it might be put to labor in
ways that exceed the limits of the body proper, through a consideration of the non-somatic
aspects of bodies— the vitality and affective capacities of bodies—which helps to foster thinking
about increasing the productive capacities of bodies (Thacker, 2006; Blackman, 2008; Clough,
2008). This opens the door to a consideration of how bodies might be thought of as more than
whole bodies, figures, and subjects, as bodies might be rendered similarly viable through their
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disarticulation and recombinant distributive capacities, when the body is understood as dynamic
matter.
The re-positioning of body studies in this work not only reasserts the centrality of the body in
mediating social and cultural relations, it engages a presently unresolved future about what the
body is becoming and thus what it will be able to do. This helps me in my work here, as I too
aim to move beyond thinking about not only soldiers’ bodies, but how all bodies are changing.
And by this I mean they are changing in ways that supersede conventional understandings of the
body comprised of “flesh” and “machine” (or “natural/organic” and “technical”) as new regimes
of the body are being produced in such a manner they may comprise bodies and parts made up of
human and non-human bodies.

Finally, no review of body studies as it lies within the context of science and technology studies
is complete without acknowledging Manuel DeLanda’s (1991) work on war and technology as
this relates to the body. DeLanda’s work, inasmuch as it shares resonance with Clough, Rose,
and Thacker, also maintains a legacy connection with both Deleuze and Foucault; but whereas
Foucault’s ontology produces only a discursive body, DeLanda is able to employ Deleuze to
gives us an informational body. Working from traditions handed down through poststructuralism
and postmodernism, with which he incorporates understanding of chaos and complexity theory,
he illustrates how human life is connected to evolutionary changes in war. According to
DeLanda, advances in modern weaponry are significant beyond their military application. He
goes to considerable length to describe how the technoscience of war evolved and correlates with
parallel developments in weaponry, battlefield strategy, and tactics. For DeLanda, the weapons
of war reflect a historical progression in terms of how human beings are related to machines and
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information; he illustrates some of the different ways we might understand the relation between
war and human bodies as one translated through a process of science and technology
developments. According to this view, war, weapons, and bodies emerge simultaneously.153

Disability Studies
Disability studies as a sub-discipline has tended to favor three general approaches to problems in
connection with disability: identity-based critiques, critiques of medical normalization, and
critiques of ableism. There are increasingly more studies focused on wounded veterans, given
how this population has grown in recent years; however, this has not always been the case.
Gerber (2000) cites Disability Studies in particular as having “chosen a path that led it to move
away from rather than toward engagement with the disabled veteran.154 As was the case with
studies of biomedicine, the clinical literature in disability studies is addressed to problem solving
through frameworks that focus on clinical-therapeutic outcomes and rehabilitation practice. Rare,
but not missing entirely, are studies engage comprehensively with critiques of knowledge and
power (Shildrick, 2009). Cultural studies scholars and body theorists have again filled some of
this void through their well-documented studies of veteran disability within the context of
military history, in addition to studies of disfigured bodies, medical “otherness” and prosthetic
epistemologies (Jones, 2008; Haiken, 1997; Serlin, 2002; 2012; Perry, 2002; Marquard and
Morra, 2006; De Preester, 2009; De Preester and Smith, 2009; Kinder, 2015). This work reflects
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a range of effort to not only document the history of veterans’ disability and how this transpired
in connection with war, it provides a basis for innovative thinking about new technologies in
connection with disability. Particularly insightful are those studies that explore veteran disability
in light of racialized, classed, and gendered systems of oppression. But here again, studies too
often limit critique to understanding disability wounded bodies as either a product of historical
and discursive practice, or a process of social identity construction. They do not always look at
how these different practices and process might be part of a biopolitical economy of
developments.
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Section Two: The Iron Cage of Medicine

CHAPTER V
19th Century Wars – Case Illustration One

Wounded bodies haunt not only the history of war, but also the history of disease and
medicine.155 Broadly speaking, this chapter initiates empirical study of the history of war to chart
its influence on the social organization of medicine. I begin with the 19th century, where I focus
on the U.S. Civil War.156 Unlike many other people in the world, the majority of Americans have
not experienced a war on their homefront since the 1861-65 War. This chapter presents
arguments that suggest this particular war initiated a materially significant time period in medical
history. First, I provide a brief overview of the war, after which I report findings that address the
substance of my original research question: how are war and wounding bound up with changes
in the social organization of medicine? From here, I move to consider other questions that
include: How are human geographies bound up in violence and war? How are soldiers bodies

155

Roy Porter, Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine, Allen Lane, 2002. Although short in length
compared to the more substantial scholarship for which he is known, the content of this book is derived
from lecture courses given at the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College
London. It offers a concise overview of important developments in medical history, which are similarly
detailed in the more expansive work, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine (1996), of which he
was the editor.
156

The chronological succession of wars as they are traditionally understood to have taken place during
this time period break down as follows: Revolutionary War (1775- 1773), Franco-American Naval War
(1798-1800), the first Barbary War (1801-1805), War of 1812 (1812-1815), Creek War (1813-1814), War
of Texas Independence (1836), Mexican-American War (1846-1848 ) and the Civil War (1861-1865).
Lists like this, which I am mindful to avoid in here, are problematic for reasons that they invite the
assumption that during the years outside the bracket, the United States was not at war.

175

“made” and “unmade” within the context of war. What kinds of knowledge might be produced
by these encounters? Whose life is valued and whose life counts?
Bear in mind now, Foucault’s study of the body did not address social identity so much as it did
subjectivity and how the subject was produced as a function of discourse. Furthermore, he did
not take up analysis of wounded soldiers, but rather soldiers in general. With that, there remains
a considerable amount intellectual terrain in his work that applies here – particularly as in
regards to how the body becomes a vector of sorts, as it is becomes bound up in the production
of knowledge, truth, and discourse. It was Foucault, of course, whose genealogical analysis
looked at the different ways bodies were rendered vulnerable and made docile. His comparative
analysis of institutions, including prisons, schools, barracks and hospitals are directly relevant to
my research undertaking. In the illustration that I present here, I think there much to be gained
from extending his original institutional analysis to look at the interpenetrating social dynamics
of military and medical institutions. In doing so, I examine how these particular bodies not only
occasioned developments in medicine; I look at the significant impact they had on what we think
about men as a social group and normative ideas about bodies in general (Serlin, 2002, 2004,
2005, 2006).
There are, as I outlined in the first chapter, four major problems that I want to explore as they
relate to my research problematic: 1) the problem of war and military institutional influence over
the social organization of medicine; 2) problems of the body which result from it being targeted
as an object of military and medical strategy and practice; 3) the problem of violence to the
extent that it creates ethical problems, which cut across institutions; 4) problems of discourse,
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where heroic narratives engage an affect economy of desire to inhibit critical inquiry as it
pertains to combat injury. I address these problems, which I find tend to overlap and enfold each
other, and at the same time build on previous critical theories to advance my own theory of
violence as it pertains to the political economy of combat injury and medicine.
The case evidence that I present here documents the social context that helped forge links
between the profession of arms and the profession of medicine. In this instance, the case frame
restricts findings focus to particular elements that I delimit as follows: 1) combat casualty
patterns and statistics; 2) the social organization of medicine; 3) battlefield strategy, tactics, and
weaponry. In the first category, I document patterns of injury as indicated by published casualty
statistics, where I note how combat casualties are classified, counted, and reported. The second
category documents developments in medical social organization, where I focus attention on
innovations in biomedical surgery practice, public health and disease management, and
rehabilitative medicine. The third category documents developments in military strategy, tactics
and weaponry are documented so that they might be analyzed in terms of their impact on the
social organization of medicine.

Afterwards, the chapter concludes with a biopolitical analysis of documented case findings,
where I point to the work of Foucault among others to illustrate how medical knowledge
production and technology innovation enter knowledge and control domains through their
imbrication with war. Foucault’s work emphasized the productive potential of biopower to
transform individual bodies and subjects and as part of that process produces specific types of
knowledge and truth. His treatment of the body and race are relevant to understanding how
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wounded soldiers became a target of power, as specific practices which aimed to discipline,
monitor and control these bodies, were facilitated by innovations in medicine. 157 158 The
purpose of the analysis is to provide synthesis of key innovations in medicine, where I argue
these developments constitute evidence of a political economy of relations: war and combat
injuries not only helped facilitate medical social organization, they evolved to engage with a vital
biopolitcs of bodily change, social control, and human transformation .

As the first of two comparative historical case studies, this case is designed to accomplish
benchmarking functions, where I document important developments and innovations, which will
be used to facilitate comparisons with the second case. In some instances, the particular
innovations themselves may not appear to be overwhelmingly significant, however, as was
noted, I am putting these developments into a historical context, which I further theorize as a
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relational economy – a political economy of injury – one that I am arguing targeted the bodies of
soldiers in particular, who were often used as medical test subjects for a wide range of treatments
and practices. Briefly put, the aim here is to illustrate how combat injury, which is to say –
wounded soldiers, played an important instrumental role in fostering major changes in the social
organization of medicine.

History: Beginnings, Endings, Causes, Effects
The American Civil War, fought between the years of 1861 and 1865 has often been called the
first "modern" war, or as Richard Brown (1976) termed it, "the conflict of a modernizing
society" (Brown, 1976: 161). Although its duration was a mere four years, the Civil War
established the high water mark for combat casualties. With well over a million casualties, a
number which includes soldiers as well as civilians, it still stands as the bloodiest and most
costly war fought in American history. According to Howard Zinn, “the United States
government's support of slavery was based on an overpowering practicality. In 1790, a thousand
tons of cotton were being produced every year in the South. By 1860, it was a million tons. In the
same period, 500,000 slaves grew to 4 million.”159 Put another way, 4 million slaves represented
almost one out of every three residents residing in the region at that time.160 To put that number

Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States 1492 - Present. This citation is the opening
paragraph of Chapter 9: “Slavery Without Submission, Emancipation Without Freedom,” Harper Perennial
Modern Classics, 2010).
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Roger L. Ransom’s analysis supports the statistic cited by Zinn, as he notes “in 1805 there were just
over one million slaves in the United States worth about $300 million dollars; fifty-five years later four
million slaves brought the total worth closer to $3 billion. In the 11 states that formed the original
Confederacy, four out of ten people were slaves in 1860, which accounted for more than half the
agricultural labor in those states. In the cotton regions the importance of slave labor was even greater.
The value of capital invested in slaves roughly equaled the total value of all farmland and farm buildings
in the South. Though the value of slaves fluctuated from year to year, there was no prolonged period
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in perspective, the figure is representative of almost one out of every three residents residing in
the region at that time. When the war was effectively over and done, the economic impact
devastated the North as well as the South.

The racial ideology of white supremacy that defined the Civil War and post-war South would
ultimately draw upon the meanings attached to these bodies – soldiers and slaves in particular in order to establish who was/was not a citizen worthy of rights. This process, which valorized
the white soldier as a heroic figure was not only materially significant; it was significant to the
functioning of a symbolic order as well as an affect economy, which set the stage for ongoing
public fascination with the celebration of soldiers. Both relied on the selective, or one might say,
“affective” partitioning of public memory from historical fact. Selective non-linear memory in
this case produces what amounts to a collective form of social amnesia. This explains why
contemporary debates continue to selectively parse the history record. Partial truths, half facts,
myths and in some instances lies continue to animate the longest running trauma narrative in the
history of United States – the history of the Civil War.

In the book Crucible of the Civil War, Edward Ayers estimates that the monetized value of
Southern slaves was greater than the combined value of all the railroads and factories in the

during which the value of the slaves owned in the United States did not increase markedly. In the seven
states where most of the cotton was grown, almost one-half the population were slaves, and they
accounted for 31 percent of white people's income; for all 11 Confederate States, slaves represented 38
percent of the population and contributed 23 percent of whites' income.” For more on this, see Ransom’s
article posted at EH.net, a publication of the Economic History Association. Downloaded from
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war/ Last accessed July 18, 2016.
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North.161 Historians have further argued that the war marked a major turning point in American
history, particularly its economic history. Often referred to as the "Second American
Revolution," historians like Charles Beard and Louis Hacker noted how the Civil Wat war
altered the balance of power between the North and South; that it effectively paved the way for
the rise industrial capitalism in the years after the war."162 Traditional timelines date the
beginning of the Civil War with the attack on Fort Sumter in 1861. As for the ending of the war,
many point to the December 1865 ratification of the Emancipation Proclamation, whereas others
cite the date Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union Lieutenant General
Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865 at Appomattox Courthouse in Virginia. And for reasons that I
will explain here, there is a strong argument to be made that the war never really ever ended,
despite the fact that almost 150 year of time have now passed since the last rifle shot was fired.

Disagreement continues to fester in regards the specific causes for the war. While the vast
majority of scholarship recognizes the saliency of slavery to the war – there are nonetheless
different versions of the Abraham Lincoln wanted to “free the slaves” argument ―others
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Crucible of the Civil War: Virginia from Secession to Commemoration. Ayers, Edward L., Gary W.
Gallagher, and Andrew J. Torget (eds.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006.
The term “Second American Revolution” remains a trope in the literature of Civil War historians. Louis
Hacker summarized what eventually became known as the Hacker-Beard Thesis, where he says: “The
American Civil War turned out to be a revolution indeed. But its striking achievement was the triumph of
industrial capitalism. The industrial capitalist, through their political spokesmen, the Republicans, had
succeeded in capturing the state and using it as an instrument to strengthen their economic position. It
was no accident, therefore, that while the war was waged on the field and through Negro emancipation, in
Congress' halls the victory was made secure by the passage of tariff, banking, public-land, railroad, and
contract labor legislation.” For more on this see Charles and Mary Beard. The Rise of American
Civilization. Two volumes. New York: Macmillan, 1927. And also Louis Hacker, The Triumph of American
Capitalism: The Development of Forces in American History to the End of the Nineteenth Century (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 373.
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subscribe to what some refer to as “Lost Cause Mythology,” as there are some who still want to
continue to argue the war was about states’ rights of nullification and secession.163 While it is
not my intention to “split the difference” here, I do want to point out that the narrative is
complicated than this and that there are, in fact, important points of overlap. Empirically,
however, there can be no doubt the U.S. Civil War was indisputably about slavery. What remains
at issue and thus it is the intent of this research to explore is the significance of this history to
medicine, and how the bodies of wounded soldiers are bound up within it. Consequently, instead
of relying on traditional linear “event-based” critique, I want to engage in a “body” centered
critique and open up this war to an understanding of how body politics and what Foucault
referred to as biopolitcs can explain the importance of relationally situated bodies to the political
economy of the Civil War. In other words, this case will document and analyze the social
dynamics that point us toward an understanding of how bodies in general, first slaves and then
soldiers in particular, were strategic to both the war and developments in medicine.

The Political Economy of Bodies & War

There is one view embedded in Civil War scholarship that stipulates the political economy of the
United States during this era was functionally divided, with effectively separate economies
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States’ rights arguments continue to circulate in contemporary public discourses in the United States,
though they are predominantly employed by those who affiliate what is often referred to as the “Lost
Cause” of the former states of the confederacy. States’ rights arguments were invoked during the 1960s
civil rights movement and have more recently been raised in connection with issues of governance that
address ongoing discrimination, i.e. religious discrimination as this pertains to LGBT issues, access to
birth control, in addition to other forms of gender and wage discrimination. Legislation aimed at curtailing
the discriminatory actions of employers and corporations has been opposed recently on the basis of the
states’ rights argument originally used to justify slavery.
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operating in the North and South. Alternatively, others have argued this idea is a gross
oversimplification of the state of the economy; that economic interests of the two regions were,
in fact, aligned and intertwined. Yet to accept the logic of the latter – and I think we must – is to
simultaneously acknowledge that the North, much like the South, reaped an economic benefit
from slavery.164

This distinction is epistemologically important to claims that I make in my research. I find the
first viewpoint particularly problematic, if only because anyone who accepts it must also
acquiesce on some level to the incipient structural violence that strives to remain hidden the idea.
To say then that slavery was simply a “Southern” problem is a gross fiction. For it penetrated
nearly every aspect of U.S. society. Thus, in the same manner as I argue in my work that war and
violence do not reside epistemologically “outside” the body and outside medicine, I dispute the
notion of segmented economies, because this view imbues understanding of what we generally
recognize to be “the economy” with a naturalness the evidence does not support.

Holding onto the fictive notion of bifurcated economies does two things. Most important, it
disassociates banks and financial institutions from the fact that their profits were (are) powered
by forced human labor. Though in this instance, I am less concerned about who is ultimately to
blame for slavery than I am about identifying the faulty logic that underlies trying to distinguish
what lies “inside” vs. outside” the economy. Absent critical challenge of the idea that slavery is
solely a Southern sin, we are set up to believe that accrual of business profit and the rise of 19th
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As one leading Civil War historian, James McPherson put it, Southerners were correct in their claims
that the revolutionary program to do away with slavery threatened their way of life (1983; 1988).
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century industrial capital all took place in a social realm removed from human suffering. In what
amounts to an act of historical white-washing, banking, finance, and insurance firms were
imagined to be non-slave identified commercial activities, when in fact finance industry profits
relied heavily on Southern agriculture to sustain profits.

Southern plantations, in other words, were integral to the growth of finance and most of all
finance capital. The South, moreover, served as a primary local market for finished products and
consumption goods manufactured in the North. Edward Baptist’s (2014) critical work argues that
19th century global finance was in many respects greatly facilitated by, if not wholly dependent
upon slavery in the American South. Slavery, he says, and its coerced system of free labor
provided the foundation for the American system of capitalism.165 That is to say, the entire
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Baptist illustrates how creative financial instruments, what were essentially bonds, were issued that
effectively tied the value of financial paper to the body of the slave, whose life and labor values were used
to secure the investment. In this manner, one might note that the commercial success of American
financial and credit institutions, the Industrial Revolution, and later the rise of Wall Street can all be
attributed to the laboring body of the slave.
Bank chartering and regulation proved to be another volatile issue, as banks had only recently been
established during this time period. In the antebellum time period, President Andrew Jackson, himself a
wealthy slave holder, inspired controversy in 1834 when he vetoed a bill to re-charter the Second Bank of
the United States. At that time, sixty per cent of all banks were located in the Northeast. Jackson believed
that because the federal bank was a Northeastern establishment, it lacked interest in helping farmers and
laborers in the Western and Southern parts of the US. Jackson was particularly concerned with the idea
of a federal bank concentrating its wealth and financial strength within a single institution, for this he
believed potentially exposed the government to control by outside interests. Instead, he advocated for
bank regulation to fall under the control of state governments. Opinions clearly, even in our present day,
remain sharply divided over the degree to which the federal government should regulate banks. For more
on this, refer to Edward Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American
Capitalism, New York: Basic Books, 2014.
Another source that provides similarly cogent analysis of these issues can be found in Craig Wilder’s
book, Ebony and Ivy, where he writes: “Slavery was deeply embedded in all our institutions, which found
ways to explain and rationalize slavery, even after the formation of the American republic.” Wilder’s
account, of course, here emphasizes the role universities played in regards to slavery.
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economic system, not just the economy of the South, was dependent upon if not completely
driven by slave labor.
Baptist’s argument crucially exposes how the reification of “separate” economies creates a
barrier to understanding how violence is structured into the system of profit; the body politics,
which is to say the biopolitics, that accompanied the expansion of finance and as I will
subsequently explain – medicine - occurred in such a way that the bodies that made that success
possible were rendered less visible. In calling attention to this, the sleight maneuver can be
revealed for what it is: a problem that imbricates the political economy of the body. First slave
bodies and later soldiers bodies, I will argue here, were taken up by a governance of control that
specifically targeted the breaking down of their bodies. Slavery thus was not merely a problem
endemic to agriculture; it was a problem endemic to the system of capitalism and it is a problem
that remains in our current time, even though it is demonstrated by different embodied forms of
exploitation. The commodity trading of crops and humans was an integrated enterprise that
proved stimulative to the economy as a whole (so it wasn’t really the American enterprising
spirit that Weber conceived). For during this time period, the conflation of humans with property
and bodies with capital became routinized to the point of being mundane. Humans and material
goods were not seen as ontologically and materially distinct; rather, they were understood to be
one and the same. These facts are supported by accounting records that cite valuation practices,
which did not distinguish between people and property.
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Slavery thus was more than a mere institution and economic system—it was a system of human
ownership that produced the greatest number of war casualties in U.S. history.166 That this
remains an issue of contention in our contemporary time period says much about the
intransigence of slavery and its ability to persist through other structural means, including mass
incarceration, residential segregation, and segregated education.167 Critical revisionist scholars
(among others that include regional apologists for the confederacy) have argued the war was
caused solely for reasons of states’ rights. The record is clear there was only “one” states’ right
the South was keen to defend— the right to own people. American capitalism was successful
because it perfected a program of economic barbarism based on the socially normative and
despotic practice of owning, torturing, and exploiting human bodies.

While it is true, chattel slavery is no longer a legally sanctioned feature of our current social
landscape, I want to argue that the ownership of people, specifically their bodies, was and
remains a far more encompassing control paradigm than is generally acknowledged. As others
have pointed out, different aspects this social logic evolved and persist, however, evidence
suggests that human ownership, as a form of governance, includes the right to own the bodies,
labor, and life of soldiers. Predatory capitalism, or more aptly white supremacist racist
capitalism, advanced because it perfected and institutionalized economic barbarism, which was

166

That this remains an issue of contention in many parts of the contemporary United States says as
much about the intransigence of slavery and its ability to persist through other means that reflect
institutionalized violence as it does speak to problems that are rampant within the U.S. system of
education.
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Michele Alexander. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York:
New Press, 2010.
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based on the socially normative practice of owning, torturing, and exploiting human bodies. Put
another way, American capitalism was successful because it perfected a program of a breaking
down bodies and making them useful. This is why abolishing slavery was a contentious issue on
all sides of the regional divide.

To parse it even more, one might concede a point here to the much maligned neo-confederate
scholars, who are in some aspects correct when they argue that the decision to go to war, where
Lincoln was concerned, was not based solely on the moral issue of slavery. For issues of control
were also important.168 The Northern imperative of controlling the expansion of slavery,
regulating the population within the United States, made keeping the South in the union a matter
of national priority. But not for simple ideological reasons of wanting to maintain national unity;
but rather, because Lincoln considered it to be strategically important to control the land and
living conditions where the majority of the slave population resided. Controlling the physical
territory of the South was part and parcel of need to control the bodies of laborers deemed
critical to securing the nation’s economy.169 Geographic terrain and human terrain were thus
considered one and the same, as he determined a need to secure the land in order to secure the
body. The U.S. President here presciently calculated the simple outlawing of slavery by
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For more on this, see Bruce Levine, The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil War and The Social
Revolution That Transformed The South. Random House, 2013: p. 29.
169

Gunderson supports his view by comparing the "costs" of war with the cost of "compensated"
emancipation, noting the two costs were roughly similar, totaling between 2.5 to 3.7 billion dollars. See
Gerald Gunderson, “The Origin of the American Civil War.” Journal of Economic History 34 (1974): 915950.
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proclamation without securing physical control of the Southern territories would have doomed
Northern economic interests.

The Civil War was thus the first U.S. war that was fought on human terrain. Going to war was
deemed both logical and rational, because keeping the South in the union was the only way
Lincoln could ensure the legislative program to not only simply contain but to also control
slavery could be accomplished170 Social stability―or what some are prone to otherwise refer to
as “peace” ― was only ever achievable through an act of war. This means that the “perfect
union” Lincoln dreamed of achieving was founded as much on the idea of the unification of
states as it was a vision for achieving a unified labor pool of physically dominated and
subordinated laboring bodies. Consequently, economic practices of human subjugation didn’t
stop with slavery; these practices were merely refined as they acquired new targets. Medicine as
both an institution and practice was eventually brought into the political economy of control
practices that helped calibrate future efforts to exploit the bodies of other groups of people like
soldiers.

Public narratives and discourses continue to dispute the beginnings, endings, and causes of the
Civil War. Confederate cultural mythology relentlessly infuses modern-day interpretations of the
war, as it continues to portray Southern involvement in revolutionary terms. There is a tendency,
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Based on this view, the purpose of the Emancipation proclamation was not what many continue to
believe –that it was conceived to serve the interests blacks. Quite the contrary, as Lincoln himself
admitted it was intended to accomplish two objectives: 1) further the economic interests of the Union; and
2) maintain control over the South. Alternatively, had the South had been permitted to leave the union of
states, scholars have argued the North could not have leveraged the means necessary to control slavery
(Ransom 1989; Ransom and Sutch 2001; Weingast 1998; Weingast 1995; Wolfson 1995).

188

for example, to romanticize the war as “the War of Northern Aggression,” where southern
identification mirrors that of a patriot underdog. According to this view, Southerners fought
bravely to fend off the Northern invaders, whose federal government policies posed a threat not
only to the Southern economy, but also to their very embodied being, threatening all manner of
social identity, including physical comportment, dispositions, and gestures that reflected an
entire way of life. Bruce Levine (2013) calls attention to these social dynamics when he argues
that slavery, as an institution and a system of practices, was not only borne out of economic
necessity; it served as a repository for Southern identity and values, to the extent that it
constituted “the unique basis of the particular outlook, assumptions, norms, habits, and
relationships to which masters as a social class had become deeply and reflexively attached.”171

Slavery, in other words, institutionalized social relations that were based on notions of
domination and subordination, which were paramount to efforts to secure the life and livelihood
of all Southern whites —not just the ones who owned slaves. This explains then why people
regionally affiliated with the South (and even some now that reside outside of the South) believe
the war constituted an existential threat to their lifestyle. Slavery was the glue that held the social
order together. The North and South thus were always bound together as a union on the basis of
the collective willingness of a people to ignore the contradiction of advocating freedom through
slavery; both maintained an interest in structurally legitimizing, through force of organized
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violence and law, the linking of property rights with white identity, white bodies, and white
privilege.172

In this particular, instance, the process of undoing the violence of slavery exposed the violence in
the social system from which all were benefitting—a fact that remains true in the present day,
where the social stratification of African-Americans in American society reflects a not altogether
different social order. By the end of the war, the institution of slavery was overturned. This is not
to say now that slavery went away; only that as a practice we can see how it evolved in different
ways to secure the body as a site of labor. Wounded soldiers returning from battlefields were
well-positioned to fulfill what were, more or less, the new laboring requirements, such that
through a process of medical objectification, they were put to labor in a manner that was
befitting of their social status. This was necessary to secure the continued expansion of the
capitalist economy.

The right to access and employ organized violence is a right the U.S. state continues to
demonstrate only belongs to white people - a tradition that the evidence here confirms goes all
the way back to the U.S. Civil War in one unbroken chain that remains wrapped around the
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Much as was the case with Southerners, Northerners also saw themselves fighting the good fight. In
their view, they were reprising the patriots’ struggle of the 1776 Revolutionary War. Unlike their neighbors
in the South, the North was, ideologically, more invested in the idea of maintaining the American union at
all costs. Even though many among them benefitted from slavery, there remained a wide-spread
consensus among Northerners that slavery was antithetical to democracy and good governance.
Nevertheless, if there was one idea that both sides could get behind, it was the idea that the principals of
egalitarianism—life, liberty, freedom, and self-governance— ideals that breathed life into American
governmentality, were in terms of design and intent dedicated solely to protecting the interests of property
holding white men. White property rights were thus, by decree as well as declaration, institutionalized in
the legal documents that established the founding of the U.S. republic. This basic sensibility was and
remains sacrosanct, as we see even in our present era how this animates debates over who “built” and
thus “owns” the property that is the nation.
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bodies of dead black people. Poor and even working class whites in the United States continue
the fight to maintain an economic order that oppresses them for reasons that they at least, if
nothing else, retain skin privilege. It’s as if to say the Civil War never really ended. The
contemporary Patriot movement in the United States furnishes us with one example of how the
fight continues; superficially, they assert rights over land as well as the right to carry guns and
other weapons without restraint. The real fight, however, is about race privilege. Blacks,
alternatively, are still fighting for the right to be recognized as people. Yet they continue to be
targeted for capture and murder by militias (police), who are paid by a capitalist class to maintain
order in the face of radical social inequality.

In this next section, I will illustrate the different ways these social dynamics play out with
soldiers. In what emerges as one of the major contradictions of the war, fighting for the right of
the state to enslave and torture black people resulted in the state being empowered to do the same
to soldiers. Their white skins, as I will demonstrate, ultimately fail an aegis of protection against
the war machine, which found it could productively make use of their bodies to facilitate profit
and progress. Having established these links, I turn now to discussion and analysis, where I argue
that the bodies of slaves and soldiers together forged a rational political economy of injury that
paved the way for important transformations in medicine.

War & Human Object Relations
While this previous section undermined some of the contradictory assumptions that distinguish
debates about Civil War history, I want to move away from this to address more directly how
slavery and combat injury evolved together and became important to the political economy of
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war. This section will look at the institutional practice dynamics of slavery and consider them in
relation to military institutional dynamics as they pertain to soldiers. I will argue here that the
racialized caste system was relevant to the production of soldiers as wounded bodies and
subjects. Both groups were essentially “body targets” of the Civil War.173 As such, they
exemplify different models of the body - the slave model and the militarized medical model of
the soldier. Medical practices, which became progressively more invasive over time, evolved
into a form of asset management; they performed a double move, securing the government’s
economic investment in soldiers’ bodies and paving the way for innovations in medical social
organization, which occurred during and after the war.
During the Civil War, it is important to remember that slaves who fought in it almost never had
their bodies counted and listed among the war’s casualties. This occurred primarily for two
reasons: a slave was technically not a “person” as defined by the law and slaves could not be
soldiers. These accounting practices were maintained despite the fact that slaves, even though
they were not understood to be a legal person were still classified as “civilians.” And although
many were technically barred from official service soldiers, a large number nonetheless served as
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The process of dehumanization, objectification, quantification, and valuation of slave, however, did not
begin simply at the point of sale; rather, it commenced prior to the slaves’ arrival in the U.S., at the remote
locations where they were captured and processed as human cargo. The first estimate that was made
was a rational guess, as accountants and others wagered how many slaves were likely to survive transit.
Expected mortality rates of fifty per cent were assumed to be normal. Later, when the trans-Atlantic slave
trade was abolished, slave owners were forced to rely on domestic slaves breeding in order to obtain
more "stock." Killing slaves for any reason during this time, although not without precedent, was not
favored because it was deemed not supportive of the long-term economic interests of owners, since it
would reduce the population of potential slave workers and could therefore disrupt the economy. As
Levine explains “this set of opposing impulses — one aimed at keeping slaves at least minimally fit, the
other preoccupied with reducing the cost of their maintenance —-governed the health of slaves.” Masters
could profit further when slaves became parents (Levine, 2013: p. 12).
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such. Yet none of this is surprising, given the disputed and contradictory nature of their status. In
the time period following the Revolutionary War and pre-dating the Civil War (the antebellum
time period), the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise was negotiated between the Northern and
Southern states at the Philadelphia convention of 1787. 174

The constitutional compromise achieved here had the effect of further codifying into law the
worth and value of a human life, which in the end was calculated by fragmenting whole bodies.
The fractionalized value of the human, as agreed here, was understood to be an expression of the
lowest common denominator—the bare minimum value of a life upon which the two opposing
sides could agree―the power to count, objectify, and fractionalize human beings for accounting

The Three-Fifths Compromise was not a “new” concept in 1787, as it originated in a 1783 amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, proposed under the Articles of Confederation (Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3
of the Constitution). It is often misunderstood, as it is thought to identify and codify the value of a slave as
equivalent to that of three-fifths of a person. Blacks were not understood to be partial human beings (i.e.
three-fifths of a person). As a point in fact, they were not understood to be human beings at all, as the
three-fifths ration did not grant personhood to slaves. The fractional expression here refers to specific
additional representational power that was granted to slave owners based on the number of slaves that
they owned. By the end of the Civil War, the abolition of slavery was codified in the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution (1865), which effectively nullified the three-fifths clause. Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to Constitution (1868) later superseded Article 1, Section 2, paragraph 3; it stated
“Representatives shall be apportioned ...counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed..." The compromise pitted Northern delegates to the convention against Southern
convention delegates, who ironically didn’t allow their unwillingness to recognize slaves as human
persons to prevent them from petitioning the government to obtain increased voting rights on the basis of
slave-holdings. The southern delegates, in other words, wanted slaves to be counted as people for
political purposes, though without granting them personhood status with full rights to vote. Put another
way, they denied their individual personhood, but were willing to leverage them as a population to
increase Southern political representation and by proxy Southern power. Northern delegates, on the other
hand, argued that only free men should be counted; that slaves were not free, could not vote, and could
not be counted. Here, the North also wagered on benefitting from not granting full recognition to slaves.
The final compromise was achieved when delegates from the two regions agreed on a fractionalized
representation of the slave’s value, which could be counted toward political representation. Consequently,
instead of counting the actual number of all slaves in accordance with a 1-1 ratio, slaves were counted as
three-fifths of a person. The fractionalized slave number was tallied in addition to the number of free
persons residing in their districts. This compromise ultimately helped the South to leverage influence over
issues related to taxation and finance regulation.
174

193

purposes is a distinguishing feature of the social context of the war. Yet for the purpose of
argument, I think it is essential to stress the fact that slavery as a system of free labor pre-dates
practice in the American South; slavery, in other words, was not an exclusive product of
Southern or American capitalism.175 This particular war, however, accomplished what no war
before it accomplished to the extent that it one of its significant outcomes was that it helped
transform traditional commodity object relations so that they became indistinguishable from
human object value equivalents.
Marx inferred as much when he wrote “the slave market itself maintains a constant supply of its
labor-power commodity by war, piracy, etc.” 176 What Marx missed in his analysis though was
the fact that unlike mere material commodities, slave bodies possessed the power to reproduce
themselves without expending additional labor power. American slave owners tapped into a new
source of power, not by locating value in labor alone, they used the body itself as a generative
source of labor power. Slavery thus increased human life value (even as it degraded it) and
human productivity through social practices linked to human reproduction.177 As a result, a war
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Self-hood and subjectivity were denied on the basis that slaves had no legal standing, as slaves were
reduced to the bare substance of their body and the labor it could provide. Under the system of slavery,
the value of a human life was located “in” the body; human value was a function of what the body could
do, in terms of the labor it was expected to perform over the course of a lifetime. This value exclusively
accrued to owners.
Marx also argued that the Civil War in the United States constituted one of the century’s major battles
for human emancipation. Kevin Anderson, cited by Suh, argues “it was a battle that forced white labor in
both the United States and in Britain to take a stand against slavery.” For more on this, see Kevin
Anderson, Marx at the Margins, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 79. Slave labor,
however, was not understood by Marx to be equivalent to living labor; slave labor, in his view, was dead
labor.
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Because slave owners claimed ownership of labor by virtue not simply employing but actually owning
the laboring body (they also owned the future labor/bodies of slave offspring), this particular system of
labor proved worthy over which to wage war. Under the factory system, a worker’s body was coupled with
a machine to produce value for capitalists; under the system of slavery, value did not accrue only in the
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driven by a slave economy accomplished what the factory never was able to do: it produced
labor value from the body and life itself. In doing so, slave owners effectively elaborated and
dare say improved upon Marx’s famous labor theory of value. They redefined the terms under
which a body might be put to labor, and in the process had a major impact on American social
relations and organization.

The Civil War thus expanded the terrain and circumstances by which bodies might be might be
put to labor—it changed the relation between machines and bodies. The import of this
development, perhaps most especially for sociologists, is that it challenges Max Weber’s
foundational narrative, which suggested the economic engine of the United States — what he
refers to as the Spirit of capitalism— was motivated by a uniquely Protestant work ethic. Thanks
to the work of revisionist historians, it is safe to say now the progressive impulse of capitalism
was indisputably slavery. Yet I want to argue further that this war, through the subjugating
practices of slavery and the development of accounting methods used to document war
casualties, was instrumental to founding the science of human measure. Rational empirical
calculation methods, which remain prized among social scientists, were developed during this
time, where they eventually evolved to not only focus on generating labor and value from bodies,
but also knowledge – body knowledge.

labor of a given body, but also in that body’s reproductive life capacity and the future labor that it
potentially represented.
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Soldiers are the New Slaves

The idea that soldiers and slaves are carved from the same stock and substance might strike some
as reductive. And while it might sound hyperbolic to state — “soldiers are the new slaves” —
there is an argument I want to make about how, over the course of time, they came to be
constituted as an increasingly exploitable and reliable form of cheap material labor. To facilitate
comparison, it may be helpful here to think of their different bodies in terms of models, where
one model of the body – the slave – gave way to another model – the soldier. As body models,
we might look at each of them to discover how disciplinary and control practices were employed
to cultivate them as labor assets.
Though as bodies – and let’s be clear black bodies – slaves were subject to the worst practices of
social exclusion, subjection, and corporeal violence. Slaves were privately owned and bound to
their masters through relations of chattel servitude. And as chattel, they were routinely bought
and sold on the open market, as exemplified by the now infamous Butler Slave Auction.178 Slave
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The Butler Slave Auction was perhaps the most notorious slave auction of the old South; the event is
also commonly referred to as “The Weeping Time." On March 3, 1859, one year prior to the
commencement of the U.S. Civil War, the largest human slave auction in the United States was held in
Savannah Georgia. The slaves belonged to Pierce Butler, a former British Army officer as late as 1772,
who later joined the Confederate Army. As a ranking officer, he at one point represented the state of
South Carolina’s governing authority, which wielded the power to trade human lives and enforced
compliance under threat of violence. Butler, as it turned out, had fallen on hard times. He was forced to
sell his slaves at an auction that transpired over 48 hour time period. Reports estimate 436 men, women,
children, and infants, most of whom were born on his plantations, were sold in a sale that generated
approximately $300 thousand dollars (present day equivalent approx. $6.7 million dollars). The highest
price paid for one family — a mother and her five grown children — was $6,180; for one slave it was
$1,750. The lowest price paid for a slave was $250. Before the auction commenced, slaves were
transported to a local racetrack, where they were put into horse stalls, so prospective buyers might
visually inspect them before placing bids. Later, they were paraded onto the grand stand, a public
scaffold, which invited the gaze of the public, who participated in the public spectacle of human inventory
as it was paraded in front of them. The event, like other slave auctions of its day, promoted competition
among gallery viewers, who wagered competitive bids based on perceived estimates of the slave’s worth
and value. Butler lost a considerable a sizeable part of his fortune and land holdings during the
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auctions, during the Civil War, served as a vehicle for Southern white identity; they reaffirmed
what was and arguably remains a precarious social order, which was upheld by embodied
notions of race, class, status, and power. The institution of slavery enabled slave owners and the
states within which they resided to inscribe not only the law of the land, but their personal beliefs
and values onto the bodies of slaves, who were not recognized as people, but were trafficked as
human commodities.
Here, I think it is important to distinguish that the particular body of the slave was produced as
an object around which the social identity and life purpose of white soldiers was organized,
given how they all invariably put their lives at risk serving the cause of either defending or
abolishing slavery. Thus, while it is not controversial or even ground-breaking to argue that the
political economy of the war was predicated in no small way on the owning/enslaving of black
bodies, it is to some degree provocative, as I will suggest now, that soldiers also served as a form
of forced labor. To be sure, soldiers were an unconventional laboring body, but they labored
nonetheless. Unlike slaves, however, soldiers were celebrated as heroes and model citizens.
Soldiers were almost exclusively white men; and officers tended to be wealthy white men. Thus

Revolutionary War when the British occupied South Carolina. Despite this setback, he still managed to
possess a large number of slaves. It was during this time period, after the Revolutionary War but before
the Civil War, that a gambling habit left him with considerable debt, forcing him to sell a large portion of
his slave holdings in an effort to cover his losses. The Butler Slave auction graphically illustrates the
concept of slave and human ownership. The slave, as illustrated here, owned neither their labor nor their
body. While, it is also important to distinguish the nature of the bonds of servitude: slaves were bound to
the master of the plantation. Slaves as well as their descendants were considered the property of the
slave owner, who might buy and sell them at any time. Familial bonds were thus tenuous at best, as
economic ties usurped blood ties. Families were often broken up as part of the condition of sale. With
that, it was not uncommon for slaves to be owned until they died. The body, life and status of a slave was
one of abjection and dispossession—never a subject or actor—a slave was always an object that was
acted upon: they were reduced to mere chattel property. But slavery, as I have endeavored to show in
this illustration, was more than a simple practice that afforded an owner with free human labor; it was an
institution that penetrated every realm of social functioning.
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I find that the white racist supremacy, that shaped both the North and South, when combined
with other social identity markers, like class and gender, produced soldiers as a distinct social
group. Martial identity and national identity were thus mutually constructed.
By the end of the war, slavery as an institution and a practice was considerably weakened, even
if it was not entirely eliminated by the Emancipation Proclamation. Different forms of forced
labor as well as social exclusion persisted throughout the Reconstruction era and remain legible
in the present era. Even after slavery was officially abolished, free blacks could not claim the
same rights of entitlement as their white counterparts. Whites were adamant about making slaves
“work” for their freedom. Far from ushering in a new era of liberation and prosperity, post war
Reconstruction brought with it new forms of exploitation, humiliation, and human precarity.
Slaves left their plantations without assets and the means to secure a living and land. Medical
care for slaves remained an issue, as lack of access to trained medical and health practitioners
forced black Americans to resort to home remedies. Their vulnerability in this regard caused
some of them to become targets for doctors that used them for medical experiments.179
Consequently, while newly freed slaves might claim their bodies as their own, they continued to
struggle for their survival after the war ostensibly ended: poverty, illness, life, and death were not
only certain features of the social landscape by the war’s end; they were constitutionally
guaranteed. With slavery having been abolished in name only, the human social division that was

179

According to the 1900 Census, 30 out of 1,000 blacks died each year from health-related illnesses, as
opposed to only 17 per 1,000 whites. This statistic is noted in the University of Richmond’s History
database, downloaded from http://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/5032 Last accessed May,
12, 2013
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a product of that time period continued to thrive and be a source of intra-social conflict in the
United States. The effects are legible in the present era, as evidence of persistent social
inequalities affecting African Americans in particular are well-documented.

Soldiers, significantly, were also caught up in these social forces. Knowledge acquired from the
institutionalized practice of owning, dominating, and controlling slaves was during this time
functionally redeployed to target soldiers as a social group. Body knowledge in the case of the
latter was, however, achieved through a distinctly different array of disciplinary and control
practices. Foremost among these new techniques were medical practices that focused on
managing the life, health, and vitality of soldiers’ bodies. Wounded soldiers, over the course of
the Civil War, were subjected to increasingly invasive medical procedures. In many instances,
their injuries opened up their bodies to a lifetime process of medical control. Wounded soldiers
who returned home missing body parts were often provided assistance, which included prosthetic
augmentation, the aim of which was to restore them to a functional status as laborers in addition
to restoring the figuratively, so they could appear to function with some degree of intact body
integrity, which was necessary for them to perform their social gender role as men.
As soldiers, they shared at least one thing in common with slaves in the sense that their lives and
their bodies were not their own; they also were governed by terms and provisions dictated by the
state. Thus, while their subject status, which was comprised of their race, gender, military, and
social status clearly differentiated them from slaves, soldiers nonetheless could not claim
ownership of their bodies; they belonged to the state, which might compel their service and life
sacrifice upon request when it was deemed to be in the national interest. This social reality stands
in contrast with conventional representation of soldiers, who even now are routinely depicted as
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paradigmatic autonomous rational actors, bodies and subjects, who based on their military
service status, lay claim to social power. This occurs in spite of evidence to the contrary: they are
often economically precarious and weak social actors, whose bodies are subject to disciplinary
control practices, which are designed to train them and keep them docile and subservient in order
to control them.

This brings me to a point that I feel it is important to distinguish: that it is sometimes difficult to
parse the differences between bodies, figures, and subjects. This applies similarly to soldiers and
slaves when we think of them both as “body productions” of the Civil War.180 Memorialization
practices illustrate how the two body models were cast differently: the white bodies of soldiers
were typically cast in bronze, which established them as heroic figures and subjects; whereas, the
bodies of black soldiers were conflated with the abject bodies of slaves. Because of the twin
legacies of slavery and white supremacy, black bodies were culturally understood, which is to
say they were inscribed, and read as a permissive site for the expression of pain, punishment, and
even illicit pleasure; their torture, sacrifice, and trauma thus were not identifiable, and so they
correspondingly were not typically registered among the war’s casualties.
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Figural productions of Civil War soldiers differed widely compared to that of slaves, who it is important
to note also served as soldiers in some limited capacity, both during and after the war. One need only
compare their different relative portrayals in the form of statues and memorials. For more on this, see
Drew Gilpin Faust, whose book This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War talks about
war monuments and the social role they play as artistic renderings of ideological memory. Faust’s book,
likewise undertakes a lengthy analysis of American Civil War dead, which includes efforts that were
undertaken to identify, reclaim, preserve, and bury battlefield dead. Among the significant outcomes of
logistically having to contend with more than 600,000 mass casualties, Faust points to the first
widespread use of embalming, the gradual emergence of military graves registration procedures, the
development of a federal system of national cemeteries for Union dead, as well as the creation of private
cemeteries in the South to document the Lost Cause. Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering:
Death and the American Civil War. Knopf, 2008.
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The relative absence of slaves and black soldiers from official casualty records is rarely
acknowledged, as their lives and stories have only recently begun to be told. Consequently, in
spite of the fact that numerous slaves and black soldiers fought, became injured and/or died in
the Civil War, their bodies are not generally recognized among the official statistics of the war’s
casualties. Black bodies, even those that died as soldiers, remain pathologized in death; their
wounds and their injuries did not confer status worthy of recognition. By way of contrast, social
meaning and status was conferred upon the white bodies, whose deeds and death were portrayed
as universally honorable and worthy of memory. Put another way, the wounded and traumatized
bodies of white soldiers were a cause for celebration; white life was thus valorized through the
erasure of black experience. In light of this, it can be claimed that the soldier’s body, by means
of social practices that excluded the slave’s body, was the corporal basis upon which social
claims to power were advanced.
As I will discuss later in the analysis section of this chapter, we might attribute this to economic
and biopolitical that evolved within the social context of the Civil War. For now, it is enough to
say that black men who served in the war lost their individuality as a condition of their service;
their sacrifice was subsumed within the anonymity of the population, whereas white soldiers
correspondingly retained and one might argue even enhanced their subject status, having been
lauded for their heroic individual efforts. Lacking the ability to claim human personhood, rights,
and representation, the loss of a slave, wounded, dead, or otherwise, was dismissed as nothing
more than lost labor power. Thus whereas, the individual losses of soldiers were mourned,
documented, and memorialized, population losses among the non-individuated masses were not
recognized. After the Civil War, military service would became something of a sine qua non for
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citizenship, public service, and holding government office. Soldiers in this manner, injured or
otherwise, relied on their service record as a means to claim status and power; claims which, by
way of contrast, were denied to slaves, former slaves, and anyone who possessed a black body.

Both the Three Fifths Compromise and the Butler Slave Auction stand as illustrations of how
slavery contributed to the objectification of human bodies and human labor, reducing them to
abstract equivalents. As 18th century exemplars of social policy, they reveal insight into the
social dynamics that facilitated what was essentially a human valuation process. Thus, we might
look at the slave model of the body, as it illustrates how human object value equivalents helped
establish the human body as a site of value, productivity, and profit. Auctions in particular
helped institutionalize and render “normal” the practice of human economic exchange; they
functioned both as market practice and a public spectacle. By this I mean, they furnished an
actual physical platform to engage the optics of the “spectacular” culture of violence.
Individuals, by virtue of the act of witnessing staged events (and not raising objection) became
agent/observers of a normalized violent exchange. Auctions, in this manner, enabled citizens to
affectively witness as well as participate in the spectacle of power. Calculation regimes and
numeric proficiencies achieved as a result of counting cotton and tobacco were thus, over the
course of time, adapted to count, classify, and commodify living human bodies. Such a process, I
want to argue, not only facilitated commodity trading in humans, it also affirmed the intrinsic
value of white people.

This relational ontology is significant to developments that occurred during this time with
respect to medicine, as the relations of domination and subordination that were enacted here
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were, furthermore, consequential to the process by which the corporeality of soldiers was taken
up into medical practice. Commodity trading in slaves not only served as a basis for justify the
war, they helped foster the development of accounting practices that would later be developed to
manage the health, life, and vitality of soldiers. The bodies of all men here, and perhaps most
especially white working class men, were thus opened up to procedures designed ostensibly to
help and heal them as they recovered from war wounds. But in practice, these developments
opened the door to a new medical regime of control.

Historical records of combat injury do not typically associate soldiers with human subjects
testing. But such a program, I will argue now, evolved over the course of time; though, it
operated informally and not in accordance with the ethical declarations with which we generally
associate such programs. Soldiers in this regard were caught up in what I identify was a
biopolitical strategy to remake bodies and populations. The early and initial signs of this can be
traced to the American Civil War time period. This next section will review some of the more
significant innovations that occurred during the Civil War time period, many of which are well
documented to point of being common knowledge. Less understood, however, are how these
developments are indicative of how war helped shaped the social organization of medicine.

Combat Casualties & Statistics
Civil War casualty statistics, much like the ending of the war, are not a settled matter. Even
today, the actual numbers of killed and wounded are not known precisely, as statistics might vary
widely depending on the source. Conventional estimates report the death toll to be in the area
650,000 soldiers, who were estimated to have perished during the course of the five-year
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conflict. To put that number in perspective, more soldiers were killed in the Civil War than have
been killed in all the wars in American history combined. In this instance, approximately
210,000 of the total number of casualties are estimated to have died from battlefield wounds.
This number increases substantially when you take into account deaths due to secondary
complications from disease. Slightly fewer than 500,000 are documented as having been
wounded in action.181

Official death toll numbers have been challenged by historians like David Hacker. Hacker argues
that the 650,000 number has been accepted for more than a century, despite its falling short of
accounting for casualties suffered by immigrants and others, who served in the ranks of the
armed forces, including many women, who were among the war’s early victims.182 To make
matters even less clear, not all of the war’s casualties occurred on the battlefield. Many people
were wounded in battle, but died at home later as a direct result of the injuries incurred fighting
in the war. Women and children, for example, were more typically killed in their homes.
Casualties among slaves, it has already been mentioned were similarly not well documented.
Consequently, blacks, even when they fought as soldiers, were rarely counted and recognized as
war casualties. Simply put — words matter. Listing people as “killed in action,” “wounded,”
“non-battle losses” or simply as “casualties” makes a difference in how people are counted.
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Statistics reported by the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs. It is important
to note that exact figures are not attainable. Reported numbers reflect a median estimates. Downloaded
from http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf Last accessed August, 15.
2016.
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Louis Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism: The Development of Forces in American History
to the End of the Nineteenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 373.
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Some obvious questions are suggested here: Who did the counting and how did these statisticians
calculate their estimates? What period of time did their calculations cover? What classification
parameters did they stipulate? These are important questions that rarely get discussed. They are,
however, important any discussion of war casualties. There can be no mistake that not all bodies
were counted and not all of the counted were counted as casualties. Given these inconsistencies
and the outright failure to count in some cases, a picture begins to emerge, where one might
argue that casualty reporting was not the neutral “value-free” exercise that is assumed to inform
documentation procedures.

The discourse that emerges from the war casualty rosters is, not surprisingly, a narrative that
celebrates the injuries, life and death of white soldiers. They were portrayed as heroic
individuals; the ones who sacrificed, suffered, freed the slaves, and gave birth to a nation. But in
this narrative we find the casualties of soldiers are effectively standing in for and replacing all of
the others, who sacrificed similarly, but whose injury, life, and death conveyed no meaning.
Later, the racial ideology of white supremacy that continued to define the post-war South would
draw upon the meanings attached to bodies in order to establish who was/was not a citizen
worthy of rights. The failure to fully document and account for casualties during the Civil War
did not occur without consequence. This missing data, in fact, lies at the heart of a conspicuous
hierarchy of injury that I want to argue was created here; one that functioned practically and
symbolically. The status hierarchy looked something like this: white soldiers/ officers (men) >
white soldiers/non-officers (men) > black soldiers (men) > non-soldiers (almost all blacks and
women). Likewise, different kinds of injuries warranted different social distinctions. So for
example, wounding incidents that produced a visible injury (lost limbs) were afforded greater
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social status than injuries that were invisible (psychic wounds). Racialized accounting practices,
in other words, served to reinforce pre-existing social status hierarchies. Erasing black casualties
had the effect of making more visible the casualties suffered by white soldiers.

In theory, slave analogies should be employed with some level of reserve. Soldiers were not
slaves. But there is a point to be made here, which is that the soldier-state relation represents to
some extent a sublimation of the master-slave relationship. While sociologists might debate
within and between group differences, I am arguing there is something to be gained by looking at
the two groups together, where we might understand that the distinctions that separated them
also worked to bind them together within a progressive political economy of relations. The
ownership of bodies in this case, which created embodied relations of servitude vis a vis the
slave, set up an analogous relation between the soldier and the state ; slavery, as a result, was not
only determinative of the life and living conditions of a slave;

it contributed to determining

the life and living conditions of a soldier. Slavery, in this manner, was a socially relevant to the
political economy of injury that developed out of the Civil War.

Combat injury patterns changed over time. And these changes proved to have a decisive impact
on medicine. This, I want to point out, occurred in spite of the fact that combat environments
tended not to foster the optimal conditions for clinical research. Battlefield exigencies, however,
lent themselves to the production of a social environment that rewarded medical risk taking. As
greater efficiencies were introduced into the “kill chain,” the increased the level of risk and
physical peril borne by soldiers was matched by risk-taking on the part of field medical personal,
doctors as well as surgeons, who developed practice methods that were more invasive over time.
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Such extreme environments, it turned out, counterintuitively fostered practice innovation and
changes in medical social organization, which could not have been achieved in a more traditional
practice environment. Advances in medicine, furthermore, paralleled advances in battlefield
strategy, tactics, and weaponry, especially munitions developments, all of which underwent
significant development over the course of the Civil War. Problematic is how these
developments surrender to an ethical framework, where medical knowledge and advance are
achieved on through violence, which continued to operate through other means and practices
associated with medicine.
Medical Social Organization
This section calls attention to some of the more important changes that occurred with respect to
medical knowledge production as this relates to biomedical surgery practice, public health and
disease management practice, and rehabilitative medicine and medical management logistics.
Not all of these developments were “ground-breaking” in the sense that they represented a
radical departure from past practice; rather, they indicate a progressive series of developments,
which nonetheless exerted a major impact on trajectory of Western medicine. The state of
medical affairs during the U.S. Civil War can arguably be termed “pre-institutional.” Medical
procedures and practices were more often than not carried out far away from conventional
facilities and under exceptionally deteriorated field conditions. Disease was naturally rampant
given the poor sanitary conditions. These environmental factors contributed to the war’s
infamously high numbers of limb amputations. But even here, Civil War soldiers died more often
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than not from the actual wound, but the subsequent infections that set in afterward. By the end of
the war, there were demonstrable signs of improvement.
The war in this case exerted a major impact on both its physicians and surgeons, who throughout
much of the war were regarded as rough, crude, and even brutish practitioners, who were not
professionalized by any standard measure. But up until now, there has been little attention
focused on the importance of military patriarchal and hierarchical structures of authority, which I
am arguing helped furnish a model of organization that was socially reproduced across the
nascent though developing medical institutional infrastructure. As it turned out here, the great
men of war and the great men of medicine were often one and the same.
Biomedical Surgery Practice
Civil War surgery practice is interesting to look at; not only because of the specific
improvements that were made, but for reasons that it helps illustrate how wounded soldiers were
important to medical advance. Surgery practices evolved dramatically over the course of the war,
as mass casualties generated an overwhelming number of new medical-surgical procedures.
These procedures progressed over time in terms of both their sheer number and complexity.
Anatomical knowledge of the body, acquired through surgery, in addition to other knowledge as
I will subsequently explain here with regard to disease processes and public health practice, all
increased exponentially, during as well as after the Civil War. Many of these developments can
be directly attributed to the battlefield experiences of military medical personnel, especially
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surgeons. Simply put, exigencies of scale enabled them to advance practice in ways that were not
possible prior to the war.183
At the beginning of the war, surgery was often performed by doctors and/or physicians who did
not have prior surgical experience; opening of the abdomen or chest by a surgeon was thus a rare
occurrence. During the course of war, however, the practice was increasingly undertaken.
Unfortunately, this almost produced fatalities. Co-morbidity factors of injury included infection,
which was almost always prevalent. Consequently, if death did not ensue from the original
injury, it almost certainly did as a result of complicating infection combined with surgery trauma.
In addition to lacking experience, surgeons were often forced, due to battlefield conditions, to
almost always operate in isolation without help or supervision.184 Surgery was, for obvious
reasons then, a practice that was to be avoided at all cost.
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At the beginning of the Civil war the Union army employed slightly over 100 medical officers, whereas
the Confederacy employed 24 within their ranks, 3 of whom were later dismissed for disloyalty. By 1865,
the numbers of physicians and surgeons employed by both armies grew exponentially: nearly 13,000
Union doctors served in the field and in hospitals; Confederate physicians and surgeons totaled around
4,000. This number included medical officers in addition to an unknown number of volunteers. Over time,
those numbers became depleted. By the war's end, there were approximately 3,200 physicians and
surgeons serving in the Confederate army. Union surgeons treated more than 400,000 wounded men–
about 245,000 of them for gunshot or artillery wounds–and performed at least 40,000 operations. Less
complete Confederate records indicate that a fewer number of surgeons treated a similar number of
patients (cite). For purposes of comparison, if we look at surgery statistics reported for the Massachusetts
General Hospital (one of the premier hospitals of the era) between the years of 1836 and 1846, there
were only 39 surgical procedures were performed annually. During the first 10 years after the introduction
of anesthesia (1847- 1857), the annual average increased to 189 procedures, about 60 percent of which
were amputations. Surgery volumes continued to increase with the introduction of antiseptic/ aseptic
techniques, so that by 1914, more than 4,000 procedures were performed (cite).
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The training of U.S. physicians typically was inadequate when compared to European surgeons, who
typically attended four-year medical schools. Europeans, furthermore, operated with greater knowledge of
disease and infection, due to their greater emphasis on laboratory training. Battlefield deaths in many
cases were not the result of injury so much as they were a consequence of surgeons lacking the proper
knowledge and experience. It has been estimated that upwards of 50% of surgeries were fatal during this
time.
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In this case, we see how the exigencies of the battle field forced surgeons to perform procedures
that would not have been countenanced or attempted during peace time. Battlefield risks
undertaken by soldiers thus found a parallel in the clinical practice risks undertaken by surgeons,
who resorted the procedure only as a last resort. One favorable result of all of this was that
experience dealing with mass casualties provided medical personnel with opportunities to refine
their skills. But that is not all.

In what I want to argue was an epistemologically significant move, Civil War surgeons
combined the science of empirical observation with military ways of seeing and applied this to a
new realm of encounter— the inner most recesses of the body. Simple medical procedures gave
way and were replaced by increasingly more advanced and invasive procedures (surgery, of
course, being the most invasive among them). Military surgeons in this manner helped shape
some of the more important surgical practices and procedures that underpin a lot of what we now
take for granted as foundational in Western medicine. Knowledge from biomedical surgery
practice, furthermore, helped launch numerous other specialty fields in the practice of medicine.
Practice developments led to other structural changes in medical institutions in the United States,
which eventually developed in some cases to launch new industries.185

“By the 1850s, improved microscopes made it possible to study diseased tissues at the cellular level,
and for pioneers such as Louis Pasteur to begin making connections between the presence of particular
microorganisms and specific diseases. It would take several decades for these connections to be proven
and widely accepted, but some, such as surgeon Joseph Lister, used the concept to reduce surgical
infections starting in 1865. Chemical knowledge was also expanding rapidly, making available morphine
from opium, ether for surgical anesthesia, and stains that could better reveal microbes and tissues under
the microscope. The field of experimental physiology was growing too, and increasingly using animals for
research.” Downloaded from National Institutes of Health, Department of Health & Human Services
website https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/GF/p-nid/361 Last accessed July 23, 2016.
185

210

In spite of this, public views of surgeons and physicians during the Civil War remained largely
unfavorable throughout the war. The armies of both the North and South had entered the war
with inadequate medical resources, which meant the vast majority of physicians and surgeons
deployed on Civil War battlefields had minimal training.186 Negative views became entrenched
as a result and were so widespread that surgery advances made during the course of the war and
the improved mortality outcomes that came along with them did little to reverse unfavorable
public opinions. Military doctors, moreover, had acquired a reputation for being rough,
incompetent and uncaring. Accusations arose of surgeons acting as “butchers,” where they were
believed to have performed many unnecessary amputations for the purpose of gaining
experience. Field sites were typically understaffed and, likewise, were poorly supplied with
drugs and equipment.187

The signature wound of the Civil War, of course, was a body with a missing limb. In light of this
specific development, the body politics of prosthesis and enhancement are interesting to look at,
though here I am less interested in the practical aspects of recovery, which historians and others
have documented; I am interested in these developments to the extent that they signify what was
at this time a developing ontopolitics of human object relations, as typified by the prosthetic
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Medical trade practices were such that older doctors achieved their experience as apprentices and
through practical encounters in lieu of formal education. While some did indeed attended medical school,
they were nonetheless often poorly trained. The average medical student in the United States during the
19th century time period typically trained for two years or less; they had almost no clinical experience, and
were not trained in laboratory procedures.
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John Keegan, author of The American Civil War points out that surgeons were typically posted to field
regiments at a rate of one per unit, with one additional assistant surgeon assigned as the only other
trained man. Downloaded from:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/6199297/The-American-Civil-War-the-gruesome-suffering-ofsoldiers-exposed.html
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encounter. For when injury resulted in prosthetic enhancement, the body that was produced
became an object to itself; bodies, furthermore, that were previously defined by their enclosure
were rendered unstable, as they were forced to remain open and were subject to ongoing invasive
medical procedures.
During the early part of the Civil War, primary wound care was administered in field hospitals
located far behind the front lines. Hospitals were improvised and in many cases consisted solely
of a few tents located on the outskirts of camps. Because there was no established hospital corps
during this time nursing care and patient assistance was often provided by other soldiers and
untrained men, often referred to as “shirkers,” who were assigned temporary hospital duty.
Wounded soldiers that managed to survive their injuries were often transported to town hospitals
by unreliable and often overcrowded ambulances, consisting of two-wheeled carts or fourwheeled wagons. Significant improvements in facilities as well as transport were made during
the course of the war, so that by the war’s end it was not uncommon for injuries to be treated
within 48 hours of their occurrence.

Oddly enough, before the war commenced, few surgeons had experience treating and caring for
gunshot wounds. Increased battlefield exposure as well as subsequent training and specialization
helped overcome this shortcoming. Public disenchantment in this case resulted in calls for
increased professionalization and training. These new programs, particularly those instituted for
surgeons, ultimately had a major impact on medical social organization, which prior to the war
was a product of the nation’s pre-industrial past. By the end of the war, despite initial
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misgivings, public opinion with regard to the competency of physicians and surgeons improved
to such a degree that many thought the best in the country were serving in the military.

In addition to improvements in biomedical surgery practice, affiliated biotechnology was also
improved. Anesthesia, introduced as early as 1846, permitted surgeons to operate more
deliberately. In light of this, as surgeons acquired more experience, their skills improved and
they became more adept at employing anesthesia to conduct more challenging operations.
Chloroform, subject to availability, was widely used during the Civil War and contributed
greatly to reducing trauma associated with interventional medical procedures. This particular
advance, however, often goes unnoticed for reasons that cinematic portrayals of Civil War
surgery practice tend to dramatize surgeries (particularly those involving limb amputations) as
procedures commonly performed without anesthesia. Medical achievements in surgery practice,
including antisepsis, alongside improvements in patient transport and logistics all helped
facilitate major changes in regards to the social organization of medicine.

Limb amputations in particular, crude as they might have been, paved the way for developments
in what would later develop into a veritable industry, as prosthetics evolved and continued on a
path of becoming more sophisticated.188 Design innovations that followed in the wake of the
Civil War initiated a wave of improvements that continue in the present day. Noteworthy is how
the combined impact of all of these developments had on mortality outcomes. Despite the
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For more on the specific history of prosthetics, see Katherine Ott. “The Sum of Its Parts: An
Introduction to Modern Histories of Prosthetics,” In Modern Histories Artificial Parts and Practical Lives of
Prosthetics. Eds. K. Ott, D. Serlin, and S. Mihm. New York: New York University Press, 2002.
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obviously dismal casualty outcomes that are documented, mortality rates from significant
injuries decreased dramatically over the course of the war. This was in no small way
accomplished as a result of surgery practice improvements combined with increased knowledge
of disease and public health practices, which meant that soldiers more often were able to survive
their wounds. 189 By the end of the war, professional standards were established and out of this
came the institutionalization of increased medical practice specialization.

Disease and Public Health Practice

Disease was perhaps the biggest killer in the Civil War. Roughly three out of five Union soldiers
died of either disease or disease related illnesses. Estimates for Confederate soldiers are higher,
with two out of three succumbing to disease borne illnesses. Nearly half these deaths were
caused by intestinal disorders, consisting of typhoid fever, diarrhea, and dysentery. Pneumonia
and tuberculosis also commonly affected encampments of soldiers, who were forced to live in
close quarters and under unsanitary conditions. Prior to the war, many soldiers had never been
exposed to common contagious diseases, including measles, chickenpox, mumps, and whooping
cough. Malaria was especially a problem in camps located near swamps. Poor diet and exposure
to the elements added to the conditions of misery. And so it was not uncommon for soldiers who
contracted a simple common cold to acquire pneumonia, a development that proved more often
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After the battle of Antietam, it was estimated that 22 percent of the 8,112 wounded soldiers that were
treated in hospitals died; one year later after the Battle of Gettysburg, a mere 9 percent of 10,569 died
from their wounds. For more on this see the article by Edward Musnon, M.D. Major, Medical Department,
United States Army. http://www.historynet.com/the-truth-about-civil-war-surgery-2.htm
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than not to be so deadly it was only exceeded by typhoid and dysentery in terms of its effect on
mortality rates.
Physicians and surgeons were generally educated about the relationship between cleanliness and
low infection rates. However, they did not as a rule practice antisepsis during the war.
Sterilization of equipment was often compromised due to water shortages and almost no effort
was made to keep hospital wards or operating theatres free of disease-carrying insects. Surgeons
characteristically operated in blood spattered clothing and dressed wounds with recycled unclean
rags. It was not uncommon for them to operate for days on end without washing hands or
instruments, which meant germs were easily passed from one patient to the next. This resulted in
infections, commonly referred to as "surgical fever." Surgical fever was believed to have been
caused by Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus pyogenes, bacterial cells which produced
pus, destroyed tissue, and released deadly toxins into the bloodstream. The infections produced
gangrene, a condition characterized by tissue necrosis (cell death) and obstructed blood
circulation. Whereas the standard treatment for gangrene is revascularization (restoration of
blood flow), which helps mitigate and can to some extent reverse the deterioration of affected
tissue, knowledge of vascular systems was limited at this time. Knowledge acquired during the
war, nonetheless, helped contribute to changes and improvements that occurred in the years that
followed.
Rehabilitative Medicine and Medical Management Logistics

At the beginning of the Civil War, it is estimated that there were approximately 80,000 Veterans
from previous conflicts, who were being treated in Veterans care homes scattered throughout the
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U.S. The Civil War added more than 1.9 million to these numbers.190 It was after the Civil War
that measures were taken to expand domiciliary care for war veterans. In what was one of the
original care homes for Veterans, the Naval Asylum in Philadelphia was established in 1811 and
officially opened its doors in 1834.191 St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, located in southeast Washington,
D.C., was authorized in 1855. Originally called the Government Hospital for the Insane, it was
actively used during the Civil War. Union and Confederate Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines,
including African-American troops, were treated at the hospital. The facility often succumbed to
overcrowding, and so to address this, tents were often erected behind the hospital to handle the
overflow of combat casualties.192

After the Civil War ended, President Lincoln made an appeal to congress in his second Inaugural
address in 1865, where he advocated support for the creation of a national infrastructure to
address the long-term health needs of veterans. Or as Lincoln put it, “…to care for him who shall
have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan.” This would later become the motto of
the Veterans Administration, renamed the Department of Veterans Affairs in 1989.193 One direct
Jerome W. Mapp (VA Staff Writer), “The Civil War: The Origins of Veterans’ Health Care.” Mapp here
points to Darlene Richardson, a historian for the Veterans Administration, who notes that Civil War
Veterans benefits were restricted to Veterans who had fought on the Union side; Confederate soldiers
were not legally recognized as Veterans until 1958, when they were pardoned by the U.S. Congress for
taking up arms against the nation. For more on this, refer to
http://www.va.gov/health/NewsFeatures/20110413a.asp Last accessed July 24, 2016.
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The National Soldiers Home, which was established in 1851 in northeast Washington D.C., also
housed Union Veterans. The National Soldiers Home today is known as the Armed Forces Retirement
Home (AFRH) Washington, D.C. http://www.va.gov/health/NewsFeatures/20110413a.asp Last
accessed July 24, 2016.
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W. Mapp (VA Staff Writer), “The Civil War: The Origins of Veterans’ Health Care.” Downloaded
from http://www.va.gov/health/NewsFeatures/20110413a.asp Last accessed July 24, 2016.
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result of Lincoln’s efforts was the establishment of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer
Soldiers (NHDVS) in March 1865. Over the course of time, the NHDVS was expanded to
include 11 National Homes. It too was renamed in due course to the National Home for Disabled
Volunteer Soldiers, for reasons that the word “asylum” carried with it a negative connotation.
When the Veterans Administration was established in 1930, all 11 of these homes, in addition to
three newly authorized homes, located in St. Petersburg, Fla., Biloxi, Miss., and Roseburg, Ore.,
became part of VA.194 195

The return of soldiers to occupational productivity was construed as essential to maintaining a
functioning economy. This depended in no small way upon their successful medical
rehabilitation. As medical practice evolved, bodies were be re-fashioned and in some cases
occupationally enhanced. Prosthetic augmentation and enhancement, despite their lack of
sophistication during this time period, made significant inroads and paved the way for more
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The eleven NHDVS properties established between 1865-1930 were known as: the Eastern Branch in
Togus, Maine (now Togus VA Medical Center); the Northwestern Branch in Milwaukee, Wis. (now
Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center); the Central Branch in Dayton, Ohio (now Dayton VA Medical
Center); the Southern Branch in Hampton, Va. (now Hampton VA Medical Center); the Western Branch in
Leavenworth, Kan. (now Dwight D. Eisenhower VA Medical Center); the Pacific Branch in West Los
Angeles, Calif. (now Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System-West Los Angeles Healthcare Center); the
Marion Branch in Marion, Ind. (now VA Northern Indiana Health Care System); the Danville Branch in
Danville, Ill. (now VA Illiana Health Care System); the Battle Mountain Sanitarium in Hot Springs, S.D.
(now VA Black Hills Health Care System); the Mountain Home Branch in Johnson City, Tenn. (now
Mountain Home VA Medical Center); and the Bath Branch in Bath, N.Y. (now Bath VA Medical Center).
The Danville Branch of the National Soldiers Home in Illinois operates today as the VA Illiana Health Care
System, Danville, Illinois (also from Jerome Mapp, “The Civil War: The Origins of Veterans’ Health Care.”
Downloaded from http://www.va.gov/health/NewsFeatures/20110413a.asp Last accessed July 24, 2016).
“Since domiciliary care was available at all state Veterans homes, incidental medical and hospital
treatment was provided for all injuries and diseases, whether or not of service origin. Indigent and
disabled Veterans of the Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and Mexican Border period, as
well as the discharged regular members of the Armed Forces, received care at these homes.”
Downloaded from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs website
http://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory.asp Last accessed July 24, 2016.
195

217

sophisticated developments that would follow later. Successful adaptation to prosthetic life,
however, required ongoing fitting and calibration. Consequently, if they were not
institutionalized after the war, many sought ongoing medical treatments that would last the
duration of their lifetime (Serlin, 2005, 2006). Soldiers who were amputees in this manner, due
needs for ongoing care, continued to be a source of medical knowledge, especially for
orthopedics. This specialized area of medical practice saw rapid and significant improvements in
the years following the Civil War.

In addition to the expansion of treatment facilities for the wounded, other changes occurred with
respect to the delivery of medical care that were significant to institutional growth. For example,
it is estimated that more than 4,000 women served as nurses in Union field hospitals;
Confederate women similarly contributed to the war effort. The Civil War in this respect fostered
important social change, which resulted in advancing the role of women in medicine as
professional caregivers, given how the number of women who served as nurses increased
exponentially over the duration of the conflict.
Battlefield Strategy, Tactics, and Weaponry
Advances in battlefield strategy, tactics, and weaponry, especially in the area of munitions
developments can be shown to be dynamically correlated with developments in medicine during
the Civil War. The Springfield Rifle, first manufactured in1861, was the principal infantry
weapon for Northern soldiers. It was also used by Confederate soldiers, who often picked up
these weapons during the conduct of field operations and appropriated them for their personal
use. In this instance, the combined targeting capability of the rifle-musket in addition to its Minié
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ball bullet had a major impact on how battles were fought as well as on the soldiers themselves
insofar as the nature of wounds they suffered as a result. This was due in large part to the unique
rifling of the gun barrel and the shape of the munition, which improved targeting and
significantly increased the range at which soldiers could engage a target.196
The Minié ball, a conically shaped lump of lead, was renowned for two things: 1) the ability to
increase reloading speed; and 2) the engineered capacity to penetrate human flesh, and in the
process create a much larger entry wound. Flesh wounds, nevertheless, were typically benign,
unless the rifle’s projectile hit a major blood vessel or bone. In any event, if the soldier didn’t die
from blood loss, the resulting shattered bone fragments often led to amputation and other serious
complications. Large flesh wounds and shattered bones posed a high risk for infection, given
how bullets tended to carry dirt and other bacteria into the wound. 197 Records document that
while limb injuries were often survivable, abdominal and head wounds were almost always fatal.
Large numbers of fatalities on the on the battlefields of the Civil War were wounded by handheld guns that featured the use of this new projectile.198
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The smooth bore muskets that were replaced by the Springfield rifles were notoriously inaccurate,
which permitted advancing troops opportunity to overrun the enemy’s trenches and engage in hand-tohand combat. The increased accuracy of the new rifled muskets and shaped bullets enabled soldiers to
deplete the ranks of opposed infantry forces from a considerable distance, thereby killing or wounding
large numbers of soldiers before they could reach their tactical objective.
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The Minié ball was a conical-cylindrical soft lead bullet; the size of the bullet was slightly smaller than
the applicable firearm barrel's bore. Originally, it was distinguished by four exterior grease-filled grooves
and a conical hollow in its base. The bullet was designed by Minié with a small iron plug and a lead
skirting.
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The increased targeting and lethality of the new weaponry forged a major impact on battlefield
strategy and tactics, because its ability to render conventional Napoleonic era line infantry tactics
obsolete. Oddly enough, in spite of the obvious lethal impact that was evident, armies continued
to deploy the outdated battle tactics, distinguished by the deployment of massed columns of
infantry soldiers, who were typically given an order to close ranks and make a frontal assault
against opposing forces, who were entrenched in established defensive positions. The failure of
the commanders to adapt their battlefield strategy to accommodate weaponry developments had
a major impact on: 1) increasing the number of casualties suffered in the war; and 2) increasing
the number of casualties due to bullet wounds. The change in both strategy as well as tactics here
had a major impact on the types and patterns of wounds that were suffered as well as the medical
treatments that were developed to address them. In light of this, it is reasonable to infer that
changes in strategy, tactics, and weaponry are bound up in the institutional change dynamics that
impact medical social organization.
ANALYSIS
This chapter has thus far aimed to situate Civil War combat casualties within a more
comprehensive historical, economic, and political context in order to demonstrate how wounded
soldiers served as a material nexus for medical knowledge production. Overlapping institutional
practices, which targeted the bodies of slaves as well as soldiers, are shown here to be bound up
in producing what I am arguing is a political economy of injury. Notwithstanding, the evidence
presented only tells part of the story. In this analysis, which will proceed in two parts, I look at
the biopolitcs of combat injury. The first section, Mapping Racialized Wounded Bodies,
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addresses how bodies and populations were produced within a relational political economy of
injury; the second section, Ontopolitics: Was Science as Life Science, looks more specifically at
how bodies were situated at the front line of attack.
For purposes of analysis, I employ an analogy here that compares Foucault’s Homo
Economicus” — his anthropomorphized term for the subject of liberalism (an autonomous
rational actor who acts on the basis of self-interest) —to “Homo Vulneratus” (wounded human),
a term I use to dynamically conceive the different wounded bodies as well as models of the body
that were produced by the Civil War (the slave model and the model of the wounded soldier).
Homo Vulneratus is thus a conceptual analog that enables me to conceive the wounded
body/figure/subject as a multi-dimensional being. As a construct, it facilitates comparative
assessment of how different bodies, soldiers among others, were wounded together. I examine
them in light of their inherent sociality and illustrate how their bodies render service within a
progressive political economy of wounding. I use this analog along with the two different models
to help point up the social dynamics of wounding, where I argue that wounded soldiers must be
seen in terms of their sociality and how they function within a progressive political economy of
wounding. This economy, as I conceive it, illustrates how war, economy, labor, and life form a
circulation that employs the body as a weapon; injury and human transformation effectively
became incorporated into a weaponized ontology of war.
As a framing device, Homo Vulneratus facilitates comparative evaluation of interpenetrating
institutional dynamics. Slaves and soldiers were, it was explained here, were subject to different
disciplinary control mechanisms; different practices were likewise used to manipulate and render
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their bodies docile. Both bodies played a role in helping to maintain boundaries essential to
Southern masculine social identity, which was premised on a normative ethic of violence.199 I
find evidence here to support a theory I want to propose; that is, a “strain” theory of war, which
helps explain how a wounded body might be taken apart as a result of experiencing injury and
becoming a victim of institutional capture.
In order to explain how this occurs, I find it is necessary to some extent to “objectify” wounded
soldiers so they might be brought into articulation with a series of other concepts —power,
economy, labor, and life. In doing so, I will also look at the gendered contours of these
developments. The key here, as I have already been pointed out, is to bear in mind that gender,
along with the body itself, is progressively becoming undone by injury. To be sure, the Civil War
demonstrates clearly how war “makes the man.” But this too will change over time. Turning
again to Foucault’s critical genealogical work, I want to consider and reflect on how wounded
soldiers were drawn into the order of knowledge-power through medical practice. These
developments set the stage for important changes that will occur later (and which I document in
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Southerners, it was argued at the outset of this chapter, were deeply committed to the war effort, but
not only for reasons of wanting to secure access to cheap labor. The black bodies of slaves were needed
to secure social dominance. For plantation owners, slaves helped them to secure their identities as
masters; poor whites, who arguable derived little financial benefits from slavery, benefitted nevertheless,
as slavery ensured that as poor people, they were not at the bottom of the status hierarchy. Their lack of
wealth was not a barrier for asserting social dominance. When slavery was progressively abolished, poor
whites turned to military service as a way to advance their status in the absence of wealth and other
status markers. The slave’s body, in this respect, played an important role in maintaining the sociocultural framework for Southern social identity, which was premised on social relations of domination,
subordination, and normative violence. Put differently, the institution of slavery, in addition to constituting
the economic backbone of the South, was bound up in the self-making social identity projects of white
men― rich and poor, slaveholders and non-slaveholders, and most especially soldiers. White
supremacist racial ideology was thus combined with normatively enacted social practices, which in the
case of the Civil war worked to produce, reproduce, and reify racial hierarchies.
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the following chapter), where I illustrate how changes that occurred in the wake of this war were
significant to not only soldiers bodies, but all bodies.
Arguing against the grain of what some believe was a conflict over states’ rights and slavery, I
will argue now the war was in fact fought over human resources — the very life force and
substance of the human body. Slavery, as a form of human ownership, furnished the original
template for what developed as a relational ontology; as such, it serves as a model for how other
bodies were drawn into the continuum of control. With respect to the evidence presented in this
case, I want to argue on that basis that the Civil War was nothing short of a biopolitical race war.
The biopolitics of the war, however, cannot be reduced to race alone. Consequently, it is
necessary to look at other social dynamics in order to round out the picture. The next two
sections aim to instruct different perspectives and offer an illustration of how these social forces
will illustrate the different ways.
In light of this, I want to turn to turn now to discuss the body politics of the Civil War, or as
Foucault would say, the biopolitcs, which as I have stated reflect a political economy of
developments. In carving out this illustration, I owe a debt to Foucault’s original work, though
perhaps most especially his war model of power and treatment of the body and race within the
context of context of knowledge/power, particularly biopower.200 In order to be clear, I think it is
important to distinguish the main aim of biopower, which as a part of capitalism functions
intrinsic to political economy— its chief aim is not to repress and physically dominate bodies.

Foucault’s conceptual interrogation of war as a model of power is documented in "Society Must Be
Defended." In this work, we find him continuing to process ideas that were originally presented in “The
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.”
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Rather, it seeks to make as well as mobilize populations of bodies in order to make them more
productive.
Mapping Racialized Wounded Bodies
Medicine, it turned out, proved to be an efficient mechanism it what was an evolving military
strategy to target bodies, whereby the very substance, life force, and vitality of humans might be
brought into what amounted to a medical governance of control. Military and medical
institutions worked together in this regard, through different coercive means and practices, which
they used to produce the bodies within their respective control domains. The effects as such were
visually rendered in a map that was produced by the U.S. Coast Survey in 1861. The map depicts
the geospatial distribution of slave ownership in the South in 1860. While on the one hand, the
map represents the material reality of flesh and blood bodies, it also reflects a symbolic discourse
of power and inscription, to the extent that practices of domination and subordination were
written on the bodies of the war’s casualties, whose living embodiment formed the basis of a
narrative that was recognized as the truth of the war. With that, I want to turn and address how
the bodies of slaves and soldiers, as mass casualties of the war, became enfolded together as a
biopolitical wounded population.
A couple of important issues here are worth noting. First and foremost he map uses gray and
black patterned markings to reflect the concentration of slaves in each county. The map shading
that can be discerned here indicates county level slave holdings, which are computed as a
population percentage of residential inhabitants. Dark shading indicates a higher proportionate
numbers of slaves; whereas, light shading indicates there are larger numbers of whites and free
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blacks, as compared to slaves. Imprinted on the top map in the center is a flourish which
indicates the map was produced to honor the war’s “Sick and Wounded Soldiers.” The map, in
this regard, is a Civil War token “thank you for your service,” produced ostensibly to honor the
wounded soldiers, most all of whom were white men, who waged war to defeat slavery.
Fighting as they were in this case for bodily integrity – their own as well as for they perceived to
be the integrity of the social body – it turns out the war accomplished quite the opposite: bodies
were destroyed and systematically disarticulated.
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Figure 1

Figure 1. The U.S. Coast Survey map, originally produced by Adolph Von Steinwehr and E.
Hergesheime, was based on 1861 census data; it highlights the location of the slave population in United
States. The population distribution patterns depicted on the map highlight the geospatial distribution of
slaves in such a way as to reveal what now passes as common knowledge - slave ownership was heavily
concentrated in the South. States like Virginia and South Carolina reflect the largest concentration of
slave holdings; however, high numbers are also posted in states that bordered the Mississippi River.
Source: The map copy depicted here is licensed and maintained by the U.S. Library of Congress,
Geography and Map Division with permission from the original publisher, Washington Henry S. Graham,
1861.
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The map effectively links the two populations that represent the war’s most visible casualties, on
the one hand slaves, who constituted its invisible casualties, and soldiers.201 In what amounts to
mathematical miscegenation, black and white bodies were comingled in an effort to produce a
numeric signifier of blackness using blank ink. Black bodies were in this sense topographically
superimposed over land they could work, but never own. I am calling attention to this particular
map because I think it illustrates the political economy of injury as well as the body politics of
succession that I am arguing demonstrates how soldiers were introduced into a biopolitical
governance of control. For by the end of the war, it was not only slaves and black men that
continued to be targeted, but also white men, especially white working class men, whose bodies
were subject the emerging biopolitical control regime.
White Supremacist Biopolitics
War was, according to Foucault, fought to secure peace inter-socially. Civil unrest and internal
conflict were thus subdued through the waging of war. In the case of the Civil War, this is
demonstrated by the physical as well as political partitioning of bodies within the territory of the
United States. The preservation of this “union” of bodies, depending on what side of the war one
was on, was of course different, as one might argue, for example, that Lincoln’s military strategy
was to induce peace intersocially through the securitization of territorial boundaries defined by
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The map pictured above (a copy of the original map) was produced by contributors that included Adolph Von
Steinwehr and E. Hergesheimer; it primarily highlights the geospatial distribution of the slave population in United
States. The population distribution patterns shown here reveal what is commonly known; that slave ownership
was heavily concentrated in the South and most of all in states like Virginia and South Carolina. This particular map
was, again, based on the census of 1860. A copy of the map, which is pictured here, is licensed and maintained by
the U.S. Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division. The original was published by Washington Henry S.
Graham, 1861. For more on this, refer to https://www.loc.gov/item/ody0314/. Last accessed July, 22, 2016.

227

the states of the Union. Simultaneous to Union efforts to secure geographic territory, it was
shown here that similar effort was undertake to exert biological control over the different
populations of bodies residing within state and national boundaries. Whereas the map appears to
convey a simple geographic distribution of black and white bodies, it actually accomplishes
much more than this. For what we see here is evidence of a biopolitical strategy, which can read
in the visual semiotics of the map. By depicting two racially identified population groups –
slaves and soldiers— the groups are classified as ontologically separate, even as they are
enfolded together in a passive display of white supremacist cartography.
Superficially, the map represents a practical attempt to both call forth and subsume the black
bodies of slaves within population estimates. In this instance, the racialized coding of the map
fractionalizes the black bodies of slaves. Blackness here does not stand on its own; it is both
derived from and produced by white social identity. Unlike soldiers, who are recognized as
heroic individual bodies and subjects, slaves/blacks are depicted as a population group, which
can only be read as such through mathematical means that produce them as a derivative of the
larger white population group. Here again, tonal differences in the map shading are contrived in
such a way as to emphasize blackness, where black bodies are reduced to proportionate
estimates, calculated as a ratio that expresses blackness in relation to the whiteness of a given
county. Population “groupness” was thus socially constructed on the basis of racialized
distinctions, even as one group imbricated the other group.
The visual ontology of the map here functions as a grid of intelligibility against which all bodies
might be read and distinguished. Thus we are left with a problematic politics of inscription,
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where in order to read the map and assimilate its logic; one must to some extent participate in the
structural violence that it encodes, as it produces legibility through a politics of erasure.
Reducing bodies to data points, in this manner, breaks them down in a way that wounding
cannot; bodies are social reproduced as they are materially reconstituted. This has the effect of
reducing the meaning of group life, embodied being, life itself, and human vitality to binary
racial coding. Documenting blackness as a derivative of whiteness, through a process of
inscription, furnishes one example of how classification practices can have embodied material
consequences. The practice, I might add, was neither benign nor incidental, but was rather
indicative of biopolitical strategy of social control. Bodies were constructed as races and races
were rendered thing-like, which made them easier to control and dominate. When slavery lost its
utility as marker to define social relations, other practices rose up in place of slavery to help
maintain the social order. The practice of military service represents merely one example of how
social identity categories were materially relevant. Groupness here was defined not only by the
military service component, but also by race – whiteness – and citizenship status. Status honor
was claimed as a direct result of the body politics of the Civil War; body politics which helped
maintain racial boundaries, because only white males could legitimately serve.
Dominant/subordinate relations were thus embodied and remained visually legible.
Historians, sociologists, and cultural studies experts have each in their own way documented
how racial stratification and social identity in the old South was anything but simple. The
conventional critique of race as a social identity category calls attention to the socially
constructed nature of race and its ability to resist classification efforts, as demonstrated by the
instability of race as a social category when one ventured across state borders and boundaries.
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Concepts of race in the South, moreover, were thus not only marked by skin color, they were
constructed by social norms, which operated in complex ways that go far beyond simple
distinctions between “black” and "white." Because during this time period (and some might still
argue the case today) white Southerners not only saw themselves as a race that was biologically
and socially distinct from black slaves; they saw themselves as a race apart from Northern
whites.202 The map in this case illustrates how, through the spatial biopolitics of map making,
wounded bodies were simultaneously made and undone; the realms of politics, economics,
culture, and population health are here shown to have been effectively assimilated to the war
effort.
The influence of this map continues to reverberate in the present day, although now we see
racialized patterns of wounding have been expanded beyond their original southern origin. The
political economy of wounding thus remains intact; and in some ways it is arguably more
powerful. While there are those who might balk at the idea that slaves and soldiers shared life
experiences in common, even if they resided at polar opposite ends of the social spectrum; they
were nonetheless caught up within the same system of exploitation. Population health disparities
with regard to who has access to medical care, who seeks it, and how people are treated are welldocumented in the literature. Missing from the literature is genealogical analysis that goes
beyond race prejudice to explain practice patterns and health outcomes as a result of institution
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In his (2013) Atlantic article “What We Mean When We Say ‘Race is a Social Construct,’” Journalist Ta-Nehisi
Coates cites one of the South’s leading writers on political economy, James B. D. De Bow, who attributed Southern
succession to “the Norman-Cavalier thesis.” This view held that the “Cavaliers, Jacobites, and Huguenots, who
settled the South, naturally hated, had contempt for, and despised the Puritans who settled the North." The
former, wrote De Bow, "are a master-race; the latter a slave race, the descendants of Saxon serfs." The two were,
in short “irreconcilable peoples." Downloaded from http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/whatwe-mean-when-we-say-race-is-a-social-construct/275872/ Last accessed May 16, 2013.
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dynamics and patterns of medical social organization that were influenced by the Civil War.
Wounded soldier population patterns and population health outcomes patterns continue to reflect
in many respects the slave holding patterns established during the Civil War. Note in the
following figures, which illustrate the geospatial distribution of black and white men in the
United States, as indicated by mortality rates. Both maps share a striking resemblance to the
1861 U.S. Coast survey map.
Figure 2

Figure 2. Mortality rates for black men in the United States.
Source. Cullen MR, Cummins C, Fuchs VR (2012) “Geographic and Racial Variation in Premature
Mortality in the U.S.: Analyzing the Disparities.” Edited by Joan A. Caylà, Public Health Agency of
Barcelona, Spain (PLoS ONE 7(4): e32930. Last accessed August 2015; Downloaded from:
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0032930
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Figure 3

Figure 3. Mortality rates for white men in the United States.
Source. Cullen MR, Cummins C, Fuchs VR (2012) “Geographic and Racial Variation in Premature
Mortality in the U.S.: Analyzing the Disparities.” Edited by Joan A. Caylà, Public Health Agency of
Barcelona, Spain (PLoS ONE 7(4): e32930. Last accessed August 2015; Downloaded from:
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0032930

The biopolitics of the Civil War have for the most part been largely ignored by historians.
Foucault’s work, nonetheless, helps us to think about how the bios of the body is significant to
combat injury and, furthermore, how this cannot be separated from population politics that
instantiate wounding in such a way as to further a governance of social control. There are
compelling reasons to argue that the trauma of slavery produced the war’s first casualties; a fact
that clearly brushes against the grain of conventional discourses of history. As I have
demonstrated, traditional discourses, including casualty reporting, have tended to privilege the
wounds of soldiers over slaves. By recognizing and reifying the physical sacrifice of soldiers as
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the only legitimate “true” casualties of the war, these narratives effectively negated the wounds
of slaves in the process. Put differently, racialized social practices, which contributed to the
launching and sustaining of the war effort, were thus contributory to a process by which bodies
were wounded and physically transformed. They are, furthermore, reflective of the biopolitics of
white supremacist racist capitalism, which sought different ways beyond skin color to distinguish
the dominated from the dominant.

As the maps clearly indicate, the legacy of slavery thus not only shaped population health
dynamics in the 19th century, it continues to be salient in the present time period, as population
health indicators for poor health outcomes, including diabetes and life expectancy are markedly
worse in regions of the United States that were part of the old states of the confederacy.
Structural violence enacted at the policy level and through practices like medicine demonstrate
slavery’s resilience, as white supremacy continues to infuse medicine and public health practices.
Slavery continues to feed the violent conflict that is unfolding in our streets – the war at home –
and it infects the social control measures undertaken by law enforcement officers, who are the
domestic foot soldiers that police racial boundaries. On the basis of this record, one might
dispute the very notion that the Civil War ever ended. The social dynamics of war highlighted in
this study suggests war might be waged through means that are not confined to open
conflagration. Of course, one might infer from this that the war never really ended; that it merely
evolved. The original body targets of the Civil War, slaves and soldiers, have found a
contemporary analog, as poor blacks in addition to poor white soldiers continue to have their
bodies used and controlled through an increasingly diverse array of discourses and practices.
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Ontopolitics: War Science as Life Science
Military and medical problem solving in connection with war casualties evolved over the course
of the war. The Civil war’s human terrain was thus expanded, as soldiers’ bodies furnished a
frontline opportunity to biopolitically wage war. In this analysis, I will draw from the work of
theorists like Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to further argue that Civil War era medical innovation
was foundational to developments that would occur later, which helped shape the conditions of
possibility for life, living, and what it means to be human. The biopolitics of innovation here
were often driven by the practical exigencies and environmental ecology of the battlefield.
Institutional problem solving revolved around questions like: How might wounded soldiers be
evacuated more quickly away from front line operations to field hospital locations? How might
more invasive surgery operations be accomplished without causing death from the procedure?
How might soldiers be cared for quickly and returned to productive service? How might
complications from disease and infection be overcome to prevent deaths from injury? How can
the long-term care needs of wounded soldiers be addressed?
Toward the end of the Civil War, concern shifted toward questions of preparedness for future
wars. Population health fitness surfaced as a “national security” interest due to the fact that Civil
War soldiers were by and large not physically fit for service; they were either too old, too young,
or in poor health. In light of this, medicine began to turn its attention to pro-actively addressing
the fitness of the social body. Thus, as war fighting de-escalated, medical practice shifted to
address long-term care and rehabilitation in addition to focusing on the health of the U.S.
population. Military planners, through their strategic planning actions, demonstrated that they
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Americans as “human resources,” whose fitness and productivity needed to be cultivated to
effectively fight future wars.
Foucault’s term “biopower” can here be used to describe the form of power that was taking
shape here. Biopower, according to Foucault and other interpreters like Deleuze and Hardt and
Negri, it is a kind of power that must be understood in terms of its functioning as both a strategy
as well as a relation. Typically, it is deployed through a combination of specific technics,
technologies, and practices.203 Such power, according to Foucault, was constituted through the
practices of governmentality, which implied the extension of state power over physical
individualized bodies in addition to the political bodies of a population. Biopolitcs, in this
respect, represents "a new technology of power,” one that “exists at a different level, on a
different scale, and [that] has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different
instruments."
This particular passage from Foucault’s work illuminates an important shift that occurred in his
thinking about how power operated. Where before he primarily focused on disciplinary control
mechanisms as they pertained to bodies, Foucault adapted his thinking to address how biopolitics
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In his work "Postscript on the Societies of Control," Giles Deleuze compared what he termed were
“programs" of control with disciplinary societies, where he notes the passage between presented
evidence that strategic shift in power relations had occurred. Foucault frames this shift historically and
economically as a problem of capitalist governance. He points to the technique of enclosure, which
serves as both a disciplinary mechanism of partitioning bodies; it is also, as Marx famously pointed out, a
tool of capitalist accumulation. Whereas disciplinary institutions, like the factory, school, prison, and as I
am arguing here, medicine, physically enclose diverse populations and force their consolidation; this
occurs in such a way that advantages accrue to the institutions, who achieve growth and expansion
during this time period. This in turn benefits Capital accumulation and positions other changes that follow
later in the wake of World War II. Deleuze makes an important observation here; namely, that rigid
mechanisms of enclosure are giving way to open systems, which no longer need to rigidly
confine/constrict the body. For more on this see Deleuze, Gilles. “Post-script on the societies of control”
October, 59, Winter, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, (1992): 3-7.
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functions as a control apparatus; one that is addressed to whole populations. This, he said, was
achieved through massifying effects by targeting the “global mass." Biopolitics here operates
through an expansive “political anatomy” that might be characterized by "an explosion of
numerous and diverse techniques” and practices, which aim at controlling and subjugating the
species, race, and large-scale phenomenon of population. 204
The dynamic shift Foucault describes was reflected in the new thinking about medicine that
occurred among the war’s medical practitioners. The medical knowledge acquired during the
course of the war was, I want to argue, a reflection of an epistemology that developed during this
time: medicine and, more specifically medical innovation, was influenced by military ways of
seeing. Medical knowledge seeking paradigms were similarly influenced as a result the physical
demands placed on practitioners, who adapted their practice to respond to needs generated by
war. Put differently, the war had a major impact on what medical practitioners could know in
regards to not only soldiers’ bodies, but all bodies. This standpoint epistemology is significant,
because it set into motion an ethic of knowledge-seeking that was based on war, violence, and
destruction. Medical organization, innovation, institutional growth, and later profit in medicine
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Where before he was primarily focused on disciplinary control mechanisms, Foucault now understands
that biopolitics functions as a control apparatus; one that might be extended to control populations as a
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lectures.
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were set up to be dependent in many respects upon the mass mobilization of wounded soldiers,
who were more or less human test subjects. Their bodies were made to circulate as a form of
capital to keep the system functioning.
The evidence suggests that soldiers’ bodies were caught up in these institutional dynamics. But
here again, the social dynamics that facilitated this development were not causal linear. Combat
injuries proved to be individualizing and at the same time as they were massifying; the war was
also generative in terms of its effects as well as destructive. Slaves, as result of practices encoded
into law, were produced as a biopolitical population without subjectivity and for that reason they
were almost never individuated. Their enslavement constitutes a form of originary trauma,
despite the fact that their wounds as such were never taken into account to identify them as
casualties. They were objectified and further abjectified as a population group. This is why the
trauma of slaves, when it is remembered at all, is generally thought of in terms of mass suffering,
because their lack of historical personhood precluded their identification as individuals. Soldiers,
unlike slaves and despite having suffered from mass injury, remained individualized, even as
they were also medically objectified. The war in this instance was instrumental in shaping the
social context that helped bring these seemingly different bodies into articulation together. Thus,
despite the obvious group differences between them, both groups were exploited as body targets
to harvest their productivity. Consequently, while soldiers and slaves might not have been seen
to be commensurable in terms of the social identity as subjects; they shared a body that was
potentially productive in common.
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Foucault is perhaps useful here again, because his understanding of race is not limited to
problems of identity and skin color. His concept of state racism, or what Clough calls
“population racism,” sheds light on how racism was deployed strategically as a matter of social
and legal policy. The ideological foundation of white supremacy provided a functioning legal
framework, which not only helped establish the right to own people as property; it helped
normalize the practice of not treating people as people. Soldiers and slaves together then,
strategically and as a matter of practice, were assimilated into the order of knowledge/power
through the sphere of biopolitical techniques and biomedical health practices associated with
war. The body politics of the Civil War were also biopolitical in light of how medical and health
practices were developed to rehabilitate and modulate the life, health, and fitness of the soldier’s
body. Wounded soldiers were in this manner drawn into a knowledge-power nexus, where the
knowledge acquired from their bodies was put to use in such a way power, working through
institutions, socially reproduce itself by occasioning ongoing militarization and war.
Having stated this, I think it is important to be clear that “the history of some is not the history of
others205” Foucault reminds us that power targets bodies and populations in different ways.
Slavery, it turns out, as an institution and as a practice helped create the conditions of possibility
that brought the Civil War into being; it furnished a biopolitical template or model for the body,
which was elaborated upon and used to manage the bodies of soldiers. In light of this, it is now
possible to see how soldiers and slaves were produced as part of a relational biopolitical
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economy, wherein they were exposed to differently modulated regimes of control.206 By the end
of the war, the soldier’s body emerged as new site of knowledge power.
We might recall now Foucault’s famous passage in the “Docile Bodies” chapter of Discipline
and Punish, where attempts to describe the physics of power that is brought to bear on in the
“making” of the soldier’s body:
Let us take the ideal figure of the soldier as it was still seen in the early seventeenth
century. To begin with, the soldier was someone who could be recognized from afar; he
bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and courage, the marks, too, of his
pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valour; and although it is true that he
had to learn the profession of arms little by little--generally in actual fighting-movements like marching and attitudes like the bearing of the head belong for the most
part to a bodily rhetoric of honor; 'The signs for recognizing those most suited to this
profession are a lively, alert manner, and erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders,
long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet, because a
man of such a figure could not fail to be agile and strong'; when he becomes a pike
bearer, the soldier 'will have to march in step in order to have as much grace and gravity
as possible, for the pike is an honourable weapon, worthy to be borne with gravity and
boldness' (ordinance of 20 March 1764 ).207
Noteworthy is the additional observation he makes here, where he observes: “by the late
eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made; out of formless clay, an
inapt body, the machine required can be constructed.” Foucault here introduces an idea that
theorists like Seltzer (1992) sometimes refer to as “machine ontology” to describe the evolution
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Soldiers, like slaves, were considered valuable human assets and resources. However, they were subject to
qualitatively different regime of discipline and social control practices. Here, despite being owned as civil servants,
serving the master of the state, soldiers very clearly were not sold as chattel (nor were their offspring). They were,
moreover, socially esteemed and were not subjugated to the same extent as were slaves, nor were they as a rule
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of the soldier’s body over time.208 That he does so using terms more amenable to social
constructivism poses a contradiction to other aspects of his work, which I find are more
supportive of the idea of relational ontology, which I use to conceptually illustrate how wounded
bodies are embedded in a dynamic circulation. Foucault goes on to say:
The 'invention' of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden discovery. It is
rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location,
which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another according to their domain of application,
converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method.209
Discipline and control practices were thus employed to produce soldiers. Notably, whereas some
practices like those described here were more overtly contrived, others hailed from different
origins; they, nonetheless, contributed to an emerging “grid of intelligibility” with regard to
bodies, which Foucault here identifies as comprising a historically period-specific discourse.
Later, he reformulates this thinking, when he elaborates his understanding of power to describe
how these practices contributed to the production of bodies within a multiplicity of force
relations.210 These developments, he says, are indicative of strategies, whose general design are
embodied in the state apparatus; thus they might be used to physically manipulate bodies and
bring them into a governance of control. 211

208

Mark Selzer, Bodies and Machines. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

209

Michel Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, p. 138.

210

Michele Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: An Introduction. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 92-93.

211

Foucault uses this term in his effort to explore conceptually and theoretically how the body becomes a site of
control as an object of power-knowledge relations.
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I am arguing that this was also the case with medical practice. Military institutional influence
over medical practice, which developed genealogically in conjunction with war, demonstrates
how biopower operates in ways that are sometimes disguised. Practice patterns unfolded through
a dynamic process that occurred over the course of time, as power was exercised incrementally
and gradually over different dimensions of social life. What originally took shape as formal legal
institutional practices that included torture, forced labor, mass killing, managed genocide, and
social exclusion, changed as a new body was introduced into the control matrix—the soldier.
Medicine was simply the latest tool in the arsenal; though it was a powerful one, to the extent
that it was used to secure a biopolitical program of medical governance. As both a technology
and a practice, medicine might now be deployed alongside other practices, as part of a
coordinated effort to regulate the fitness of soldiers, population health outcomes, and labor
productivity within the same political economic circulation.212
These developments, I want to point out, did not materialize passively and incidentally; they are
indicative of a progressive military strategy to utilize medicine as a means to effect bodily
change. In this case, they illustrate how combat casualties and the radical undoing of bodies in
connection with the war became relevant to the political economy of both war and medicine. Not
to be downplayed or overlooked is how an ethic of harm was insidiously incorporated into a
rational-ethical medical framework of progress. Bear in mind now that patients, including
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subsequently discharged when they were determined physically unfit.

241

wounded soldiers, were not always treated in accordance with the ethic of “do no harm” (the
ethic is itself is an outcome of World War II). Patients who were soldiers were instead treated in
accordance with institutional ethical imperatives that were designed to accommodate military
needs and specifications.
In light of these developments, Civil War medical practice was positioned to help accelerate
economic growth and foster new growth industries in medicine. In this manner, it also helped
occasion new ways to exploit bodies. In retrospect, slaves and soldiers were together reduced to
the substance and soma of their bodies, as they each on their own terms embodied a form of
cheap powerless labor. War, medicine, labor, and life thus came to operate together in the same
circulation. Soldiers were in this respect were human inventory; they became slaves with guns.
Summary
Patricia Clough argues that violence needs to stand behind a human figure in order to be legible.
To be sure, the idea is simple. Though we might reflect on it as a means to consider the degree to
which body politics remain paramount in all wars. I argued in this chapter that the Civil War was
nothing short of a biopolitical race war. Seemingly undertaken to preserve the union of states, the
was in fact prosecuted in order to eliminate internal threats to the nation’s economic social order;
a social order that was in no small way predicated on the control, domination, and subordination
of human bodies―first slaves and later soldiers. Civil War combat casualties were thus not
terminal developments in and of themselves any more than they were simple byproducts of the
war; they were rather produced as part of a relational economy that imbricated a wide spectrum
of political, social, and economic developments. My aim here, as was stated before, was to open
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up the problem of combat injury to a larger conversation about violence, so that I might
demonstrate how wounded soldiers are bound up within a complex of entanglements: social,
political, economic, material, and affective. And nowhere is there perhaps more evidence to
support this than the Civil War. Slaves and soldiers were both products of the war’s violent
ecology. The history of this war is one that still continues to be read through the blood sacrifice
and suffering of these bodies.
One basic assumption that guided this research is that combat injuries cannot be thought of as
independent and detached from the political economy within which they function. Furthermore,
they are not mere accidents that stand “outside” history; but rather, are an outcome of military
and medical strategy and practice. With that, I want to return briefly to my main research
question in addition to other questions that were explored in this analysis: How are war and
wounding bound up with changes in the social organization of medicine? How are human
geographies bound up in violence and war? How are soldiers’ bodies “made” and “unmade”
within the context of war? What kinds of knowledge might be produced by these encounters?
And finally, Whose life is valued and whose life counts? As for medical social organization, I
think the findings are clear. Significant innovation accompanied by the expansion of institutional
infrastructure and capability were achieved as a result of the mass casualties inflicted during the
war; casualties that I might add are reflective of numbers that are yet to be eclipsed, even in
modern times.
This case introduced arguments that suggested the 19th century marked the beginning of a turn,
which turned out to be materially significant for developments in medical history. Medical social
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organization, in addition to innovations in battlefield medicine, were shown to be achieved
alongside corresponding innovations and developments in weapons technology, strategy, and
tactics. Using interpretive methods, I pointed to evidence to develop the claim that wounded
soldiers played an important instrumental role in fostering developments in medicine, including
its social organization, knowledge production, and practice innovation. Medicine, I argued,
benefitted from having access to large numbers of war casualties. I evaluated the impact of
multi-level institutional configurations, to include their interaction with different social groups.
Military institutional complicity and competency sharing was and continues to be normative, as
practices are shared across institutions. The financing of medicine was also an issue here, as
financial investments made to support the war effort helped lay the groundwork for what would
eventually develop into a sophisticated multi-level funding mechanism for medicine. Thus I was
able to illustrate how the edifice of modern medicine was not the rational, neutral, violence-free
practice it is imagined to be; rather, it was substantively built through a relation to violence and
war.
Slavery was, of course, shown to be the source of agitation that ignited the conflict; it produced
the first casualties of a war that manufactured the greatest number of war casualties in U.S.
history. On that basis I argued that the Civil War produced two different models of the body—
the slave model of the body and the militarized medicalized body of the soldier. Both body
models produced bodies that were docile, obedient, and subservient to the authorities that
governed (owned) them. In light of this, there can be no theory or understanding of war
casualties without understanding slavery’s contribution to the political economy of injury.
Slavery, combat injury, and medical knowledge production were enfolded together.
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The Civil War thus marks a moment in time when physicians and surgeons commenced their
own full-scale invasion of the body, as the human terrain of war and the human terrain of
medicine were essentially merged. As human test subjects, soldiers furnished the somatic
substance that helped secure the advancement, expansion, and social reproduction of institutions
like medicine. Soldiers, in other words, were among the paradigmatic “biological citizens”
produced by the war. Surgeons, especially, advanced their craft by taking on increasingly
invasive and complex medical procedures on the “clay-like” terra forma bodies of soldiers. The
radical undoing of their bodies was accomplished through a combination of practices that were
designed to produce body knowledge on a scale that had never before been achieved. Military
and medical practices were in many respects complimentary and mutually reinforcing. This
development suggests this particular war—a war that continues to stir controversy over its
alleged causes and effects—was not waged simply over slavery and states’ rights issues, but
rather was fought over something admittedly more abstract - the life force and substance of the
human body.
The problem of the body thus became a central line of focus for military as well as medical
institutions. By the war’s end, nowhere was the connection between “knowledge and power” and
“knowledge and cutting” more vividly evidenced than in the practice of medicine that benefitted
from the mass casualties produced by the war. The Civil war in this sense facilitated a politics of
the body that helped establish the human terrain of the body as a legitimate “theater” of
operation. Distinctively, we see here how ideas of “duty,” “sacrifice,” and ‘service” were tied to
notions of citizenship under the aegis of good governance. Soldiers’ bodies, their lives, and
livelihood were in a manner not unlike the slaves before them; they share the same connective
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tissue in the sense that their bodies were collectively drawn into an oppressive biopolitical
medical governance of control.
Yet where initially the focus was to render bodies more “knowable,” “calculable,” and thus more
“productive,” this began to change by the end of the war. Instead treating the wounded body as a
human body confined to bodily limitation, a demonstrable shift took place: medical practitioners
saw the body in terms of its potential: the body (limbs in particular) were re-ordered as the
spatial topography of the body came to be seen as “fashionable.” Bodies might thus be
transformed through a material process of re-framing and enhancement. This development
helped shift the visual ontology of medicine, which was also transformed: medicine progressed
from “knowing” to “making” bodies, as it set its sights to see beyond the limits of the body
proper. Medical instruments were deployed alongside rifles and cannons to pursue politics by
other means. Consequently, the “will to knowledge” as demonstrated by the Civil War reveals
how medicine advanced in measurable ways through the human harvest of wounded soldiers.
Military and medical institutions worked together; and though early efforts were crude, the blunt
object of medicine was over the course of time refined to become an effective tool of
governance.
Despite the fact that many of the specific developments cited here were not “breakthrough”
innovations, they nonetheless set the stage and helped positon developments that would occur
later. Far from being a mere story about great men, great battles, and disputes over states’ rights,
the U.S. Civil War was a contest waged over human terrain, the body, and life itself. To facilitate
analysis of the biopolitcs of the war, I pointed to Foucault’s thinking, which helped me situate
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these developments within a framework of power. By the end of the 19th century, soldier’s
bodies assumed a place within the same circulating economy that captured slaves; soldiers’
bodies were produced as a knowledge objects within a progressive, political economy of
wounding. In the case of the latter, their bodies and subjectivity distinguished bodies that
mattered (soldiers) from bodies that did not (slaves). Over the course of the war, human
productivity emphasis shifted from slaves to soldiers and other bodies that might be similarly
exploited, including free laborers, women and children. The differences, as I pointed out,
between the old slavery and the new slavery were substantial. Soldiers bodies were broken down,
re-ordered, and to some extent were re-made through a process of medical objectification; their
bodies were put to labor on battlefields and again in field hospitals – the new capitalist
plantations. Thus, in much the same manner as plantation owners maintained a corporeal vested
interest in the bodies of slaves, the state invested similarly in the bodies of soldiers, who
constituted a new form of human capital.
I compared soldiers and slaves together in an effort to illustrate how the bodies of both of these
groups were produced as part of a relational economy. Thus, I argued that slavery, as an
institution, was not only important to the growth of a liberal economy; slavery likewise, as a
model of the body, facilitated the development of biopolitical technics and practices that were
elaborated and used to break down the bodies of soldiers. Labor and accounting practices
developed under slavery, I argued, proved fruitful and productive to the extent that set a
precedent for managing soldiers as biocapital investments. Slavery, in this sense, helped pave the
way for the emergence of the militarized medical model of the body; it served as a catalyst for
the development of financial tools and accounting practices that introduced soldiers’ bodies, their
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lives, and livelihood to progressive economic and medical calculation regimes. With that, one
might conceivably argue that without slavery, a major impetus for the war would have been lost;
without slavery, the U.S. economy would not have expanded at the rate that it did; without
slavery, there would have been no mass casualties; and without mass casualties, medicine’s rapid
professionalization, institutionalization, and growth would have also been impacted.
In what I think is one of the more significant developments, a shift was instigated here in regards
to the temporality of injury. Combat injuries in the Civil War were the opening “cut” in a sociomedical process of bodily displacement. Bodies were first objectified as military targets. Second,
they were subject to targeting by the objectifying practices of medicine. And finally, they were
objectified within an affect economy that recycled injured bodies. Homo Vulneratus, the
wounded body/figure/subject, illustrated how different bodies, soldiers among other, were
wounded together and how war broke down the down the body and re-distributed subjectivity vis
a vis a disarticulated corpus. Human subdivision, in other words, became part of the essential
calculus of combat injury. The wounded body of the soldier, in this manner, became a
knowledge object around which institutions like medicine were built.

The Civil War was in this manner instrumental to a process that aimed to take the body apart in
order to rebuild it again. Institutional efforts were invested in the disciplining of soldiers’ bodies.
Military and medical institutions in this regard exploited the resource capacities of bodies in
order to control them. These particular bodies were produced to be docile, obedient, and
subservient to power, while they were at the same time rendered submissive to economic
domination. Their bodies here, having been made to measure, were rendered knowable in ways
248

that would ultimately later make them profitable. Soldiers were in this manner articulated into
the order of knowledge power through an alignment of body technics and practices derived from
a combination of military discipline and medical practices associated with war. Wounding thus
suggests a turn away from the notion of a body defined by its enclosure, to an ontology of the
body conceived in terms of multiplicity.

Medical knowledge production was shown to operate within a regime of power and control, to
the extent it was shown to be complicit with military strategies that aimed to open the body and
render it more docile and useful. Military and medical institutions, each in their own way,
benefitted from mass casualties and violence. Contentious body politics were productive insofar
as they helped the institutions achieve growth, knowledge, and extend their influence; both
benefitted from biopolitical strategies to break the body into pieces and parts, thereby extracting
utility and vitality that could be used to pursue military dominance. By calling attention to the
instrumental role played by wounded soldiers to medical advance, I suggest we might re-think
the transcendence of medicine through war and capitalism: funding medicine through war turns
soldiers into human subjects, who cannot ethically consent any more than medicine can ethically
be practiced when its advance can be shown to depend on violence. Having been fashioned as
such, they were further drawn into a governance of social control, which used them to secure as
well as reproduce a political economic order that functioned on the basis of war.
Aside from looking at how soldiers’ bodies were physically invaded and broken down by means
associated with medicine, I argued it was important that we look critically into the process of
casualty accounting itself. The mechanics of counting, as I have already shown, produces a
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statistical body that stands in for the physical body; numbers are substituted for flesh to create
the truth of the body. Counting and documenting war casualties was strategically incorporated
into the biopolitical project of managing bodies, if only because it afforded institutions yet
another way in which they might re-assemble and re-make the desiccated bodies the statistics
portrayed. Reducing wounded and dead bodies to their digital humanity permits what is
essentially a re-ordering of the body, which fosters a pernicious form of public attention deficit
disorder; one that trades body knowledge and information for the cold comfort that numbers
provided. Numerical framing as such, in this war as well as the ones that followed it, employed
the stage props of objectivity and numerical certainty to exsanguinate and fractionalize war’s
human remainder. Human atrocities, it turns out, are more easily objectified and disembodied
when they are itemized like sacks of coffee, sugar, and flour. Casualty statistics, in this manner,
defeat even our best of intentions to grasp their significance. They destroy history and erase
biography. They are, furthermore, productive of an affect economy, which effectively “forgets”
the injuries borne by black bodies in order to celebrate and venerate the injuries of soldiers,
whose embodiment is invariably white. This perhaps explains why the dead bodies, wounded
bodies, and bodies rendered in pieces and parts —the virtual visual ontology of the Civil War ―
was (and remains) compelling. Tragically, however, disembodied memory diverts the public
gaze away from the physical bodies of combat casualties, as it permits them to fade into the
background noise of numbers and statistics.
Finally, by calling attention to the ethic of violence upon which war is based, I was able to show
how affects of violence were rendered salient to the practice of medicine. The practices of
systematic torture, bondage, and commodity trading in human bodies served different and
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oftentimes contradictory purposes. On the one hand, they justified the conflict in the first place
and later were employed as part of an effort to sustain ongoing war. They, furthermore, furnished
the institutional logic for a system of medically invasive body practices. Military and medical
institutions, each working to hold up their end of the war effort, consolidated their influence and
worked together so that each could optimize their own interests. The major problem here, of
course, it that this ethic of violence stand at odds with the value-free ethics of care, rational
enlightenment, and progress that are assumed to drive the pursuit of medical-scientific
knowledge production. Medicine cannot remain neutral in this regard if it is subject to capture
and used as a tool for state violence. Such a process, it turns out, was not only materially relevant
to the needs of military and medical institutions; it was salient to the development of an affect
economy.
Affect was thus instrumental to how the soldier’s body was put to labor: medicine was
militarized as the bodies of soldiers were medicalized; “life-making” and “life-taking” practices
were here brought together in ways that illustrate how a biopolitical strategy was beginning to
take shape to inform a productive political economy of social relations. Material and affective
processes work together in this regard; they are not separate. In the case of the Civil War, the
hegemonizing practice of celebrating soldiers and counting their loss, while simultaneously
diminishing slaves was not a simple error of omission. The statistical manipulation that
masquerades as oversight here engages an affect economy of exchange. By this I meant the
statistical representation of dead and wounded soldiers, accomplished through the documentation
and itemization of casualties, was reified and rendered productive through what amounted to a
practical body politics of erasure. Recall now that slavery, as both an institution and a practice,
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represents the Civil War’s originary trauma. The collective practice of remembering and
forgetting that remains attached to slavery achieves productive impact through its implied social
division of labor; one where slaves are forced to perform the body work of repression and
trauma― their bodies must be forgotten so that others, like soldiers, might be honored and
remembered.
Finally, having resisted the “disciplining” of linear methodology, it might be helpful to think of
the Civil War time period as a “rupture” within a continuum of developments, rather than as an
isolated event; one that affectively engages a circuit of events and conflicts, such that it is
possible to evaluate the continuities and discontinuities of findings documented thus far. Moving
forward, the same research problematic and questions that were addressed here will be looked at
again, as the next chapter continues to explore the political economy of war and medicine in the
20th century.
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CHAPTER VI
The 20th Century

The previous case demonstrated how during the course of the 19th century the human terrain of
war and medicine were essentially merged. I presented arguments to support the claim that the
U.S. Civil War was waged as a biopolitical race war. This case picks up with the time period that
followed the Civil War. It will continue to argue, on the basis of wars that occurred in the 20th
century, that modern medicine continued to reap significant rewards from the corporal
investment made by soldiers. The political economy of 20th century war thus demonstrates an
ongoing elaboration of social dynamics established during the previous time period. But as I
have already made clear, the discontinuities of the case are as important as the continuities in
regards to findings. Case selection criteria dictate a continued focus on wars that produced mass
casualties among soldiers. But instead of looking only at one war, like I did with the Civil War, I
address how 20th century developments unfolded over the course of three major global wars:
World Wars I&II and the war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Here again, I provide a brief overview of the relevant wars, after which I report findings that
address the substance of my original research question: how are war and wounding bound up
with changes in the social organization of medicine? From here, I move to consider other
questions that include: How are human geographies bound up in violence and war? How are
soldiers bodies “made” and “unmade” within the context of war. What kinds of knowledge
might be produced by these encounters? Whose life is valued and whose life counts?
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This case sets out yet again to examine what my preliminary research indicated were four
problem areas of interest: 1) the problem of war and military institutional influence over the
social organization of medicine; 2) problems of the body which result from it being targeted as
an object of military and medical strategy and practice; 3) the problem of violence to the extent
that it creates ethical problems, which cut across institutions; 4) problems of discourse, where
heroic narratives engage an affect economy of desire to inhibit critical inquiry as it pertains to
combat injury. The general aim here, as I stated before, is to build on previous critical theories to
advance my own theory of the political economy of combat injury.
The case frame will again restrict focus to the following elements: 1) combat casualty patterns
and statistics; 2) the social organization of medicine; 3) battlefield strategy, tactics, and
weaponry. In the first category, I document patterns of injury as indicated by published casualty
statistics, where I note how combat casualties are classified, counted, and reported. The second
category documents developments in medical social organization, where I focus attention on
innovations in biomedical surgery practice, public health and disease management, and
rehabilitative medicine. The third category documents developments in military strategy, tactics
and weaponry are documented so that they might be analyzed in terms of their impact on the
social organization of medicine.
But where the previous case identified a hierarchy of wounding that privileged the wounds of
soldiers’ over those of slaves, I find the order of wounding that emerged in the 20th century is
more complex. In what I identify is the first major developmental discontinuity, I note how
boundaries that distinguished soldiers from civilians began to break down. Second, the wars
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themselves exhibited a distinct order of stratification on the basis of injury: World Wars I & II
are thought of as the “good wars.” Consequently, their casualties remain privileged to an extent
when they are compared to the casualties of the Vietnam War, which remains etched in history
as the “bad war.” Another major development concerns the stratification of knowledge. Where
before wounded soldiers were used to produce knowledge in an effort to “know’ the body, I note
a decisive shift toward “making” bodies and managing their life, health, and vitality.
The case begins with a brief historical overview of the three wars and is followed by highlights
of important medical major innovations. The chapter concludes with a biopolitical analysis of
case findings that make claims about the political economy of war and medicine. Drawing from
the work of Foucault again, my analysis illustrates how medical knowledge production and
technology innovation enter knowledge and control domains through their imbrication with war.
Foucault’s treatment of the body and race are once again relevant to understanding how wounded
soldiers became a target of power. The case illustrates yet again how biopower operates to
transform individual bodies and subjects and as part of that process produces knowledge and
truth about the body.
History: Beginnings, Endings, Causes, Effects
The turn to the 20th century was a period of transition for the United States, which after a brief
interlude of seeming peace, became involved in two global industrial-sized word wars, in
addition to other small wars too numerous to explore here. The almost 150 year time lapse since
the ending of the Civil War introduced significant social change. Post war Reconstruction
initiatives launched after the ending of slavery brought with them a major shift in emphasis, as
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the country pursued a path of rapid industrialization fueled by the exercise of imperial interests
abroad. The ever-shifting social landscape that that came to define the operating terrain of war
expanded during this era, as it evolved to comprise not only three dimensional geographic space,
but ever-shifting human terrains and topographies, which included minds, bodies, tools, and
technologies. Population dynamics similarly reflected the changing times to the extent they
indicated new patterns of internal migration and immigration. Social identities and social group
formation dynamics proved likewise to be volatile. All of these social currents helped set the
stage for the global wars in the 20th century.

This section will review key events and timelines that comprise three of the major wars that
occurred during this century. Afterwards, I present findings that are indicative of some of the
more significant medical practice and technology developments. As was the case with the U.S.
Civil War, the beginnings, endings, causes, and effects of the major wars here continue to be
subject to interpretation and disagreement.

World War I (1914-1919)

Beyond the advances that were achieved in the science of murder and medicine, the Great War
introduced changes in global geopolitics that continue to reverberate in our present day time
period. In this manner, the war has withstood the test of time, as we still refer to it as the First
World War is still referred to as “The Great War.” This designation does not elicit its existential
greatness so much as it does refer to the relative importance of the role the war played in
changing the face of modern warfare. Notwithstanding, it is sometimes also referred to as
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“The War to End All Wars,” a goal that was clearly underachieved and never realized.213
Conventional war narratives portray World War I as a battle to secure Western Europe from the
ascendency of Hitler. This narrative, of course, stands in stark contrast with what critics argue
was actually a war fought to secure the entrenched moneyed interests and power structures that
ruled Europe during that time.

Setting aside these divergent claims, we might look instead at the role played by this war, the
first major conflict of the new century, and the extent to which its casualties helped advance the
cause of medicine. As my findings will show here, infrastructural investment in the
technoscience of war combined with high rates of injury among soldiers helped foster
institutional changes that contributed to developments in medicine. The influence of World War
I, however, is often marginalized and even forgotten, overshadowed in many respects by the war
that followed it.
To recap quickly, World War I produced for Europe what was at that time an unprecedented
bloodbath of combat casualties. But here again, as was the case with the U.S. Civil War, the
official source of statistics (body counts) are armies. So not only are the counts likely to be
politicized, with under/over reporting not uncommon, the logistics of “value-free” counting
made accuracy virtually impossible to accomplish. Again, we must ask: Who did the counting
and how did these statisticians calculate their estimates? What period of time did their
calculations cover? What classification parameters did they stipulate? What classification

Historians are similarly prone to write about the war using terms that declare it the first “industrial war”
and/or the first “modern” war.
213

257

criteria were used to document casualties? Nonetheless, we can proceed with the understanding
that the real number will never be known. Consensus estimates from different sources put the
total number killed in action at around 38 million. U.S. military casualties for World War I are
estimated at 321,000. This number, of course, pales in comparison to the total number of military
losses suffered on all sides, which again varies by source. Add civilian estimates to these totals
and the number approaches 70 million.214 215
Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination in 1914 by the Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, triggered
a series of events that that rippled across Europe, from the Balkans to Berlin, Paris and London,
all of which culminated in the launching of the war. Later that same year in August, AustriaHungary declared war on Serbia, Germany declared war on France and Russia, whereupon they
invaded Belgium preemptively as a prelude to action against France. Later, in 1915, the sinking
of the ocean liner, the RMS Lusitania, provided Britain with the opportunity it had been seeking
to justify its entry into the war. The passenger ship was torpedoed and sunk by a German U-boat,
which lead to the deaths of 1,198 passengers and crew. There were 128 Americans listed among
the dead.216 It was in fact the sinking of this ship that historians point to as a lever of influence,
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Statistics reported by the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs. It is important
to note that exact figures are not attainable. Reported numbers reflect a median estimates. Downloaded
from http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf Last accessed August, 15.
2016. In addition, refer to T. J. Mitchell and G. M. Smith, Medical services, casualties and medical
statistics of the Great War, Volume 5, London : H. M. Stationery Office, 1931.
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To put this numbers into greater perspective, the French Army suffered nearly four times the number
of casualties that the Americans suffered in only the first four months of the war.
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Early in the war, Germany declared the seas around the United Kingdom a war zone. The German
embassy in the United States went so far as to place a newspaper advertisement warning people not to
sail on the Lusitania. The ship, nevertheless, set out for Liverpool England on what was her final voyage,
May 1 1915. During this time period, submarine warfare was intensifying in the Atlantic. On the afternoon
of 7 May, a German U-boat torpedoed the Lusitania 11 miles off the southern coast of Ireland, declaring
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which helped shape public opinion in the U.S. and paved the way for an eventual American
declaration of war in 1917.
In the run up to the war, there was a lot of sensationalizing about the need to curtail Germany’s
dictatorial ambitions (the WWII version of the “make the world safe for democracy” narrative).
Much of this might have been dismissed in hindsight as pure propaganda, though it was validated
to some extent by the events that followed later. Subsequent efforts to end the war culminated in
the Armistice that was negotiated between the Allies and Germany (also known as the Armistice
of Compiègne in recognition of the location where it was signed). The armistice went into effect
at 11 a.m. Paris time on November 11, 1918. The terms of settlement marked a victory for the
Allies and a defeat for Germany, although it stopped short of demanding a formal surrender.
Whereas the armistice officially ended the fighting on the ground, it still took another six months
of post-war negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the war, recognized in the
signing of a formalized document, the Treaty of Versailles.217 The difference between the two
dates accounts for a common discrepancy that appears in different records and on war
memorials; that is, the fighting was officially concluded in November 1918, but the war did not
end until the Treaty was signed in 1919.

that the ship had breached the boundary of the declared "zone of war." The ship's sinking provided
Britain with a propaganda opportunity. This helped shift public opinion in the United States, disposing it
against Germany, and ultimately influenced the United States to declare war two years later.
217

The actual terms of the agreement were written in large part by French Marshal Ferdinand Foch. This
terms in regards to the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of German troops behind their own borders,
the preservation of infrastructure, the exchange of prisoners, promises of reparations, as well as the
disposition of German warships and submarines, and other conditions for prolonging or terminating the
armistice.
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Even after it ended the war continued to resonate in the public conscience, where there was
palpable affective resentment born out of a sense of injustice about the treaty’s terms, which was
shared by parties on different sides of the conflict. The restrictions imposed on Germany by the
Allied powers are cited by historians as the cause for Hitler’s eventual rise to power. The French
were unhappy, for example, because they believed the terms of the agreement were not
sufficiently punishing. Though it was Germans who proved to be most unhappy of all with the
armistice terms negotiated by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.

One stipulation required that all German colonies in Africa and the Pacific be turned over to the
control of Allies, who wasted little time carving up the territories and passing them out like
prizes to allies and business partners. Middle Eastern partners were particularly unhappy as a
result of broken agreements negotiated in 1915. To make matters worse, in terms of Middle East
politics, the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the post-Ottoman Middle East
into French and British control spheres, effectively drew new arbitrary borders around countries
like Iraq. Wilson’s much-heralded “self-determination” declaration was implemented in such a
manner that it effectively institutionalized a racialized hierarchy of power: the majority white
Eastern European countries that were allies with the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and
Russian empires were provided opportunity for self-governance; whereas majority brown and
often Muslim countries were given no such rights of determination. For it was thought they had
not yet achieved sufficient levels of “maturity” appropriate for self-government.

In what was technically the year after the war supposedly ended, violence exploded again in
years 1919–21. Military conflict broke out between Soviet Russia and Poland in what was
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effectively a dispute over Ukraine. Another armistice was signed in October 1920 and
culminated in the Treaty of Riga in 1921. The new treaty provided for Ukraine to remain under
the protection of the Soviet republic, although large tracts were ceded to Belarus and Poland.
At the same time, groups who had served the Allied cause militarily and otherwise discovered
the agreements struck at the beginning of the war would no longer be honored. Deals negotiated
with Egypt, India, Korea, and China were all variously ignored. The British high commissioner
in Egypt, for example, promised independence for Arabs and to keep holy sites in Mecca under
their control in return for their support fighting the Ottoman Empire – the agreements were
effectively disregarded. It was only two years later, the result of Britain’s Balfour Declaration,
that another controversial agreement was brokered, which remains a source of contention in the
present era: Zionists were promised a protected Jewish homeland in Palestine.

The wartime collapse of the Ottoman Empire proved to be particularly consequential, for it
brought about the demise of its sultan, the all-powerful caliph, and created a crisis in Islam, as a
result of having lost a spiritual center. Muslim-dominated countries thus remained colonies after
the war’s end. They were ruled by the imperial powers, who sought institutional cover to
legitimize their authority under the aegis of the League of Nations. With that, the Muslim
Brotherhood (a pre-cursor to al-Qaeda) was founded in Egypt in 1928 as a means to counter
Western influence and exploitation of the Islamic world.

The war and its aftermath remains in the minds of many did not imprint the American war
conscience in the same way it did Europeans. It’s not that American losses were not significant,
nor is it a simple reflection of the fact that American cities were not carpet bombed and
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destroyed like the major cities of Europe. Rather, the answer might be attributed to a problem of
public narratives of the sort that the journalist David Frum calls attention to when he writes:
“Americans prefer narratives in which they play a central heroic role. Unfortunately for them, the
First World War’s Dwight Eisenhower was French, Marshal Ferdinand Foch.218 This explains to
some degree the American fascination with World War II, as demonstrated by the fact that the
bulk of academic study reflects greater interest in the latter.

Nostalgia for World War I remains strong in countries like France and England. Annual
commemorations symbolize the conflict through the wearing of the red poppy flower, which has
proven to be as popular as it is controversial (some people wear white flowers to protest). The
contradictions of the war are symbolized by the artistic memorial installed in 2014 on the
grounds of the Tower of London in Britain. To commemorate the centenary marking Britain’s
participation in the war, artist Paul Cummins and designer Tom Piper created a display which
was intended to strike a visual as well as visceral cord as it commemorated the blood sacrifice of
the fallen. A tapestry of red poppies, staged to flow like a river of blood, were arranged to tumble
onto the dry moat as a tribute to the war’s victims.

While the history books regard the war as technically over, public expressions of nostalgia are
evidence of a vital affect economy, which continues to feed public emotion in our current time.
Reactions to the display were reported as mixed. Whereas some found the tribute a fitting
acknowledgement of Britain’s sacrifice, others had a different view. In this case, there were
many who saw it as nothing more than a cynical and manipulative effort crafted to maintain
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ongoing public support for a war that served no purpose other to wager the lives millions to settle
the financial disputes of the wealthy that pre-dated the beginning of the war.

Consequently, an art installation that was ostensibly intended to show public reverence for blood,
life, and sacrifice was seen to be something of a hollow effort, considering how Britain continues
to partner with allies like the United States to engineer wars for profit. Public memory, in this
instance, serves as an affective reservoir for disagreement over the war’s causes, effects, and
symbolic meanings. The empirical “truth” of the war, which its organizers aimed to convey by
representing each of the war’s documented casualties by a single red poppy, attests to how power
harvests public feelings about combat casualties to enlist support for ongoing war.

Absent the American entry into the war, which some critics argue was winding down by the time
U.S. forces joined the conflict, there is much to speculate in regards to what might have
happened. Without the Americans would Germany have suffered a defeat? What kind of
alternative settlement might there have been without Wilson’s influence?219 Admittedly, no one
knows if the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty were solely responsible for the rise of
fascism and the eventual launching of World War II in Europe.
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There are many, of course, who argue it was the arrival of American forces on the Western Front that
proved to be a decisive factor in breaking the German spring offensive in 1918. Absent the Americans, it
is not unreasonable to speculate that the Germans might have been able to consolidate their position and
outlasted the attacking British and French forces. The same logic applies to the Eastern Front. By 1917
when America entered the conflict, German forces were already in complete control, having conquered
significant holdings of territory they were unlikely to give without it being forcefully taken from them.
German forces remained split, fighting the war on two fronts simultaneously, which ultimately contributed
to their demise.
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World War II (1939-1945)
The Second World War was arguably one of the most important wars in human history.
Significant progress was achieved in terms of technology development, which helped usher in
not only improvements in medicine and health, but also fostered the climate for major post-war
social evolution and change. The wars major players returned from WW I, though now the Axis
powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) faced off against the Allied nations, led by Britain, the
United States, and the USSR. WW II began on September 1, 1939 and lasted until 1945.
Germany launched the second global war by invading Poland. Great Britain and France both
immediately responded by warning Hitler that if his forces didn’t withdraw, their countries
would launch an attack. The U.S. notably did not enter the war until December 1941, and only
after it was attacked by Japan in the Western Pacific.

Despite the fact that enormous intellectual effort has gone into documenting the history of this
war, there remains considerable disagreement in regards to whether the First World War ever
really ended. The seeds of discontent that many cite were instrumental to the launching of WW
II were, as some argue, sewn when the World War I armistice was negotiated. The simmering
disagreements that persisted in the wake of the accord proved to be insurmountable and were the
root cause of the second installment of a global war, cementing a legacy of carnage so that now
World War II ranks among the most deadly in human history.220
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The interwar years, a time of great global instability, have been cited by numerous historians as being
a time period that fomented what later emerged as nationalist uprisings in countries that included
Germany, Italy and Japan. Germany in particular was motivated for reasons that had to do with wanting
to overturn and even avenge the harsh terms forced on them at the end of WW I. Nationalist tensions
had, likewise, caused social unrest in the Baltic states and led to the Bolshevik Revolution in czarist
Russia during the First World War. This conflict was followed by the Russian Civil War, which resulted in

264

The second installment of WW I thus continued the trend of mass-injury and killing, where each
of the major powers shifted their economic, industrial, and scientific endeavors to support the
war effort. In what represented a major shift in strategy, WW II is distinguished in history for the
mass targeting of civilians in addition to soldiers and troop formations. Aerial bombing
campaigns that focused on civilian population centers in addition targeting internal civilian
populations for extermination make WW II one of the more deadly conflicts in human history.
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki pushed the human carnage to levels unrivaled by any
other war or group or wars. By the end of the war, it is estimated that more than 80 million
people were casualties of the conflict.
Consequently, WW II was not unlike the First World War, as these casualties helped furnish
significant contributions to 20th century medicine. Conventionally speaking, however, when we
think about human test subjects and/or medical testing vis a vis the war, it’s not the bodies of
soldiers that come to mind; rather, it is the infamous experiments conducted on Jews among
others by the Nazi regime. Here, it is perhaps fair to say that scientific achievements in other
areas of scientific achievement like physics and telecommunications to a large extent
overshadowed innovations in medicine. But as I will demonstrate subsequently, medicine also
benefitted, even if the perceived benefits accrued indirectly; military investment in the body as a
weapon of mass destruction continued to influence medical social organization as well as the
pattern of ongoing medical innovation and progress.

the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Western republics and capitalists in
particular were fearful of the spread of Bolshevism and communism.
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Unlike the U.S. Civil War and World War I, no one even in particular is cited as the effective
cause of the war. Despite the fact that enormous intellectual effort has gone into documenting
the history of WWII, there remains considerable disagreement in regards to whether the First
World War ever really ended. The seeds of discontent that many scholars cite as being
instrumental to the launching of World War II were, some argue, sewn during the time when the
World War I armistice was negotiated.221 The simmering disagreements that persisted in the
wake of the accord proved, however, to be insurmountable, leading many to attribute them as the
root cause of a second installment of a global war, thereby establishing the legacy of carnage so
that WW II now ranks among the most deadly wars in human history.222
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Some scholars point to Japan’s unexpected victory over czarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-05) left open the door for Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific. The United States U.S. Navy
first developed plans in preparation for a naval war with Japan in 1890. “War Plan Orange,” as it was
called, would be updated continually as technology advanced and greatly aided the U.S. during World
War II. And still others point to the year 1931, when Japan seized Manchuria from China. Italy’s invasion
and defeat of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, Adolf Hitler’s re-militarization of Germany’s Rhineland in 1936,
the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 are also often
cited as precipitating events. There are, however, two dates that are most often cited as "the beginning of
World War II" — July 7, 1937, when the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" led to a prolonged war between
Japan and China, and September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, which led Britain and France
to declare war on Hitler’s Nazi state in retaliation. For more on this, see http://www.historynet.com/worldwar-ii Last accessed August, 15, 2016.
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The years between the first and second world wars were a time of instability during the worldwide
Great Depression that began around 1930. It was also a time when some nations, including Germany,
Italy and Japan developed intense nationalist feelings that led to a desire to expand: Germany in Northern
and Eastern Europe, Italy in Africa and Greece, and Japan in Asia and the South Pacific. Germany had
the added motivation of overturning (and ultimately avenging) the harsh terms forced on it at the
conclusion of the First World War. Competing ideologies further fanned the flames of international
tension. The Bolshevik Revolution in czarist Russia during the First World War, followed by the Russian
Civil War, had established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a sprawling communist state.
Western republics and capitalists feared the spread of Bolshevism. In some nations, such as Italy,
Germany and Romania, ultra-conservative groups rose to power, in part as a reaction against
communism. Germany, Italy and Japan signed agreements of mutual support but, unlike the Allied
nations they would face, they never developed a comprehensive or coordinated plan of action.
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Admittedly, no one really knows if the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty were solely
responsible for the rise of fascism, which provided the accelerant to aid Hitler’s rise to power.
Whereas armchair historians are fond of speculating what would have happened if Hitler had
won World War II, there less fervor about engaging the speculative politics of World War I.
Imagine a war and a world where Kaiser Wilhelm wins, or where the Americans simply fail to
enter the war. Even more speculative, imagine a different Civil War outcome; where the South
wins independence and later sides with Britain and France in WWI, while the independent North
becomes allies with Germany. How would the world look as a result? Absent the American entry
into the war, which some critics would argue was already beginning to wind down by the time
the U.S. joined the conflict, we are left to wonder if perhaps a different settlement might have
been negotiated. What might have happened without the influence of Woodrow Wilson? Might it
have been possible for a deal to have been struck that would have been less punishing and
economically damaging to Germany? What if the Allies had resisted the temptation to carve up
the Middle East and its resources like party favors to be shared by the war’s victors? All of this
is pure conjecture. Though it is at the very least interesting to speculate about how a less forceful
U.S. response to a boat sinking might have prevented the Holocaust, the Islamic Revolution, and
the rise of Al Qaeda. Without the influence of Americans and its soldiers, could the War have
lived up to its mantra: The War to End All Wars? 223
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Many argue against this idea; that the arrival of American forces on the Western Front proved to be a
decisive factor in breaking the German spring offensive in 1918. In other words, without the Americans,
some think it is reasonable to speculate the Germans might have consolidated their position, dug in, and
outlasted the attacks made by British and French forces. The same logic applies to the Eastern Front. By
1917 when America entered the conflict, German forces were already in complete control, having
conquered significant holdings of territory they were unlikely to give without it being forcefully taken from
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American nostalgia for the morally pure era of the World War II time period remains strong even
in our present day. This too, I find, must be unpacked, particularly in light of how that nostalgia
operates in accordance with implicit assumptions that couple the notion of the “good war” with
the “good life.” By this I mean, assumptions about race, class, and gender, and how these social
identities connect to established hierarchies of social power. In other words, the affect economy
of the war cannot be thought of as separate from material economic processes. All of this must
be taken into account in light of their power to influence how people think and feel about war.
In what constituted a dramatic demonstration of technological prowess, the Allies launched the
final chapter of the war that is now known to everyone. After years of secret planning, they
dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The official ending of the war followed soon
after and is generally dated as August 15, 1945.224 Having entered the atomic age, the two major
superpowers left standing after the war - the United States and the USSR, commenced operations
for a covert Cold War that would continue to the end of the century. Numerous small wars, what
were essentially "surrogate” or proxy wars, were launched in the decades that followed. Different
nations around the world, including countries like Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, El
Salvador, Cuba, Chile and the Dominican Republic were caught up in different insurrections and
military coups, all of which were orchestrated to some degree and fully backed by one of the two
nations.

them. German forces remained split, fighting the war on two fronts simultaneously, which ultimately
contributed to their demise.
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On the night of August 5–6, 1945, an American B-29 bomber piloted by Paul Tibbets dropped a single
atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. Citing the lack of an immediate surrender, a second bomb was
later dropped on the city of Nagasaki.
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The Vietnam War (1955 -1975)

Until the more recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Vietnam War was the longest running
war in U.S. history. This Cold War proxy war is sometimes also referred to as the Second
Indochina War. In Vietnam, the war is known as the Resistance War Against America, or simply
as the American War. According to most records, the war began on November 1, 1955 and was
concluded on April 30 1975 with the fall of Saigon. Unlike the first two World Wars, the
Vietnam War proved to be (and continues to be) extremely divisive; not only in the United
States, but in Europe and other countries like Australia that committed troops to the war effort.

Historians argue the roots of the conflict lie in events that transpired a nearly a decade prior to
the official beginning of the war. In September of 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman sent a
team of advisors to Vietnam to assist French troops, who conducted operations there during the
First Indochina War. President Eisenhower’s administration later split Vietnam into North and
South Vietnam. North Vietnam was, of course, communist. The decision to split the country was
undertaken within the context of Cold War anxieties and fear of communist expansion in
Southeast Asia. The prevailing ideology that guided military and foreign policy decision making
was “Domino Theory” – the idea that if communism was not contained (as in the case of North
Vietnam) and even one country was allowed to fall under its control, other countries would
surely follow, falling like dominoes. Acting on this concern in 1961 when he took office, John F.
Kennedy made it the official policy of his administration to not permit South Vietnam to fall to
communist rule.
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The timeline in regards the actual beginning of the war might be disputed in some aspects,
considering that many of the root causes of the conflict were derived from the First Indochina
War (1946–1954), where France, claiming Vietnam as its colony, waged war against the Viet
Minh communist forces. U.S. involvement in the war was escalated as a result of the 1964 Gulf
Of Tonkin incident, where it was claimed that a U.S. destroyer was attacked by North
Vietnamese torpedo boats.225 Shortly thereafter the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by
congress, which gave President Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to increase troop support as he
saw fit to prevent communist aggression in the region. Although the U.S. never officially
declared war on Vietnam, this resolution was used to provide legal justification for the use of
ground forces. With that, regular combat units were deployed to Vietnam in 1965 when the U.S.
along with other members of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) moved against the
Army of the Republic of South Vietnam. The opposition here was comprised of an alliance of
Vietnamese regular force units (Viet Cong or VC for short), South Vietnamese guerrillas, as well
as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). U.S. participation in this instance constituted what some
historians argue was a “second” conflict. The majority of the fighting in Vietnam took place
between 1965 and 1968 and peaked in January1968, when communist forces launched the Tet
Offensive against the forces of South Vietnam, the U.S., and other allies.
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The Gulf of Tonkin incident (also known as the USS Maddox incident) designates what was in actuality
two separate conflicts. The first incident occurred on August 2, 1964, when the Maddox came under
attack by Vietnamese torpedo boats. A second incident was alleged to have occurred later on August 4,
however, later U.S. Department of Defense officials admitted there was no basis in fact for either incident.
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While the operation failed to overthrow the South Vietnamese government, sufficient damage
was done, nonetheless, to the extent the event proved effective in shaping public opinion in the
U.S. Many Americans saw the Tet Offensive as a turning point, as they for the first time began to
doubt the government’s claims of progress. Up until this point they had been led to believe that
the communists were not sufficiently powerful and organized enough to execute an operation of
this scale. Because the U.S. failed to secure a decisive military victory in Vietnam (South
Vietnam was ultimately taken over by North Vietnam), Vietnam was forever established as "the
only war America ever lost." For this reason, it remains a contested topic in American politics;
the shadow of the war is influential even in the present era, to the extent it continues to influence
U.S. policy making and important political and military decisions. In light of this, one might
argue that a "third" Vietnam War began in 1973, when hostilities resumed between North and
South Vietnam (this installment of the war occurred without significant U.S. involvement). The
final leg of the conflict concluded with the communists declaring victory in April 1975.

Much in the same manner as it occurred in the first two World Wars, the dates that delimit the
beginnings and endings of the war in Vietnam are not nearly as uncontroversial as some might
make them out to be. In what represents something of a departure from previous conflicts, the
territorial boundaries of this war were contested in light of the fact that a large portion of the
bombing and fighting took the form of secret operations waged in border countries like Laos and
Cambodia. Military advisors were similarly dispatched to locals in China (the island of Taiwan)
and also to Thailand, where in the case of the latter the U.S. military continues to maintain an
active presence.
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The recruitment of soldiers during the Vietnam War was also marked by controversy. While
nearly two thirds of American soldiers volunteered for the war, others entered service by way of
the draft, as the names of all draft-eligible men were collected by the Selective Service.226
Individuals whose names were called were required to report to a local draft board comprised of
various community members, at which point an evaluation processes was initiated. The process
gave enormous subjective powers to local authorities to determine eligibility. Not surprisingly,
the process was highly politicized. Members of disadvantaged social groups were subjected to
draft selection more often than those with connections and access to political power, which
helped them to secure non-selection decisions and deferments. While the draft was alleged to
have been conducted using empirical methods of random selection, the results reveal the
opposite occurred. Poor and working class men were far more likely to be drafted than were
middle class men, who either deferred service or claimed exemption on the basis of family,
education, and medical status. In what was intended to be a transparent attempt to make the draft
fairer, the Selective Service conducted an elaborately staged draft on December 1, 1969. This
particular event will be discussed at greater length in the analysis section that follows. Draft
resistance was evident throughout the 1960’s; however, the activity peaked by the early 70’s.227
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Selective service guidelines were put into effect during World War II and required males who attained
the age of 18 to register for service. During the Vietnam War, approximately 25% of those drafted were
poor, 50% were working class, and another 20% were middle class. Very few men were selected from
wealthy and upper class families. In 1970 and 1971, draft lotteries continued to be conducted, though
later in 1973 they were effectively terminated.
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Famously during the Vietnam War, many Americans elected to take evasive action, avoiding the draft
altogether by escaping to Canada. Draft induction refusal cases exceeded 200,000 by the early 1970’s.
This occurred in spite of individuals being threatened with imprisonment. In 1974, President Gerald Ford
granted conditional amnesty for those people that took action to avoid service. Later, President Jimmy
Carter, on his first day in office, granted a full pardon to the so-called ”draft dodgers.”
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When we look back now on the Vietnam War and compare it to the two World Wars, one cannot
help but to note there are different global economies of scale reflected. World Wars I & II
encompassed more nations, greater land mass in terms of conduct of battlefield operations, and
of course there were correspondingly larger numbers of casualties. This fact, I want to point out,
does not take away from the fact that Vietnam era casualties still managed to have a significant
impact on medicine. To illustrate briefly, although the landmass of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia is only slightly larger than the U.S. state of Massachusetts, more than 7 million tons of
bombs and other explosives were dropped there; an amount that is more than twice the tonnage
dropped on Europe and Asia in all of World War II.

Finally, it is important to note that casualty reporting during the Vietnam War was unlike any
other war, either before or after it. The U.S. government tried to shape the public discourse with
reports that it was winning the war. Journalists on the ground, however, told a different story and
often contradicted official reports that were given by the military. Mounting casualties were
displayed without censure on television screens and in living rooms across the world. The war’s
affect economy of death and injury led to the era’s renowned anti-war protests. Casualty
counting remained suspect here again and remained subject to knowledge-power dynamics. But
here, not only was the counting of casualties shown to be unstable, so were the wars themselves
insofar as not all of the century’s wars were counted as wars.

Combat Casualties & Statistics
If the U.S. Civil War produced the most casualties among American soldiers in a single conflict,
the collective wars of the 20th century set a new record. World Wars I, II, and the Vietnam War
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were fought at the beginning, middle, and end of the 20th Century. Despite the number of
casualties being spread out over an extended period of time, the impact on medicine was
nonetheless significant. Injury patterns established during the Civil War were in evidence again,
but so were the problems typified in regards to casualty accounting: not all casualties were
soldiers, not all bodies counted as casualties, and not all wounds were counted as injuries.
Complicating accounting matters was a major development that occurred in the 20th century;
namely, the eroding of traditional boundaries between military and civilian populations. Civilian
populations, which is to say everyone, found themselves in the crosshairs of combat and were
considered acceptable military targets. While estimates of death and injury tolls vary widely,
civilian casualties during these wars exceeded by far the death and injury rates of soldiers.
Nevertheless, I will argue here that it was the soldier’s body that remained the ultimate prize and
war trophy; their bodies, more than others, were used to advance the cause of medicine.

World War I (WWI), which during its time set new records for the mass slaughtering and injury
of humans was only outdone by the Second World War that followed it. The total number of
deaths includes 8-10 million military personnel and about 7 million civilians. Allied losses were
in the area of 6 million military personnel, whereas the Central (Axis) Powers lost nearly 4
million. At least 2 million died from diseases and 6 million went missing, presumed dead. In
what turned out to be one of the major casualty trends associated the war, nearly two-thirds of all
military casualties were incurred in battle, effectively reversing a trend established during the
previous century’s conflicts, where the large proportion of soldiers perished from complications
from wounding and disease. By some estimates, up to 10% of the fighting forces during WW II
were killed in battle. Disease also posed serious problems and many perished as a result of the
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1918 flu pandemic. Nearly 116, 516 U.S. soldiers were listed as casualties (dead), with an
additional 204, 002 listed as wounded.228
Casualty classification nomenclature, however, continued its downward slide into semantic
oblivion over the course of the century, as there was no consistent means of defining and
counting casualties that demonstrates consistency across wars. The worst of this, of course,
occurred during the Vietnam War, which politicized combat casualty accounting beyond all
recognition. The signature wound of World War I generally depicts a casualty from its famous
front-line trenches ̶ soldiers are shown lying in place, both dead and injured, afflicted with blast
injuries, chemical burns, shell shock, or other disorders, many of which were the result of living
in putrid conditions in the trenches. Battlefield conditions in World War I made evacuation
difficult, so in this instance, despite progress being made with regard to extremity wounds and
wound closure, which resulted in fewer amputations and a decrease in mortality rates,
battlegrounds continued to be a breeding ground for infection and disease.229 Casualties from
secondary complications resulting from injury thus continued to be a problem. As for shell
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U.S. Dept. of Defense figures from 2010, list 116,516 war dead from all causes for the period ending
Dec. 31, 1918 [this includes 106,378 in the Army, 7,287 in the Navy and 2,851 in the Marine Corps].
There were 53,402 battle deaths [50,510 in the Army, 431 in the navy and 2,461 in the Marines]. And
there were a total of 63,114 non-combat deaths [55,868 in the Army, 6,856 in the Navy and 390 in the
Marines]. The wounded are estimated at 204,002 and break down as follows (Army: 193,663, Navy: 819,
Marines: 9,520). U.S. casualty figures were revised by the US Dept. of Defense in 1957. The United
States War Dept. figures from 1924 for U.S. casualties reflect as follows: total mobilized force 4,355,000;
total casualties 350,300 (including killed and died from all causes 126,000; wounded 234,300 (including
14,500 died of wounds); prisoners and missing 4,500). For more on this, see Congressional Research
Service, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics. Downloaded from
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf Last accessed August 18, 2016.
Peter Pollack and Carolyn Rogers. “A Brief Background of Combat Injuries.” Published by the
American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons. Downloaded from:
http://www.aaos.org/news/bulletin/marapr07/research2.asp Last accessed August 18, 2016.
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shock, in what represents an obvious contradiction, this particular injury was classified as a
psychiatric illness/nervous disorder, not a bodily injury. This is, of course, odd considering that it
etiology was attributed to nerve damage sustained during combat. In this case, the determination
of whether or not one was “sick” from combat stress depended on a combination of local
circumstances as well as the expert diagnosis of a medical practitioner. Intense fighting, for
example, brought about an increased rate of diagnosis for stress casualties as a ration of battle
casualties, often resulting in the production of rates of 1:1; lower intensity conflicts yielded
diagnosis of 1:10230 U.S. soldiers, here again, only joined the conflict near the war’s end, taking
slightly less than half a million casualties.
Injuries in this war then, not surprisingly, depended in no small way on the physical
characteristics of the battlefield landscapes where they occurred. Battlefield technology
developments, which will be addressed in the next section, proved to be a major factor that
contributed to injury patterns. The large-scale deployment of mechanized weapons, including
tanks, machine guns, and heavy artillery, further complemented by the use of barbed wire, hand
grenades, and poison gas, all had a major impact on the kinds of casualties that were
materialized. Horrific casualties, which included burns from poison gas in addition to death and
debilitation from disease, forced medicine to adapt as a result.
World War II, as it turns out, set the high water mark for casualties. Arguably the most lethal
conflict in human history. Over 60 million people were killed, which was about 3% of the 1940
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Russ Zajtchuk (Ed) and Ronald F. Bellamy, War Psychiatry, Textbook of Military Medicine, Published
by Office of the Surgeon General of the United States of America.
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world population (est. 2.3 billion).231 Casualty estimates reflect that approximately 4.5% of all
the fighting forces were killed during the war (as compared to WW I’s 10% estimate).
Approximately one million U.S. soldiers were listed as casualties, with nearly 671,000 of that
number listed as injured. Total U.S. military battle deaths (including POWs who died in
captivity, does not include those who died of disease and accidents) were 292,131 [Army
234,874 (including Army Air Forces 52,173); Navy 36,950; Marine Corps 19,733; and Coast
Guard 574].232

To put this into still greater perspective, more Americans died in WW II than in all the post-1945
conflicts combined. Aggregate losses for the Allied Powers vary similarly, with different sources
citing a number in the area of 6 million for military personnel, whereas the Central Powers lost
approximately about 4 million. These numbers do not, however, include estimates for those
individuals that remained missing and accounted for at the end of the war; missing data in this
regard is largely attributable to the heavy bombardments on both the Western and Eastern fronts,
which effectively obliterated bodies beyond all hope of physical recognition. In light of this,
more precise numbers can never be known.

The pattern of targeting civilian populations during this war, which was established in WW I,
unfortunately continued and was expanded. Civilians, it should be noted, were not simply
“collateral damage.” They were targeted as part of a deliberate strategy and tactical practice.
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US Census Bureau World Population Historical Estimates of World Population. Retrieved August 18,
2016.
For more on this, see Congressional Research Report – American War and Military Operations
Casualties. Updated February 26, 2010. Retrieved August 18, 2016.
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The calculated mass deaths of civilians during WW II then was not an aberration, as serial
bombing campaigns routinely targeted industrial cities and nearby population centers. When it
was all over and done, more than 20 million civilian were counted among the dead; another 20
million were wounded. An additional 2 million are generally estimated to have perished from
diseases, with another 6 million plus remaining unaccounted for and presumed dead at the war’s
end. 233 234
The greatest numbers of soldiers during WW II were killed by machine gun fire, mortar fire and
mobile artillery, which were often placed in fortified bunkers. Beach invasions were typically
defended by German heavy artillery. Thus, for example, during the Normandy D-day invasion,
Allied casualties were estimated to be around 10,000, with more than 4,000 confirmed dead.
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There are of course numerous sources that document casualty statistics that are too great in number
to be listed here. The authors of the Oxford Companion to World War II maintain that "casualty statistics
are notoriously unreliable." Scholarly sources are often prone to differ, for example, with government
sources and so one might as a general rule look at the footnotes of major publications to get a sense of
the debate. Whereas soldier casualties are again typically documented by the military and the U.S.
Department of Defense, civilian casualties are documented by a range of different sources. Civilian
casualties might include deaths caused by strategic bombing campaigns, deaths due to Japanese and
German war crimes, Holocaust victims, as well as deaths due to famine and disease.
In the case of Japan, for example, which was devastated by two nuclear weapons, a report was published
by the Strategic Bombing Survey, “The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” The report
contains what are again only estimates, as it note the exact number of dead and injured will never be
known because of the confusion after the explosions. Numerous people were obviously burned beyond
recognition. Bodies were often disposed of in mass graves and mass cremations without so much as a
note of documentation. To make matters more complicated, there were not accurate records of
population counts that existed prior to the bombs being dropped. With that, casualty estimates have
generally ranged between 100,000 and 180,000 for Hiroshima, and between 50,000 and 100,000 for
Nagasaki. The dead for Hiroshima were listed at a number ranging between 70,000 and 80,000, with an
equal number injured; at Nagasaki over 35,000 dead and somewhat more than that injured seems the
most plausible estimate.
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Documentarian Neil Halloran created a remarkable visualization of World War II casualties that
accounts for civilians as well as soldiers, which can be accessed here:
https://mic.com/articles/120271/this-incredible-visualization-shows-just-how-many-people-died-inwwii#.dSPACL2ra Last accessed August 18.2016.
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Nonetheless, WW II’s mass casualties typified the enfolding of soldier and civilian casualties.
They were, in other words, distributed across a more expansive human terrain. In what is perhaps
the signature wound of this war, it is not the image of a soldier that is suggested, but rather that
of a civilian – the now iconic gaunt images of tortured Jewish captives, which themselves only
rivaled by the images of melting flesh that typified the Japanese civilian victims of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.235 236 Both of these populations, incidentally, were medically objectified, though
in different ways than were soldiers.

As for U.S. soldiers, during the run up to the Cold War the United States conducted a series of
nuclear bomb blast tests, many of which included radiation and bio-medical field tests that
subjected soldiers to harmful experiments that were part of military training exercises. Operation
Plumbbob, the name designated for the test series conducted between May 28 and October 7,
1957 at the Nevada test Site is one example of this kind of human subjects testing.237 Even
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Recently, historians have written about the strategies implemented by the military targeting group,
which made recommendations with regard to the cities selected for the final attack. The selection of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was driven by the desire of military planners to select “virgin” targets in order to
facilitate post-war measurement of bomb blast effects.
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Even though the world was shocked by these casualties and mass devastation that they signified, the
fact remains that more Japanese casualties were counted as a result of the many previous bombing
campaigns waged by U.S. war planes.
For more information on dose reconstruction, see the reports “Analysis of Radiation Exposure, 4th
Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, Exercise Desert Rock VII, Operation PLUMBBOB”
(DNA 5774F); “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot SMOKY, Exercise Desert
Rock VII-VIII, Operation PLUMBBOB” (DNA 4747F); and “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force
BIG BANG, Shot GALILEO, Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation PLUMBBOB” (DNA 4772F). Also
see the report “PLUMBBOB Series 1957” (DNA 6005F). These reports are available online at
http://www.dtra.mil/Home/NuclearTestPersonnelReview.aspx. Also refer to information in the fact sheet
provided by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which can be found here:
http://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/1-Fact_Sheets/19_PLUMBBOB.pdf Last accessed
August 16, 20016.
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today, it is considered to be the biggest and most ethically controversial test series in the United
States. One nuclear test alone put into motion the largest troop maneuver ever associated with
U.S. nuclear testing. The purpose of the operation was to furnish data that could be used in the
development of warheads for intercontinental and intermediate range missiles, which was
considered critical for national defense within the context of the Cold War. The large-scale
exercise included more than 40 separate explosions. Comprised of a contingent of naval and land
forces; it included soldiers from the U.S. Army’s acclaimed 111th Airborne Division, who were
enlisted to participate as observers. In a related exercise, approximately 18,000 members of the
U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines participated in a series of Desert Rock exercises,
Desert Rock VII and VII, which were part of Operation Plumbbob. The purpose of this series of
tests was to document baseline data for human radiation effects and in the process determine
how soldiers might physically and psychologically respond to tactical nuclear battlefield
operating conditions.238 Another troop exercise, operation Smokey, exposed over three thousand
soldiers to high levels of radiation.

Noteworthy here is that the potential health risks of the experiments were never disclosed to the
soldiers in advance of their participation; the risks here were hidden much like the bodies of the
soldiers who were victims of the blast that suffered the worst injuries. The testing on soldiers
occurred in spite of the fact that the U.S. Defense Department and the Atomic Energy
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According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, over 200,000 military and civilian personnel
participated in 19 U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons test series from 1945 until the Limited Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty in 1963. More than 230 individual above ground atmospheric tests were conducted. Cite
http://www.publichealth.va.gov/epidemiology/studies/cancer-mortality-nuclear-weaponstests.asp#sthash.dIGCaqPi.dpuf
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Commission had conducted previous tests on pigs, which demonstrated beyond all doubt the
harmful effects of extreme radiation. Many of the soldiers who participate never fully recovered
from their injuries; they were often cared for in secret locations, where the data derived from
their wounded bodies was meticulously documented and monitored by military medical
personnel, who treated the data as national secret. In other words, the results from what were
essentially the “clinical trials” of the Cold War furnished information that helped inform military
battle strategy, soldier readiness and endurance. Data provided by soldiers additionally
contributed to understanding radiation effects within the context of managing population health
outcomes, as both were deemed critical to national security. Some of these trials, it should be
noted, also involved Pacific islanders and other civilian populations. And this included civilian
populations in the United States, many of whom were prisoners and disabled children. The
experiments, which were conducted with government approval, deemed the unhealthy radiation
exposure worth the risk, because the research was undertaken in the defense interest of the
United States. All of this data and information underlies the foundations of nuclear medicine in
the United States.239

Vietnam, on the other hand, was a different war altogether. Casualty patterns here differed
greatly in terms of size and scale when compared to the previous two World Wars. The Vietnam
War, it should be understood, was also a war that was waged unofficially in Laos and Cambodia.
This development alone — the official disavowal and refusal to acknowledge the specificity of
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Medical personnel and medical organizations also played an important role in the efforts since 1945 to
prevent the further use of nuclear weapons in war and to prevent their proliferation and achieve their
abolition.
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the terrain where the war was waged— had a major impact on casualty accounting. In terms of
casualties, the Vietnam War claimed a total body count of approximately 58,220 soldiers. Of that
number, 40,934 were documented as killed in action with 5, 299 listed as “died of wounds.”240
The peak years for casualties were 1967 -1969. Additionally, there were more than 153,000
casualties recorded as injured and over 10,000 soldiers listed as missing in action at the war’s
end.

There is an interesting footnote that can be found in the National Archive records, which more or
less substantiates what this research has been arguing: “Record counts provided for informational
purposes only, not official statistics.” One general trend that we can infer from these numbers is
that they represent a significant reduction in the total number of casualties when compared to
WW I & II and the Civil War. Though it is interesting to note that with passage of time, the war
with the largest proportion of wounded soldiers still living are soldiers who fought in the
Vietnam War.241

So what was different? For one, unlike the global-scale World Wars, the battle theater for this
war was geographically concentrated in the region of South East Asia, a much smaller land mass
compared to the expanse of Western Europe, Japan, and the Pacific islands. The reduction in the
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Casualty statistics recorded in the National Archives. Downloaded from
http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html Last accessed August, 17,
2016.
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Nearly one third (33%) of all living injured veterans served during the Vietnam era (1964-73). In
comparison, 18% have served in the post-9/11 era, about the same as the share of surviving veterans of
World War II and Korean War. About a quarter (26%) served between 1974 and Sept. 11, 2001, a period
that includes the 1990-91 Gulf War. Pew Report http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/08/for-manyinjured-veterans-a-lifetime-of-consequences/
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total number of casualties reflect, likewise, that significant developments in medicine, in terms of
social organization, practice, and technology innovations, all helped reduce mortality rates.
Military and medical institutions here again continued to work together in contradictory ways, so
that even as wars were increasingly rendered more lethal, they also became more survivable.

Now, more than in the past, soldiers benefitted from the accumulated knowledge of medical
research that occurred in both military and civilian arenas; they benefitted from knowledge
accrued within the vastly expanded institutional apparatus, much of which I have argued was
facilitated by investments made in previous wars. The process of knowledge transfer was neither
linear, nor was it unidirectional. Knowledge passed from the military into domestic medical
practice and vice versa. Knowledge flows, in other words, had by this time developed in such a
way that they freely circulated. Vietnam era soldiers also benefitted from logistics and
transportation improvements, which facilitated evacuation to sanitary facilities behind the lines
of fire, where they could more readily be treated and stabilized. All of these developments had a
major impact on casualty patterns.

Injuries in Vietnam, however, demonstrate important changes. While the chemical burns of
World Wars I and II were not as prevalent, more long-term residual effects are noted from the
use of chemicals like Agent Orange, which according to the Defense Department was not really a
weapon because it was developed as a defoliant.242 Blast injuries caused by stress, shock, and
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Agent Orange, a chemical mixture of Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid mixed with dichlorophenoxyacetic
acid, was originally developed by the British and was designed to decrease cover and concealment
opportunities for Viet Cong soldiers. Later, it was manufactured by Monsanto Corporation for the U.S.
Department of Defense. The name Agent Orange (Herbal Orange) was derived from the orangestriped barrels in which the chemical was shipped. Originally, beginning in October 1962, the U.S.
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impact continued to cause severe tissue damage and even amputation, but incidents of these
injuries were significantly reduced when compared to wars in the past. Thus, whereas machine
gun fire, artillery, and mortar weapons accounted for the vast majority of casualties in WW II,
these types of injuries were not as prevalent in Vietnam.

Vietnam mirrored other wars in the sense that the casualties that were the primary focus of
government documentation efforts were U.S. soldiers. It’s the accounting and documentation
practices that set this war apart. Combat casualty patterns over the course of time demonstrated a
tendency to not always reflect facts on the ground; rather, their reporting as such was
increasingly indicative of the power of institutions to engage in what I will discuss later as the
onto-politics of materialism: they produced wounded bodies through the classificatory practices
of accounting. The politics that informed the mechanics of the practice by which one
counted/accounted, in other words, had a major material impact on producing a body as a
recognizable casualty. Classification categories like Killed in action (KIA), Died of Wounds
(DOW), Wounded in Action (WIA), Hostile Deaths (HD), Non-hostile deaths (NHD), and
Missing in Action (MIA) were “used to make bodies “appear” and “disappear” in such a way as
to serve the needs of power. Often the soldiers themselves shouldered the primary responsibility

military targeted food with Agent Blue. It was not until later in 1965 that the American public was made
aware of systematic crop destruction programs. By 1966, resolutions were introduced at the United
Nations that charged the U.S. with violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol that regulated the use of chemical
and biological weapons. The U.S. argued against and eventually defeated the charges by claiming that
Agent Orange was not a chemical or a biological weapon; but rather, it was an herbicide/defoliant. Thu, it
was not intended for target human beings. The UN definition for a weapon in this case was “any device
used to injure, defeat, or destroy living beings, structures, or systems.” In the eyes of the U.S.
government, Agent Orange did not qualify under that definition.
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of counting battlefield casualties under circumstances where there was pressure to produce a
body count. As has been the case in every war discussed, inconsistencies prevail as there was an
outright failure to count in many cases.
The medical management of injury diagnoses complicates the picture even further, as injuries
were “produced” as a function of nominalism and classification. Maladies are variously referred
to as “war trauma,” “combat fatigue,” “shell shock,” “soldier’s heart,” and by the end of the
century “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),” all reflected different, time period specific,
ways of thinking about injury. And as I have been arguing here, how one thinks about injury has
a material impact on how one practices medicine, recommends treatment, etc. The problem of
mind-body dualism resurfaced here again, as records indicate injuries of the body were
consistently privileged over those of the mind. Nevertheless, despite not achieving a position of
privilege in the hierarchy of wounding, PTSD still stands as the signatory wound of the Vietnam
War.

Consequently, even a cursory glance at casualty records and patterns of injury suggests
accounting efforts were at the very least highly suspect. Here again, not all bodies were counted
and not all of the counted were counted as casualties. Human casualty classification practices, in
this manner, materialized and vitalized what was to some extent a neoliberalized political
economy of injury, confirming yet again that casualty reporting was not a “value-free”
objectively rational exercise in accounting. The notion that the body count produced the truth of
war, as Vietnam illustrates, has since been discredited. In light of this, we would do well to
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consider that just because a war, any war, is officially declared "won" or "over" doesn't mean
that violence and injury cease to take place.

Medical Social Organization
By the beginning of the 20th century, the wounded body of the soldier was well on its way to
evolving into a military model for medical social organization and practice: medicine might now
draw from the very life force and substance of wounded soldiers to advance as an institution. As
was the case before, this section will call attention to some of the more important changes that
occurred with respect to medical knowledge production as this relates to biomedical surgery
practice, public health and disease management practice, and rehabilitative medicine and medical
management logistics. During this time period, the institutional apparatus that underlies what we
traditionally think of in terms of “Western Medicine” went through a period of dramatic change
and discovery. Nonetheless, as was discussed in the last chapter, if we think of Civil War era
medicine as “pre-institutional,” what followed afterwards was, by way of comparison, a veritable
flourishing of medical practice; something akin to a “golden-age” of institutional innovation and
development. Here again, not all of the innovations were “ground-breaking” in the sense that
they represented a radical departure from past practice; rather, they indicate a progressive series
of developments. The institutional synergies that were achieved, however, suggest that war and
the role played by injured soldiers continued to help stimulate medical innovation and progress.
The hundred year time period that spans the century indicates medicine grew as an institution to
encompass a virtual industry, which included pharmacy and biotech. It effectively transitioned
from the practice of “medicine” to what Laura Mamo and Adele Clark et al describe as
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“biomedicine” (2010).243 During this same time the military model continued to influence the
development of organizational and professional structures, as well as the development of
facilities for patient care. Major changes were initiated in such a manner as to continue to
provide support for the expansionist American empire.

These changes, it will be argued here, occurred in many respects as a direct response to military
needs and were shaped by the different battlefield conditions of three major wars. Continued
impact is noted here with respect to physicians and surgeons. Military patriarchal and
hierarchical structures of authority, likewise, continued to demonstrate their influence on the
development of institutional organization and infrastructure. Research as and practice innovation
continued to be focused, among other issues, on addressing the injuries and diseases that resulted
from war.

Biomedical Surgery Practice

As the first case study illustrated, medical practice patterns demonstrated a progressive trend,
where they became more invasive over time. The breaching of bodily integrity that occurred
during the Civil War had by the 20th century become more or less routine, as physicians and
surgeons continued to apply their talents to the task of remaking and reshaping bodies.
Biomedical surgery practice continued down the path of progress, both a profession and a
practice, where it once again achieved considerable gains as a result of surgeons’ access to large
populations of wounded soldiers. Roger Metcalf argues as much when he notes how war helped
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advance medical practice due to the mass of bodies that large-scale conflict provides.244 Andrew
Cameron (2004) documents the influence on surgery, as he notes “the development of trauma
surgery in the United States has been synonymous with its military medical history.”245 And
more recently, Rutkow (2010) observes a similar dynamic. “War,” he says, “provided thousands
of doctors with a crash course in military medicine that catapulted clinical practice forward.”246
Armed conflict, moreover, “created surgeons from physicians who previously had minimal
operating experience” and it was this “extensive hands-on training hastened specialization in
American medicine.”247 Feminist scholars of body modification lend further support to these
observations in their efforts to document advances made in plastic and reconstructive surgery
(Haiken, 1997; Jones, 2008).
At the outset of World War I, wounded limbs were often amputated as a routine matter of
practice in an effort to prevent gangrene and death from injury, which often followed. Infection
and decay were not uncommon because a soldier’s initial treatment was often delayed due to
battle conditions that made it difficult to wash wounds and thereby prevent surgeries. Once this
understanding was achieved, the numbers of soldiers killed by infection and surgeries in
subsequent wars was greatly reduced.
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The unprecedented nature of the carnage of WW II in particular served as a catalyst for major
developments in medical care. The practice of orthopedics in particular was benefitted. Paul
Dougherty MD et al contribute some statistics to bolster this claim:
“United States Army hospitals treated 599,724 patients who were wounded in action, and
approximately 67.1% of them had extremity wounds. In addition, 68,207 members of the
United States Marines and 37,778 members of the United States Navy were reported as
wounded in action. As a result of the tremendous number of casualties, this war provided
a catalyst for advancements in medical care. Advancements in the specialty of
orthopaedic surgery came with a heavy price. Some lessons were hard learned in the
hostile environment of the battlefield and were intensified by a paucity of medical
supplies and limited experience. Other advances emerged from timely prospective
analysis and retrospective review.”248
Notable developments incorporated increased efficiencies and technology innovation, both in
surgery practice and drug development, which had the effect of enhancing wound care and
helping to reduce overall mortality rates. So for example, techniques that included surgical
debridement ad external fixation as a means to stabilize fractures were increasingly used to treat
bone breaks and fractures. Surgical outcomes were further impacted by the mass production of
antibiotics like penicillin. Widespread use of anesthesia meant that longer and more complex
surgeries could be undertaken.

These developments, I should point out, occurred in tandem with innovations in other
institutional specialty practices. Major advances were registered during this war across diverse
practice areas, including developments in plastic surgery, orthopedics, anatomy and pathology,
epidemiology, nuclear medicine, psychiatry, neuroscience, and mental health services. As was
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noted in the previous chapter, specialization in medicine was one of the major developments that
occurred in the wake of the Civil War. Specialized practice, it is important to note, developed not
as a result of isolated practice, but through the collaborative practice of distributing knowledge
and information across disciplinary boundaries. With that, the professionalization of the
profession continued a trajectory of progress throughout the 20th century, as continued demand
for formalized education of physicians and surgeons resulted in the expansion of medical
schools, research institutions, and training academies.

Nonetheless, there were other important non-surgical developments and social dynamics that
influenced medical practice outcomes. In World War I, for example, the Thomas Splint proved
to have a major impact on casualty survival rates. Named for the Welsh surgeon Hugh Owen
Thomas, the splint was used to support broken legs. Although seemingly simple, the results of
the treatment were not only impressive, most importantly they helped reduce the need for
surgeries. The experience of war, furthermore, and the commitment to a single military objective
helped focus the efforts of physicians and surgeons and promoted social bonds among
practitioners. 249 This also helped foster knowledge sharing across practice areas.

It is the World War II time period, however, that scholars note as having been most
consequential for innovations not only in medicine, but also in the management of disease and
public health. Now perhaps more than ever medicine was recalibrated to some extent, as it
acquired a new focus aimed at regulating the life and health of a soldier. No longer simply
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focused on doing “damage control” and essentially repair bodies injured in combat, new
advances in medicine operationalized the strategic management of human health and life as
military objective. Continued improvements in logistics, which included blood typing and
transport meant that life-saving treatment could be rendered more quickly; improvements made
in blood banking (the collecting and storing of blood) and patient transport meant that wounds
that were previously almost always fatal became survivable.250 Decisive advances in
pharmaceuticals and genetic testing were also all developed during the WW II time period.

The war in Vietnam, while clearly different in many ways from the two World Wars that
preceded it, demonstrated further major impacts on medical social organization. Additionally,
major improvements are noted in specialty practice areas, like vascular surgery. Military
surgeons from this war were at the forefront of innovations in trauma surgery. MASH units
(Mobile Army Surgery Hospital) introduced with success late in World War II, and again during
the Korean War, were fielded extensively during Vietnam. Originally designed as an alternative
to the front line hospitals fielded in previous wars, MASH units were designed to get medical
personnel even closer to the front, so that the wounded could be treated sooner. These hospitals
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not only helped saved thousands of lives during war, they had a major impact on the delivery of
trauma and critical care in civilian hospitals.251 Surgical outcomes during the Vietnam War were
estimated to have demonstrated improvement over previous wars by upwards of 60%. This was
due to a combination of practice process improvements in addition to changes in weaponry and
ordinance.252

Finally, in what is probably one of the more directly attributed uses of soldiers as human test
subjects, Vietnam era military doctors working at Edgewood Arsenal near Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland conducted a series of risky experiments, where soldiers were administered
LSD in addition to highly toxic nerve agents like VX, which were being tested there to evaluate
their potential efficacy as chemical weapons. One of the program’s stated objectives was “better
fighting through chemistry.” The idea here was to terrorize, kill quickly, efficiently, and leave
important infrastructure intact. More than 5,000 soldiers unwittingly put their lives at risks when
they submitted to the tests as “volunteers.” The breach in protocol is particularly noteworthy in
light of the fact that by this time ethical standards guiding human subjects testing were standard
procedure, after having been put into place after WW II. Soldiers were often not told what drugs
they were being given, what the potential effects might be, nor were they advised of the potential
risks and side effects. No one in the Army, furthermore, followed any discernible protocol with
regard to patient follow up. In another lapse of protocol, data and other technical reports were not
secured. As it turns out, the American government had acquired many of the WW II era Nazi
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formulas for chemical gas along with the scientists, who produced them, as many of the were
recruited and brought to Edgewood to work at the end of that war.253
Disease and Public Health Practice
War and disease have been linked throughout history. As was pointed out in the previous case,
soldiers stood a greater risk of succumbing from disease than they did from any particular
wound. One of the major challenges of 20th century warfare was that it had evolved to a size and
scale that oftentimes overwhelmed disease management efforts. Millions of soldiers battled each
other across diverse terrains and topographies throughout and beyond the European theater of
operation. The combination of horrific blast injuries produced by advanced weaponry and the
deteriorated heath and sanitation conditions of battlefield trenches fostered conditions for disease
to proliferate. Complications from diarrhea, dysentery, and typhus were also a problem. Civilian
populations were, likewise, devastated.
Early in the century, there were significant problems that posed a challenge to medical
practitioners. In The Spanish American War and again during WW I, typhoid fever devastated
the American Army. Carol Byerly (2010) writes:
“Viruses traveled with American military personnel across the Atlantic ocean, from camp
to camp and across the continent of Europe during the height of American involvement in
the war, September through November 1918. During this time, influenza and pneumonia
sickened an estimated 20% to 40% of U.S. Army and Navy personnel. Influenza and
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pneumonia killed more American soldiers and sailors during the war than did enemy
weapons. 254
The trenches in World War I, likewise, provided an optimal breeding ground for maladies like
“trench foot,” the result of soldiers standing too long in stagnant mud and water, and “trench
fever,” a malady transmitted by body lice. Battlefield environments thus continued to wage war
against the bodies of soldiers; if their enemies did not kill them, disease stalked them as they
made their way across unforgiving physical terrain.255
As time progressed, however, more disciplined practice of antisepsis and the widespread use of
antibiotics helped improve medical outcomes. Surgeons like Army Major Walter Reed, who
engaged work after the Civil War, helped give rise to the new fields of bacteriology and
epidemiology that emerged at the turn of the century. Navy Surgeon General William C. Braisted
is noted as saying “infectious diseases that formerly carried off their thousands, such as yellow
fever, typhus, cholera, and typhoid, have all yielded to our modern knowledge of their causes
and our consequent logical measures taken for their prevention.”256 Crucially, medical
discoveries by military men like Reed furthered efforts to complete work on the Panama Canal,
which helped revolutionize the political economy of commerce and trade in the Americas.
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Military and medical institutions together confronted the ongoing challenges presented by
disease management. The most significant progress, however, with regard to the management of
disease was achieved through a focus on maintaining clean water supplies; likewise, vaccines
were developed to inoculate troops against typhoid and smallpox and to help treat and prevent
other infections. According to public health and medical researchers:
As the Army grew, the Army Medical Department raced to meet its needs. Military
medicine was more like public health medicine (which managed large populations) than
private medicine (which focused on care for individuals). By necessity, line officers cared
less about who was sick or on leave than who they could send into battle. This was called
the “effective” rate—how many men were available in a given unit to work and fight.
Medical officers therefore tried to keep non-effective rates as low as possible, and
measured their success statistically more than by individual patient care. The Army
Medical Department tracked sickness in camps, combat units, labor battalions, ports, and
ships by the day, week, month, and year, and compared its record with civilians, earlier
wars, and other armies. Army Medicine also combined the old sanitation model of clean
water and fresh air with the new public health approaches of educating soldiers on how to
stay healthy and prevent disease. Army Surgeon General William C. Gorgas came out of
the sanitary tradition and stressed good food, clean water, fresh air, and no crowding, but
like other Progressives, also saw the Army as an opportunity to instill young men with
middle-class values such as good personal hygiene.257

Additionally, improvement in various therapy regimes that involved the systematic administering
drugs like antibiotics and chemotherapy were able to foster improvements in care for diseases
like cancer, high cholesterol, and high blood pressure, and diabetes.
In light of these developments, one could argue there was no one specific “break-away”
technology innovation that engineered progress; rather, there were multiple interpenetrating
social dynamics that helped bring about improvement in health outcomes for soldiers. Advances
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in epidemiology were, furthermore, facilitated by knowledge sharing and social learning between
different armies, who communicated specific knowledge acquired from their experience on the
ground working with local populations in different countries. The knowledge transfer helped
advance understanding of how problems that concerned basic hygiene and germs were key to the
successful treatment of casualties and wounds.
Rehabilitative Medicine and Medical Management Logistics
In the wake of the Civil War, medical and healthcare facilities saw significant growth and
development. It was during this time period that many state veterans’ homes were established,
many of which continued provide psychiatric and elder care services in the present time.
Hundreds to hundreds of thousands of patients, including soldiers, were held in these
facilities – what Goffman called “total institutions - for everything from depression to criminal
behavior.258 And of course there were many who, medically speaking, suffered from no mental
condition at all. In his essay "Notes on the Tinkering Trades" Goffman attributed the
"medicalization" of mental illness in addition to its various treatment modalities to be the result
of 19th century social dynamics shaped by the Industrial Revolution; in his view, the so-called
"medical model" that was used to treat patients exhibited influence from the practices trade
craftsmen, who worked on clocks and other mechanical objects. Machine epistemologies, in
other words, were credited for the change. Many of the therapies and surgical procedures that
took place in these facilities, which I have pointed out tend to be generally less known, played a
key role in shaping the social organization of medicine in the United States. But I am arguing
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that it is a mistake to only attribute these developments to changes in the economy, without also
looking at the role played by war.
Like Goffman, I myself worked for a period of a year in the locked men’s ward of one such
facility, located in Athens, Ohio – the Athens Lunatic Asylum. This particular asylum was
original built to care for Civil War veterans in 1852; it was enlarged on several subsequent
occasions in 1859, 1866, 1881 and 1902. After it was closed in closed in 1989/1990 after, it was
bought by a property developer, who turned it into housing. Another partially built facility, the
Trans Allegheny Lunatic Asylum in Weston Virginia was converted into a military post during
the fighting of the Civil War and was renamed Camp Tyler, whereupon construction of the
Asylum was completed and eventually expanded. As a result, even though many towns in the
area were devastated by the war, the Asylum contributed to the economic vitality of the town
and did so until it was closed 130 years later. 259
WW I brought additional changes and developments in diagnosis and rehabilitation, as disabled
veterans compensation and benefit programs were approved by Congress, which led to the

founding of the Veterans Administration in 1930. As war veterans from previous wars continued
to age, their numbers increased in residential care facilities, which helped drive increases in
funding for medical resources and supplies to treat the sick and injured. This particular era
initiated a period of resurgence in investment in mental health and the treatment of psychological
disorders. Though medical professionals were sometimes hesitant to diagnose mental illness and
effective treatments were lacking, WWI helped promulgate the formalized practice of psychiatry
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in the United States. French methods adopted by American psychiatrists led to the ‘Salmon
principles,’ named after the innovator who developed new techniques of care and support on the
front lines in Europe.260 Some of the more important advances in treatment and diagnosis
occurred in connection with understanding what was at this time termed “shell-shock” to be a
legitimate wound of war. During this time period, shell shock was categorized as a psychiatric
illness with a physical etiology, which was the result of injury to the nerves sustained during
combat.

Nevertheless, there was considerable latitude afforded doctors who made the ultimate
determination of whether or not a shell-shock sufferer was considered "wounded" or "sick."
It wasn’t until later in WW II that more serious study was undertaken as part of an attempt to
understand the problem of psychiatric injury. The US entered WW II in December 1941. It was
only later in 1943 that the job title “Military Psychiatrist” was added to the table of organization
of each division, and this policy was not implemented in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations until March 1944. The U.S. Army had by this time dispensed with the term “shellshock” and by 1943 was using the term "exhaustion" as a general principle of military psychiatry
to diagnose combat stress. Other terms include "combat fatigue" and "battle neurosis" all of
which share affinity with the diagnosis of acute stress in civilian psychiatry.

260

United State Medical Officer Thomas W. Salmon was a strong advocate for mental hygiene. He is
generally cited as the originator of what are referred to as PIE principles (proximity, immediacy,
expectancy). Salmon as a result of his work with the European Allies set up a system of diagnosis
procedures that were standardized for military physicians. The efficacy of the PIE protocol, however, was
not validated by empirical research; there is no evidence that it is effective in diagnosing and preventing
PTSD. Downloaded from: http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2006.095794 Last
accessed August 24, 2016.

298

Of course, one of the reasons combat stress was determined to be a problem was not so much
because of its impact on soldiers; it was the impact and degree to which it was understood to
degrade an individual and their unit’s fighting efficiency that was deemed to be of greater
concern. Studies of social bonds among soldiers were also instituted as part of an effort to
understand how social relations and mental fitness impacted soldier performance in the field.
Findings suggested social cohesion was important as a protective factor to help mitigate mental
health problems. 261
During the Vietnam era, physical rehabilitation as well as treatments for combat stress and other
trauma injuries took a different turn. The term “combat stress reaction” (CSR) was commonly
used to diagnose psychiatric cases. CSR was/is used exclusively by the military to describe
symptoms of acute behavioral disorganization that are understood to be triggered by the trauma
of war. Common symptoms of CSR are fatigue, slow reaction times, indecisiveness,
disconnection from one's surroundings, and inability to prioritize. CSR is, however,
fundamentally different form “post-traumatic stress disorder” which came into wider use during
the Vietnam era. CSR was used to describe what was thought to be a short-term trauma;
therefore, it is not appropriate to confuse it with PTSD, which demonstrates more long-term
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effects, despite the fact that soldiers may exhibit similar symptoms. Vietnam era studies on
soldiers that sustained traumatic brain injuries, some of which have continued into the present
era, have had a major impact and contributed greatly to research in the fields of
neuropsychology, neurosurgery, psychiatry, neurology, and neuroimaging.
Battlefield Strategy, Tactics, and Weaponry
Advances in battlefield strategy, tactics, and weaponry, again in the area of munitions, but also
artillery and other advanced weaponry reveal there is an ongoing dynamic correlation between
war and developments in medicine during the 20th century. Intensive capital investment in the
technoscience of war during this time tie these technical advances together in one unbroken
chain that is, furthermore, wrapped around the soldier’s body.
World War I, of course, remains infamous for its employment of trench warfare as a battlefield
strategy.262 In what amounted to a war of attrition, soldiers fought what were primarily defensive
battles that caused them to sustain particular kinds of casualties, where wounding more often
than not occurred as a result of blast injuries from aerial bombardment and artillery and, of
course, disease. Soldiers encamped for long periods of time in dug-in defensive positions, such
as those typified by the French Maginot line. Artillery use during the war necessitated the use of
steel rather than cloth helmets, which over the long-term helped mitigate the number of deaths
from head injuries. World War I is similarly known for giving birth to modern chemical warfare.

Even in the present day, the Great War’s trenches remain as a scar on the landscape: shell-cratered
ground, barbed wire, and uneven grassy plots, which are not useable due to toxins accumulated in the
soil, are still visible in many places. Trench lines can still be seen in remote places that include the woods
of the Argonne, Verdun and the mountains of the Vosges; the same holds true for the warren of
elaborately constructed tunnels, which range across the French, German, and Italian frontiers.
262
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The strategic use of chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas resulted in the war’s trademark
disfiguring burns and other injuries were implicated in bringing about advances in wound
treatment and plastic surgery.
The Germans, by way of contrast, employed a “blitzkrieg” strategy – a war of movement—and
thus were able to avoid to a great extent the pattern of injuries that plagued the Allied forces,
which were caused by prolonged exposure of siege warfare (this was not the case, however, on
the Eastern front, where the Germans experienced similar casualties). The horrific nature of
chemical injuries caused armies on both sides to curtail their use during World War II.
World War I also laid the groundwork for a system of internment camps that would become an
even larger part of the strategy to manage internal civilian populations across Europe and
beyond. The camps were created to contain populations of people that were determined to be
hostile, deviant, and threatening due to their perceived contaminating influence. While civilians
were clearly not soldiers or enemy combatants, this did not keep them from being treated as
such. The century’s first genocide, which targeted Armenians in Turkey, was followed by the
Nazi Army’s systematic program of ethnic cleansing and extermination in the Second World
War

World War II pushed these strategies into a more extreme realm of tactical execution. The use of
chemical defoliant munitions and the atomic bomb produced injuries among civilians as well as
soldiers and on a scale that by far exceeded anything that occurred during the Great War. The
deliberate targeting of civilian population for aerial bombardment, as noted previously, was one
of the major developments that distinguished both World Wars, though by WW II the practice
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was commonplace. Where in previous wars tactical air warfare focused primarily on attacking
soldiers on battlefields, World War II’s development of the heavy weaponry, carried by bombers
and fighter-bombers, facilitated the launching of air strikes deep within the territories of England
and German-occupied Europe. Japan was distinctively attacked using long-range aircraft, and of
course was the only major power that sustained a nuclear strike launched by the United States. In
what has become one of the mythic truisms of that war, it was often repeated that the dropping of
nuclear munitions on Japan was unavoidable and, while horrific in terms outcomes, the decision
to deploy tactical nuclear weapons was undertaken to “prevent” upwards of a million additional
casualties had the war been permitted to continue. Here again, the strategy was one that was
intended to levy a heavy toll on civilians. Historians have since this time confirmed that the
prophesied “million casualty” estimate was contradicted by the fact that Japan, right up until the
time the bombs were released, had been trying to negotiate a surrender, which was refused by the
United States. The real target in this case was not really Japan at all, but the USSR, with whom
the U.S. immediately launched the Cold War as a result.263 Other weapons, which featured the
use of proximity fuses, were similarly thought to have been impactful to the extent that they also
saved lives
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Another WW II era strategic development that had an impact on casualty patterns and medicine
was the mass deployment of tanks and self-propelled artillery. While this battlefield technology
saw limited action in WW I, it became a major pillar of strategy for the Allies, the Germans, and
the Soviets. Tanks and artillery were optimized for increased maneuverability and independent
offensive action. Improved weaponry featured more powerful munitions, recoilless rifles, and
included large and small-caliber guns, which were mounted on self-propelled carriages that
typically laid down barrages of shells and bullets in order to inflict mass casualties on troop
formations. The power of small arms weapons also improved, such that the firepower of
individual soldiers by far exceeded that of previous conflicts. Where before soldiers carried
limited bolt action rifles, soldiers were by WW II conventionally equipped with semi-automatic
weapons. In some cases, they carried submachine guns or light machine guns, which were again
highly portable and capable of inflicting more damage on opposing forces.

The Vietnam War, as it has already been pointed out, was for many reasons an entirely different
conflict. Strategic and tactical developments during this war, nevertheless, forged an impact on
the types of casualties and wounds that were experienced by soldiers, and so they influenced the
trajectory of medical advance. The Vietnam War was waged in such a way that introduced new
efficiencies into the kill chain; battlefield strategies, tactics, and practices were both massifying
and individualizing. Calculated efficiencies, in terms of how bodies were targeted and counted
are perhaps the greatest legacy of the war; that this occurred even as there were many bodies and
wounds that were never counted remains as one of its major contradictions.
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Battlefield conditions that were unique to this war forced doctors and trauma surgeons especially
to develop new skills that helped them confront the different types of injuries suffered by
soldiers, even as they labored under unfavorable operating conditions. The prolific use of
landmines, which caused blast injuries, combined with the Viet Cong’s preference for cruder
weaponry like punji sticks, which caused deep penetrating puncture wounds as they often
impaled their victims were among some of the major changes wrought during this war.
Battlefield operation “speed-up,” which came about through the use of light infantry and small
unit operations, necessitated that soldiers be treated quickly and as close to the front lines as
possible. These developments incentivized innovations like the use of MASH units, which were
enhanced during the war to support field medical practitioners, who were confronted with an
increased operational tempo, which put pressure on them to return soldiers to the front lines
faster than ever before. The strategy of employing chemical weapons also enjoyed something of
a resurgence in Vietnam, which continues to be known for its infamous use of “search and
destroy” tactics, used here again to not only to kill and wound soldiers, but to eradicate all
human presence from the physical landscape. The soldiers in this case, who worked with
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chemicals, if they did not suffer from immediate wounds, experienced them over the long
duration of their service and throughout the course of their lifetime after the war ended.264 265

ANALYSIS

This chapter aimed to situate 20the century combat casualties within a more comprehensive
historical, economic, and political context; it advances the claim that wounded soldiers served as
a material nexus for medical knowledge production, thereby demonstrating how wars were
increasingly fought to control human resources — the very life force and substance of the human
body. As the first case demonstrated, Foucault’s term “biopower” can be used to situate these
developments into their wider social context and explain how soldiers’ bodies were relevant to
the process. Yet while much remained the same, there were also clearly new developments,
which I am arguing illustrate how institutions helped facilitate a medical governance of social
control, human transformation, and bodily change. Here again, in the interest of clarity, it is I
think important to distinguish the main aim of biopower, which as a part of capitalism functions
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At the close of the century, after the Vietnam War ended, higher quality helmets made of ballistic
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such injuries, brain injuries from concussive shock waves from explosions continued to be a lingering
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intrinsic to political economy— its chief aim is not to repress and physically dominate bodies.
Rather, it seeks to make as well as mobilize populations of bodies in order to make them more
productive. This leads me to conclude that during the 20th century time period, more traditional
medical concerns that focused on merely saving human life, evolved to focus on enhancing
human health and life; the goal was to render bodies more productive; to augment them;
optimize them, and to in some cases regenerate human life and vitality.

This analysis will proceed in two parts, where I look at important developments that illustrate the
biopolitcs of combat injury. For it is not enough to simply cite a list of achievements in war-time
medicine; rather, I want to situate these developments within a wider social context, so to better
understand the political and economic landscape within which they evolved. The first section,
“The Epistemology of the Cut,” addresses the important 20th century shift that occurred in the
medical imaginary, as different bodies became entangled and were transformed together. The
second section, “The Biopolitics of Detention,” looks at the biopolitical consequences of massscale interventional medical procedures.
The analysis in this case will continue to engage a reading of Foucault’s concepts of power, war,
economy, labor, and life, which he articulates within his treatment of the body and race within
the context of knowledge/power and biopower. These developments can, I think, be further
elaborated when they are looked at alongside Achille Mbembe’s concept of “necropolitics” and
my own concept that I presented in the last case, “Homo Vulneratus.” Overlapping institutional
practices are again shown to be bound up in producing what I argued is a political economy of
injury. I draw from these concepts and look at them in combination with case findings to argue
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combat injury is produced within a relational biopolitical economy, where governance, science,
capitalism, and war operate together by creating a circulation or feed-back loop. War, as both
cases have now shown, produced combat casualties in ways that helped sustain the institutional
growth of medicine; medicine was funded by war; and human bodies, as well as their life and
vitality, were over the course of time managed through a medical governance of control. The
wonders of Western medicine, in this respect, do not simply reflect the accomplishments of the
great men of medicine any more than are casualties produced as mere accidents; all are brought
into a process of production through social relations that constitute a militarized programmatic
harnessing of the forces of capital and organized violence.

Soldiers and civilians, as it has already been demonstrated to some extent, were subject to
different disciplinary control mechanisms; different practices were likewise used to manipulate
and render their bodies docile. All of these bodies played a role in helping to maintain
boundaries that were essential to white masculine social identity, which was premised on a
normative ethic of violence. Thus, I find evidence again to support a theory that I proposed in the
previous case — a “strain” theory of war that explains how a wounded body might be taken apart
as a result of experiencing injury and becoming a victim of institutional capture. Homo
Vulneratus, conceptually speaking, helps to further articulates how wounded embodiment
functions within the broad spectrum of neoliberal economic developments that came about
during the 20th century. No longer content merely to wage war over territory and geographic
space as defined by land mass, the ontological strategy of producing wounded bodies and
populations aimed at redefining what we recognize to be a body and perhaps even life itself.
Bodies, I find, were increasingly were being made to suit military needs as well as the needs of
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industry and capital. Increasingly, over the course of this time period, wounded bodies became
incorporated into an economy that drew from wounded soldiers as a resource. War, economy,
labor, and life thus form a circulation that employs the body as a weapon; injury and human
transformation were effectively incorporated into a weaponized ontology of war.
As was illustrated in the previous case, issues of identity continued to be a factor, although they
demonstrated a tendency to collapse and become unstable over the course of the century. Bodies
and social identities were together articulated and re-articulated in ways that made it increasingly
difficult to sustain categorical notions of essential difference. Racially dichotomous relationships
between blacks and whites continued throughout the 20th century to be reproduced, though on
different terms. Over the course of time, a more insidious form of white supremacist benevolence
came to infuse war and war narratives: white men possessing white bodies were, by the end of
the century, fighting and dying to “save” non-white people from the threat of Nazism,
communism, and their own savagery.
Consequently, over the course of the 20th century racialized identity categories were
supplemented with other categories that drew upon perceived social identity differences like
ethnicity, citizenship status, and gender, all of which had previously worked together to
distinguish soldiers from non-soldiers as military targets of opportunity. Fault lines emerged
within frameworks of categorization, which revealed social identities were becoming subject to
constant challenge and contradiction. Gender in particular became an issue as it too was
progressively undone by injury. War continued in the 20th century to “make men” but it also
made women too in light of the increased formalized participation of women in the armed forces.
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Turning once again to Foucault’s critical genealogical work, I continue to focus on the process
by which wounded soldiers were drawn into the order of knowledge-power through medical
practice. These developments are further indicative of changes that occurred over the course of
the century were significant to not only soldiers bodies, but all bodies. His analysis of the
problem of the soldier’s body— how it might be disciplined and broken to produce a consenting
subject— provides substance for reflection as the 20th century brought other problems to the fore
in connection with mass casualties. The problems of the “prisoner” and the “camp” brought the
issues of necropolitics, biopolitics, and population health management into the realm of military
strategy and tactics and at the same time set a precedent for military and medical health
governance. The minimizing, and in some cases statistical erasure of the injuries, while often
privileging the injuries of soldiers over civilians, demonstrated yet again how a conspicuous
hierarchy of injury was established that functioned within a biopolitical framework of power.
The section that follows this one will analyze these different aspects of wounding and injury, as
it looks at what I call the epistemology of the cut. For now, it is enough to say that combat injury
not only impacted the bodies of those who endured them, they forged a similar significant impact
on the physicians and surgeons whose applied efforts aimed to “remake” them.
The Epistemology of the Cut
Setting aside for a moment my focus on combat injury, I want to turn attention now to those
individuals whose practice aimed to “remake” them in order to argue that war made it possible to
imagine bodies in different ways; a virtual visual epistemology of medicine developed as the
tools for war adapted for medical vision. By the end of the 20th century, military and medical
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ways of knowing and seeing continued to evolve together and were in many ways, as I have
argued, strategically integrated. There is evidence to suggest that the medical imaginary that
operated during the 19th century was superseded by a new vision, as advancing practice
innovation made it is possible to imagine and practice medicine in ways that were different from
the past. War thus made it is possible to re-envision the body and this process imbricates medical
advance. The conduct of warfare in this respect had a major impact on the medical imaginary.
War over the course of time influenced how medical practitioners, especially surgeons, came to
“see” and thus “know” the body; it changed what could be thought about bodies in terms of their
essential being, as knowing progressed to a point where they might embark now on a process of
“making” the body. This shift in the biomedical imaginary was produced by a combination of
material and affective social processes bound up in what I refer to as the epistemology of the cut.
Surgery as Embodied Practice

The evolution of surgery during the 19th century, as I already pointed out, is interesting to look
at for many reasons. As both a practice and a technology, it underwent rapid and significant
change. In this particular case, however, it serves the research objectives of the current study,
because I find it operates empirically as a primary process: it allows me to “open up” the
wounded body so as to acquire a better conception of it. Epistemologically, it acts as a
gatekeeper process in the sense that it modulates the cut between “knowing” to “making.”
Surgery, to be clear then, is simultaneously a “cutting,” “knowing,” and “making” practice.
On one level, it functions as an empirically rationalized medico-scientific method of seeing, to
the extent that surgeons manipulate tools and use it to facilitate medical observation, thereby
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rendering visible to observation what was previously invisible. On another level, it functions
biopolitically through the modulation of affect, where bodily integrity and wholeness are subject
to being disrupted, given how the act of cutting effectively works to breach the body’s physical
boundaries. Bodies, furthermore, as a result of surgery, are not only cut open, they may also be
reorganized and reassembled. The fundamental ontology of what it means to be human thus also
becomes subject to power.
Surgery then, as I conceive it, offers one illustration of how practice and technology operate
together in what might be thought of as a liminal zone; it operates “in between” the injured body
and that of the medical practitioner. It is in this regard well suited to analyze soldiers, whom I
have shown here have a well-documented history of association with surgery practice. As human
test subjects, soldiers have been positioned as liminal/marginal bodies, where as a social group,
they more than others, have been uniquely subject to injury and wounding on a large scale due to
the wartime exposure of their bodies. The unstable nature of their bodies is thus exposed in
dramatic fashion, as it may not always be clear “who makes and who is made.”266
Additionally, surgery modulates what scholars have described as a prosthetic encounter.267
Though I want to point out, this way of thinking falls short of accounting for the dynamism of
practice changes that occurred over time. For this reason, I think we must re-think prosthetic
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epistemology in light of the changes that occurred late in the 20th century; which is to say, we
must move beyond thinking about epistemologies and ontologies of “extension,” to engage open
ended systems that imply, nonetheless, fully embodied concepts of bodily being. Surgery thus
might be seen not so much as a practice that “acts upon” a body, but rather as one that modulates
and interprets a dynamic social relation, where regimes of power work within and through the
body. These particular social dynamics are perhaps better explained from the perspective of an
object oriented epistemology, which more attuned to situating the wounded body within a
biopolitical non-linear relation of exchange of relations with other bodies, technologies, objects,
and practices.
Surgery, nevertheless, still produces a submissive, disciplined, consenting body-subject. Cutting,
in this instance, serves an empirical function, both in terms of method and practice. So for
example, cutting as a practice (surgery) helps renders visible what is invisible; it’s a medicoscientific way of seeing that opens up a body to “making” as well as “knowing.” Cutting, of
course, is also a method that engages the politics of measure. Decisions about how and where to
cut are ultimately a function of knowledge/power. Consequently, the “cutting” of mass casualties
engages the overlapping politics of discipline and control over populations. Populations of
individual bodies were assimilated to a regime of control, where they became a “technical
political object of management and government.”268
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Body knowledge acquired from surgical manipulation of a body was in this manner created as a
circulating knowledge object. This furnished another example of what I have been arguing;
namely, that in order to comprehend the dynamic nature of wounding, we must understand it
relationally in light of connection to other bodies, objects, and things. That is, we must
understand combat injury as a relational ontology. Bear in mind now there were other knowledge
frameworks operating here that were also influential. Machine epistemologies, along with
prosthetic epistemologies, both of which were over the course of the century widely featured in
art and literature, had similarly worked their way into the medical imaginary of practitioners
upon whom the task fell to reassemble broken bodies produced by the war machine. While these
early endeavors were crude by modern standards, they nonetheless illustrate how the two
industrial wars (WWI & II) helped forge a new path for medicine, as the project of engineering
better bodies became coupled with the conduct of war.
Notwithstanding these developments, the challenge of having to logistically deal with so many
wounded “open” bodies pushed practitioners as well as the boundaries of knowledge. Here, I
think it is helpful to recall Foucault, who links medical knowledge and body knowledge in
particular to medical technology and what he referred to as the politics of the gaze. Foucault’s
concept can be further invigorated by combining it with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived
body and his ideas about embodiment and embodied practice. Such a body, according to his
view, is a conscious body; a perceiving body, such that body and world are intricately
intertwined and mutually "engaged." World and self comprise emergent phenomena as they are
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together engaged in an ongoing process of “becoming".269 Merleau-Ponty’s existential
phenomenology aimed to overcome the deficits inherent in both rationalism and empiricism in
the sense that the former’s claim rests on claims of the superiority of observational methods,
whereas his philosophy gives primacy to s perception. The implications of this are such that the
experience of injury is not limited to the soldiers themselves; rather, that injury might be
multiplied through a process of perceptual engagement with others.
The consequences for embodiment are potentially significant, if only because this means the
experience of injury extends beyond the typical ideation of the body as a container. To look upon
a wounded body; furthermore, to touch it and thus know it initiates an embodied perceptual
experience among those who are practicing medicine, as they incorporated this knowledge into
their own bodies through enacted practice. The stimulus to the “medical imaginary” compels a
body transit so to speak, where injury is no longer confined to the wounded body-subject; body
trauma is thus inter-corporealized, as it becomes transferred in this manner from one body to
another. The ontological relation, which I want to further specify does not exemplify
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While the concept of becoming predates Friedrich Nietzsche, it was an important philosophical
concept for him among others like Deleuze and Guattari, to the extent that they all were concerned with
understanding the process of becoming, where they rejected the notion that becoming produces fixed
entities, including subject, object, being, substance, thing, etc. Accordingly, these concepts were
understood to be false constructs; an epistemological mistake reflected in language in discourse set on
understanding the chaos implied in the state of becoming. The epistemological error is attributed to the
Greeks, who postulated “being” as the underlying reality of the world. By construct a world outside of
being, the process of becoming was rendered effectively occluded. This opened up a space for the
pursuit of “reason” to become a primary aim of philosophy. The work of Merleau-Ponty, on the other
hand, through his emphasis on the body as a primary site of knowing the world, served as a corrective of
sorts to this philosophical tradition of placing being and consciousness as the source of knowledge. He
maintained that the body and that which it perceived could not be disentangled from each other. His
articulation of the primacy of embodiment led him away from the phenomenology of consciousness and
perception towards an understanding that he referred to as “indirect ontology” or the ontology of “the flesh
of the world” (la chair du monde), which he discussed at length in his final, though incomplete work, The
Visible and Invisible (see also the essay, “Eye and Mind”).
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epistemological “incorporation,” wounded bodies and medical practitioners reside in concurrent
relation with one another, even as both may be changed by the encounter.

War thus was not only instrumental in helping to bring about major institutional and practice
changes in medicine; it instigated profound change in terms of our thinking about the biopolitical
potential of human bodies. The epistemology of the cut helped instigate this move; it influenced
clinical practice and ideas about how a body’s capacity might be harnessed and made to live
under conditions of war. And as was the case before, military and medical institutional practices
continued to strategically target and exploit bodies, only now efforts became increasingly
focused on managing the resource capacities of those bodies. The body politics of targeting the
soldiers, through a focus on harvesting its resource capacities, helped further the politics of
discipline through a governance of control.
These developments, both in terms of epistemology and practice, demonstrate war’s imbrication
with the biopolitics of social control and human transformation. They illustrate how institutions
as well as the people that worked within them were brought into alignment around the project of
how to visualize as well as “make” a better body.” War thus not only put physicians and
surgeons in the position of determining who lived and who died; it fostered the social conditions
for practice innovation that determined how a body might be “un-made” and “made” within the
context of war. Medicine, as such, was foundational to biopolitical strategies, which used war as
a tool of politics to govern life. It is Foucault again who reminds us that the will to knowledge is
as much about domination as it is interpretation; knowledge, he says, doesn’t come from
“above,” rather it is a weapon used below: “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made
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for cutting.” Taken together, we might consider how these epistemologies speak to the dynamic
nature of injury and, furthermore, how injury might be incorporated into multiple and different
bodies that lie beyond the boundary of the body that experienced the originary event or trauma.

With that, I want to argue that war helped initiate a new virtual visual epistemology of medicine,
where a practical focus on soldiers brought about significant change, in terms of what was
possible to see, know, and make. This shift came about as a direct result of practitioners’
battlefield experience dealing with the material viscera of casualties, which was to some extent
was incorporated into their own embodiment, and thereby influenced thinking – thinking about
war and blood and what a body might do and be. Surgeons in particular aimed to not only heal
and enhance the quality of life for the physical bodies remanded to their care, their battle forged
medical imaginary helped materialize new forms of bodies, as war occasioned a militarymedico-scientific way of seeing, which helped produce, shape, and transform living human
bodies. Military ways of knowing thus inevitably influenced medical ways of knowing and
seeing, as the two continued to work together and were more fully integrated; so much so, that I
find evidence to claim that military investment in medicine became infrastructural to medicine’s
practice and progress. Medicine, both as an institution and a practice grew as a result. Through
the same process, wars also became invested in a strategy to dominate, discipline, and control the
life and health of the social body.
As it is the case with all vision, there was a carried risk of it being compromised or occluded.
Some bodies were rendered more or less visible and the same held true for some injuries, which
were more or less visible than others. The virtual visual epistemology of war and medicine,
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which helped create a new ontology of the body, was unavoidably itself constituted as a form of
violence, for reasons that it helped create a conspicuous hierarchy of wounding. As was the case
before, military and medical institutional practices continued to engage in a strategy of targeting
bodies, only now the focus was more finely tuned to manage the resource capacities of those
bodies. The targeting the soldier’s body in this manner, through a focus on the body and life
itself as a resource, helped further the biopolitics of discipline through a governance of control.
The biopolitcs of the 20th century were thus considerably advanced by the militarization of
medicine. The visual epistemology of medicine established by the end of the 19th century gave
way to what was a distinctly more pro-creational form of medical practice. Knowledge
paradigms created as a result of military and medical institutional overlap indicate that over the
course of the century military strategists adopted a distinct ontological focus. War and violent
conflict were thus rendered instrumental to military strategies aimed at using medicine as a tool
to govern life.
Each one of the three wars, World Wars I & II and the Vietnam War, in their own way offer
evidence that attests to how wars continued to be waged as biopolitical race wars. No longer
undertaken to preserve the integrity of national boundaries or the ideals of freedom and
democracy, the wars in the 20th century were prosecuted as part of a coordinated effort to
eliminate threats to the global economy; a social order that was in no small way predicated on
the control, domination, and subordination of human bodies―first slaves, then soldiers, and
eventually civilian populations. Soldiers and civilians together shared the distinction of being
“body projects” of 20th century wars. Understanding how soldiers and civilians were produced
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not separately, but together, demonstrates how the bodies of different social groups were
produced as part of a relational economy. The biopolitical economy of war, as it applies in this
case, engaged knowledge/power and particularly biopower as it mobilized the body politics of
discipline and control to manage populations.
The Cut of Method: Social Dynamics of Casualty Classification

Historical hindsight being what it is, there is a tendency to classify World Wars I & II as the
“good wars.” The legacy of Vietnam, by way of contrast, endures as the “bad war.” Minding the
gap between them is not a simple matter of overcoming linear factors of time and duration;
rather, we must, as I argued in the last case, look deeper into the process of how bodies were
produced in connection with war. The epistemology of the “cut” here as it pertains to combat
casualties, the practice of medicine, as well as the methods and practices of measure are
therefore highly relevant to analysis. Moreover, we must look beyond the simple practice of
highlighting the war’s “victims” and instead endeavor to look at war’s targets – which is to say,
its body targets.
The counting of casualties in the 20th century continued to be suspect. For as it turned out,
researchers and others, whose task it is to compile statistics do not always employ comparable
measures to document war casualties in a manner that is consistent across the different wars. The
Vietnam era, more than in the past, revealed the process breaking down: not all injuries were
counted as casualties, not all wars counted as wars, and not all bodies were counted as bodies.
The body’s essential indeterminacy, however, was not an accident or an unfortunate byproduct
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of war; rather, it was an essential element of a political-economic strategy; one that was deeply
biopolitical and characteristic of evolving forms of governance.
Progressively, over the course of the 20th century, the body politics of state politics continued to
infuse medical practice encounters, as military and medical institutions combined to extend their
influence. Casualty classification and the biopolitics of human measure, likewise, continued to
evolve, in spite of the fact that there were problems that emerged, which I uncovered when I
tried to compare casualties across time periods. Recall how in the previous case, where I showed
how operationalizing concepts and definitions were unstable and subject to break down upon
analysis. As Goldberg (2010) noted, this leads to problems in benchmarking outcomes and
making comparisons between wars and conflicts. Consequently, categories of measurement and
casualty counts varied widely depending on the source, since there were almost no stable
casualty classification categories. Moreover, I found the mass casualties that occurred during this
particular time period occurred across simultaneously discontinuous and overlapping terrains of
conflict; they involved multiple nation states, armies, and bodies too, as the cut of measure that
defined them as a body was not always categorically consistent and well-defined. Part of the
problem here is the inherent tendency to assume stable subjectivities in connection with
casualties, which creates additional problems when one attempts to accurately classify and count
them. Casualty classifications, as I have already shown, are subject to collapse during
wartime ―i.e. soldiers might become civilians and civilians might become soldiers.
The counting of war casualties was also shown to undergo significant change over the course of
the century. Putting these particular changes into a context with developments in medicine thus
319

called for a critical theory; a critical interpretive framework that could reveal casualties in light
of the power that produced them. The hierarchy of injury, which in the previous case was shown
to reflect a racialized social order of bodies was also operating again here, though in decidedly
more complex ways. Contradictory social relationships were reproduced in patterns of injury, as
the injuries of white men above all others were privileged even as injury increasingly over the
course of the century was democratized to include civilians, non-white men as well as women.

The Vietnam War in particular demonstrated how the casualties of war might be produced for
purposes of affect as much as effect. For despite the war’s many disputed counts and
contradictions, casualty statistics were nonetheless reported in a manner that implied the
impartiality of numbers reflecting cold, hard, fact. The Vietnam War, in this sense, initiated its
own empirical turn. Death and injury were rendered more calculable, even if they were not
always predictable. What counted as a “soldier,” a soldier’s body, and particularly a wounded
soldier’s body, could not always be determined. The methods of identifying the war’s casualties
and counting them as such was not the straightforward statistical exercises many pretended to
imagine. Counting combat casualties in Vietnam suggested, as a practical matter, that an old
adage might apply here: “not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that
counts can be counted.” Judith Butler (2006) infers as much in her book Frames of War, when
she asks “who counts as living and who does not; how are we to count the war dead?" Thus,
there are important questions that remain unanswered in regards to how war casualties and the
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counting of war dead "frame and unframe" the losses of war. Casualty accounting, according to
Butler, constituted an essential element in "the apparatus of war waging”270

The cutting methods employed during the war for the purpose of counting bodies was,
furthermore, biopolitical to the extent it produced individual soldiers’ as circulating knowledge
objects, as information lifted from the bodies of wounded soldiers was used to further manage
the life and death outcomes of populations. Rational empirical accounting procedures were here
used in such a manner that they simultaneously reflected and served the needs power and capital;
multiple forms of bodies, figures, and subjects are produced as a result. The biopolitics of human
measure in this manner evolved to operate on multiple and different levels simultaneously. Now,
they were inclusive of the realms of affect and performance. The infamous “drafting” of
recruits – the war’s human resources - and the performance of “body counts” during the war
were all staged productions. In light of this, the biopolitcs of injury are such that when “cutting”
as a practice was combined with cutting as a method, there were impacts on how we counted and
classified injury. For this reason, it is important to examine the cut of measure as it applies to
accounting for war casualties.

What we see here demonstrated is the dynamic and fluid nature of bodies, which is once again
demonstrably characteristic of the political economy of injury in the 20th century. Statistical
bodies were produced alongside flesh and blood bodies, which were brought together through
conflict dynamics that I am arguing were similarly biopolitical. The Vietnam War’s affect
economy, in this instance, rendered its material economy correspondingly more productive,
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given how the bodies it produced could be more easily broken down and distributed across
different topographies and social landscapes. The circulation of bodies in this case helped inform
a medical governance of control, which not only determined who lived and who died; it further
dictated whose bodies might be “un-made” and “made” coincident with war. Combat casualties
were in this manner not accidents; they were produced, which is to say they were “made”
through a complex social interaction. Making war and making bodies were thus part and parcel
of the same relational economy.
In light of this history, one cannot help but to conclude that the indeterminacy, ambiguity, and
general lack of specificity in regards to body counts is not simply be the result of empirical
“accidents” or “errors.” Casualty (ac) counting, like the body itself, is subject to break down
when the aim is to render visible and quantify that which cannot always be seen. Methods,
definitions, and classifications are created as a compensation for this failure. Absent the
pretention of empirical certainty, perhaps their real value lies in what they tell us about body
politics and power. This explains to a degree why so much effort is invested in the manipulation
of body counts and efforts to "hide" the body during wartime. With that, wartime efforts to count
are not neutral undertakings and on a practical level must be considered suspect. Consequently, I
find it is important to challenge what often masquerades as an empirically rational process.

The boundary that my findings reveal to be the most permeable is the one that distinguishes the
bodies of soldiers from civilians. Although unstable, this identity remains salient, nonetheless, as
casualty counts exert a major impact on how bodies are politically represented. Some might
argue –and argue correctly—that the act of counting a body as a soldier constitutes an appeal to
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subjective identity, a specifically nationalist one at that; despite this, I think it is important to
acknowledge the tendency of identity categories to collapse during wartime. This is why I don’t
think it is possible or even desirable to dispense with identity critique, considering how given
different contingencies of time, space and place, any one among us might be defined as a soldier.
In this respect, the will to count --a manifestation of the will to know-- is fully imbricated in
power relations and is subject to entanglement "with the appeal for unending war, entangled with
the governing of the not-yet lived, at the point of emergence, where ontopower is shadowed by
necropolitics" (Clough, 2012: 8). We are perhaps all combatants one way or another. This much
is suggested by the advertising slogan for "Call of Duty" (or COD as it is well known), which
stands among the best-selling and most violent military-themed video games: “There's a Soldier
in All of Us.”

The Biopolitics of Detention
Throughout the work presented here, in addition calling attention to war’s impact on the social
organization of medicine, I have also claimed that war has a biological basis and that this has
consequences for the body. Having said this, I turned to consider how progressive biopolitical
developments in medical practices like surgery helped instigate a process of transformation,
where bodies were framed, shaped, and enhanced through the applied practice of medicine.
With respect to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding that the different modes of being are neither
separate or fixed, but are instead deeply intertwined, I want to argue now that the act of
surgically intervening affectively destabilizes a body and imbricates it with others with whom it
is engaged. Doctor and patient, I want to argue, were thus transformed together. The
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body/subject of the surgeon – the “cutter”— was entangled with the body/subject of the patient,
the object of practice. Surgery, notwithstanding, was disembodying even as it also enhanced the
experience of embodiment; it forged an impact on human subjects at the same time as it
influenced the minds and bodies of those with their hand “on the knife” so to speak.

Given this state of affairs, there are biopolitical consequences to consider, which I attribute to the
mass-scale practice of interventional medical procedures. Theoretically, such a process might
produce multiple and different productions of the body-subject-self; it can, in other words,
produce a “strain,” such that minds and bodies are forced into a state of contradiction, which
holds them in detention. An individual soldier or person conflicted as such is forced to confront
multiple and different forms of embodiment and subjectivity, one or all of which might not map
continuously onto what is normatively understood to be a whole intact body. No longer slaves, as
was the case before, soldiers were produced as biopolitical detainees.
Here, I define a “biopolitical detainee” as a victim of affective capture, where an individual
becomes caught up in different and often contradictory ideational understandings of the bodysubject- self. Wounded soldiers, who are subject to capture and control dynamics, are in this
manner suspended between institutions (military and medical) as well as different forms of
embodiment that inform their self-concept (before and after injury). The relationship is not one
of contingency; nor is it fully determining, as it may play out different ways under differing
social circumstances. Potentially, injury might be experienced as transcendence when the terms
of embodiment no longer confine a person to being in a body as this is traditionally conceived.
Corporeality, however, potentially interacts problematically with issues of affect and
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temporality; invasive medical procedures can act as a catalyst or “trigger” for ongoing violence.
In this instance, the modulation of affect operates as a primary process. Differing and alternative
embodiment is neither a form of deviance nor is it a departure from what may be considered
“normal” embodiment. Multiplicity and radical disembodiment should thus be understood as
normative for a body subjected to wounding in war. Likewise, “in-between” subjectivities and
social identities are also produced as normative and thus are not exceptional.
Machine discourses here again asserted themselves, as the logic of the “body as machine” made
it possible to envision the wounded body as a technical problem to be solved. As engagement
with these practices became more normative over the course of time (i.e. prosthetic fitting,
rehabilitation and therapy), people (especially soldiers) were left in a state of contradiction. The
marriage of human bodies with machine parts has not been, as many scholars note, without
controversy. Competing dualisms like “natural” and “technical” or epistemologies like
“extension” and “incorporation “ in addition to more conventional opposition between human
and machine constitute the fiery substance of debates on subjectivity as hybridity and questions
about what it means to be human. The danger here, of course, as Alan Hyde (1997) warns is that
we “see the body as a machine so that we are not tempted to see it as human.”271 Setting aside
these debates for the moment, I want to offer analysis in terms of what potentially happens to
soldiers whose injuries expose them to the threat of bodily discontinuity, such that they may
become caught up in a liminal zone produced when they undergo techno-medical transformation.
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Pieces and Parts; Objects and Things

Wounded soldiers thus, having confronted the peril of their bodies being opened by force in
battle, were not uncommonly subjected to significant, multiple, invasive medical procedures,
many of which radically altered their bodies and body schema. For purposes of illustration, let us
look at one example of a significant injury – a blast injury that leads to a surgically amputated
limb and prosthetic enhancement. Paradoxically, surgery here both configures as well as
disfigures the body-subject-self. To be sure, the injury has already caused disfigurement.
Nonetheless, subsequent to surgery, a veritable “crisis” in subjectivity is produced to the extent
that individuals are forced to integrate their altered state of embodiment back into what they
perceived to be whole/intact subjectivity – in other words, the body-subject that existed prior to a
surgery. The injury that required surgery, in this case, produces a body-subject-self that is forced
to confront the risk of becoming a self that is divided from the self; such is the result when a
body is forcibly opened and enhanced with an external object/thing (i.e. a medical
device/prosthetic).

Surgery thus, as an interventional medical procedure generates a paradox that takes the form of
an embodied contradiction: here, while surgery may be potentially life-saving, it may not always
be life- enhancing. Even though surgery might occasion new forms of subjectivity and
embodiment not possible, were it not for forced intervention, the contradictions that are produced
can be life-threatening (i.e. suicide) when an individual fails to process the affective
discontinuities that are the result of the procedure. Surgery, in other words, is inherently
destabilizing; clinically it is known to produce what is called “post-surgery affective disorder.”
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The term aims to account for the stress put on a body that results from one having undergone
such a procedure. But it is not only the body itself that is affected here, as surgery also acts as a
stressor on the very notion of individual liberal subjectivity. Radical intervention theoretically
compels a body-subject-self transit; one that if it is not successfully negotiated, may result in one
getting caught between different productions of their body-subject-self—the old “me” vs. the
new “me.”

Wounded soldiers are potentially left to grapple with the embodied contradiction that is the
manifest result of an attempt to negotiate their “in-between” status, as they are forced to confront
what they perceive to be an irreconcilable difference between two bounded as well as different
productions of bodily subjectivity. Any attempt to “reset the clock,” as it were, to reclaim an
imagined previously intact singular production of subjectivity, may be met with frustration, as
one aims to achieve an imagined integrated body-subject-self. To put it differently, they are
confronting the challenge of integrating the new pieces of their body into what they perceive to
be a unitary integrated whole body. The challenge may be compounded, as one separates military
service and aims to socially reintegrate and re-individualize their body to both re-claim liberal
subjectivity as well as their bodies as property.
Confronting one’s body as an object essentially suspends them between two forms of embodied
subjectivity: individualized liberal subjectivity and group subjectivity, which they experience as
soldiers, who are a subject to monitoring as a biopolitical population. These different aspects of
embodiment and subjectivity, I want to argue, are again are not actually separate. As the heuristic
Homo Vulneratus illustrates, they are experienced fluidly and contemporaneously. Discipline and
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control are, likewise, shown to overlay one another, as individualized disciplined subjects were
simultaneously subject to ongoing biopolitical monitoring and control.
This interpretive framework can perhaps also explain other types of injuries and not only those
that resulted in the loss of an appendage and surgery. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
for example, might be explained as not simply a mental disorder that is triggered by a wound,
shock, and/or trauma; rather, we might understand the injury in terms of a crisis of subjectivity;
one that is produced when there is a severing or disruption of spatio-temporal relations, such that
aims to recover what is perceived to be a fixed and unitary subject status may be thwarted.
Wounded soldiers are thus classic liminal bodies; they are caught in an “in-between” status,
where they remain “stuck” as a result of their failed attempts to reintegrate and reclaim their
subjectivity. Soldiers who experience the most negative effects from the embodied
contradictions produced by such a process are perhaps, in fact, the ones who remain entrenched
in mythic thinking that insists they reclaim an intact whole body.
Foucault argued that soldiers’ bodies are produced as subjects through a combination of
discursive, disciplinary, and control practices, many of which he illustrated shared affinity with
non-military institutions (prisons, hospitals, clinics). Put differently, he explained soldiers using
what are basically social construction and cultural inscription models of the body, which are
grounded in the bodily regime of the body-as-organism. I want to critique this conception on the
basis that it fails to adequately account for the body, both as a concept and in terms of its
potential lived embodiment. The wounded bodies of soldiers suggest to me that war potentially
produces a body that is no longer a closed, bounded entity. Wounds create openings in the body
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that are indicative of instability, fluidity, and indeterminacy, such that the very notion of what it
means to have and be a body may be subject to challenge and negotiation. This critique has, of
course, been made of the female body, and cited as a source of its essential subordination and
difference. But here again —and this is important— I’m not arguing the wounded body of a
soldier is essentially different; rather, I am saying it is dynamically differing. In my view, this
dynamism has biopolitical implications. The biopolitics of injury perpetuate a circulation of
injuries that may be experienced over the course of a lifetime, such that a soldier’s struggle to
attain body-subject-self integration keeps them “in the war” that produced them this way.
Consequently, whereas Emily Martin would argue “the boundary between the body (self) and the
external world (non-self) is rigid and absolute,” I am suggesting, in the tradition of MerleauPonty, that war produces a body with boundaries that are permeable – that flesh is reversible.
Wounding subjects’ soldiers to a process where they are left to contemplate the ever-shifting
boundaries of their bodies, which may no longer be coterminous with the self; boundaries
between human and machine, natural and artificial; between the flesh of the body and the flesh
of the world. As “biopolitical detainees,” they remain effectively suspended, mind as well as
body, within an affective state of detention and capture.
Simply put then, the war that is being waged here is essentially one that is being fought to resist
disembodiment. For the body politics of war are such that it strategically empties bodies of their
contents; like the figures in Bacon’s paintings, soldiers’ bodies are often violently opened in such
a way as to remove them from the container of their skin. The resulting embodied crises is an
indicator of the fragility of selfhood based on a misrecognition of bodily integrity and wholeness:
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it is not so much fear of death that induces trauma, as it is a fear of being cut and opened; a fear
of seeing what is supposed to be maintained inside the body, rendered outside, such that one is
forced to come to terms with the actualization of shattered bodily integrity.
Forced to acknowledge the reversibility of their own flesh, what remains of identity and
subjectivity must be re-assembled from cut-up pieces of the body ―pieces which significantly
cannot be returned to an individualized body. Unfortunately, even the act of separating from
military service offers no guarantee of a return to unified individualized subjectivity; moreover,
it suggests there may be questions about whether such a notion is tenable at all. Prolonged forms
of rehabilitation and treatment risk “disfiguring” of the body-subject-self-relationship, because
they can never own their body, nor can they escape the war.
SUMMARY
In summary, I think it is important to understand how 20th century medical innovations coincided
with the rise of industrial capitalism and war. The findings here again support the conclusion that
military and medical institutions, each in their own way, benefitted from the production of
violence and mass casualties. Contentious body politics were shown yet again to be productive
insofar as they were strategic to the efforts of institutions, which acquired knowledge from
bodies to position their growth and extend their influence, These were, in other words,
biopolitical strategies, which sought to break the body into pieces and parts in order to extract
utility and vitality, which was in turn used to pursue military dominance. War, medicine,
capitalism and governance were thus shown to operate together by creating a circulation or
feed-back loop. War produced combat casualties that helped sustain the institutional growth of
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medicine; medicine was thus indirectly funded by war; human bodies, including their life and
vitality, were drawn into a system, where they could be managed through a medical governance
of control. The wonders of Western medicine thus do not merely reflect the accomplishments of
the great men of medicine any more than are casualties produced as simple accidents; they are all
introduced into a political economy of relations that constitute a militarized programmatic
harnessing of the forces of capital and organized violence.
This case illustrated yet again how violence stands behind the human figure to make itself
legible. Body politics were thus shown to be salient to the conduct of war and medicine. The
breaking down of soldiers in particular during this era, the harnessing of their embodied
productivity, demonstrate evidence of how this particular body, as a site of power, was treated as
a biocapital investment. As was the case before, the wars of the 20th century were shown to be
biopolitical race wars. The biopolitics of war here, however, cannot be reduced to race alone.
Thus, I endeavored to show how a range of social dynamics were implicated in the process. Like
before, this case illustrates how combat injuries must not be thought of as independent and
detached from the political economy within which they function. Combat casualties, as I
explained, were not terminal developments in and of themselves any more than they were simple
byproducts of the war; they are produced within a relational economy that imbricates a wide
spectrum of political, social, and economic developments. Consequently, casualties are not mere
accidents that stand “outside” history; they are an outcome of military and medical strategy and
practice.
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This case introduced arguments that suggested the 20th century marked the beginning of another
turn, which turned out to be materially significant for developments in medical history. And as
was the case with the U.S. Civil war, the biopolitics of 20th century war reveal how the human
terrain of the body continued to be a legitimate “theater” of operation. Unlike the previous case,
which looked at one war, this case looked at three different wars that took place over the course
of a century. As for the two World Wars, it turns out, they were neither “great” nor did they
manage to “end all wars.” All three of the wars that were looked at here demonstrated some level
of continuity with previously established trends, even as they also demonstrated discontinuity.

With that, I undertook to examine the ever-shifting social landscape that that came to define the
operating terrain of war, which was considerably expanded during this era. War and violent
conflict evolved in such a manner as to comprise not only three dimensional geographic space,
but human terrains and topographies, which included minds, bodies, tools, and technologies.
Population dynamics, likewise, reflected the changing times. Social identities and social group
formation dynamics also proved to be volatile and were subject to break down in much the same
way as wounded bodies. And whereas the previous case aimed to document the origins of the
neoliberal imperative to classify and “count” slaves among other commodities as a pre-cursor to
what happened to soldiers, this case illustrated the full flourishing of that process, as wounded
soldiers were rendered salient to the process of 20th century medical advance. All of these social
currents helped set the stage for war in the 20th century.

With respect to the question of medical social organization, the case findings establish once
again that significant innovation in battlefield medicine was accompanied by the expansion of
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institutional infrastructure and capability, much of which was achieved as a result of the mass
casualties inflicted during the war. What is more, the path to innovation closely tracked other
developments in battlefield weapons technology, strategy and tactics. Using interpretive
methods, I pointed to evidence to develop the claim that wounded soldiers played an important
instrumental role in fostering developments in medicine, including its social organization,
knowledge production, and practice innovation. Medicine, I argued, benefitted from having
access to large numbers of war casualties. Medicine, I argued, was militarized, as the bodies of
soldiers were medicalized. Military and medical institutions effectively synthesized “lifemaking” and “life-taking” activities in ways findings suggest they are indicative of a biopolitical
strategy to manage life through war.
To facilitate analysis of the biopolitcs of the war, I pointed to Foucault’s thinking and also
Mbembe’s necropolitics, as both helped me situate these developments within a framework of
power. By the end of the 20th century, soldier’s bodies were by now well entrenched within a
circulating economy; soldiers’ bodies were produced as a knowledge objects within a
progressive, political economy of wounding. With that, in spite of the fact that many of the
medical developments cited here were not always “breakthrough” innovations, they still
demonstrate progressive change; they illustrate how the human terrain of bodies, their
corporeality as well as their life and vitality were increasingly targeted for military and medical
regulation.

This case thus illustrated how the problem of the body continued to be a central line of focus for
military as well as medical institutions. Once more, I evaluated the impact of multi-level
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institutional configurations, whereupon I looked at their interaction with different social groups.
Military institutional complicity and competency sharing was and continues to be normative, as
practices continue to be shared across institutions. The financing of medicine, likewise,
continued to be an issue here, as military financial investments substantially increased. War thus
continued to fuel a sophisticated multi-level funding mechanism for medicine. And so I find here
that medicine was not the rational, neutral, violence-free practice it is imagined to be; rather, it
was substantively built through a relation to violence and war. I argued that war provided the
social context for doctors and surgeons to expand the influence of their profession. Each of the
three wars, in fact, furnished illustrations that demonstrated how soldiers were used as human
test subjects. Though it was World Wars I & II in particular that illustrated how physicians and
surgeons continued their full-scale invasion of the body. Surgeons honed their skills by taking on
increasingly invasive and complex medical procedures, which were exercised on the bodies of
soldiers.

In what was perhaps the most decisive shift that occurred, military and medical ways of knowing
and seeing were by the end of the century strategically integrated. The evidence that I presented
suggests the medical imaginary that operated during the 19th century was superseded by a new
vision for medicine as well as the body. The conduct of warfare in this respect had a major
impact on the medical imaginary. Thus, whereas the previous century revealed a shift toward
rendering bodies more “knowable,” “calculable,” and thus more “productive,” this too changed
over the course of the 20th century. The wounded body now was decidedly a body no longer
looked at as confined to bodily limitation. Twentieth century medicine looked at the body in
terms of its potential: the body (limbs in particular) were re-ordered as the spatial topography of
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the body came to be seen as “fashionable. Medical practitioners came to “see,” “know,” and
“make” the body in ways now that were more “pro-creative.” And nowhere was this connection
between “knowledge and power” and “knowledge and cutting” more vividly evidenced than in
biomedical surgery practice, which continued to benefit enormously from the mass casualties
produced by war. Bodies might now, far more than in the past, be reframed and enhanced by
combining them with other objects and things. The very notion that one might “make” a body
was quickly becoming realized, as medicine accomplished the shift from “knowing” to “making”
bodies. Consequently, war here took a decisive ontological turn to the extent that it became
enfolded in a process of shaping what the body is and what it might become.
The “will to knowledge” in 20th century wars was thus acquired through progressive
mechanisms, such as those that typified medicine, which benefitted from the ritual harvesting of
wounded bodies. Soldiers here again played their role as paradigmatic “biological citizens.”
Notions of “duty,” “sacrifice,” and “service” that would ultimately come to define American
exceptionalism were now solidly tied to notions of citizenship under the aegis of good
governance. Military investment in rational empirical methods to account for war casualties
(another way to “make” bodies) emerged simultaneous with the rise of empirical accounting
practices in global political economy. Soldiers’ bodies, their lives, and livelihood were exploited
in a manner that was both similar and yet dissimilar to the slaves before them; both share the
same wounded connective tissue in the sense that their bodies were collectively drawn into an
oppressive biopolitical medical governance of control.
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The radical undoing of soldiers’ bodies, however, was over the course of this century
accomplished on a scale that far exceeded the previous record. War casualties were not simple
byproducts of war; they were to some degree produced on purpose. Soldiers then, as medically
laboring bodies, merely constituted a different form of economic slave. Their principle “value”
was embodied as they underwent a process of medical objectification, technologization, and
physical enhancement. Over the course of time, this value would accrue exponentially, as their
bodies were broken into pieces and parts. Home Vulneratus was in this respect shown to be
bound up with emergent simultaneous developments in neoliberal economic strategy, which as a
result of operating through a more diverse array of social, political, and economic practices,
aimed to more effectively regulate bodies and populations to serve the burgeoning needs of
global finance.

Perhaps more than the one before it, this case illustrated how war and medicine became invested
in the radical undoing of bodies. No longer satisfied to merely wage war over territory and
geographic space, military and medical institutions used the wounded bodies of soldiers to
develop proficiency, which they in turn incorporated into a biopolitical strategy to redefine the
vital, the natural, and the physical.272 Soldiers were medically objectified to the point that they
were reduced to an engineering problem. And by this I mean that the very soma and substance of
their bodies, in addition to their affective capacity and vitality, were rendered manipulable by the
very same tools and technologies that were used to heal and to some extent “make” them.
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Wounded soldiers were thus drawn into the equivalent of an extended medical supply chain; one
that connected the battlefield to the life sciences. These developments support my claim that it
was through this body politics of body making and modulating injury, that war forged an impact
on what it meant to make war and have and be a body. Radical change dynamics, here
occasioned through war’s influence, provide additional evidence that an evolving strategy was
being played out; one that aimed to renegotiate the boundaries between what were traditionally
understood to be ontologically distinct categories of living and being – machine and human,
natural and technical, living and dead.

In light of these changes, I suggested there is a need to move beyond merely trying to understand
how the state uses war as a tool of politics to “take life” to instead look at how the targeting of
bodies during this time period illustrate a commitment to also “making life.” Medicine here, as a
tool of biopolitics, did not simply engage in a politics to make live and let die; its ethics were
subject to compromise from without by a military ethic of violence, which sought to dominate
and control terrain that included the human body. Medicine thus imbricates what I identify as an
ontological politics, which seeks to make life through war. Biopolitics and necropolitics are “two
sides of the same coin.”273
To conclude, the human terrain of war expanded its territory during the 20th century. Though
significantly, it continued to maintain a strategic interest in controlling the knowledge and
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information parameters of the human body as it corresponds to the globalized expanse within
which it now functions. New mechanisms of control might now target a body independent of its
physical location. These controls range from the mundane (remote overhead electronic
surveillance) to the extreme (DNA recoding, genetic engineering, and bio-regeneration
technologies). Institutional practice by means of enclosure still retains an influence, but this too
gave way to more open systems of control, as the walls of the factory, the rest home, and the
asylum have given way to outpatient rehabilitation, personal fitness management, and other
forms of self-care. The political economy of relations that shaped the sociality of bodies, soldiers
and civilians together now, effectively shifted away from a sociality that organized bodies as
mere pieces, parts, objects, and things, to an open information-based system, where bodies might
be networked even as they are combined with other bodies, pieces, parts, objects, and things,
thereby replacing spatial concentrations of populations made up of individual bodies. Violence
here again operates as an ethically functional epistemology even as it also operates biopolitically
independent of localized bodies and structures.
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Coda
Conclusions & Theoretical Implications

If it is not apparent by now, there are at least two important general conclusions that emerge
from the research. The first is that sociopathic violence is deeply woven into the capitalistic
fabric of our contemporary social relations. The second is that there is an awful lot of money that
can be made from human misery. To be sure, medical and technological advancement have been
achieved, but there is a price to be paid in the form of human flesh. Martin Luther King’s famous
words perhaps ring more true now more than they ever did: “the United States remains the
greatest purveyor of violence and terrorism in the world.” Forty-eight years after the Vietnam
War was ended, his words are if nothing at all prophetic. The violence to which he addressed
himself, however, was not a violence that started and ended on the battlefield. As King well
knew, the legacy of human conflict, bondage, wounding, and suffering continues to reverberate
through our ongoing engagement with organized violence. The genealogies of violence that
shape the contours of modern social life take many forms: interpersonal violence, structural
violence, and affective violence, all of which are deeply intertwined. Given the obvious that
there has been a large-scale failure to eliminate war as a policy tool and vehicle of governance, it
remains to be seen how we might address the contradictory role played by systemic violence in
the institutional practice of medicine; violence, which I pointed out has proven to be both
generative as well as destructive. Is it even possible to eliminate systemic violence from the
practice of medicine, given its relation to neoliberal governance, which benefits from war? Such
a question, while it might not be empirically testable, at the very least, it fosters thinking about
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the problem of the pervasive nature of systemic institutional violence, without reducing violence
to an individual level problem.
There is an old saying— "rich man’s war, poor man’s blood" —which can be applied to nearly
every conflict in the history of warfare. This research aimed to highlight how these particular
power dynamics are operating in the U.S. context; it aimed to, furthermore, shine a light on how
social inequalities that are bound up with military service may have far reaching implications for
us all. By looking at how soldiers have been used to advance medical social organization, I was
able to show power operates through institutions in contemporary society. I showed how the very
bodies of soldiers, their blood, viscera, and vitality played an instrumental role in helping to
advance medical social organization and progress. Such a body is more than a mere body in a
naturalistic sense; its ontology reflects it is a living, fully embodied “substrate of capitalist
mediation.”274
In proposing a return to the body itself— the human terrain of war — my research aimed to
explore the different dimensions of violence, as I pursued a deeper systemic critique of how
combat injury occurs within a framework of power. The dynamic that is illustrative of how this
process evolved is, I argued, distinctively complex and non-linear; it is a material as well as an
affective process. I aimed to demonstrate how institutions, bodies, knowledge, power, and
capital, through war, became functionally intertwined.
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With that, I employed a combination of ethnographic and comparative historical methods to
analyze the links between war and medicine. Specifically, I looked at the problem of war
casualties as this relates to military influence over medical social organization and health
governance. Violent epistemologies and social logics were found to inform the functioning and
expansion of military and medical institutions, which in the case of the latter are more typically
associated with non-military and non-violent domestic affairs. These two institutions were shown
to have grown and developed together.
Medicine’s praxis of knowledge and power was shown to have evolved in concert with military
strategies to dominate the human terrain of the body. Bodies were broken down and reassembled
again in ways that, furthermore, mirrored the logic of capitalism. Throughout each successive
war that I evaluated, these trends illustrated how bodies were taken up into a political economic
circulation. In this regard, I aimed to create a body-centered, if not always human-centered,
account of how war targets the bodies of predominantly poor and working class people to
facilitate institutional growth and expansion. Social inequity, as I pointed out, is not a bug but a
major feature of a system, which produced bodies in such a way as to serve the needs of capital
and power.
By systematically exploring the links between war and medicine, I tried to illustrate how violent
social contexts are potentially shaping our bodies and determining how we live. Theorization and
analysis were based on case study data, which furnished evidence for arguments that claimed the
bodies of wounded soldiers have throughout history been used in an instrumental capacity to
advance medicine. Data furnished the basis for an evaluation that looked at the impact of war
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stimulus on multi-level institutional configurations and practices, which I demonstrated
benefitted from the medical regulation of soldiers’ bodies. Findings documented evidence that
challenges the idea that combat casualties and the radical undoing of bodies in connection with
war are “accidents.” I showed rather they were (are) purposefully produced and remain
infrastructural to the progressive political economy within which medical social organization and
progress is made possible. In short, there is a functioning political economy of injury that
operates intrinsic to both war and medicine.

Analysis considered the biopolitical implications of findings, where I focused on four key
problems. First, I considered the problem of war and military institutional influence over the
social organization of medicine. Second, I looked at ethical problems and contradictions as they
occur across a spectrum of institutional practices, such as when casualty statistics were compiled
and manipulated. Third, I considered problems of embodiment that result from the “strain” of
structural contradictions imposed on individuals, who become victims of institutional capture
particularly when those institutions are organized by violent epistemologies of knowledge and
control. Lastly, I called attention to problems of discourse, where heroic narratives engage affect
economies of desire to inhibit critical inquiry as it pertains to combat injury and disability.

A point of emphasis worth considering is how medical institutions and the practice of medicine,
both founded upon the ethic of “do no harm” became implicated over the course of time in a
medical governance of social control; this development, I argued, played a strategic role in
helping to make violence appear normal. Violence, under the aegis of medicine, moreover, took
on the appearance of being “useful,” as “sacrifice” in the name of progress was incorporated into
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a new work ethic that justified violence as a way to get things done. This dynamic influenced
affective landscapes, as military ways of knowing and seeing, which are informed by
epistemologies of violence, came to shape how we think and feel about injury, killing, and war.
Put another way, the political economy of war and medicine engaged an affect economy; one
which helped foster public acquiesce and support for social policies that contribute to ongoing
war.

It is this curious juxtaposition of social forces that my research calls attention to, as it aims to
show how these developments, while not determining and totalizing, they are nevertheless
constitutive of what amounts to a political economy of injury and a medical governance of social
control. War and medicine, it was shown, through the biopolitics of making and managing
injury, are forging a major impact on what it means to have and be a body. As such, they play a
role in forging the broader currents of violence that are implicated in shaping the conditions of
possibility for what it means to be human.

In closing, it bears repeating that war has helped create a violent, even abusive society. As for the
United States, it continues to default to war as the policy of choice in resolving problems it
perceives to be in its interest. Investment in war and military adventures continues to be a
principle mechanism, even if it is not the only one, through which the U.S. funds its most
important scientific endeavors—everything from basic science to medicine, bioengineering, and
outer space exploration. The U.S. maintains more than 800 military bases across the globe. This
defense infrastructure has not only proved to be costly; it remains for the most part completely
unaccountable to organizations within the government charged with responsibility for oversight.
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The expansion of war and militarism into what are traditionally thought to be domestic
institutional spaces, like medicine, but more recently policing and even education, has been
fueled similarly by the same pattern of investment.

Military service provides a lot of people with what any advanced society should provide its
citizens: education, health care, a sense of purpose. For many Americans, the only way they can
live in socialism, albeit a deeply flawed version of it, is to volunteer for military service; they are
all, unfortunately, looking for the next good war in order to live the good life. The connection
between the warfare state and the welfare state has never in our time been stronger, even as what
remains of our social contract has been shattered beyond all recognition. The militarized vison of
social welfare policy, however, is not one that is empowered to envision a world without strife
and conflict. For it is predicated upon a Hobbesian world view of all against all. This particular
world view, more often than not, appeals to economically precarious men; men who have been
produced in such a way that they feel they must respond when called upon to fight wars, even
when it is apparent the game is not rigged in their favor.

Pursuant to these trends, the unmitigated development of defense institutions, public as well as
private, poses what is arguably a major threat to national security. We have found different ways
to normalize and routinize that violence – in our city streets, the doctor’s office, throughout our
media, and even at school. The weapons of war and its violent logics now saturate our thinking,
norms, and values. This has caused us, in turn, to think differently about ourselves. Americans in
particular appear to have internalized the contradictions of sociopathic violence, which they have
come to accept it as a normal part of daily life. We live the way of the gun, which is to say we
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have too readily accepted the idea that we are all empty shell casings; human resources to be
depleted; commodities to be measured, calculated, and used. Our human potential is lost in
pursuing retrograde economic agendas that can only be fulfilled by more violence and war.

To some extent, it is our collective affective need to continue the American
celebration – celebrating soldiers as trauma “heroes” – that prevents our acknowledging
responsibility for the social conditions we inflict on others forced to deal with the human residue
created by our military escapades. Soldier worshipers in particular are prone to fawn wildly in
their efforts to remind us that we enjoy “freedom” because of the blood sacrifices of others,
whose Christ-like civil service was bestowed as a special gift to Americans, if not mankind in
general. They are wrong. Our wars are not the “just” wars as we profess to support. As a country,
we neither believe nor practice the values we proclaim are uniquely ours—not abroad or, for that
matter, on the homefront. Americans enjoy power and privilege because they are the
beneficiaries of scientific achievement, medicine included; achievement won in large part as a
result of the long-standing practice of radical dispossession; the taking by force of the land,
labor, bodies, and blood of others. Americans have, in other words, expropriated the vital, natural
and physical, leaving the desilicated carcasses and corpses for others to police off the battlefield.
They take what they want by justifying force and violence, demonstrating a preference for guns
when ideas fail. At some point, action must be taken to stop the cycle of violence.
Regarding the wider implications of this research and how it may be of service to humanity in
general, I think I have called attention to an important social undercurrent, which unfortunately
tends to be buried: how human performance and bodily change are products of history and a
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violent one at that. How then we manage our escape from the iron cage of medicine? And what
about funding? Why not fund medical research through more direct institutional means, rather
than funneling money through military channels like DAARPA, for example, to fund important
initiatives like regenerative medicine? Regarding issues of policy and ethics, is it permissible
ethically and even morally speaking to work as a medical practitioner for an apparatus that
benefits from violence, even if one does not cause said violence directly? Perhaps the real
problem lies not with institutions, but within the technical and economic rationality of
capitalism.
But what are the wider implications of these developments? What are the implications for policy
studies and humanity in general? If nothing at all the development of autonomous weapons
draws many of these issues into a different frame of focus. Their development is heralded as
means to avoid injuring soldiers; however, their lack of purported “surgical precision” on the
ground has posed other problems, shifting the burden of war casualties almost entirely onto the
backs of civilian noncombatants. Whereas social scientists might debate the policy planning and
ethics implications of this development, we must remain ever mindful these “eyes in the sky” are
indicative of a knowledge management problem, which I argued is characteristic of war.
Briefly put, in order to move forward we will have to move beyond our present mode of social
organization to find more ethical and just means of human social improvement. We must find a
way to envision a society that does not require the literal sacrificing of life and limb to advance
medical practice and progress, where all people are entitled to have a good life without engaging
in the mass murder of their fellow humans. Our very bodies and lives depend on this.
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Beyond the Body
The two case studies that were presented stopped short of addressing events in the 21st century,
where we continue to be consumed with the problem of war and injury.275 The process of
medical discovery continues unabated, although the political economy of injury has advanced
considerably. Absent a case study, I would like to offer final thoughts here about where we have
ended up, as I offer in what follows an analysis of more contemporary major changes and
developments. We are, as I have argued throughout this work, moving along a path where we are
in essence “losing the body” as we know it. War has unquestionably facilitated a process, where
the human body has been violently un-made, in order that we might make better and exceed our
expectations for embodied human potential, even as we are simultaneously destroying others.
Thus, I argued, it is imperative that we understand how this political economy functions, if only
that we might develop an awareness for how all bodies might be drawn into this circulation.
Absent a critical focus from researchers who are willing to transgress disciplinary boundaries to
address issues and problems in connection with war that imbricate as well as surpass concerns
about social identity and social inequality, these connections will remain hidden.

The arguments and analysis presented here endeavored to bring into relief a well-established, yet
overlooked, relation between combat injuries, medical social organization, and health
governance. I want to move now to suggest consideration of a more radically conceived onto-
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politics of war and economy, where recent innovations in biotechnology can be shown to be
implicated in producing not only soldiers’ bodies, but non-human bodies and populations that do
not always coincide with a somatic body. Thus, instead of understanding soldiers and weapons as
bodies and objects as dissimilar discrete entities, I suggest we think of their entanglement as a
militarized biosocial process.

The consequences of such a process are far reaching to say the least. For one, they expose a
tension in our understanding of bodies as fixed, integral and unified, and shift us in the direction
of recognizing contingent states of being that are theoretically inclusive of multiple forms of
bodies. Such a bodies, as I have conceived them here, are not produced strictly on the basis of a
material process of construction and addition. Nor can they be explained through conceptual
means of metaphor and representation, or in the case of prosthetic epistemologies, using
concepts of extension and incorporation. In the case of the latter, conceptual distinctions between
mechanical prostheses that extend the body, and neural prostheses that aim for incorporation, are
increasingly being rendered irrelevant by contemporary developments in neuroscientific research
(De Preester and Tsakiris, 2009; Cartwright and Goldfard, 2006). With that, I want to suggest an
alternative conceptualization; one that goes a good deal further than looking at discrete relations
between humans and prosthetics, and bodies and machines. I want to suggest an ontology, where
being in a body enters into a relationship continuum with other bodies, weapons, and objects;
one where war and violence continues to remain salient to the body’s fashioning.
So rather than treating the human and material as opposed, I point to theories represented by the
new materialist philosophy that emphasize “vibrant materiality” (Bennette, 2010) as a means to
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re-think their entanglement.276 This work helps me to work through how these particular humanmaterial linkages do not extend the body as much as they “constitute the body qua ‘human.’ ”
(Steigler, 1998);277 they open the door so one might speculate how bodies, weapons, tools, and
other objects might be affectively imbricated together, within and throughout the body.

What I am suggesting here is that we envision the different ways the social dynamics of war
might pose consequences for human embodiment, but in a way that owes as much to Simone De
Beauvoir as to Marx, Freud and Deleuze: How is that soldiers are potentially not born, but under
some circumstances may be in the process of becoming a body that is a weapon ? (drones
illustrate a reversal of this dynamic - how a weapon becomes a body). In both cases the process
is not linear, so much as it indicative of a production process that imbricates material,
immaterial, and affective dynamics with bodies and machines. This course of development, a
variation of De Beauvoir’s “becoming flesh,” is in many respects consistent with classical
theory’s notion of the “fetish” and Deleuze’s notion of a “becoming” body; though here, I think
contemporary work in affect theory and speculative realism potentially offers greater insight into
how to conceive the entanglement of flesh and machine.

The idea of the body as a weapon, if I may distinguish, is not the same as a weaponized body;
neither, however, has up until this point been the subject of in-depth critique and analysis. It is as
if problematizations of the body in this manner are better suited to the realm of social science
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fiction, where films like District 9, for example, took up problems of social exclusion and
featured the use of mechanized bio-suits/exoskeletons that feature DNA triggered bio-weapons.
In this case, the weapon is not attached to the body by means of extension; rather, the body is the
weapon. Certainly, this is not a realm for rational empirical inquiry, or is it? On the limited
occasions where speculation might be ventured, the reverse inertia of cyborg epistemology tends
to assert itself, a framework which I critiqued in a previous chapter as falling short of capturing
the full range and scope of the social dynamics that capture this body. Nevertheless, despite the
fact that corporealized transformation of this nature appears extraordinary; it is consistent with
the developments I have been tracing since the outset of my study.

Findings up until this point emphasized the instrumental role played by wounded bodies and
demonstrated how they were produced as part of a biopolitical economy of relations. I want to
turn now and offer a few closing thoughts about how the next step in the evolution of this
process might be conceptualized. That is to say, I want to speculatively illustrate how soldiers,
weapons, and bodies might be “made.” To do this, I will draw upon critical theories in cultural
and visual studies, which facilitate the exploration of psychoanalytic concepts in connection with
new materialism theories, which I find are positioned to address changes in medical science and
technology, which are implicated in forging not only bodies, but also modern forms of identity.
Hal Foster and Matthew Biro both employ different interpretations of these concepts in their
efforts to advance a figural critique of bodies in connection with war. Their focus on fascist art
and the cultural movement of Dadaism helps us to take a look from a somewhat different
perspective at how the project of engineering better bodies become coupled with the conduct of
war. In point to this work to make claims about how the concept of the “fetish” potentially sheds
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light on the process by which bodies might be materially fashioned in a fetishistic process of
incorporation, where affects of violence, fear and desire serve a pro-creative function in a
political economy driven by war.278

Epistemologies of violence are once again at work here, as the cumulative knowledge produced
from war casualties supports efforts to assemble humans in new and novel configurations.
Clough’s work on the biomediated body raises questions about ontology and epistemology in
relation to technology. Her (2008) treatment of the biomediated body lays the groundwork for a
critique that makes it possible to envision how a soldier’s body might be made through
technological reframing and enhancement, but in such a way that the organic, physiological
constraints and capacities of the natural body (body-as-organism) are exceeded while remaining
biological.

The Logic of the Fetish: Sex, Guns, and Money (F = SG&M)
I want to begin with Marx and Freud’s different interpretations of the fetish, because I think
these original ideas are well suited to illustrate how material and immaterial social forces might
effectively be combined, so that bodies might become weapons. Homo Vulneratus, the wounded
body/figure/subject continues to be an important site of action, as I find changes reflected across
these different dimensions of corporeality further interpret changes in neoliberal political
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economy. Soldiers perhaps now more than ever share much in common with Marx’s industrial
factory worker. Marxist theory, however, and its reliance on dialectics and oppositions is not
appropriate to articulate the changes taking place with this particular body, for reasons that it
cannot address the dynamism inherent in bodies and matter; though, we might look at Marx and
Freud together to explore their synergies. The “fetish” is for Freud an object of desire, while for
Marx it is a mechanism of defense necessary for survival under the contradictory conditions
imposed by life in a capitalist system of political and economic domination. Superficially, it
might appear their respective viewpoints are opposed, where one of them is addressing a reaction
to a material and economic problem and the other is addressing an immaterial problem of the
psyche, I find this not to be the case and refer to Beatrice Hansen (2000), who writes:
It seems curious that both Marx and Freud should have recourse to the same term to
describe what seem like totally different phenomena. For Marx, ‘the fetishism of the
commodity’ is the way in which value seems to inhere in the object rather than in the
labor that produced it. For Freud, sexual fetishism is the election of an (often inorganic)
sexual substitute so as to deny the sexual lack that would otherwise have been discovered
in the mother.279
Both men built their life’s work on writing about problems that suggest “things are not as they
appear.” Likewise, they make prolific use of symbols and substitute subjects and objects like
interchangeable parts. In Freud’s case, the subject object dialectic is irreconcilable. He describes
a process of displacement and condensation that requires and avowal of what is disavowed. 280
The resulting contradictions that give birth to the fetish are experienced within an eroticized
psycho-sexual drama; a drama rooted in castration anxiety induced fear that implicates mind as
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well as body. For Marx, these contradictions function ideologically and produce a form of false
consciousness in relation to commodities and money. The fetish is, according to Marx, a
“sensuous nonsensuous thing” that occurs as part of a process of mystification, one where human
social relations are understood to be both imbedded within and arising out of market trade and
exchange. Social relationships between people are mediated by and transformed into what Marx
infers are illegitimate objectified relationships between things. In other words, social relations as
well as the social character of commodities are somehow made into concrete things, setting up
what is inferred to be a transgressive relationship between humans and objects. Significantly,
human labor is abstracted and concealed within this process. Fetishism in Marx’s work is also
understood to refer to a process where forces are “magically” or symbolically attributed to
objects. Through a process of market-mediated mystification, people come to believe that these
intangible forces are intrinsic to the objects themselves, rather than seeing them as a product of
human attribution, culture and exchange. In reality, the attributed forces are not intrinsic to the
object; nonetheless, they are understood to be real. According to Karen Jacobs (2001) “these
apparently mutually reinforcing exchanges can be viewed, as Althusser does, as analogous to
unconscious processes, acting upon subjects in an “imaginary relation to their real conditions of
existence.” 281 Such a process relies on the power of the imaginary to transform subjects into
objects and objects into subjects, setting up what Marx famously argues in the fourth section of
Capital as “material relations between persons and social relations between things.” 282

281

Althusser as cited by Karen Jacobs in The Eye's Mind: Literary Modernism and Visual Culture. Cornell
University Press, 2001: p. 16.
282

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. Penguin Books. London: England, [1867]
1990: p. 166.

353

I want to propose a different model of the fetish (F = GS&M) that incorporates a synthesis of
Freud’s and Marx’s ideas, which I in turn look at alongside others who furnish operational
concepts to help explain how bodies might be transformed into weapons. At the same time, I
suggest we also think of the fetish in ontological terms.283 By this I mean, I want to engage a
reading of Freud, where the fetish is understood to suggest a play of differences that marks the
crisis of absence as well as presence. Following Gemerchak, absence and presence rotate on an
axis, where subjects are faced with coming to terms with absence or presence through the
construction of a fetish that in some cases attempts to replace the perceived loss of the mother’s
phallus, but in other cases might disavow it.284 These concepts can potentially explain the
contradictions, embodied and otherwise, that are bound up in body-weapon combinations, where
there is an implied loss (or feared loss) of a body part or significant appendage that conjures
thoughts of affirmation or disavowal of such a part. Reading Freud and Marx together opens up a
theoretical space within which we might consider how both the image object/fetish object and
manufactured object are suggestive of a new ontology of the body, considering how both are
bound up in the experience of living and being in a body. The Marx and Freud synthesis achieves
added explanatory power when we take into consideration what Walter Benjamin refers to as the
“sex appeal of the inorganic,” as I find this potentially generates insight into the affect economy
that imbricates the eroticism of the prosthesis ( the mother’s phallus/prosthesis in Freud’s view)
and the mystic attraction of the commodity.
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In light of this, I am suggesting these concepts might contribute to a framework of understanding
that might account for how weapons and bodies are brought into a productive relational
ontology, where they function as mutually oriented fetish objects. The fetish object
(i.e. weapon/phallus) is a compromise or reaction formation that substitutes for the loss of an
integrated whole body-self; it becomes incorporated as part of a process of self-fashioning or
self-making. In this case, the soldier body-subject attaches desire to the fetish object as part of an
effort to substitute for what is perceived as lack or absence. The fetish, in other words, serves a
compensatory function as soldiers confront the perception of their own fragmented subjectivity.
In the political economy of injury, the object fetish becomes essential to efforts to make over the
body and “body-ego image,” both of which are damaged in the event of injury.
Practically speaking, we find a productive illustration of the concept framework in Stanley
Kubrick’s film Full Metal Jacket. In one of the more evocative sequences from the film, male
recruits are led by their drill sergeant, Gunnery Sergeant Hartman, played by R. Lee Ermey, in a
traditional call-and-response work song, where the men synchronize cadence and learn to
associate their rifles with their penises, which are referred to using the pejorative term “gun.”
While the men in the scene are not yet wounded or missing body parts, their participation in
Marine Corps basic training implies that the process of breaking down the body has commenced.
In order for them to be successful as soldiers, they must negotiate a perilous mind body split,
whereby their social identity is effectively split from their body as part of a process of creating a
new group identity. The weapon/phallus they balance on their shoulders is a prosthetic extension
of their penis, which must now be fully incorporated into their embodiment and sexual economy
of desire; to resist this process is akin to living death and perhaps even real death on a battlefield.
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Both the logic of extension and incorporation are functioning here, as weapon parts and body
parts are constitutive and not opposed, in what now functions as a weaponized economy of
desire, which I find is intrinsic to the political economy of injury. The failure to incorporate
hegemonic masculine ideals within this economy of desire is itself an injury, as illustrate by
Vincent Donofrio’s character, who kills himself before being deployed to Vietnam. It is
significant that he puts the rifle/gun/phallus into his mouth, as if to eat it, in one last futile
attempt to overcome his failure of incorporation.

The takeaway from this illustration once again, as I argued in chapter 6, is that the experience of
war and injury compel a body transit, which is potentially problematic if it is not successfully
negotiated. Success is here defined by bodily incorporation of other bodies and objects, such that
we might arrive at an understanding of bodies that is no longer limited to being in a body. This is
why I am suggesting that war is making an ontological turn of sorts; it is forcing us to think
about bodies, objects, and potentially even weapons in a manner that is different than we are
accustomed. Here again, the experience of war may be fundamentally altering how we think and
feel about bodies; it is shaping what we imagine is possible for our human potential. To be sure,
there are potentially empowering configurations of bodies that might be imagined, but if we look
to past practice, the trend of bodies developing in ways that are consonant with the development
of battlefield strategy and weaponry portend a different outcome; one where weapons and bodies
may be brought into an alignment in what functions as a weaponized ontology of war.
In this case, I want to suggest there is a productive affective economy of desire that underlies the
production process, particularly as it relates to soldiers. The very idea that men as well as women
might be forged in accordance with the logic of the assembly line is not far-fetched, when we
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consider the short time period within which medical technology has advanced to bring us to this
moment in time. If we recall Marx momentarily, who in Capital described what he conceived as
an evolving social relation between bodies and machines (which he understood in terms of
opposition and displacement), what I am proposing is a complexification of this process to
reflect changes that have developed in connection with our modern day neoliberal political
economy. For we have long since advanced beyond the logic of the classic linear production line,
where workers were merely subject to the external domination of the machine. In light of this,
the sex appeal of the inorganic may be very well derived from our apprehending what is already
familiar and not strange, because we have always been technical. I am envisioning a process of
co-production, where soldiers – a militarized version of Max’s factory worker – are related to
other mutually oriented bodies and objects within what effectively comprises a “militaryindustrial manufacturing supply chain.” Here, it is not unthinkable to attribute vitalism to the
objects, which might be incorporated as part of this process. The choice of object, in the case of
war, is almost always a weapon; they are war’s significant others. And so we must explore the
implications of this, to understand how bodies might be turned into weapons within an affective
economy of desire.

The Transformation of Bodies into Weapons
Doubtless, the notion that we might transform a body into a weapon might sound like it belongs
to the realm of science fiction; certainly not social science. Yet despite the fact that such a notion
requires a radical re-thinking of the body in general, I would argue the work of contemporary
body theorists and object oriented philosophers indicates we are already moving down this path.
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Although writing almost 15 years ago, Mark Seltzer’s (1992) book Machines and Bodies took a
historical look at issues of entanglement in connection with, not surprisingly, machines and
bodies. The relation is one that he described in terms of a radical “crossing over.” Such a
crossing, in his view, subjects interior and exterior states of being to a process of conflict he
referred to as being distinguished by a “violent erotics.” The result is a violent form of
materialism is produced in the process of crossing.285 Bruno Latour goes yet another step further
by proposing an ontology we might draw from to theorize how bodies and objects might be
theorized on a single plane. Although, I should point out, his metaphysics stops short of engaging
the potency of a “becoming” body. Graham Harman’s object oriented ontology, a work that
bases in large part on thinking by Latour, suggests a different approach. He says we might
instead not think of the world in terms of objects that oppose human forms that are subjects;
these are not, in his view, “rock-solid forms” and “natural kinds,” but are rather “mutant objects
that have struck a hard bargain with reality to remain as they are— solid yet fragile, isolated yet
interwoven, smooth yet twisted together [they] form strange fabrics.”286

The new materialism theories, I find, are potentially more useful when they are combined with
theories that prioritize psychoanalytic concepts in connection with affect theory. These theories
are positioned to address important dynamics that arise as part of the process of injury, where
there are issues of psychic fragmentation and dissolution. Potentially, mind and body, skin and
psyche (and I will argue now weapon and body) are not only intermingled, they held together in
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dynamic tension with one another (Clough, 2008; Hansen, 2006; Foster, 2006; Anzieu, 1989,
Theweleit, 1987). In view of this, I look at these theories together as I want to suggest a
potentially a new approach to understanding the body; one that challenges assumptions about
substance and soma as it expands the field of body studies and takes it in a new direction. Of
particular interest to me is how work in new materialism and object oriented ontology might be
looked at in light of arguments advanced by critical and cultural theorists like Klaus Theweleit,
Didier Anzieu, Hal Foster, and Matthew Biro, who all to some extent incorporate body-ego
theories in their efforts to conceptualize conflict as it occurs within and beyond the body. I lean
on this work to argue that combat injuries reflect a social process of ego-armoring,
fragmentation, dissolution and violence.
Hal Foster’s (2006) critique of fascist art helps illustrate what I am proposing here, insofar as he
advances a materialist, psychoanalytic account for how bodies might be turned into weapons.
Foster along with Matthew Biro both contribute framing to the theoretical explanation I am
advancing here; that is, an object oriented ontology that explains the transformation potential of
wounded soldiers’ bodies. I call upon this work when I suggest we consider how weapon and
body, skin and psyche, might be intermingled and held together in dynamic tension with one
another. Such tension, I find, is potentially productive as much as it may be destructive;
furthermore, it compels us to consider what kind of social relations, including bodily as well as
non-bodily relations, might be produced from such a process.
Foster’s work explores the importance of fascist imaginary to the production of the soldier’s
body as the paradigmatic technological body of high modernism. Biro, on the other hand, offers
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a figural account focused on cyborg epistemology or what he calls the “the militarized cyborg.”
They both share a common focus on a model of the body produced by war, or what I have been
calling Homo Vulneratus, a combination body/figure/subject that is produced by the political
economy of injury in connection with war. Birth metaphors are, likewise, used by both theorists
to describe the bodily transformation occurs coincident with war and its development of
advanced weaponry and technology. In their view, art produces a visual ontology of war, which
similarly suggests a visual ontology of the body that I am arguing is potentially within our grasp
now to fabricate.
According to Foster, the soldier’s body becomes fetishized as a result of a dialectical process that
he refers to as “the double logic of prosthesis.” The double logic, in this case denotes the way the
prosthesis is understood to be either a “magnificent extension” or a “demonic supplement to the
body.” 287 The prosthesis, says Foster, replicates the logic of the fetish because it produces the
machine as a castrative trauma AND as a shield against such trauma, which represents a form of
ego-armoring. To make this point of emphasis, he references the art of Wyndham Lewis and F.T.
Marinetti, each of whom use their work to represent what they envision as the birth of the “new
man.” The mass deaths of WW I, Foster says, call into doubt any efforts to affirm the notion of a
natural, or normal body, as the war rendered such claims suspect and merely “therapeutic or
compensatory.”288 The world created in the wake of this war forms the back-drop for Lewis’
work, which emerged later. Lewis, according to Foster, imagined a new body and ego; one that
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was capable of withstanding the shock of social transformation introduced by the “militaryindustrial, the modern-urban, and the mass-political.” The ego formation he envisions is capable
of forging these stimuli into a protective shield, and this in turn produces a hardened subject who
is able to thrive on such shocks.289
Marinetti’s work, on the other hand, attacks the very idea of a non-technological subject, where
technology is assumed to be separate from and residing outside the body. His work, Foster points
out, embraces Freud’s notion of “binding” and “unbinding,” and illustrates how the death of the
old bourgeois subject is necessary to occasion the rebirth of the modern technological subject.
According to Foster, “the blurring of birth and death in the conjoining of man and machine” is a
recurrent theme in Marinetti’s work, which accounts for how a new identity is potentially
achieved. The artist in this case is depicting a fantasy of “technological procreation,” where,
according to Foster, “the baptism is industrial and the identity is technological.” This move, he
says, anticipates the greater hypothesis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where Freud argues it
is a fundamental drive of the organism to return to its prior state of inanimation, expressed by the
inorganicity of death.290
Of course, what I find to be of value here in Foster’s reading of Freud is that he connects the
organism’s evolution with the soldier’s body and modern identity projects, observing that by
force of necessity, due to the imposed conditions of capitalism, wounded soldiers are forced to
create a protective shield to hold together the fragmented pieces of their body out of stimuli from
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the world. The body transit that he implies, however, reverts to dialectics and oppositions; here,
the human and the natural are forced together to create a technological hybrid (not unlike
Haraway’s hybrid), albeit it is one that confuses the creative and the destructive, which causes
the figure/body in question to represent and/or experience its embodiment as both violated and
exalted, as well as abled and disabled, as a result of interventional technology. This act of
procreation, in Foster’s view, is necessarily a fetishistic operation, compelling one to turn an
agent of trauma into a shield against trauma. With that, he suggests the only way to survive, even
thrive, in the military-industrial era of capitalism (and by extension neoliberalism) is to
“exacerbate the fetishistic process of reification characterized by the double logic of
prosthesis.”291
Biro’s study, by way of contrast, is more focused on the German avant-garde movement,
particularly the work of Berlin Dadists like Hannah Höch, George Grosz, Raoul Hausmann, and
Otto Dix. Like Foster, he examines how the aesthetics of this work challenged bourgeois
subjectivity. Biro somewhat problematically, in my view, resurrects the figure of the cyborg as a
figure and a model to further his critique. Cyborgs, according to Biro, are emblematic of public
imaginary and how it conceptualized potentially new forms of human existence during the period
between the two world wars. Biro’s new human, conceived as a product of the war years, was
one that was essentially born on the battlefield; as a figure and model of the body, it anticipated
the model of the body that was later envisioned by cybernetic systems and posthumanist
contemporary thought. Militarized cyborgs were in this manner emblematic of how people were
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thinking about bodies as a result of the two world wars and, as such, foreshadowed an
interpretation of modern technologized hybrid identity.
To be fair, Biro’s acknowledges a need to move beyond post WW II concepts of the cyborg that
evolved out of Norbert Wiener’s mechanistic and humanist vision and Haraway’s post-humanist
model. As models, he alleges, they are conceptually abstract and subject to dissolution due to the
generality that they imply.292 Instead, he proposes a third model, the “militarized cyborg.” where
the cyborg is understood as a perceptual locus or framework.293 The work of the Berlin Dadaists,
in his view, represented just such a model, which overcame the deficiencies of the former; they
transformed our senses and created “new modes of interior/exterior awareness created by the
impact of technology on human perception.”294 The Dadaists, in this respect, who used
representational techniques in combination with figural perspectives, suggest questions that have
import for issues of ontology and embodiment, as their work called attention to the lived
embodied experiences of soldiers traumatized by war injuries.
To the extent Biro’s militarized cyborg brings these issues into greater focus, there is potential
added value. Otto Dix’s painting Forty-five Percent Fit for Work, subtitled The War Cripples
was painted with the intention of calling attention to post war conditions in Germany and the
bodily trauma experienced by war veterans, especially those struggling with newly fashioned
prostheses. This particular work helped bring into sharper relief issues and questions about the
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impact of technology on human faculties of perception, including vision, hearing, and touch. In
making this last observation, Biro is suggesting that perhaps the terms of human embodiment
were being renegotiated through technological mediation. Consequently, as I argued in the
previous chapter, a potentially similar influence was realized among medical practitioners,
whose medical imaginary was influenced by the visual ontologies created by the war.
Finally, I want to add that the “machinic modernisms” critiqued by both Foster and Biro
potentially explain an important contradiction in the design process of our most advanced
contemporary medical prostheses. The most sophisticated models have effectively bridged the
philosophical gap between extension and incorporation, and I would argue now that perceptible
differences between bodies and machines are rapidly disappearing. There are potentially
significant implications for all of this, not the least of which is that the medical imaginary that
conceived them draws inspiration from Cartesian dualism. Prostheses, for example, that operate
on the basis of re-mapping brain circuitry suggest there are potentially control issues to be
considered, especially if bodily movement commands are assisted by externally located
computers. Engineering bodies in this manner opens the door to potential biopolitical control of
body functions, including thought, as topographies of mind and body are worked and reworked
through means and measures that lie beyond the body. Questions of vitality, animation, and
agency are all potential flashpoints of contradiction and tension, as potentially new control
technologies are hard-wired into our essential being as bodies.
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Theoretical Implications
My research, through its focus on soldiers’ bodies, has aimed to facilitate thinking across
disciplines to engage thinking about corporeity in terms of the biopolitcs of life, labor, and
capital, which I argued are bound up in a political economy of injury driven by war. This
circulation has proven to be both influential and productive, as it informs changes across
medicine as well as the human terrain of the body itself. The challenge presented in our current
time is we must move beyond closed-system prosthetic and cyborg epistemologies, in order to
grasp ongoing changes that are potentially impacting our bodies, lives, and livelihood. I proposed
that we employ biopolitical theories and concepts as a means to open up new topographies of
mind and body, so that we might see how these developments became incorporated into a
medical governance of control. Soldiers were interesting to look at because their injuries call
attention not only to the institutional contradictions the imbricate the political economy of injury,
they demonstrate through their embodiment how these contradictions enter into an affective
economy of desire; they produce spatio-temporal problems of continuity and discontinuity within
the bodies of people, whose bodily boundaries and contents become displaced and/or are refashioned as a result of their war injuries.

What this implies is that conflict and violence, which potentially assumes different forms and
occurs at different levels of analysis, might nevertheless be traced and observed within and
throughout a given body in terms of its effects. This process, I argued, is not causal-linear, rather
it is dynamic and reflects a pattern I described is consistent with a relational ontology.
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In our present time period, war and violent conflict are unremitting and continue all around us.
The timing has never been better to observe now such phenomena comprises the living
embodiment of soldiers, to the extent that these social dynamics are fully embodied and are
being lived. As others have suggested before me, it is further important that we continue to rethink the regime of the body-as-organism, where bodies are understood as separate from
machines, and to consider other models, mediated and otherwise, perhaps assemblage and
network models, where bodies and their parts as well as machines might be understood to reside
in concurrent relation with one another.

The concept of assemblage, as employed by Deleuze, is particularly helpful here, because it
engages the idea of a body that is in the process of becoming. Deleuzian theory enables thinking
about bodies in such a way that objects and social forces are not understood as coming from
outside the body, but are rather working within the body. Thinking in these terms helps us to
envision how we might make the ontological shift to a consideration of bodies as things and as
matter, even as they remain bodies. Here, we might imagine multiple forms of embodiment and
subjectivity, not all of which are necessarily human-based, as the human body and ‘life itself’ are
increasingly becoming organized as something less than a body, having been reduced to
informational substrate. My understanding in this instance is, of course, predicated on an
understanding that neither science nor technology should be understood as neutral categories or
physical instruments/ apparatus that are merely appended as an addition to the body.

For this reason, I think it is important to not be entirely dismissive of more traditional identitybased critique, as I have shown that different ways of knowing are crucial to efforts to achieve a
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more complex understanding of the social phenomena that I am describing. Bear in mind,
combat injuries were demonstrated to call into question issues of gender relative and embodied
notions of personal fitness. Missing body parts were not simply evidence of lost life and vitality;
they produced the body as a signifying platform, where everyone might affectively participate
with soldiers engaged in self-making projects, thereby creating meaning and making claims to
power on the basis of having/not having a “perfect” body. Female embodiment in particular
continues to be portrayed as open, unbounded, “leaky” and is therefore suspect and remains
problematic.
Consequently, despite the inherent limitations of Haraway’s cyborg, which is anchored in
notions of hybridity and dialectical thinking (a move that had the effect of reifying the very
differences the model was intended to overcome), we might still see it as a powerful, time period
specific illustration, that enacts a vision of a body during a particular moment in the long-history
of capitalism. Following the same logic, the birth metaphors invoked by Dadaists, which ever so
effective in their ability to illustrate non-biological, mechanized reproduction and procreation,
are also powerful, because they illustrate the mechanistic thinking that tended to dominate the
sciences during the war years of World War I and II.
Ultimately, we must bear in mind that the “beyond” body, that theorists like Clough and others
have imagined, where we might see this particular body as helpful to efforts to rethink bodily
matter, considering how these dynamics may be demonstrated as lived as empirical embodiment.
Such a process must take into account the psycho as well as the social, as well as material and
affective dynamics. In suggesting this, I do not argue for disembodiment, so much as I call for a
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“complexification, materializing as a body becoming other than the body-as organism.”295 The
bodies produced by such a process might be understood as infinite sequences of vitality, code
and information; we see them revealed not only in Cloughs work, but also in Eugene Thacker’s
(2006) work, where he points to what he calls the “biomolecular body.” These theories, although
they do not directly address the production of soldiers, nevertheless, call forth this type of body
as an informational body. Consequently, the technoscience of war, as indicated by a wide range
of interventional practices, medicine and surgery being examples of this, not only controls the
bodies of wounded soldiers, it valorizes this body as information. Bodily integrity is disrupted
when the body is put to labor as a carrier of information, such that value inheres not in the bodyas-organism, but in the knowledge generating vital capacities of those bodies.
Subjectivity, or what is more appropriately termed “subjectivities” are also informed by this
process, as bodily entanglement and fragmentation produce embodied contradictions that
challenge one’s self-concept. This process, while it may be value generating and productive on
the one hand, nonetheless, compels a retrograde body transit that I argued imbricates an affective
of economy of relations. The body, in its affect, tries to defend itself through a process of egoarmoring that aims to put the body back together again. In this instance, the equilibrating of mind
and body is based on vision of bodily integrity and wholeness, which is no longer attainable (and
is perhaps not even desirable); thus it sets the stage for continued violence.

Clough, P. T., “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia and Bodies.” Theory, Culture &
Society, 25: 2008, p. 2.
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Fetishization and to some extent technophilia remain problematic when addressing contemporary
issues and problems that concern traumatic injury, as weapon, body, skin, and psyche
increasingly may be intermingled and held together in dynamic tension with one another. This
tension, I find, is potentially both productive and destructive. Likewise, we must consider the
implications for social relations. How might different subjectivities and forms of bodily
organization be produced from such a process? Soldier’s bodies, I argued, appear to be
undergoing a long slow process of reorganization and transformation. This is occurring within a
constantly evolving political economy of relations. In our contemporary timeframe, capitalism
operating under conditions of modern neoliberal governance no longer requires sharply
delineated body and boundary distinctions. At the same time, it no longer demands that
distinctions be upheld between the individual subject of bourgeois liberalism and the population,
or between the machine and the human. The bodies that are produced as a result may very well
be self-generating, as the emergent biopolitical rationality favors the self-organizing, selfmonitoring assemblage.
This is why I think we must move away from understanding soldiers’ bodies and weapons as
discrete entities, made of traditional substance comprised of wholes and parts, and think of them
instead as matter in communication, where their entanglement is fundamental to ontology. Thus,
instead of conceiving soldiers’ naturalistic bodies as closed systems, where there is an opposition
between individual subjects, material objects and social forces, I theorize them relationally, in
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terms of their openness.296 By taking this approach, we might begin to comprehend how bodies
and weapons might be “made” together as part of a co-relational process.
Thank You for Your Service
While there is no shortage of thanks being offered to soldiers for their service commitment, what
tends to get lost in that celebration is that we have for quite some time now been engaged in a
process of “bio-prospecting” soldiers’ bodies.” Medical knowledge acquired from the bodies of
soldiers, however, is not confined to the limits of the body itself. Such knowledge, while in many
respects it is emptied from the container of their skin, nonetheless still travels on the body, as
indicated by what are essentially signifying wounds. Soldiers’ bodies, I argued, are in this sense
“Empty Metal Jackets. Their hollowed out bodies are produced as “intelligible, communicable
terrain,” whereby the body itself is made in such a way as to constitute the “raw matter” of
knowledge production.297 The value of this body lies in its inherent ability to produce knowledge
that might be lifted and redistributed, as soldiers’ bodies/parts are more or less made to circulate
within a manufacturing continuum of related material objects, parts, and things. Value
equivalencies are thus achieved by opposing one life form against another. As living carriers of
information, we might think of them as being produced within what functions as a Taylorized
“regime of information warfare.” Producing wounded bodies as a source of knowledge and
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information thus not only serves the needs of medicine, it assures the needs of war and capital
are simultaneously satisfied.

In light of these developments, the political economy of injury, which can on the one hand
produce a body that becomes a weapon, produces global circulations of body parts and human
matter, which are not unlike the global trafficking of weapons and arms. War creates the demand
for and causes the subsequent displacement of large numbers of bodies in society. When bodies
are put into motion and made to circulate on a mass scale, the result is more conflict and
violence, which I argued produces consequences for the population as a whole. The political
economy of injury in this manner is incorporates as much as it reflects the institutional rationality
of capitalism, which as history has shown, it not only draws on, it thrives on harvesting the life
force of marginalized, enslaved, poor, and working class bodies, who are subject to recruitment
on the promise of an American dream fulfilled – that you too might claim a share of the riches
produced by this violent system of wealth production, but only if you are one who is worthy of
sacrifice. Capitalism thus produces the body it requires as a means to both articulate and satisfy
its essential aims.

In closing, I demonstrated here how capitalism, over the course of time, became invested in a
social process that broke the body down into pieces and parts. The process was one of
dispossession, appropriation, commodification, and reallocation, as the human resources of
bodies were targeted for assemblage to achieve greater productive capacity. Consequently, in
what is the latest battle being waged, soldiers are now fighting a war over the commodification
and technologization of their own bodies. If they fail to effectively resist this, they may be
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subject to having their bodies turned into remotely piloted semi-autonomous weapons. As it has
always been the case, fighting, killing, and injury remain certain outcomes. With that, we would
do well to recognize that where war is concerned, we are all meat and potential carcasses.298 The
machines potentially rising from within and without our bodies can thus be shown, at least on
some level, to owe their vitality, if not the actual substance of the body, to the casualties of war.
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